1980 — Nov 21, Fire, MGM Grand Hotel, Las Vegas, NV — 85

— 85  Clark County Fire Department. MGM Fire. “November 21, 1980.”

— 85  Greenpeace. PVC Fires List. “Las Vegas, Nevada MGM Grand Hotel.” June 1994.

— 85  NFPA. “Fire at the MGM Grand.” Fire Journal, Jan 1982, p. 20 of pp. 19-37.

— 85  NFPA. Investigation Report on the MGM Grand Hotel Fire, Las Vegas… Abstract.

— 85  National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History.  1996.

— 85  NFPA. U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State. December 2008, p. 23.

— 85  National Fire Sprinkler Association. F.Y.I. 1999, 6.

— 84  USFA. The MGM Grand Hotel Fire: Preliminary Investigation Report. 1981, p. 1.

— 84  New York Times. “The Century’s Worst Fires.” 3-26-1990.[1]

— 84  OJP DOJ. Community Crisis Response Team Training Manual: 2^nd Ed. (Appendix D).

 

Narrative Information

 

Clark County Dire Dept. webpage abstract: “….Within six minutes of the time of discovery, the total casino area was involved in fire, at a burning rate of approximately 15 to 19 feet per second!

 

Greenpeace: “The MGM Grand Hotel occupied a city block and rose twenty six floors. The design and operation of the hotel violated codes and practices for smoke control.

 

“Among other synthetics, the hotel had a plenum (space between the casino ceiling and the floor of the first story) that contained PVC drainage pipes (tons of plastic), and a vast electrical network, with all wires insulated in PVC plastic.  Wall covering, rigid molded furniture, and fake leather upholstery also contained PVC.

 

“PVC, which decomposes readily, existed in the same environment in the casino as ABS, which burns readily and emits hydrogen cyanide, and as PMMA, which burns readily and emits methylmethacrylate, which is its monomer and an irritant and nerve poison.  In general, combined dosing has proven worse than single-type dosing, toxicologically.

 

“The fire started at 7:30 am in the casino deli electrical system. The fire spread to the plenum igniting the synthetic materials. A fireball raced through the 200 yard long casino. The plastics hidden in the wall and ceiling determined the fireball speed and direction in only a few minutes.

 

“What was unusual about this fire was the smoke: its quality, quantity, density and the number of people it killed.  The most striking fact about the MGM fire was that the great majority of those killed  (61 out of 85) died on the 19^th through the 26th floors of the hotel. These victims were as far away from the fire as they could be and still be in the building. The smoke had risen to the top floor, accumulated, and sunk downward, then up out of the building top. Control over the fan system was lost when its PVC tubing melted in the early stages of the fire, so the fans continued to push smoke around the building.

 

“Most of the people who died on the bottom floors died of smoke inhalation before they burned.  Forty seven percent of all victims showed a sub-lethal level of carbon monoxide in the lungs.   The avenues of the fire spread to the top floor included the air handling system, the elevator shafts, the seismic joints, the fire stairs, the electrical and plumbing systems, and even the broken windows on the windward side of the building.

 

“Over 500 were injured. Some of them had neurotoxic reactions to their exposures. Many of the injuries, which were also incurred by firefighters were respiratory problems, sleep difficulty, irritability, depression, skin sensitivity and dryness, and problems with microcirculation in the extremities. Attributed to chlorinated hydrocarbons were: uterine dysfunctions, excessive sweating, muscle spasms and shaking, skin rashes, acne and discolorations. Some of the strongest symptom patterns were psychological. Depression, irritability, nightmares, inability to concentrate, and relational problems with friends and family were common in survivors.  Irritants and hydrocarbons both have been found to influence psychological function, especially through the catecholamine system. In some of the victims, the red blood cells had completely disintegrated.  The destruction of red blood cells has been seen in victims of other plastics fires and in lab animals exposed to PVC fumes. Hydrogen chloride destroys oxygen-carrying hemoglobin, the protein that forms the major content of red blood cells.  Some of the elements in the soot found in the lungs of the victims appears to be from PVC products: antimony, zinc, and lead, iron, chlorine, nickel, calcium.

 

“It was concluded that the synthetic polymeric products in the casino were the source of the soot found in  the rooms and in the victims bronchi, because wood does not contain these elements in

large quantities. It was also concluded that at least some of the soot came from the PVC products, specifically.

 

“Sixty-one people died twenty stories above the fire from soot and fumes given off by burning plastics in the ground floor casino.”  (Greenpeace. “PVC Fires List.” June 1994; cites Deborah Wallace, In the Mouth of the Dragon.)

 

NFPA Investigation Report (1-15-1982 revision): “A fire at the MGM Grand Hotel on November 21, 1980, resulted in the deaths of 85 guests and hotel employees. About 600 others were injured and approximately 35 fire fighters sought medical attention during and after the fire.

 

“The high-rise building, constructed in the early 19705, consisted of twenty-one stories of guest rooms situated above a large ground-level complex comprised of a casino, showrooms, convention facilities, jai alai fronton, and mercantile complex. The hotel was partially sprinklered but major areas including the Main Casino and The Deli, the area of fire origin, were not sprinklered. About 3,400 registered guests were in the hotel at the time of the fire.

 

“As reported by the Clark County Fire Department, the most probable cause of the fire was heat produced by an electrical ground-fault within a combustible concealed space in a waitresses’ serving station of The Deli.

 

“Following full involvement of The Deli, a flame front moved through the Casino. Smoke spread to the high-rise tower through stairways, seismic joints, elevator hoistways and air handling systems. The means of egress from the high-rise tower was impaired due to smoke spread into stairways, exit passageways and through corridors.

 

“The high-rise tower evacuation alarm system apparently did not sound and most guests in the high-rise were alerted to the fire when they heard or saw fire apparatus, saw or smelled smoke, or heard people yelling or knocking on doors. Many occupants were able to exit unassisted down stairs. Others were turned back by smoke and sought refuge in rooms. Many broke windows to signal rescuers or to get fresh air. The fire department confined the fire to the Casino level in a little over one hour. It was approximately four hours before all guests were evacuated.

 

“Of the 85 fatalities, 61 victims were located in the high-rise tower, and 18 were on the Casino level. Five victims were moved before their locations were documented. The 85th victim died weeks after the fire. Of the 61 victims found in the high-rise tower, 25 were located in rooms, 22 were in corridors, 9 in stairways and 5 were found in elevators. One person died when she jumped or fell from the high-rise tower.

 

“The major factors that contributed to the loss of life that occurred as a result of this fire incident are the following:

 

Rapid fire and smoke development on the Casino level due to available fuels, building arrangement, and the lack of adequate fire barriers.

 

Lack of fire extinguishment in the incipient stage of fire.

 

Unprotected vertical openings contributed to smoke spread to the high-rise tower.

 

Substandard enclosure of interior stairs, smokeproof towers and exit passageways contributed to heat and smoke spread and impaired the means of egress from the high-rise tower. [end of page 6.]

 

Distribution of smoke throughout the high-rise tower through the heating, ventilating and air conditioning equipment. [p. 7]

 

(National Fire Protection Association. Investigation Report on the MGM Grand Hotel Fire, Las Vegan, Nevada, November 21, 1980. NFPA, 1-15-1982 revision.)

 

USFA: “On the morning of November 21, 1980, 84 people died and 679 were injured as a result of a fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. This was the second largest life-loss hotel fire in United States history.[2]….

 

“The MGM Grand Hotel was located on the southeast corner of the intersection of East Flamingo and Las Vegas Boulevards. The 26-story building was constructed during 1972 and 1973 and opened in December of 1973. Like most of the large hotels on the “Strip,” this building was located in Clark County….

 

“The T-shaped tower contained 2076 guest rooms. Seven hundred eighty additional guest rooms were under construction on the west side of the existing building. On the morning of November 21, 1980 there were at least 5000 guests, staff, and other people in the building.

 

“The building complex was partially sprinklered. Protected areas included the Arcade level, major portions of the Casino level, and part of the 26th floor. Protected areas on the Casino level included convention areas, showrooms, and some restaurants. The large gambling Casino and the high-rise tower were not sprinklered.

 

“Means of egress from the Casino level was either through doors directly to grade or down a stairway to grade. The means of egress system for the high-rise tower consisted of one interior stair and one smokeproof tower for each of the three wings for a total of six stairs. All of the stairs discharged to the outside of the building. At the bottom of most of the stairs, horizontal passages were used to reach the outside. All three of the interior stairs and one of the smokeproof towers were not enclosed with two-hour fire rated construction. Due to locked doors, once the people entered stair enclosures, they could not gain access to other floors.

 

“A manual fire alarm system with bells and public address capability was provided in the building. There did not appear to be manual pull stations or the Arcade or Casino levels; however, the system could be activated from the security office on the Casino level. Manual pull stations were located throughout the guest room floors. The system was arranged to sound a pre-signal and then a general alarm in five minutes after activation of a manual pull station. The system was a local signaling system only. Other than automatic sprinklers, there were no automatic detection devices in the building….

 

“At approximately 7:10 a.m. on November 21, 1980, an employee discovered a fire in a bus station in a restaurant called the Deli at the east end of the Casino. The bus station was a waitress and bus boy service area. The Deli was not open for business. The Casino and adjacent coffee house were in full operation. Security was contacted and an attempt made to extinguish the fire using an occupant use hose; due to the magnitude of the fire, the attempt was unsuccessful. The Clark County Fire Department was notified at about 7:15 a.m. There is no evidence that the building fire alarm was sounded.

 

“The Clark County Fire Department has determined that the most probable source of ignition of this fire was electrical in nature. This occurred within a combustible concealed space adjacent to a pie case along the south wall of the Deli.

 

“The first materials ignited included plywood used to enclose the pie case. The fire most likely smoldered for a period of time before breaking out of the concealed space and into the Deli bus station at approximately 7:10 a.m.

 

“Initially, smoke would have moved directly from the bus station to the return air plenum above the ceiling through an air transfer grill. Once open flaming took place in the bus station, the fire apparently began spreading on lightweight fuels such as plastic and paper products and combustible interior finish. The fire then spread to the remainder of the Deli, consuming other available combustibles such as wooden decorative members and foam plastic padding of chairs and booths.

 

“Flashover of the bus station and then the Deli along with the lack of fire resistant barriers allowed the transfer of thermal energy into the Casino. Large amounts of air flowing through the adjacent coffee house and the Arcade provided a fresh air supply for the fire. Present in the Casino were highly combustible furnishings and contents and combustible interior finish. Large amounts of plastic materials such as foam padding and moldings were included in the fuels. The presence of fuel, air supply and a very large undivided area allowed for extremely rapid fire spread and heavy smoke production. The entire Casino and porte cocker[3] on the west end of the building were fully involved with fire by 7:25 a.m. There were limited or nonexistent barriers to fire spread which allowed the spread of heat, smoke, and other products of combustion to the building’s upper floors. These shafts included elevators, stairs, and shafts located at seismic joints in the high-rise tower.

 

“Tower occupants slowly became aware of the fire by smelling or seeing smoke, people yelling, or eventually due to helicopters flying around the building. Some occupants were able to exit the building without assistance. Many were rescued by firefighters, construction workers, and passersby. Many other occupants made their way to the roof where they were removed by helicopter. A large number of guests were trapped in their rooms where they awaited rescue. Total evacuation of the building took nearly four hours.

 

“Preliminary information as to the locations of victims in the hotel accounts for approximately 78 of the total 84 fatalities. Some casualties were removed from the upper levels of the building before their locations were documented. Fourteen victims were on the Casino level and approximately 64 victims were on the upper floors of the hotel. Of the 64 victims above the Casino level, 29 were located in guest rooms, 21 were in corridors and elevator lobbies, five were in elevators, and nine were in stair enclosures. Most victims were on the 20th through the 25th floors.

 

“Three-of the interior stairs were not enclosed with two-hour fire rated construction. There were direct openings from the return air plenum above the Casino to these stairs. In addition, there were non-rated access panels that allowed fire and products of combustion to spread into these stairs. The spread of smoke into the stairs directly contributed to several fatalities. At least one of the smokeproof towers was not enclosed on the bottom with adequate fire resistant materials which allowed direct transmission of smoke from the Casino area into the smokeproof tower. As far as can be determined, the air handling equipment was not equipped with smoke detectors arranged to shut down the systems upon sensing products of combustion. In addition, some fire dampers were disabled so that they could not close when the fusible links melted and others did not close completely. As a result, products of combustion were distributed through the tower by the HVAC equipment.

 

“The fan coil units in the guest rooms most likely contributed to the movement of products of combustion from the corridors to the guest rooms. These fan units were not directly connected to any vertical air shaft and provided a method for spread of smoke that may also have contributed to several fatalities.” (United States Fire Administration. The MGM Grand Hotel Fire: Preliminary Investigation Report. 1981.)

 

Wallace: “….Nothing is what it seems to be in the casinos, restaurants, and bedrooms [of Las Vegas]. The “wood” furniture is rigid urethane or PVC. The “tapestry” wallcovering is plasticized PVC. The “glass” is polycarbonate or polymethylmethacrylate. In the walls and ceilings, much more plastic lies concealed in the form of electrical insulation, plumbing, and even parts of the air handling and HVAC (heating, ventilation and air condi­tioning) system. Metal trim, mirrors, velvet plush, and marble aren’t what they seem. They are all plastic in this world of pseudo-pleasures.

 

“The residents of Las Vegas look upon the tourists as booz­ers, gamblers, sexual adventurers, and gluttons. Tourist safety did not rank very high in the priority list of voters and members of civic associations until the MGM and Hilton Hotel fires. When income from tourism declined after these fires, and when the rest of the country asked hard questions about tourist safety in Las Vegas hotels, then remedial action came fast.

 

“The economic status of the big casino hotels has often been pointed to as the rationale for the governmental agen­cies winking at the potential dangers in design, materials, and operations. Certainly, economics influences decisions. But the tourist life that forms the other part of the tradeoff between economics and life safety apparently weighs much less in the minds of our governmental regulators than it does in areas offering other kinds of recreational activities.

 

“Like most of the major casino-hotels in Las Vegas, the MGM Grand Hotel occupied a large city block and rose over twenty stories above grade. We cannot assign a precise number of stories to these hotels because of the height of the casino and of the plenum above the casino. These two layers may each be two to four stories in height and cover more than the area of two football fields. No firewalls interrupt the huge spaces, so that any fire that would ignite in either would roar through the space, probably spreading to the other because of the many penetrations between them…. [pp. 99-100]

 

“…the casino-restaurant first floor, where the fire started. The quantities of uninterrupted combustible materials in the habitable space and the plenum were esti­mated by Clark County investigators as, collectively, hun­dreds of tons. About ten tons of mastic (this particular glue was made from silicone plastic) held the processed wood ceiling tiles, which were the upper finish to the casino-restau­rant complex. The “glass” of the slot machines, mirrors, and chandeliers was either polymethylmethacrylate (PMMA, an acrylic) or polycarbonate. The “wooden” tables were rigid polyurethane. Wallcovering, rigid molded furniture, and fake leather upholstery all contained PVC. The casino-restaurant area, which had no fire walls to break the space, provided uninterrupted access to an immense fuel pile in case of fire. Although much ado has been made about the lack of sprin­klers in the hotel, it is possible that sprinklers would have been overwhelmed by the sheer concentration and pervasion of uninterrupted fuels. In its annual reports on fires causing over $1 million in damage, the NFPA has listed numerous fires in which sprinklers were overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of petrochemicals present under one roof.

 

“Certain of the fuels, by themselves, would have generated a lethal cloud at casino level and, possibly, on the first floors into which the smoke traveled. These fuels are PVC, ure­thane, ABS, and the mastic….PVC, which decomposes readily, existed in the same envi­ronment in the casino as ABS, which burns readily and emits hydrogen cyanide, and as PMMA, which burns readily and emits methylmethacrylate, which is its monomer and an irri­tant and nerve poison. In general, combined dosing has proven worse than single-type dosing, toxicologically. No lab tests have ever been performed to expose animals to the mixes of acids and organics that would have been present in smoke such as that generated by the MGM fire…these products are tested individually, not in combination. [p. 101] ….

 

“The pipes in the plenum had given the fire a directed energy and transformed it into the much-described “fireball.” This was a front of fast moving flame that crossed the casino (a distance of about 200 yards) in about five minutes. It was a coherent mass of flame moving in one direction, and actually burst out of the Flamingo Avenue doors, setting the canopy on fire and damaging the first-to-arrive fire engine that had parked there. It did not consume the entire casino-restaurant area, but a distinct pathway within it. Lounge seats within its path were completely destroyed except for their bare springs, but lounge seats only a few feet from those destroyed were completely undamaged by flame.

 

“Within the pathway of the fireball, most of the damage to the carpeting was surficial, except for a peculiar grid-like pattern of deeper burns. This pattern reflected the layout of the ABS pipes above in the plenum and showed the impact of the added heat from above. Thus, the ABS was responsible not only for its own smoke but also for the added smoke and fumes from the deeper burned objects below in the casino. These kinds of interactions have never been considered when standards and codes have been made, but may contrib­ute significantly to smoke toxicity and toxic hazard. [p. 103] ….

 

“The fire occurred at 7:30 in the morning, a time when few people in Las Vegas hotels are awake. In fact, few people were on the casino level at the time. Even fewer were in the direct path of the fire. Much has been made of the speed and heat of the fireball. It is estimated to have reached 1,200°F. For a building fire, this is a rather standard temperature. Firefighters are told in their training that building fires reach 1,000°F within five minutes of ignition. Other fires have been much hotter; the New York Telephone fire reached 3,000°F and buckled structural steel beams.[4] This fire was also not unusually fast as far as hotel fires go. The Stouffer’s Inn fire[5]…was at least as fast, if not faster. The flames were not that unusual in speed or intensity, and did not directly kill many people.

 

“What was unusual about this fire was the smoke: its qual­ity, quantity, density, and the number of people it killed. The most striking fact about the MGM fire, a fact re­peated time and again by newscasters, firefighters, and fire scientists, concerns the distribution of the fatality victims: the great majority of them (sixty-one out of eighty-five) died on the nineteenth through the twenty-sixth floors of the hotel (the twenty-sixth floor was the top floor). These victims were as far from the fire as they could be and still be in the building. The smoke had risen to the top floor, accumulated, and spread downward and up out of the building top.

 

“The avenues of this spread to the top floor included the air handling system, the elevator shafts, the seismic joints, the fire stairs, the electrical and plumbing systems, and even the broken windows on the windward side of the building.

 

“The air handling system did not have a smoke detector connected to automatic dampers. Smoke had a clear path through the ducts. In addition, the PVC (!) pneumatic tube that connected the control panel to the fans melted in the early stages of the fire, being located in the casino plenum. PVC should never be used for this purpose. Control over the fans was lost when the PVC tubing melted, and the fans continued to push smoke around the building. In the rooms in the tower, many of the occupants had tried to diminish the amount of smoke entering their rooms by placing wet towels over the air outlet from the supply duct. One of the first cues that the air handling system was an avenue for the smoke came when investigators noticed the towels over the air sup­ply grating.

 

“The elevator shafts and the seismic joints could have been constructed so that they would not act as chimneys. The seismic joints, especially, could simply have had a cover over their bases instead of being open to the casino plenum.

 

“The electrical and plumbing penetrations were marked by black soot. These are supposed to be completely fires- topped so that they will not provide an avenue for firespread. Firestopping would also have reduced or elimi­nated the spread of smoke. The fire stairs were illegally breached with plumbing penetrations and proved a death­trap for several fatality victims who took refuge in what should have been a safe, smoke-free area.

 

“Thus, the smoke and heat rose to the top of the building. The smoke was so voluminous that even the towering pillars that were given off by the fans at the building top could not relieve the pressure sufficiently to keep the smoke from spreading downward when it filled the top floor and had nowhere else to go. Even the windows that were broken to obtain fresh air proved to be avenues of smoke when the wind shifted and blew a column of smoke back into the building.

 

“THE VICTIMS

 

“This cloud of smoke caused eighty-five fatalities. The great majority were found in the top floors (floors nineteen through twenty-six) and near the avenues of smoke move­ment….The location of death may not be the place where the lethal dose was received. People may have received an initial lethal dose and then moved around for a while to try to save themselves. However-, the locations of the bodies generally neighbored the major avenues of smoke described in the previous paragraphs. One of the eighty-five deaths can be indirectly attributed to the smoke. A woman jumped from a high floor in a panic trying to escape the smoke….

 

“The fatality victims ranged in age from twenty to seventy- two. An almost equal number of men and women died. Most of the victims were between thirty-five and fifty-five years old.

 

“Obviously, the victims on the upper floors had no direct contact with the flames and died of smoke inhalation only, with the exception of the woman who jumped from her win­dow. Although several of the victims who died on the first floor had burns that were sometimes extensive and severe, the general consensus of the pathologists who examined the bodies was that most of these people died of smoke inhala­tion and were burned after death. Even those who may have died partly from burns appeared to have first been incapaci­tated, and showed signs of sudden fall-down….

 

“The majority of the victims showed lethal levels of carbon monoxide in their blood…. Cyanide was present in the blood of a number of victims….

 

“We use the National Bureau of Standards carbon monox­ide analyses, rather than the analyses of the Clark County coroner or Johns Hopkins Medical School. The office of the Clark County Coroner had taken certain shortcuts and pro­duced unreliable results. The Johns Hopkins results were not reported in toto, and the piece of paper shoved under the noses of expert witnesses during deposition showed only the average of several different analyses of the same blood sam­ples. We had no idea of the reliability of the analyses because the raw numbers were never produced for review. Therefore, the only analysis to be relied upon is that of the National Bureau of Standards. The Johns Hopkins results were being supported during litigation by the defendants who manufac­tured and distributed the various plastic products that were consumed in the fire and that contributed to the smoke and fumes.

 

“Besides the blood chemistry, the pathologists who per­formed the autopsies made a number of important observa­tions about the organs of the victims. One of the frustrations they had in trying to obtain carbon monoxide concentrations in the blood was that the red blood cells in a few of the victims simply disintegrated. The destruction of red blood cells has been seen in victims of other plastics fires and in lab animals exposed to PVC fumes. Hydrogen chloride destroys oxygen-carrying hemoglobin, the protein that forms the ma­jor content of red blood cells.

 

“The autopsy protocols typically listed a number of obser­vations about common conditions in the victims: irritated eyes, reddened lining of the respiratory tract, large quantities of soot throughout the respiratory tract, frothy bloody liquid in the lungs, lung tissue destroyed, influx of a large volume of blood into the blood vessels of major organs (liver, kidney, brain, lungs), and copious mucus from nose. A few victims showed bleeding from ears and nose, originating from the pharynx. Some victims showed signs of cyanide effects, with ashen gray coloring to the skin and lining of the mouth. Carbon monoxide alone would not have caused these effects, although signs of carbon monoxide were seen, such as the typically cherry-red coloring of the lips and some areas of skin. Cyanide was present in at least some areas of the build­ing, and corrosive irritants were present in all the areas where victims were found…. [pp. 104-108]

 

“If this fire had occurred later in the day or in the evening, hundreds of people would have perished. Fortunately, igni­tion occurred early in the morning when few people were on the casino level…. [p. 117]

 

“The design and construction of the MGM Grand Hotel…increased the number of people that were killed and injured.

 

“The filters on the air handling system showed what kinds and quantities of smoke raced through the hotel. The filters were overwhelmed — they were completely black and clogged. There were at least two layers of filters: one by the fans on the way to the rooms and one at the room level (each room had a filter). Both layers of filters were black. In the rooms where there were fatalities, the hotel tried to tamper with the evidence by replacing the room filters. We found loosened screws on the corners of the grill to the air supply vent and pieces of tissue or paper toweling used to clean the grill. When we looked at other rooms on the same floors, we found blackened filters and grills. The air had circulated during the entire fire, but the filters could not save anyone. Indeed, the air had circulated because the PVC pneumatic control tube had melted during the early stages of the fire in the casino plenum, leaving the fans without control at all.

 

“Even twenty stories above the fire, with all the dilution of the smoke, people could attain fatal levels of carbon monox­ide. This is a remarkable fact. Everyone has been busy point­ing out the fact that a certain percentage of victims had sublethal levels of carbon monoxide in their blood, in order to implicate other chemicals, such as the acids and cyanide, as proof of the toxicity of the plastics. A very important and overlooked fact is that plastics generally produce larger quantities of carbon monoxide per unit volume than natural polymers produce. And, they produce much larger quantities of carbon monoxide than inorganic solids, such as metal and glass, for which plastics often substitute. (Other chemicals besides CO can and do cause deaths in plastics fires, but just on the basis of CO production, plastics are more dangerous than wood or cotton; and much more dangerous than metal. or glass.) A second very important fact is that plastics are generally present in much greater weights than natural poly­mers. Silk, wool, cotton, or even wood are usually not present in quantities of several tons and would not produce the huge quantities of carbon monoxide that plastics, which are often found in massive quantities, produce. The high concentra­tions of carbon monoxide produced by plastics means that the potentially lethal area of smoke and fumes is much greater even if only the carbon monoxide, and not the other gases and soot chemicals, is considered.

 

“Of course, the other data from the autopsy protocols and medical records show the presence of acid gases, cyanide, and hydrocarbons in the fumes and smoke. The lung damage seen in both the fatality victims and the injured survivors was typical of inhalation of acids. The reactive airways seen in the survivors also indicated inhalation of acids…. [pp. 117-118]

 

“THE LESSONS

 

“Let us summarize the lessons of the MGM Grand Hotel Fire, lest 85 people should have died without leaving a legacy.

 

“Lesson 1

 

“The, quality and quantity of fuel load, especially fuel load uninterrupted by fire walls or other firestops, must be con­sidered when a place of public assembly or public accommo­dation is on the drawing board. Estimates of the quantity and toxicity of the smoke and fumes that would possibly be gen­erated by this fuel load should be part of the basis for choice of materials and for material usage. If we were to propose building a nuclear reactor, we would have to develop a worst case scenario. Now this kind of thinking ahead is even being applied to chemical plants and warehouses. Certainly, the plastics produced by these chemical plants and stored in these warehouses, plastics that are related both by lineage so to speak, and by structure to pesticides, require emergency response planning and designs that minimize exposure.

 

“Lesson 2

 

“Building design can interact with fuel load in disastrous ways. The bigger the building, the bigger the potential disas­ter. The larger and more toxic the fuel load the bigger the disaster. Also, carelessness in building design and construc­tion will augment any problems in a fire from a nontradi­tional fuel load. The less traditional the fuel load, the more necessary that every feature of the building be designed to follow specifications that are accumulated through knowl­edge about safety and that all methods of keeping smoke and fire from spreading and of giving occupants early warning be used. This may even mean extra-dense sprinkler systems; sprinklers and smoke alarms in the hidden spaces, such as ceilings and walls; and methods of pressurizing both corri­dors and stairs so that escape routes are free of smoke. It also includes such accepted methods as automatically operating dampers in the air ducts. It may be that such heavy use of plastics as seen in the MGM Grand Hotel requires exorbitant investment in order to partially overcome the fundamental properties of the materials. The cheapness of these materials is a myth, an illusion broadcast by the industry. These materi­als cost us all plenty.

 

“Lesson 3

 

“This lesson destroys the illusion that if we follow a host of little “safety tips” in case of a hotel fire, we will come out alive. Many of the guests followed these safety tips. Some had even studied NFPA pamphlets about hotel fire safety. Three guests who were interviewed had read the NFPA pamphlet after previous hotel fires had made them concerned. But there was no way to be safe in the face of the huge and toxic fuel load, the pathways of smoke into the rooms, and the contamination by smoke of the supposedly “safe” stairs. Peo­ple who stayed in their rooms died. People who left their rooms died. People who put wet towels over their air supply vents died. To mislead the public into thinking that they could survive a disaster like the MGM Grand Hotel fire would be like giving safety tips on how to survive in Pompeii when Mount Vesuvius blew. The little pamphlets place a great burden on citizens by implying that if you do all the right things and are a responsible, moral person, you will survive a hotel fire. If you don’t survive, according to the ethos of these pamphlets, you didn’t do the right things or you were drunk or otherwise immoral. Of course, we all have the responsibility of knowing how to behave in a way that maximizes our safety in a disaster of a common nature, but there are other parties in this responsibility to keep us alive and well; government, quasigovernment, and industry. Their failures kill us.” [pp. 119-121]  (Wallace, Deborah. In the Mouth of the Dragon: Toxic Fires in the Age of Plastics (Chapter 6: “MGM Grand Hotel Fire,” pp. 99-121).

 

White: “Ninety minutes after the first alarm, the flames of the fire were being brought under control by the combined efforts of over 200 firefighters manning 15 engine companies, 4 ladder companies, 2 snorkels and 7 rescue units from Clark County, Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, Henderson, and Boulder City fire de­partments….

 

“The combined efforts of many differ­ent departments and agencies provided a force needed in such emergencies, but also presented monumental co­ordination problems. The command post set up at the battalion chiefs car on the north side of the hotel had a lack of communication with many of the agencies involved in rescue efforts. The fire departments were all able to operate on the same frequency, but it was difficult to communicate with so many different firefighters using the same frequency. The police, ambulance companies, pub­lic works departments, and helicopters were not able to communicate through a central command center at the scene, so many efforts were delayed and co­ordination difficulties were magnified…. [pp. 31-32.]

 

“To reduce the danger of smoke and heat traveling up elevator shafts, elevator lobbies should be protected or isolated from large un­divided areas and should exit directly to the outside.

 

“The spread of smoke to the upper floors was facilitated by some serious breaches of the building and fire codes. In one stairwell, a contractor doing re­modeling work had cut numerous open­ings through the fire-rated Sheetrock walls and had left the openings unpro­tected. These openings were directly above the casino area that became totally involved in fire.

 

“Normally the entrance of smoke through the stairwells should only fill the stairwell and not enter the corridors of each floor. The locking of stairwell doors caused people to block doors open to leave an avenue of escape if needed, thus allowing smoke to enter the cor­ridors. (Stairwells could also be pres­surized to keep smoke and gases from entering them at all. A pressurized sys­tem consists of blowers or fans engi­neered to maintain a positive pressure in the stairwells. Such systems are turned on automatically when fire is detected in the building.)

 

“The air handling units of the air-conditioning and heating systems were not protected by smoke detection devices and fire dampers. These systems were not shut off apparently until the power failed in the entire building at 7:26 A.M….  [p. 59]

 

“The absence of emergency lighting undoubtedly caused many guests attempting to escape to be increasingly alarmed. They could not determine whether they were encountering simple darkness or heavy smoke….

 

“…before the smoke cleared and the flames extinguished, looters had already stolen an estimated $270,000 from the guest rooms in the hotel.” [p. 71]

 

(White, David. “MGM Update: In-depth report reveals new evidence.” Firehouse, Feb 1981.)

 

White: “The fact has been well established that the MGM fire alarm system did not alert occupants or notify the fire de­partment of the impending danger. The tragedy which can result from this is illustrated by the deaths of two volunteer firefighters who were staying at the MGM….William Gerbosi, from the Western Springs Volunteer Fire Department and David Paul Pot­ter, a photographer with the La Grange Fire Department, were leaving the twelfth floor by elevator. Unwarned, they did not try to escape, but merely proceeded with their morning plans. They became two of the nine bodies found in an elevator.

 

“If there had been an alarm warning, these two firefighters would have avoided taking the elevator and pre­vented others from doing so. They knew not to use elevators in case of fire and they knew how to operate in fire and smoke environments — but they died because there was no warning.” (White. “Two Firefighter Guests Die Without Warning.” Firehouse, Feb 1981, p. 30.)

 

Firehouse: “Firehouse has obtained a copy of the preliminary report on the MGM fire conducted by the Clark County Department of Building and Zoning. One section of the report states that, “Code violations exist throughout the complex and hundreds contributed adversely to

the life safety of the occupants.” Some of the other findings con­tained in the report include:

 

1. Extensive smoke paths from casino to the high-rise hotel allowed smoke to penetrate es­sentially all floor levels. Numerous holes exist in corridor fire walls, varying in size of openings around pipes in ducts to about 12 square feet in size.

 

2. Exiting systems were totally inadequate for Code compliance as follows:

• Inadequate width for many areas served…
• Exit sign visibility, illumi­nation, mounting for proper viewing and shortage of di­rectional signs were exten­sively inadequate.
• Inadequate emergency lighting.
• Stairways and horizontal exit, corridors, improperly rated…
• Fire walls separating hotel corridors from rooms are penetrated by mechanical ducts and registers.

 

3. Elevator shafts are not suffi­ciently vented to the outside (UBC 1706d). Open elevator doors allowed smoke to travel into the two-hour fire resistive shafts and leaks developed at levels above thus contaminating corridors with smoke.

….

7. Mechanical ventilation and air conditioning systems in several locations did not shut down when smoke and heat levels became intense.

 

8. Several areas have materials with improper flame spread rating in ceilings and attic areas.” (Firehouse. “Hundreds of Code Violations.” Feb 1981, p. 59.)

 

Sources

 

Clark County Fire Department. MGM Fire Investigation Report. 168 pages. Accessed 6-11-2017 at: http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/fire/Documents/MGM_FIREInvestigationReport1980.pdf

 

Clark County Fire Department. “November 21, 1980.” MGM Fire webpage. 8-1-2011 update. Accessed 6-11-2017 at: http://fire.co.clark.nv.us/(S(m5guos2eznyputruhkgiqyie))/MGM.aspx

 

Firehouse. “Hundreds of Code Violations.” Feb 1981, p. 59.

 

Greenpeace. PVC Fires List. June 1994. Accessed at: http://archive.greenpeace.org/toxics/reports/gopher-reports/pvcfires.txt

 

National Fire Protection Association. “Fire at the MGM Grand.” Fire Journal, Jan 1982, pp. 19-37.

 

National Fire Protection Association. Investigation Report on the MGM Grand Hotel Fire, Las Vegas, Nevada, November 21, 1980. NFPA, 1-15-1982 revision. Accessed 5-30-2015 at: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:jy80v7LIgAwJ:www.nfpa.org/~/media/files/press-room/lasvegasmgmgrand.pdf%3Fla%3Den+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

 

National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996, 2010. Accessed at:  http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1

 

National Fire Protection Association (John Hall, Jr.). U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 31 pages, December 2008.

 

National Fire Sprinkler Association, Inc. F.Y.I. – Fire Sprinkler Facts. Patterson, NY: NFSA, November 1999, 8 pages. Accessed at: http://www.firemarshals.org/data/File/docs/College%20Dorm/Administrators/F1%20-%20FIRE%20SPRINKLER%20FACTS.pdf

 

New York Times. “The Century’s Worst Fires.” 3-26-1990. Accessed at:  http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE2D9113CF935A15750C0A966958260&n=Top%2FReference%2FTimes%20Topics%2FSubjects%2FF%2FFires%20and%20Firefighters

 

Office of Justice Programs, United States Department of Justice. Community Crisis Response Team Training Manual: Second Edition (Appendix D:  Catastrophes Used as Reference Points in Training Curricula). Washington, DC: OJP, U.S. Department of Justice. Accessed at:  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/crt/pdftxt/appendd.txt

 

United States Fire Administration, National Fire Data Center (FEMA) and National Fire Protection Association, with approval of Clarke County (Nevada Fire Department. The MGM Grand Hotel Fire: Preliminary Investigation Report. 1981.

 

Wallace, Deborah. In the Mouth of the Dragon: Toxic Fires in the Age of Plastics (Chapter 6: “MGM Grand Hotel Fire,” pp. 99-121). Garden City Park, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1990.

 

White, David. “MGM Update: In-depth report reveals new evidence.” Firehouse, Feb 1981, pp. 26-30, 32, 59 and 71.

 

White, David. “Two Firefighter Guests Die Without Warning.” Firehouse, Feb 1981, p. 30.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] A possible explanation of the discrepancy between 84 victims and 85 is from the NFPA Investigative Report, which notes that one the victims died weeks afterwards. (NRPA. Investigation Report on the MGM Grand Hotel Fire, Las Vegan, Nevada, November 21, 1980. NFPA, 1-15-1982 revision.)

[2] Actually this fire was the 3^rd highest loss-of-life fire in the U.S. and its territories (see our Typology document). The largest loss-of-life hotel fire was the Winecoff Hotel fire in Atlanta 12-7-1946, with 119 deaths. At the time of the USFA report the second deadliest hotel fire was the Newhall House/Hotel fine in Milwaukee on 1-10-1883 (though to be fair there are disputed reports on the deaths with a range of about 70 to about 90). Since the MGM fire there has been (as of 6-10-2017) one larger-than-85-lives-lost fire — Dupont Plaza Hotel, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 12-31 1986, with 97 deaths.

[3] Original footnote: “A roofed structure extending from the entrance of a building over an adjacent driveway and sheltering those getting in and out of vehicles.”

[4] Guessing this a reference to the 2-27-1975 New York Telephone Exchange fire in Manhattan.

[5] Harrison, NY, 12-4-1980, killing 26, mostly by toxic smoke.