1872 — Nov 9-10, Conflagration (“Great Boston Fire of 1872”), Boston, MA –25-41

–27-41  Boston Fire Historical Society. Boston’s Fire Trail.  2007, p. 88.[1]

–25-41  Blanchard range.[2]

—      30  Docema. Damrell’s Fire. “Boston Burnt: The Great Fire of 1872.”  2003.

—      25  Blanchard tally of fatalities and missing, presumed dead, noted below.

–13-20  Boston Fire Historical Society. Great Boston Fire of 1872 (webpage).[3]

—      20  FEMA/NETC/LRC.  “Great Boston Fire 1872.” Historic Fires. 2011.

—      14  History.com. Nov 9, 1872.

—      14  Lowell Sun, MA. “Fires and Fire Losses,” April 30, 1908, p. 16.

—      14  Safety Engineering. “Boston’s Lodging House Holocaust.” V26,  No. 6, Dec 1913, 425.

—      14  Willsey and Lewis.  “Massachusetts,” Harper’s Book of Facts. 1895, p. 492.

—      13  NFPA. “100 Conflagrations Since 1900.” NFPA Quarterly, V29, N1, Jul 1935, 145.

—      12  Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours. 1977, p. 656.

 

Narrative Information

 

Boston Fire Historical Society (website): “This page contains basic information about the Great Boston Fire of 1872, which occurred on Saturday and Sunday, November 9 & 10, 1872. The fire destroyed 776 buildings across 65 acres of land, with the assessed value of the properties at nearly $13.5 million and personal property loss of $60 million dollars. The downtown area of Boston had undergone a rapid development in the years after the Civil War, but improvements, especially water mains, had not been upgraded during these years. The fire department at the time was dealing with an epizootic, a disease which affects equine animals, thus affecting the horses that pulled the heavy fire apparatus. The fire spread rapidly, creating its own energy or firestorm, due to the tremendous heat generated. Although many or most buildings were made of brick or stone, the window frames and other fixtures were made of wood, thus allowing the fire to communicate to nearby structures. During the course of the fire, which burned uncontrolled for more than 12 hours, buildings were blown-up using black gun powder in a controversial effort to create a fire break.

 

“The fire started in a building at 83-85 Summer Street, at the corner of Kingston Street, in the downtown area. The first alarm was received at 7:24PM from Box 52 located at Summer and Lincoln Streets. The fire had nearly total possession of the building of origin upon the arrival of the first fire engine, Engine Co. 7 from their quarters at 7 East Street, near South Station. Hose Company 2, from Hudson Street, is credited with getting the first water on the fire. Additional alarms were struck at 7:29, 7:34, 7:45 and 8:00PM. Further alarms were struck for Box 48 and Box 123. Urgent calls for help were sent by telegraph, but help was delayed due to many telegraph offices having closed for the evening. Nearly all the cities and town surrounding Boston sent help. Some cities sent steam engines by railroad, with many coming great distances, including from New Haven, CT. Chief Engineer John Damrell was in command at the fire, but his attention was frequently interrupted by city officials seeking meetings to discuss strategy and the political impact of the fire.

 

“The fire was finally stopped at corner of Washington and Milk Streets through the efforts of the firefighters to save the Old South Meetinghouse, on the opposite corner of Milk Street. The Old South, a fixture since colonial days, was (and remains) an important symbol of Boston’s heritage and every effort was made to save it.  Most accounts of the fire attribute credit for saving Old South to the Kearsarge Engine 3 of Portsmouth, NH, although that point is still debated. Despite the enormity of the fire, only two Boston fireman were killed, with the total deaths numbering between 13 and 20, depending on the source. Chief Damrell was heavily criticized and much of the blame for the fire was directed at him, despite his record of having sought improvements in the city’s fire safety infrastructure. By 1874, he was replaced with a Board of Fire Commissioners. He later served many years as the commissioner of the Boston Building Department.” (Boston Fire Historical Society.  Great Boston Fire of 1872.)

 

Boston Fire Historical Society (book): “….More than sixty acres and 776 buildings were devastated. The damage in today’s dollars would be close to $1 billion. Nine firefighters were killed fighting the ‘fire demon,’ as the inferno was dubbed. They were

 

William Farry [or Farril],[4] [or Farrie][5] foreman of Boston Hook and Ladder Company 4;

Daniel Cochrane, assistant foreman, Boston Hook and Ladder Company 4;[6]

Henry Rogers, volunteer, Boston Engine Company 6;

Lewis P. Abbott, ex-fireman and volunteer, Charlestown Fire Department;[7]

William S. Frazier, volunteer, Cambridge Fire Department;

Frank D. Olmstead, volunteer, Cambridge Fire Department;[8]

John Connelly, member, West Roxbury Hook and Ladder Company 1;

Walter S. Trombly, member, Malden Hose Company 2;[9] and

Thomas Maloney, member, Worcester Fire Department.[10]

 

“Two more firemen later died from their injuries:

 

Martin Turnbull, member, Charlestown Hose Company 3;[11] and

Albert C. Abbott, former member and volunteer, Charlestown Fire Department.[12]

 

“The exact civilian death toll was never determined, but it was probably sixteen to thirty people….” (Boston Fire Historical Society. Boston’s Fire Trail. 2007, p. 88.)

 

Commissioners Appointed to Investigate…Great Fire: “…on the 9th of November last, on a calm and mild evening, a fire broke out in the building numbered 83 and 85 Summer Street, and raged without control till the afternoon of the following day, spreading through the best business portions of Boston, covering sixty-five acres with ruins, destroying 776 buildings, assessed at the value of $13,500,000, and consuming merchandise and other personal property estimated at more than sixty millions of dollars.…

 

“It is conclusively proved that the fire began near the elevator in the rear of the basement of the building, and passed with great rapidity up the elevator to the upper stories. The positive testimony of the many witnesses who distinctly saw the fire in the basement first, and then saw it, in the language of one of them, “roaring up the elevator,” is not controlled by the negative testimony of those who from their position failed to see the flames in the lower part of the building, or of those who did not see the fire at all until it had mounted to the upper stories and the roof. The condition of the floor, after the ruin, shows that it probably began near the ceiling.

 

“To the more important question how the fire began, no answer can be given. There is no evidence whatever criminating any of the occupants of the building, nor is there anything to show that it caught from the furnace or the boiler, except the fact that it began in that portion of the building. And the condition of the boiler and its surroundings, after the lire and the excavations, as described by .witnesses, and as observed by members of the Commission, seem to show that it did not take from the heating apparatus, unless it took from some flue. Of this there is no evidence….

 

“The fire was first seen at 7:08 or 7:10 P. M. The first alarm was given at 7:24. The second alarm was at 7:29, followed by alarms at 7:34, 7:45, and at 8 P. M.  When first seen, the fire had made great headway, and yet there was a disastrous and strange delay of quarter of an hour in giving the alarm. We would call especial attention to the evidence of Messrs. Sargent and Brown, policemen of Charlestown, who saw the fire from Prison Point Bridge. We refer to their testimony, because they fix the time by a clock, and by a depot clock, which may well be supposed to have been accurate.  Their statement is, in general, confirmed by many persons present in Summer and Kingston Streets, and it leaves no doubt that, for fifteen minutes after the fire had become visible, even in a neighboring city, no steps were taken to call out the Fire Department of Boston….

 

“It is a remarkable fact that so little was done by the neighbors and bystanders towards giving the alarm. Some of them testify that they were criticizing the Fire Department, and wondering at their delay, while they, themselves, were neglecting to take the only means for calling them out. In this connection, we shall inquire, in another portion of our report, whether the city does not need more fire-boxes, freer access to them by the citizens, and a more general knowledge as to the places where keys are deposited. The annoyance of an occasional false alarm is not to be weighed against the dangers of delay.

 

“The rapid spread of the fire in the building first consumed was chiefly owing to this delay, and to the faulty construction of the elevator, which, like most other elevators in Boston, was sheathed with wood, and destitute of self-closing hatchways. If the proprietors of the building had procured automatic hatchways, such as are generally used in factories, and one of which was in use in a neighbor’s warehouse, our city would probably have escape this calamity, as the fire would not have reached the roof before the engines arrived.

 

Dangerous Architecture

 

“The uncontrolled spread of the conflagration from the first building through the great district swept by the flames, was principally owing to the delay of the apparatus in arriving, and to the general faulty construction of the buildings, and especially to the exposure of timber to the flames at a height which could not be reached by water, — an exposure which would deserve condemnation, even at a lower level. The dangers arising from this mode of building were greatly aggravated by the narrowness of the streets, and by the great height of the buildings.

 

“This danger had been foreseen, and our calamity had been foretold both here and abroad. There is sad interest in the statements of our State Insurance Commissioner, who tells us that just before the fire, English underwriters spoke to him, at Liverpool and London, of the probable fate of Franklin Street, Winthrop Square, and their surroundings, and proposed to cancel their policies, and to cease insuring in our city. While some of us were justly priding ourselves on the elegant architecture of this district, and boasting that if was practically fire-proof, English insurers were dreading a conflagration on this very spot, and preparing to withdraw their agencies from our city.

 

“These dangers had been brought to the attention of the public, and of our municipal authorities. The remarkable warning of Mr. Joseph Bird was given through the press in November, 1871. The members of the Fire Department protested in vain against the style of building; and the Chief Engineer, especially, declared, after the Chicago fire, that a similar disaster might occur in our own city, and on this very spot. It was plain to him and his associates that our style of building required larger provision for the extinction of fire than we had made.

 

“With this knowledge, the department should have taken all possible precautions, so that every fire might be met at the earliest moment. Seeing that our only salvation lay in confining every fire to the building where it began, no time should have been lost by the department in bringing all its available force to the scene of each fire.

 

Delay From Want of Horses.

 

“Unfortunately this was not done. During the prevalence of the horse distemper, the department relied upon hand-power to bring up the apparatus; and this error was one great cause of the terrible calamity that befell us on November ninth. It is no less our duty to censure this error, because rumor has greatly exaggerated the delays caused by it.  We know that many witnesses of the fire confounded the time that elapsed before the alarm with the time that elapsed after the alarm and before the arrival of the apparatus; and many added these two periods together in making up their charge against the department. We know that there is some difficulty in using untried horses in drawing steamers, but it was a difficulty which could be overcome, which has been overcome in other cases, and was overcome in some instances on that very night. The testimony shows that volunteers were enrolled in order to facilitate the arrival of engines, and that an order had been given to the police, designed to secure a more prompt alarm during the prevalence of the disease.  We admit also that the difference of speed between horse-power and hand-power is less than the general public suppose. But, with all these reasons for mitigating censure, the great fact remains; time was invaluable, and time was lost.

 

“The first piece of apparatus, Hose 2, came as soon as it could have come by horse-power. So did the first engine, No. 7. These were from the immediate vicinity. Engine 15 came as fast as it could have come by horse-power. Three engines were drawn by horses.  But all the other Boston apparatus was delayed from three or five minutes for the nearest, to forty minutes for the most distant.  No one can tell what was the cost of these minutes to our city.

 

“It will not be supposed that the horses were dispensed with from motives of humanity.  It is not denied by any one, however humane, that man has a right to overwork a beast in case of necessity, or to work a beast to death, if the need be sufficiently great. The horses of the department were not used, because they were generally unfit to be used, and could not have gone as fast as the men did.  Excepting, perhaps, a few that were convalescent, and excepting a few that were employed, they were rightly left in the stable or the hospital.  The fatal error lay in not having supplied their places with others able to do the work.  The evidence shows that at that time the disease had greatly abated; that horses were freely used on the omnibus and horse-railroad lines, and were in general use in the city, and before this time might readily have been obtained for the use of the Fire Department. There is no evidence that this occurred to any one, but it ought to have occurred to those whose especial duty it was to guard the community from the perils of fire.

 

“The fact that there was loss of time appears from the table of time (approximate) made by each piece of apparatus, printed in Appendix, and from the testimony of the officers who were all examined on this point.  It is the testimony of honest and heroic men, whose desires and feelings and prejudices would all lead them to uphold their department, and to protect their Chief, but who state facts as they occurred.

 

“We cannot but feel that the earlier arrival of aid, between 7:30 and 8 P.M., might perhaps have prevented the flames from crossing from Summer to Otis Street, both by throwing streams on the northerly side of Summer street, and by reducing the heat on the southerly side, which prevented such streams from being thrown on the opposite buildings. This was the “key of the fire” at its outset; and when it was lost, the flames became almost uncontrollable.  But even then, a larger force might, possibly, have checked the fire before it had crossed Franklin street. Whether the employment of horses would alone have achieved success at either of these points, it is impossible to form a definite opinion.

 

Want of Water in the Burnt District.

 

“The efforts of the firemen were greatly impeded by the want of water, especially in Summer street.  The demands of the Chief Engineer for larger mains, for more hydrants, and for the more efficient Lowry hydrant, had been unsuccessful. He had especially called attention to the exposed condition of this district; and his forebodings were fully realized. The insufficient supply of water was felt at the outset, and was, without doubt, one cause of the conflagration….

 

The Fire Department.

 

“The engines were generally in good order, and they continued to be so throughout the fire; the hose was generally excellent. Some difficulty arose in coupling, as the hydrant-couplings of different towns differ in size. This is not strange, and can only be remedied by a general law; but it does seem strange that Boston hydrant-couplings differ from each other, being of two sizes. Some of the Commission were surprised to learn that we have no engine of the largest size in Boston.  We need larger steamers, and in the city proper we need a larger number.  In the city proper we have but six engines. There are the same number in Ward 16.  The assessed value of the property of the city proper is $514,697,450.00. The assessed value of property taxed in Ward 16 is $31,395,300.00.

 

“In the most important element of a Fire Department — in its men — Boston has the best material. Words fail to describe the courage and devotion of our firemen. No battle-field ever witnessed nobler heroism than was seen in our streets. The story of the fire, as told simply and truthfully by the engineers, is a story of hardships endured and dangers braved in obedience to duty. More than one of our firemen has literally proved “faithful unto death.”…. The successful resistance of the firemen on the southern boundary of the district, and again in preventing the fire from crossing Washington Street, and finally on the northern line, when it was conquered, has left in the scorched and half-burned buildings now standing indisputable proofs of their great service.

The Chief Engineer.

 

“The Chief Engineer deserves all praise for his courage. He shrank from no exertion, and from no danger. Indeed, he sometimes exposed his life when it ought not to have been risked. He manifestly intended to do all that he could to subdue the flames. He is described as being cool, and, with perhaps one exception, as master of himself, of his temper, and of his faculties. But while seeing this, and while admiring his many good qualities, we cannot fail to see that there was a want of preparation for so great an emergency, a want of system when the emergency came, and especially the want of a leader capable of grasping the details of a great plan adapted to the terrible occasion. The fire was attacked piecemeal, as chances occurred. The heroism of individuals was too often wasted, because it was not directed by a master-mind.

 

“The Chief seems to have performed the duties of a fireman from time to time, now placing a ladder, now performing some act of humanity, now applying fire to a mine.  In a word, he tried to unite the services of a private with those of a commander-in-chief.  It seems to us that, at such a time, the Head of the Force should remain for the most part in some accessible place where he could command a view of the conflagration — a place known to his subordinates, where he could receive reports from them, and send them his orders. This would prevent much confusion; and orders would be issued more wisely and carried out more effectually than when the Chief is actually engaged in fighting the fire from place to place. For example, when aid from abroad was telegraphed for, the Superintendents of Railroads were not generally informed of this, nor were they requested to “give the track” to the coming engines. This necessarily delayed the coming of the desired aid. It is not strange that this did not occur to one who was risking his life in actual warfare with the flames. It would have occurred to one who was directing the contest, as a commander directs an army.

 

“Again: Mr. Damrell gave an excellent order to the Deputy Chief of Police, that a hundred officers should be detailed to combat the fire with wet carpets, or other woolen fabrics. This order was wholly ineffectual, because there were no men who could be so detailed. But there were thousands of good citizens in the streets — longing to be of some service — who would gladly have performed this duty under proper leaders. These would have been found if the Chief had allowed himself leisure to superintend the whole work, instead of spending his time and power in attending personally to details.  For the same reason, there was great lack of attention to the reception and disposition of engines from other towns. They were, no doubt, desirous of being directed by our Chief; and the law gave him nearly absolute power over all persons present. This power was by no means fully exercised….

 

“It is said…that great quantities of water were wasted by being thrown ineffectually against closed windows and granite fronts at the second and third stories, while the upper stories of the building were consumed by tho flames, and reached by no streams. This, undoubtedly, did occur, both early in the fire and afterward, when, from causes just mentioned, the roofs could not be reached by the men, who still desired to make some use, however slight, of the water and of the apparatus. A more thorough supervision of these men would have employed them and the engines in some better service….

 

Efforts of Citizens to Save Their Own Buildings.

 

“The occupants of some of…[the] buildings on Oliver Street have been summoned by the Commission, and have told their story modestly. Enough appears to show that they fought back the fire by their personal exertions, and put heart into the firemen by their example.  If the flames had passed this point, it is difficult to say where they could have been stayed. Thus a great service was rendered to the public. Like remarks apply to the owner and occupants of the store of Messrs. Hovey & Co., on Summer street. The story of their co-operation with the firemen, both at the great fire and at the renewal of that fire on Monday morning, deserves to be carefully read and remembered….

 

“The conduct of the gentlemen to whom we have referred as aiding the firemen by their personal exertions, was in marked contrast with the thoughtlessness of many spectators who crowded the streets, and greatly impeded the efforts of the department. In some cases violence was necessarily used toward these persons. Yet, many of them would have gladly joined in efforts to save property, if more well-directed efforts had been made to that end.

 

“We have received, and are compelled to publish, some evidence of misconduct by a few firemen, and by men who wore the badges of firemen. The instances were rare. We are glad to believe that much of the wrong-doing was by men who falsely represented themselves as belonging to the honorable body of firemen.  And we feel bound to condemn the grave mistake of those who gave away their stocks of goods when it was impossible to save them.  The motive was amiable, but the practice tended, to demoralize firemen and other citizens, to encourage theft by confounding thieves with honest men, and to bring about a time of plunder and confusion….

 

Dangers From Gas.

 

“The fire, like all great city conflagrations, was greatly aggravated by the escape of gas from the burning buildings.  The fall of heavy warehouses broke the main pipes, and on Monday morning, the escaped gas in the sewers exploded, and caused another fire, which destroyed a million of property, and cost two lives.  The officers of the Gas Company believed that their water-valves were sufficiently powerful to cut off the supply of gas, as they had proved to be hitherto, but found that the belief was an error.  The lack of valves properly constructed, and so placed as to isolate the burnt district, led to terrible loss, exposed us to the inconvenience and peril of total darkness during two nights, and endangered the whole city. The company have undertaken to repair this error by providing sliding-valves. The risk arising from the impossibility of isolating a burning district should never be incurred again.

 

Gunpowder.

 

“The peril from the combustion of gas was increased by the manner of using gunpowder. And this is only one of many dangers incurred by the unscientific use of explosives. The law governing the demolition of buildings by gunpowder, or otherwise, during a fire, is fixed by the statutes of the Commonwealth, and has been explained in several decisions. The power is given to three fire-wards, and in their absence, to other civil or military officers. In Boston, the power of fire-wards is given by statute to the Engineers; and the City Ordinance provides, that if the Chief is present, he must be one of the three Engineers consenting to the demolition of a building. When three fire-wards, or in Boston three Engineers, are present, no one else has by statute the right to destroy a building, in order to stay a fire. One fire-ward has no more right to do this than any other person, even when it is impossible, by reason of the fire, for three to be present; nor has one fire-ward a right to act, even when the Board has voted to grant the power to one, in case of an exigency. It is not enough, that three fire-wards concur that gunpowder must be used in general. No building can be destroyed, until it has been specially adjudged by the three there present, that the particular building must be destroyed. As the power to select a building for destruction cannot be delegated to one fire-ward, of course it cannot be delegated to any other person. It is necessary to state the law so far, in order to appreciate the action of various parties at this fire. For this reason we give in the appendix a statement of the laws and of the decisions in this Commonwealth.

 

“The common-law right, which exists independently of legislation, and which prevails every-where, to destroy a structure, in order to suppress a fire, is not taken away or superseded by the statutes of this state.

 

“There is a conflict of testimony as to the balance of good or evil arising from the use of gunpowder on November 9 and 10. It is less necessary to strike that balance accurately, because all witnesses agree, and all sane people will agree, that explosives never should he used again, as they were at that time, and that, if used at all, we should be prepared to employ them skillfully, carefully, and by a fixed plan. We have no word of censure for the citizens who volunteered to risk their lives in brave and energetic attempts to save the city. But they will all admit that the only justification for employing powder, as it was employed, is the fact that no proper provision had been made for the use of explosives; and they will concur with us, that the greatest wonder of that night was, that no life was lost, and no personal injury was incurred from the use of gunpowder.

 

“The Chief and his associates did not believe in explosives. They had studied the matter to some extent, and generally agree in condemning this method of attempting to check fires. This is one reason why no preparation had been made by storing a magazine, nor by providing means for confining powder when used, nor by drilling persons for its use. We were left to the chances of obtaining an inadequate supply at the shops, or of sending to a distant magazine, or of taking it from the powder boats. We were, also, left to the chances of finding skill and discretion to apply this dangerous remedy. Yet history had told us that gunpowder had often been used with good effect in staying great conflagrations. The story of the Fire in London was in the books of children. After the great Boston fire in 1678, the town was divided into four districts, each of which was provided with four barrels of gunpowder for use in case of fire. And in our own day the town of Nantucket had been saved from destruction, by the foresight and courage of one man, who prepared in advance to use gunpowder in the day of need, and who dared to use it when the day came.

 

“When it was at last decided to use powder, it was done by the Chief Engineer giving written authority to several public-spirited gentlemen to remove goods and demolish buildings. Some slight attempt at organization was made, but no proper system of action was devised; and in a short time the different parties were in confusion and at variance. Instead of three Engineers designating the buildings to be demolished, each man was left to act as he pleased. The Chief Engineer now heartily condemns his error in this respect, and we agree with him.  It is evident that he was still unconvinced of the wisdom of using powder, and that he yielded to the pressing demands made by many of our best citizens.

 

“The course actually pursued was objectionable, not because it was illegal, but because it was dangerous and inefficient. The action of the parties was not such as is provided by statute, nor such as is necessary to make the city liable for the property destroyed. But it by no means follows that it was unlawful. The courts of our own state and country, and of other states and countries have always held that, in case of necessity, it is lawful to demolish buildings, in order to stay the spread of a fire. And in our own state it has been distinctly declared that this right is not taken away by the statutes regulating Fire Departments. It was impossible to obtain the adjudication of three engineers, including the Chief, on each building selected for demolition. The assistant engineers could not be constantly withdrawn from their other duties without great injury to their work, nor was it possible for the Chief to be present at each building proposed to be destroyed. But it is to be deeply regretted that there was not a more thorough organization of the parties engaged in this service.

 

“The dangers of using gunpowder at a fire hardly need to be stated.  It demolishes the gas pipes, and thus creates a fierce fire when the gas is not shut off; it tends to scatter the flames; it drives back and discourages the firemen; and, above all, it causes long delay in attempting to quench a fire, when delay is ruinous. Added to this is the danger of premature and accidental explosions, especially when powder is carried in open kegs, as it was, at least in one case, at our fire.

 

Recommendations.

 

“Dangerous as explosives are, they must sometimes be used, and we suggest, as our first recommendation, that preparation be made for the future, for using a far more powerful and less dangerous explosive, and for training a number of men to use it skillfully.  The best explosive now known for this purpose is Dynamite, sometimes known as Giant Powder. It is ten times as powerful as gunpowder.  Its force as an explosive is so directed as to bring down a building, rather than to scatter its materials.  It does not, of itself, kindle any fire when exploded, nor does it explode when brought into contact with fire.  It may be dropped, or jarred in any way without danger; and cartridges containing it may be safely cut or broken; so that it is free from the peculiar perils that attend the use of other explosives, and especially of gunpowder.  It may be safely stored and conveyed to the midst of a fire. Some better article may be furnished by science; but, at present, this is clearly the best known material for the purpose under consideration.  A quantity of this material should be kept constantly in proper places.

 

“A portion of the force belonging to the Fire Department should be instructed in the use of it, and especially in the proper manner of using it at fires. These men might do other and ordinary work in the department; for it probably will not he thought expedient to keep a body of men exclusively for a service which may not be required for many years, and which we hope will never be required. They would act, of course, under the orders of the Chief Engineer, and the Chief, with some, or all. of his assistants, should be trained in the use of explosives.

 

“It seems to us that the law on this subject needs careful revision; and if general legislation is not desired, that a special Act should regulate the demolition of buildings in Boston in cases of fire, so as to secure more prompt action.

 

“MORE ENGINES. We need more fire apparatus, more men, and more powerful engines. It would probably be wise to procure a few larger steamers, and reserve them for great emergencies, as the lighter ones are more easily handled. We gladly record the construction of a powerful fire boat; and one member of the Commission has witnessed its successful use. The feasibility of using a self-propelling engine with advantage in our streets perhaps needs to be tested further.  In this connection we call attention to Richard’s Hose Elevator and Fire Escape, a sample of which is now attached to the Lawrence building, at West street. The new engines, or some of them, should be placed in the large districts still exposed and unprotected.

 

“WATER SUPPLY.  The city needs a better distribution of water, especially in the burned district. The six-inch pipe in Summer street was entirely inadequate to the needs of a street, which has changed its character, from a place of private dwellings to a street of great warehouses. Nor is this the only district where such a need exists.

 

“We also want more hydrants, and hydrants better adapted to the use of firemen. The Lowry hydrant, which is used in the neighboring towns, in the Highlands, in Ward 16, and in East Boston, is quite as necessary in the city proper. The evidence shows that while it is less liable to freeze than our hydrant, it will furnish four engines with two streams each. Such was the operation of the Lowry hydrant which was tried for a short time in Winthrop Square, in 1862, and its success then led to its adoption by Charlestown. This style of hydrant is attached to the main pipe, while ours are attached to four-inch branch pipes. It gives five times the supply of the Boston hydrant, which was fit only for the hand engines.  Abundant evidence has long shown that little or no trouble arises from the use of these hydrants during the season of snow, or at any time….

The Building Act.

 

“The Building Act passed at the extra session of the Legislature seems to us to need careful revision, aided by the testimony of skilful architects.  It is especially desirable that Elevators in warehouses should be forbidden, except such as are constructed with self-closing hatchways. Experience has shown that these can be made with little cost, and used without any inconvenience. They are not only a safeguard against the spread of fire, but they are of great value in preventing loss of life by accident.  If the existing law relative to fire-escapes could be extended to all warehouses, or, better still, to all buildings of a certain size, it would tend to save life, and to encourage firemen in their work.  It is well to consider whether every high warehouse ought not to have a permanent stand-pipe of iron capable of having hose attached to it….

 

Portable Apparatus.

 

“We would earnestly recommend the general use of Fire Extinguishers and Hand Pumps in every building. These would prevent many fires from becoming serious, and they would inspire confidence in cases of alarm of fire.

Finally.

 

“The Commission are unanimous in the opinion that His Honor Mayor Gaston intended to do his full duty, and labored faithfully to that end.  But Messrs. Philbrick and Firth hold that he failed to give that guidance, unity and efficiency to the efforts made to stay the fire, which the occasion required, and which the public had a right to expect from their Mayor.

 

“The majority had not supposed that a criticism of the Mayor [Gaston], favorable or otherwise, was expected from a Commission appointed….” (Commissioners Appointed to Investigate… Great Fire…  Report.  1873, iii-xxi.)

 

Docema: “Great fires plagued America’s cities during the 19th century, such as the well-known fire in Chicago in 1871.  Most Bostonians today are not aware that a large swath of Boston’s commercial district was destroyed in a single fire just one year after Chicago.  The…fire spread north from Summer Street and raged on for 15 hours destroying 770 mostly commercial buildings in its path.

“Boston’s Great Fire started in the basement of a 5-story warehouse building at the corner of Kingston Street and Summer Street on Saturday November 9, 1872 just after 7PM.  No one was in the building when the fire began but early witnesses outside the building testified that the fire was first spotted in the basement windows. The exact cause of what started the fire was never determined but the common consensus is that coal spark from a steam boiler that powered an elevator in the building may have ignited dry materials stored near the boiler. Whatever started the fire became irrelevant as the blaze quickly spread from building to building, rooftop to rooftop, engulfing entire blocks of buildings that were commonly considered to be fire-proof.

 

Boston firefighters, led by Fire Chief John Damrell, were challenged by a coincidence of bad circumstances and bad politics:

“The Horse Flu: Boston’s fire department like any other at the time relied heavily on horses to pull fire engines, hose reels, coal carts, and ladder carts. However most of the horses in the Boston area were stricken by an epizootic flu forcing the fire department to organize teams of men to pull each piece of equipment to a fire. This added delays getting enough equipment to scene of the fire just after it began.

“The Water Supply: Boston’s fire chief John Damrell had warned the city officials that the water supplies in the commercial district were outdated and inadequate, and unfortunately this fire proved him right. In some areas firefighters stood helpless as blocks of buildings burned unable to find a hydrant with adequate water pressure to pump from.

“The Buildings: At the time of Boston’s Great Fire of 1872 building codes were mostly suggestive and seldom enforced. As a result, Boston’s downtown architecture although stately and ornate in appearance, was also mostly a fire hazard. The streets were narrow, the buildings often too tall to reach the upper floors with fire ladders and hoses, and the top floor of each building was often a wooden Mansard roof packed to the rafters with dry materials.

 

“The Gunpowder: During the fire a committee of concerned citizens gathered in city hall to lobby Mayor Gaston to permit the use of gunpowder to demolish buildings in the path of the fire. The idea was to form a break in the path of the fire to stop it from spreading further. Fire Chief Damrell at first objected strongly knowing the gunpowder would do more harm then good but eventually under political pressure Damrell relented and issued permits. Several improvised teams of people with no training or prior experience packed buildings with gunpowder kegs and lit a fuse. Soon the explosions were causing injury and flaming debris lighting adjacent buildings, Chief Damrell had to force a stop to the use of gunpowder.

“The Crowds: Boston firefighters struggled to do their job amongst streets jammed with spectators, looters, and panicked property owners. Crowds had to kept back from collapsing buildings, explosions, and fire hoses that were easily punctured by cart wheels and granite chucks falling off the cornices of buildings.

“After raging for 20 hours the fire was stopped short of Boston’s historic landmarks, including the Old South Meeting House, Faneuil Hall, and the Old State House. In the wake of the fire was the smoking rubble of bankrupted merchants, manufacturers, newspapers, and insurance companies.  Hundreds were made homeless and thousands jobless. Thirty people had died during the fire itself.

 

“Boston’s Great Fire has a lasting legacy in American history through the efforts of Boston’s Fire Chief John Damrell. Just after the fire, Damrell organized the National Association of Fire Chiefs, a key organization in establishing universal building safety codes. Damrell also became Boston’s inspector of buildings and made sure that building codes were legally enforceable.” (Docema. Damrell’s Fire.  “Boston Burnt: The Great Fire of 1872.”  2003.)

 

FEMA/NETC: “Fire started on November 9, 1872, in the basement of a commercial warehouse. Caused some 20 fatalities, destroyed 776 buildings and over $73.5 million in damage.” (FEMA/NETC, Learning Resource Center. “Great Boston Fire 1872.” Historic Fires. 2011.)

 

History.com: “On this day in 1872, a fire in Boston destroys hundreds of buildings and kills 14 people. In the aftermath, the city established an entirely new system of firefighting and prevention. The fire also led to the creation of Boston’s financial district.

 

“The fire began in the basement of a warehouse at the corner of Kingston and Summer streets. At the time, this area of the city contained a mix of residences and light industry. Its buildings and most area roofs were made mainly of wood, allowing the blaze to spread quickly as the wind blew red hot embers from rooftop to rooftop. In addition, as Boston streets were narrow, large flames from one structure could literally leap across them to nearby buildings.

 

“Firefighting units from Maine to New Haven, Connecticut, arrived to help, but efforts to fight the fire were plagued by difficulties. There was not enough water on hand to get the fire under control; the hydrant system did not work well because much of the equipment was not standardized; and even when firefighters got their hands on an adequate supply of water, the height of the buildings and the narrowness of the streets made it difficult to direct the water at the blaze from the optimum angle. Because a local equine epidemic had struck the city fire department’s horses, it was difficult to get the fire engines to the correct locations at the right times. In addition, some of the efforts were counter-productive. Explosions were used to attempt fire breaks, but this high-risk strategy was not executed with enough precision and served only to further spread the fire.

 

“The fire was finally stopped at the doors of Fanueil Hall the following morning, but it had already destroyed much of the downtown area. Boston’s officials realized that their fire-prevention efforts had been ineffective and, in the aftermath of the disaster, began to revise and strengthen all of the city’s fire laws and regulations. An inspection system was instituted and the local fire departments began to coordinate their efforts.

 

“The fire also helped fuel Boston’s growth. The business community saw the burned area as an opportunity to expand its presence downtown. The city’s financial district was established where the fire had hit hardest and Boston soon became a key business center of the late 19th-century United States.”  (History.com.  This Day in History 1872: Fire Rips Through Boston)

 

Safety Engineering: “…the great fire of 1872…ten firemen and four citizens were killed.”

(Safety Engineering, “Boston’s Lodging House Holocaust.” Vol. 26,  No. 6, Dec 1913, p. 425.)

 

Newspaper

 

Nov 11: “There is nothing more remarkable in the dreadful calamity that has befallen our city than the awful rapidity that marked the progress of the flames. There is something appalling, too, in the contemplation of the success with which they persistently defied every means that were taken to conquer them. Whole blocks were literally mowed down by the flames like wheat before the reaper’s scythe. Granite was of no more avail against them than so much cardboard. No sooner did the heat touch it, than it began to crumble away piecemeal, and, gathering force and volume on its way, fell, crunching and thundering to the ground in huge masses, with the roar and resistless fury of an avalanche, blocking up the roads and blotting every trace of a street from view. The scene had more of the terrible than the grand in it. The sky was lighted up for miles around, and was disfigured by great patches of dun smoke, across whose discs burning fragments darted like angry meteors. Now it would be light as midday, and presently an ominous darkness spread like a pall across the heavens, and was only relieved by the lurid forks of flame that writhed tortuously through it, and disappeared in its depths.

 

“The air was filled with burning cinders that were hurled wildly above, where they hovered confusedly for a moment and then descended like a shower of gold to the earth, where they hissed, sputtered and crackled as though in malicious glee at the ruin of which they were a part. Every now and then a broad wave of light would suddenly show distant spires, sharp and clear against the dark sky, from which the next instant they would fade like specters, as the thick curling masses of smoke swelled upward and spread ghastly smears of black across the heavens….

 

“The march of the flames was as inflexible as fate, and as pitiless. There was no resisting them. Building after building, square after square, acre after acre was absorbed as steadily and as surely as the seconds swell into minutes and the minutes into hours. Men seemed stunned by the ruin that was so suddenly sown broadcast. Some, who a few hours before had enjoyed a full sense of that security which wealth bestows, and who were now beggared, stood gazing with a painful weariness and a listless apathy that were touching to look upon. Others shrugged their shoulders, lighted a cigar and went on their way with a true ‘Vive la Bagatelle’[13] air; though their pale faces and anxious brows told another story of the anguish they tried so hard to stifle.

 

“In the midst of all the bustle and confusion there suddenly started up without warning, numberless men, women and children bearing goods on their backs, in their arms, on their shoulders, and wagons filled with books and papers, thrown promiscuously in, burdened the roads. Here was to be seen a man carrying a trunk, and casting a look over his shoulder at the ruin from which he was hurrying away; and there, a number of boys carrying bushel baskets containing a curious mixture of odds and ends, hustled their way through the crowds that impeded them. People fought, struggled, cursed and stormed for the possession of wagons, carriages, hacks and even wheelbarrows. The sidewalks of the streets adjacent to the fire were heaped up with bedding, desks, furniture, boxes and goods of every description. The ‘birs of prey,’ who fatten on the calamities of their fellows, hovered about, eager to pilfer upon any opportunity that offered. They skulked in the shadows of the houses, watching with greedy eyes for a chance to gratify their rapacity. Well-dressed gentlemen were hustled by them with a view to watches and pocket-books. They crouched in dark niches, ready to dart forth and pounce upon any neglected trifle. They leered horribly in the faces of timid women, and uttered course jests in their hearing. Their brutal faces, low brows, small, snaky eyes, narrow lips and heavy jaws showed them to be the botchings of nature’s handiwork, and these distinctive and repulsive features were seen in distressing numbers in every direction. They grew so bold at last that the military were called in to keep them in check, and as the steady tramp of the soldiers was heard through the din, and their swords and bayonets reflected back the fire in cold and fitful flashes, this scum crept away to the dark holes from which they emerged, and gradually disappeared from the scene….

 

“The firemen seemed composed. They worked incessantly and with the most touching earnestness, but they were baffled completely, and were driven back step by step by the fire they sought to conquer. At length it was proposed to try the effect of powder in staying the progress of the flames.[14] A train was laid; the crowd was urged backward by the police to a position of safety. Some turned pale and fled, while others obstinately held their ground until they were compelled to retreat by main force. Then there was a moment or two of deathly silence, such as precedes a storm; then there is a low rumble, a trembling of the air, a lurid flash, and then the notes of thunder, accompanied by a deafening crash, a smothered shriek of alarm and a series of dull thuds in rapid succession as the heavy beams and blocks of stone struck the ground. The air is obscured by a thick cloud and tainted by a sickening odor. There is a momentary hope that the flames are stayed, but they break forth again in all their fury, apparently stimulated to fresh rage by the effort to thwart them. And these scenes are enacted over and over again with but little variation through the weary night, under the quiet sky and bright stars, till a faint gray of dawn imperceptibly creeps and swells into the broad glare of day, to find the swaying crowd, the battling firemen, the lapping flames, the hoarse cries of men, the sharp shrieks of engines, the wild confusion and the frightful havoc still at work, and a thick, blood-red cloud hovering over the city and filling the hearts of all with an ominous and indefinable mixture of terror and sadness.

Origin of the Fire and its Course

“The origin of this fearful calamity that has fallen thus heavily upon us was of so apparently trifling a nature that it is hardly possible, even now, with a full knowledge of the fact strong within us, to fully realize that results so awful in their magnitude could have arisen from so simple a beginning. The fire broke out in the large granite block on the southeast corner of Summer and Kingston streets, and was first discovered about a quarter-past seven o’clock on Saturday evening [Nov 9]. It began in the lower story, and probably caught from the engine. When the firemen arrived the flames had crept up to the fourth story, and the building being surmounted by a Mansard roof,[15] the fire soon sped upward and enveloped the woodwork. In a short time the whole building was in flames, and the adjoining blocks on Summer and Kingston streets, and also the blocks on the corner of Summer and Otis streets were almost completely enveloped.

 

“The building in which the fire originated was the first to fall, and soon after the block on the corner of Summer street and Otis place gave way. The flames ran rapidly up Summer street, pausing on the south side at Chauncy street, but on the other side, gaining force with every moment, it soon cleared the block between Otis and Arch, down which the flames poured as in a wind-fanned funnel, reaching Franklin square, some time before its course on Summer had swept to Hawley.

 

“From Arch street on Summer, the conflagration also moved through Devonshire, Federal, Purchase and Broad streets, with even greater rapidity than it did in the other direction, the buildings in its course being older, more inflammable and even closer together. As the buildings burned down Summer street each street opening into it became at once a funnel, through which the fire poured. Otis, Devonshire, Federal, High, Purchase and Broad became one after the other sheets of flame, which, leaping and licking from one side to the other, generally catching at the roofs, went roaring and cracking along the streets, wrapping block after block in flame….

 

“While the fire rushed down Summer to Broad, in a southeasterly direction, the main body of the fire swept through Arch into Franklin street, where…it acquired new force, as the fire which was then coming up Otis and Devonshire streets added force to its own movement, creating from each opening a motion which was almost a tornado, thus fanning the flames in Franklin street with the force of a hurricane. From this point the fire seemed to spread like a fan, the central pat of which was still Devonshire street to the new post-office building. Here the flames were checked for a time, and from that point it again spread out down Milk into Congress, Bath, Kilby and the adjacent streets. In the meanwhile Summer street had been swept to Broad street, while in its turn that was destroyed to Oliver, as the fire gained, passing up each street leading into the funnel, whose culminating portion was in the business blocks in and around the new post-office structure.

Summer Street.

 

“Summer street, beginning at Broad and extending towards Washington, presents a desolate appearance. On the entire north side there is but one house standing, that being at the corner of Washington… The walls of Trinity Church still stand, looking bare and grim enough, but everything perishable is seen only in the form of ashes. On the south side, the progress of the flames was stopped at Chauncy street, and even below that point there are two or three buildings still remaining. Yesterday afternoon, members of Company B, Ninth regiment, were guarding the ruins of the Freeman’s National Bank, No. 109, as the vault in falling had been burst in, and the contents were somewhat exposed. No injury has been done on the south side, above Chauncy street.

Franklin Street.

 

“Of Franklin street little can be said, except that of the magnificent buildings, by which, forty-eight hours ago, it was bordered, nothing now remains but huge piles of cracked and powdered stone and brick which cumber the street, making passage through extremely difficult, if not actually impossible. Not one of the many imposing edifices which were Boston’s pride, the Cathedral building, Donahoe’s block and others, now remains….” [Two further columns are devoted to street by street descriptions of damage.] (Boston Daily Globe, MA. “Devastation! A Terrible Conflagration in Boston.” 11-11-1872, p. 1.)

 

Nov 11, Boston Daily Globe from page 8: “The fate of the men who were in Walker & Co.’s on Federal street, is unknown.[16] The police say they cautioned them that they were in a dangerous position, but they did not heed the warning, and it is feared they perished in the building….

 

“Twenty-five thousand work girls were thrown out of employment by the fire….” (Boston Daily Globe, MA. “Devastation! A Terrible Conflagration in Boston.” 11-11-1872, p. 8.)

 

Nov 12: “Boston, Nov. 12.–This morning opened with a light but steady rain, which was the most welcome of all possible visitors, as it not only served to help quench the fire still smoldering in the ruins, but answered the equally happy purpose of keeping the streets clear of the curious crowds which yesterday impeded travel through the chief thoroughfares near the scene of the fire, and seriously interrupted business….

 

“To facilitate this business [of clean-up] the merely curious were strictly excluded from the limits, as was not the case yesterday, when any one was permitted to pass the lines uon his mere assertion that he had business within. Today, however, no one is allowed to enter without a pass signed by Gen. Burrill, commanding the military, and the ruins are thus kept free for the operations of those energetic merchants who already have gangs of men at work clearing away the debris…

 

“The buildings destroyed were so vast, and erected of such heavy material, that the whole space over which the fire swept is literally choked with broken blocks of granite, fallen iron columns and huge masses of bricks. In Chicago, where the streets are wide and the heat so intense as to crumble marble and brick into powder, the thoroughfares were cleared with comparatively little labor, where they were encumbered at all, which was seldom the case. But here the streets are narrow and crooked, and the buildings were composed of so much better material, that the wreck is much more difficult to get out of the way. All the streets are covered with the fallen ruins, so that it is impossible to take a horse and wagon anywhere in the burnt district, and the whole of the sixty acres are so thickly strewn with the debris that he who explores the area must clamber over granite blocks, hot piles of bricks, and stumble against the projecting ends of iron columns half buried in the mass of rubbish….

 

“Sunday morning two men, who were engaged in removing goods from one of the burning stores, were caught by the sudden fall of one of the side walls. One of these men was completely buried, and in all probability instantly killed, but the other was reserved for a more terrible fate, as he was caught only by the legs. He shouted for help, saying he was yet unhurt and if a few bricks were removed he could easily extricate himself. Several firemen, notwithstanding the heat was intense, and the danger from the other walls falling imminent, rushed to his assistance. While they were engaged in this work, the front wall fell, and not only was the first unfortunate buried under the ruins, but with him two of the noble firemen. As yet it is not positively known who these firemen were, but fears are entertained that Assistant Foremen William Ferry and Daniel Cochran, of Hook and Ladder No. 4, both of whom have been missing since that time. This afternoon a search will be made for these bodies….

 

Fault Finding.

 

“Considerable fault has been found with the manner in which the work of suppressing the fire was conducted. There are not wanting those who accuse the Mayor and Chief Engineer of vacillation and want of strength of character, in not taking means to blow up buildings before they did, and thus prevent the fire from spreading. It seems by the city statutes that the authority to do this is delegated wholly to the Chief Engineer, and as he appeared unwilling to assume this responsibility, the Mayor did not like to act in the matter. It is difficult to tell how far these officials are to be blamed. Certainly, in several instances the blowing up of buildings only added to the intensity of the fire; and the event proved that unless a large number were blown up under some system, and the shattered mass promptly drenched with water by the firemen, this means of prevention was worse than useless….

 

“Citizen soldiery are found here to answer the purpose of preserving the peace during a great crisis no better than they did during the days after the Chicago fire, and a public sentiment is forming on the subject which will probably compel their withdrawal, and remand the city to the police today or to-morrow. Several cases are reported where these soldiers were found intoxicated yesterday, with loaded muskets in their hands, and, besides their apparent uselessness as guards while in this condition, there was the constant danger that they would purposely or accidentally shoot somebody. There has been no such disorganization of society her as to call for the supersedure of the civil authorities, and the public will not patiently submit for another day to martial law. The police of the city has been happily managed, and shown admirable qualities during the crisis, so that the city runs no risk in giving them back their charge….” (New York Times. “Boston Alive Again.” 11-13-1872.)

 

Nov 13: “Boston, Nov. 13.–Today has been an extremely busy one among the ruins. The heavy rain of last night had entirely extinguished what little fire was left in the debris, and the gangs of workmen engaged in pulling down walls, clearing away the wreck, and digging for safes, worked with much greater facility than on the previous days. The streets are now almost entirely cleared, and a tour of the burnt district is no longer difficult….

 

“To-night the ruins are guarded by the militia as last night, and portions of the city are under martial law….” (New York Times. “The City of Boston…The Fire Entirely Extinguished by a Heavy Rain…” 11-14-1872.)

 

Nov 14: “Boston, Nov. 14.–It is now possible to make a list, nearly complete, of the loss of life and limb by the terrible conflagration. The following are the names:

 

Lewis C. Thompson, of Worcester, struck by a falling wall, and killed.

Frank Olmstead, of steamer No. 1, of Cambridge, fatally injured.

William Forry and Daniel Cochrane…steamer…4, buried under Weeks & Potter’s store.

Five unknown persons, also buried under Weeks & Potter’s store.

….

Joseph Burr and George Smith, the former of Dorchester and the latter of Neponsett, came in on Saturday evening [Nov 9] to see the fire; were last seen in the vicinity of Chauncy-street, and, it is feared, they have been killed by falling walls.

 

Walter F. Twombly, of Sheridan Hose Company No. 2, of Malden, has been missing since 3 o’clock Sunday morning. He was last seen on State-street, going toward Pearly-street. He was twenty-two years of age.

 

John Dillon, a machinist, aged eighteen, living at No. 122 Broadway, has been missing since 3 o’clock on Sunday.

 

Albert C. Abbott, an exempt fireman [volunteer], of Charlestown, lies in a very critical condition at the Massachusetts General Hospital from injuries received while at work at the site of the old Post-office, on Sunday afternoon. [Reported to have died.][17]

 

Lewis Porter Abbott, brother of Albert C., is missing, and is supposed to be buried in the ruins of Bradford & Anthony’s store, on Washington-street. He leaves three little children to the care of his aged and widowed mother at No. 11 Perkins-street, Charlestown. Albert was to have been married to a young lady of Charlestown on Thanksgiving Day, all the arrangements having been completed. His fiancée has been in attendance on him constantly since Sunday evening….” (NYT. “List of the Killed and Wounded…” 11-15-1872.)

 

Nov 16: “Boston, Nov. 16….The remains of two ladies taken from the ruins of the fire on Wednesday are in charge of an undertaker, and there is no way of identifying them except by patches of clothing. The remains of the mother of Miss Martha Hutchinson have been found among the ruins of Messrs. Shreve, Crump & Lowe’s store. Miss Hutchinson save herself by jumping from the window. Search continues for other bodies.” (New York Times. “Recovering from the Fire.” 11-17-1872.)

 

Nov 18: “Boston, Mass., Nov., 17….Recovering The Dead. The remains of Daniel Cochrane, late second foreman of Hook and Ladder Company No. 4, was exhumed from the ruins on Washington-street today. They were charred beyond recognition, but identified by a tag, with keys attached. He was thirty years of age, and leave a wife and two children. Shortly after finding Cochrane, Cat. William Farrie, of the same company, was exhumed and identified by a gold chain belonging to his wife. Michael Cuddy has been missing since Saturday night, and was last seen at the falling of the walls on Summer-street….” (New York Times. “Boston Yesterday…Two Dead Bodies Exhumed and Identified.” 11-18-1872.)

 

Nov 24: “Boston, Nov. 24.–This afternoon another body was taken from the ruins of the fire, but had not been identified up to a late hour. In the pockets of the pantaloons were some papers, but nothing to lead to identification of the body. A party of firemen from Cambridge have been searching throughout the day for the body of one of their own number, who is missing….” (New York Times. “Another Body Found in the Ruins of Boston–Search for a Missing Cambridge Fireman.” 11-25-1872.)

 

Summary of Deaths and Presumed Dead Noted Above

 

  1. Abbott, Albert C. Volunteer firefighter and former member of Charlestown Fire Dept.
  2. Abbott, Lewis Porter, ex-fireman and volunteer, Charlestown Fire Department.[18]
  3. Burr, Joseph, of Dorchester. Last seen Chauncy St. area; thought killed by falling walls.
  4. Cochrane, Daniel, assistant foreman, Boston Hook and Ladder Company No. 4.
  5. Connelly, John, fireman, West Roxbury Hook and Ladder Company No. 1.
  6. Cuddy, Michael. Still missing Nov 17 after last being seen at Summer St. falling walls.
  7. Dillon, John, 18. Missing as of Nov 14. Resided at No. 122 Broadway.
  8. Farrie/Farry/Farril/Forry, William. Foreman of Boston Hook and Ladder Company No. 4.
  9. Frazier, William S., volunteer, Cambridge Fire Department.
  10. Hutchinson, Mrs. (Identified as mother of Miss Martha Hutchinson.)
  11. Maloney, Thomas. Firefighter, Worcester Fire Department.
  12. Olmstead, Frank D., volunteer, steamer No. 1, Cambridge Fire Department.
  13. Rogers, Henry, volunteer, Boston Engine Company No. 6.
  14. Smith, George. Of Neponsett. Last seen Chauncy St. area; thought killed by falling walls.
  15. Thompson, Lewis C., of Worcester, struck by a falling wall.
  16. Trombly, Walter S., fireman, Malden Hose Company No. 2.
  17. Turnbull, Martin. Firefighter, Charlestown Hose Company No. 3.
  18. Unidentified female [body recovered wearing pantaloons] on Nov 24.
  19. Unidentified female, body recovered Nov 16.
  20. Unidentified female, 2nd body recovered on Nov 16.
  21. 1st of five unknown persons buried under Weeks & Potter’s store.
  22. 2nd of five unknown persons buried under Weeks & Potter’s store.
  23. 3rd of five unknown persons buried under Weeks & Potter’s store.
  24. 4th of five unknown persons buried under Weeks & Potter’s store.
  25. 5th of five unknown persons buried under Weeks & Potter’s store.

 

Sources

 

Boston Daily Globe, MA. “Devastation! A Terrible Conflagration in Boston.” 11-11-1872, p. 1. Accessed 10-19-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/boston-daily-globe-nov-11-1872-p-1/

 

Boston Fire Historical Society. Boston’s Fire Trail: A Walk Through the City’s Fire and Firefighting History. Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2007.

 

Boston Fire Historical Society. Great Boston Fire of 1872. Accessed 10-18-2017 at:  http://bostonfirehistory.org/?s=great+boston+fire+of+1872

 

Docema LLC. Damrell’s Fire (DVD and website). “Boston Burnt: The Great Fire of 1872.” 2003. Accessed 10-18-2017 at: http://www.boston1872.docema.com/

 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. “Great Boston Fire 1872.” Historic Fires. 8-26-2011. Emmitsburg, MD: FEMA, National Emergency Training Center, Learning Resource Center. Accessed at: http://www.lrc.fema.gov/disasters_fires.html

 

History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, November 9, 1872. “Fire Rips Through Boston.”  http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=tdihArticleCategory&displayDate=11/9&categoryId=disaster

 

Lowell Sun, MA. “Fires and Fire Losses,” April 30, 1908, p. 16. Accessed at:  http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=56171711

 

Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours – A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters from Ancient Times to the Present. New York: Pocket Books, Wallaby, 1977, 792 pages.

 

National Fire Protection Association. “100 Conflagrations Since 1900.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 29, No. 1, July 1935, pp. 129-156.

 

New York Times. “Another Body Found in the Ruins of Boston–Search for a Missing Cambridge Fireman.” 11-25-1872. Accessed 10-19-2017 at: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=990CE0DE163BEF34BC4D51DFB7678389669FDE

 

New York Times. “Boston. Funeral of a Fireman Killed at the Great Fire.” 11-20-1872. Accessed 10-19-2017 at: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9901E2DF163BEF34BC4851DFB7678389669FDE

 

New York Times. “Boston Alive Again.” 11-13-1872. Accessed 10-19-2017 at: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D07EFD61F38EF34BC4B52DFB7678389669FDE

 

New York Times. “Boston Yesterday…Two Dead Bodies Exhumed and Identified.” 11-18-1872. Accessed 10-19-2017 at: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9E00E3DF163BEF34BC4052DFB7678389669FDE

 

New York Times. “List of the Killed and Wounded…” 11-15-1872. Accessed 10-19-2017 at: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D0CE0DA1439EF34BC4D52DFB7678389669FDE

 

New York Times. “Recovering from the Fire.” 11-17-1872. Accessed 10-19-2017 at:

http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9907E4DF163BEF34BC4F52DFB7678389669FDE

 

New York Times. “The City of Boston. Progress of the Merchants in Resuming Business. The Fire Entirely Extinguished by a Heavy Rain…” 11-14-1872. Accessed 10-19-2017 at: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9506E7DF163BEF34BC4C52DFB7678389669FDE

 

Safety Engineering. “Boston’s Lodging House Holocaust.” (26/6, Dec 1913, p. 425). From: Vol. 26, No’s 1-6, July-December, 1913. NY: Safety Press, Inc., 1913. Accessed 10-18-2017 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=L9YMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:LCCNsc80000582&lr

 

Willsey, Joseph H. (Compiler), Charlton T. Lewis (Editor). Harper’s Book of Facts: A Classified History of the World.  New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1895. Accessed 9-4-2017 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=UcwGAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false

 

 

 

[1] Nine firefighters fighting the fire and two later from injuries. “The exact civilian death toll was never determined, but it was probably sixteen to thirty people.” Thus, 11 firefighters plus 16-30 civilians comes to 27-41

[2] It appears from our listing of fatalities and missing/presumed dead below, that there were at least 25 deaths (and probably 27, as the Boston Fire Historical Society notes in Boston’s Fire Trail). We use as the high range of our estimate the figure of 41 also provided by the Boston Fire Historical Society notes in Boston’s Fire Trail, though our attempt to enumerate fatalities and presumed dead comes to only 25. (See footnote 1.)

[3] “Despite the enormity of the fire, only two Boston firemen were killed, with the total deaths numbering between 13 and 20, depending on the source.”

[4] “Farril” spelling is from New York Times. “Boston. Funeral of a Fireman Killed at the Great Fire.” 11-20-1872.

[5] New York Times. “Boston Yesterday…Two Dead Bodies Exhumed and Identified.” 11-18-1872.

[6] From New York Times: “The remains of Daniel Cochrane, late second foreman of Hook and Ladder Company, No. 4, was exhumed from the ruins on Washington-street today [Nov 17]. They were charred beyond recognition, but identified by a tag, with keys attached. He was thirty years of age, and leaves a wife and two children. Shortly after finding Cochrane, Capt. William Farrie, of the same company, was exhumed and identified by a gold chain belonging to his wife.

[7] Brother of Albert C. Abbott. (New York Times. “List of the Killed and Wounded…” 11-15-1872.)

[8] The Boston Daily Globe of Nov 11, page 8, notes: “Frank Olmstead, a fireman of Steamer 1 of Cambridge, about 10 o’clock Saturday night was in C. T. Walker & Co.’s carriage depository, 91 Federal street, getting out carriages with seven or eight men, when he was injured by a wall falling from the adjoining building striking him on the head. He was taken to the Second station, where Dr. Weston attended him, after which he was taken to the Massachusetts General Hospital on a stretcher, where he died from the effects of his injuries at two o’clock yesterday afternoon.”

[9] New York Times of Nov 15 notes he was last seen Nov 10 on State Street going toward Pearl.

[10] “Thomas Maloney…of Worcester, and twenty years of age, suffered the fracture of his ankle from…[falling of a wall], and is now lying at the City Hospital in a precarious condition. His only hope is amputation of the foot, which, however, he will hardly be able to endure and survive.” (Boston Daily Globe, 11-11-1872, p. 8.)

[11] “About eleven o’clock [9th], Mark Turnbull, a member of Washington Hose Company No. 3 of Charleston, received an injury to his spine and head from the butt end of the hose which struck him knocking him down and also causing a compound fracture of two of his ribs. He was carried to the Second station, where Dr. Merriam attended him, when he was taken in a wagon to his home in Charlestown.” (Boston Daily Globe, 11-11-1872, p. 8.)

[12] The Boston Daily Globe of Nov 11, page 8, notes: “Albert C. Abbott, a member of Hose Company No. 1 of Charlestown, fell from a ladder, a distance of twenty-five feet, at the old post-office, about two o’clock yesterday afternoon, and was severely injured about the spine. He was taken to the Second station, and thence to the Massachusetts General Hospital.”

[13] In French “vive” means long lived, and “bagatelle” can mean something of trifling importance.

[14] Meaning to attempt to create a firebreak by dynamiting buildings at the edge of the fire.

[15] “Mansard roof, type of roof having two slopes on every side, the lower slope being considerably steeper than the upper.” (Britannica.com)

[16] Several paragraphs above, it is noted that a fireman, Frank Olmstead, was injured by a wall falling from an adjoining building into the one he “with seven or eight men” was in while trying to move carriages to safety. He later died. Presumably this reference is to the “seven or eight men” who were with him.

[17] Boston Fire Historical Society. Boston’s Fire Trail: A Walk Through the City’s Fire and Firefighting History.

[18] Brother of Albert C. Abbott. (New York Times. “List of the Killed and Wounded…” 11-15-1872.)