Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 12-6-2024 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

Blanchard note: We view the Interstate Commerce Commission report to be authoritative, and thus show the death toll as 39 rather than 40 (Railroad Stories), or 41 (Wickware.)

–41 Wickware. The American Year Book: A Record of Events and Progress, 1912, p. 826.

–40 Railroad Stories. “July in Railroad History,” July 1935, p. 28.

–39 Interstate Commerce Commission. Investigation of Accident…East Corning…July 4, 1912. P.3.

–39 Reed, R.C. Train Wrecks: A Pictorial History of Accidents on The Main Line. 1968, p. 79.

Narrative Information

Interstate Commerce Commission. Investigation of Accident…East Corning…July 4, 1912:

“On July 4, 1912, there was a rear-end collision on the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad near the freight station at East Corning, N. Y. This collision resulted in the death of 39 passengers and the injury of 86 passengers and 2 employees, many of the injuries being serious. An investigation into the nature and cause of this accident developed the following facts.

“Westbound passenger train No. 9 runs from Hoboken, N. J., to Buffalo, N. Y. On the day of the accident this train consisted of 1 buffet car, 7 Pullman sleeping cars and 2 coaches, all of wooden construction except one of the coaches, the second car from the rear of the train, which was a modern steel car. This train was hauled by engines Nos. 1052 and 973, and was in charge of Conductor Staples and Enginemen Still and Schick. Train No. 9 left Elmira, N. Y., at 4:37 a.m., and on approaching the freight station at East Corning, 16 miles from Elmira, at about 5 a.m., was flagged by the flagman of westbound freight train extra No. 393, which had stopped on account of the draft sills of a car having broken. It was necessary to cut off the head engine of train No. 9 to push the rear end of extra No. 393 into the westbound siding. After this had been done and while the engine was returning, the rear end of train No. 9 was struck by train No. 11.

“Westbound train No. 11 is an express train, carrying no passengers, and also runs from Hoboken, N. J., to Buffalo, N. Y. At the time of the accident it consisted of seven express cars and one combination mail and express car. It was hauled by engine No. 1026 and was in charge of Conductor Sullivan and Engineman Schroeder. This train left Elmira, N. Y., at 5 a.m., and after passing the two block signals, one at caution and one at danger, as well as the flagman of train No. 9, collided with the rear end of that train at 5:21 a.m., at a point approximately 250 feet west of automatic signal No. 2771. The speed of train No. 11 at the time of the collision was about 60 miles per hour.

“The wooden coach on the rear end of train No. 9 was completely destroyed. The vestibules and platforms on both ends of the steel coach next to it were crushed, the damage on the rear end continuing in as far as the second seat in the car. This car was stripped of its trucks, and after telescoping the wooden sleeping car Esthonia, the third car from the rear, for two-thirds its length, was thrown on its side to the north of the track. The rear coach and the sleeping car Esthonia were so badly damaged that the wreckage was burned at the scene of the accident. Engine No. 1026 remained upright although derailed and quite badly damaged. The forward end of the first express car of train No. 11 was also derailed and slightly damaged. None of the other cars in this train was derailed….

“At the place where this accident occurred the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad is a double track line running along the northern bank of the Chemung River. The collision occurred at the eastern end of a 1⁰ curve. The track is level. This division is equipped with two arm, lower quadrant automatic block signals of the normal clear type. These signals are so arranged that when a train is in a block the fits signal to the [word unclear, rear?] of the train indicated stop, both arms being horizontal, the second signal to the rear of the train indicates caution, the lower arm being horizontal and the upper arm at an angle of 45⁰, while the third signal to the rear of the train indicates clear, both arms being at an angle of 45⁰.

….

“On the date of this accident, westbound freight train extra No. 393, consisting of 55 loaded cars, left Elmira, N. Y., at 3:50 a.m., in charge of Conductor Holleran and Engineman Hemphill. Engineman Hemphill stated that as his engine was not steaming properly he was unable to reach the siding at East Corning freight station in time to clear train No. 9, and as he approached this siding he sounded the whistle signal for the flagman to protect the train. He stated that it was very foggy and that signals could not be seen a distance of more than one or two car lengths. Extra No. 393 arrived at the eastern end of the passing track at 4:46 a.m., and the train entered the siding without stopping. When it had proceeded about 15 car lengths on the side track it was flagged by the flagman of train No. 61, a freight train which was standing on this siding. As the siding was not long enough to hold both trains, No. 61 pulled up into the freight house track west of the passing track to make room for extra No. 393. Engineman Hemphill then started his train but had proceeded only a few car lengths when the train parted, due to the breaking of the draft sills on one of the cars.

“As extra No. 393 approached the siding at Corning freight station two green fusees were thrown off, and Conductor Holleran instructed Flagman O’Connor to protect the rear end of the train. Conductor Holleran stated that at this time it was so foggy he could see only a few car lengths. Flagman O’Connor dropped off the train at a point just west of automatic signal No. 2773. He stated that it was foggy at that time, and he placed two torpedoes on the rail. He saw train No. 9 approaching when it was, in his opinion, about 25 car lengths distant. He flagged this train, and as it slowly ran by him he signaled to Engineman Still, of the leading engine, that his train was taking the siding and that train No. 9 was to pull ahead. Flagman O’Connor then returned to his train, meeting Flagman Lane, of train No. 9, at a point about 300 or 400 feet from the rear of the passenger train as the latter was on his way out to flag.

“Engineman Still stated that as he approached East Corning freight station the fog was very thick and it was hard to distinguish signals, at times he could see them a distance of only one car length. Signal No. 2773 was at caution, and after running over two torpedoes and passing Flagman O’Connor he brought his train to a stop at signal No. 2781, which was in the stop position. He then proceeded slowly and stopped his train behind the caboose of extra No. 393, the rear end of his train at this time being about 250 feet beyond automatic signal No. 2781. Engineman Still immediately sounded the whistle signal for the flagman to go back and protect the train. His engine was then cut off and used to push the rear end of extra No. 393 in on the siding. He stated that while doing this work he could see signals at a distance of seven or eight car lengths. Conductor Holleran stated that at this time the fog was not so thick, and he could see signals about 15 or 20 car lengths distant. Flagman O’Connor and Engineman Hemphill stated that the fog was clearing away in that place at the time of the accident, which occurred while the engine was returning to the train.

“Flagman Lane, of train No. 9, stated that when his train stopped behind extra No. 393 he immediately took his red flag and one green fusee and went back to a point about midway between signals Nos. 2781 and 2773, on straight track, about 2,000 feet from the rear end of his train. He remained there for 10 or 12 minutes. Flagman Lane stated that while the weather was a little foggy at that time he could see a distance of 30 or 40 car lengths. When he heard train No. 11 coming he lighted his green fusee and placed it on the end of a tie on the engineman’s side of the track. He did not place any torpedoes on the rail, as required by the rules during foggy or stormy weather. He saw the engine of train No. 11 coming around the curve some 300 or 400 feet from him, running at a speed of from 60 to 65 miles per hour. He flagged the train with his red flag until he was compelled to step off the track, and the train passed him without having answered his stop signals, and with the engine still working steam. He further stated that he could see the engineman in his cab as the engine passed him, and that he was not looking out of the cab window, but appeared to be looking over the boiler toward the left-hand side of the engine.

“Conductor Sullivan, of train No. 11, stated that at Elmira the air brakes on his train were properly tested and were found in good working condition. The first knowledge he had of the collision was when he felt the shock. He stated that the weather was foggy, and prior to the collision there had been no application of the air brakes.

“Flagman Sweet, of train No. 11, corroborated the statements of Conductor Sullivan, and stated that after the collision he immediately went back for the purpose of protecting his train. He stated that as soon as he started back he could see the green fusee which Flagman Lane had left burning, and he met Flagman Lane at a point about halfway between signals Nos 2773 and 2781. He immediately went to signal No. 2773 and found it in the stop position, this being the proper position for the signal at that time, as the rear end of train No. 11 was standing in that block.

….

“At the coroner’s inquest evidence was introduced tending to show that Engineman Schroeder was under the influence of liquor on the night of July 3, but this he denied. He admitted that he had two drinks of gin between 10 and 11 o’clock, and later visited a number of saloons, but did not drink any more intoxicating liquor. He stated that he had slept during the afternoon from 2 o’clock until 6 o’clock, that he left his home at 9 p.m., and returned at 12:10 a.m., sleeping from that time until he was called for this run, which was at about 3 a.m. He answered the call boy, but did not get up and it was necessary to send for him a second time. At about 4:10 a.m. the call boy went into the room where he was sleeping, took him by the hand and called twice before arousing him. Engineman Schroeder then got up and went to the roundhouse, arriving there at 4:48 a.m.

….

“This collision was caused by the failure of Engineman Schroeder to observe and be governed by automatic block signal indications intended for the prevention of accidents of this character, as well as signals given by a flagman. While the automatic block signals in use operated properly, and would have prevented the collision if observed and obeyed, a much greater degree of protection would be afforded by the signals on this road if they were properly overlapped, so that trains would be protected by two stop signal indications and once caution signal indication. While overlapping signals in this way would reduce the maximum capacity of the road for the movement [Page 9] of trains, nevertheless this arrangement is used on a number of railroads and is recognized as a much safer method of train operation. Had this arrangement been in use on this road this accident would probably have been averted, as Engineman Schroeder failed to observe only one fixed signal. But where trains are operated at high speed while the weather is so thick that signals can be seen a distance of only a few feet no system of fixed roadside signals can provide the measure of protection to which the traveling public is entitled, and the use of automatic train stopping devices is urgently demanded. Devices of this character would automatically stop the train in case the engineman failed to observe or obey the indications of fixed signals, due, for example, to the engineman being asleep, dead, or physically incapacitated, or to his attention being diverted by other duties, or to the signals being obscured by fog, snow, or smoke. Attention has heretofore been called to the necessity for the use of automatic train control devices in reports covering the accidents which occurred at Bridgeport, Conn., on the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad at Fort Wayne, Ind., on the Pennsylvania Railroad, and in Hoosac Tunnel, near North Adams, Mass., on the Boston & Maine Railroad In the absence of such automatic train control devices, during foggy or stormy weather, when signal indications can be seen but a short distance, positive and definite instructions should be given prohibiting the running of trains at high speed.

“A contributing cause of this accident was the failure of Flagman Lane to use torpedoes. Rule No. 99 of the rules of the transportation department of the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad, which is a literal copy of so-called Standard Code rule No. 99, reads as follows:

When a train stops or is delayed, under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, the flagman must go back immediately with stop signals a sufficient distance to insure full protection. When recalled he may return to his train, first placing two torpedoes on the rail when the conditions require it.

“In addition to the above rule, the rule book of the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad contains rule No. 99 (a), reading as follows

99 (a) At night, and in fog or severe storm day or night, flagmen will, the last thing when recalled, place one lighted green fusee upright outside the rail on engineman’s side in addition to placing torpedoes.

….

“Attention is called to the lack of definite certainty in the rules of this and many other railroads covering instructions to employees in an emergency similar to that presented in this case. When a train stops or is delayed under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, a condition of danger is present which is not met by a requirement that a flagman must go back a sufficient distance with signals to insure full protection. This leaves it entirely to the judgment of the individual employee to determine what is a sufficient distance, making the rule uncertain, and leaving room for error in judgment where such error may be disastrous. Rules like these fail to provide a definite guide to employees. Many railroads by their rules fix a minimum distance which the flagman is required to go back, and this is the safer practice, although in the case here in question the flagman had gone back far enough to permit the train to have been brought to a stop had his warning signals been heeded. In this connection attention is called to the recommendation of the Commission contained in its twenty-fifth annual report to Congress, for the “standardization of operating rules of all interstate carriers.”

“The determination of the existence of conditions which require the use of torpedoes should not be left to the judgment of employees. In this instance the rule leaving the use of torpedoes to the judgment of the flagman is further complicated by time-card rule No. 14 quoted above, which prohibits the use of torpedoes in block signal territory unless it is foggy or stormy. Flagman Lane, using his individual judgment that there was not sufficient fog to warrant the use of torpedoes, did not use them. Had the rules required their use under all circumstances this accident would undoubtedly have been prevented. The requirement of the use of torpedoes under all circumstances should be mandatory and absolute. No chances should be taken and every precaution should be employed. If the engineman were engaged in other duties, or his mind preoccupied, the detonation of the torpedoes would arouse and warn him of a dangerous situation.

“Not only are the provisions of the rules of this railroad as to the use of torpedoes less stringent than safety requires, but this investigation has also disclosed the fact that rule No. 583, requiring flagmen to have not less than four torpedoes securely attached to their flag-staffs, is being habitually disregarded by the employees of this railroad, and has been for a number of years.

….

“This accident has again demonstrated the superiority of all-steel equipment. In this connection is called to the following recommendation which was made in the report dealing with the accident which occurred on the Pennsylvania Railroad at Fort Wayne, Ind., on August 13, 1911:

“That, in order to provide the safety to which the traveling public is entitled, the substitution of all steel equipment for wooden equipment in high speed passenger service shall be required at the earliest practicable date.

“As a result of the investigation of this accident the conclusion is confirmed that the use of steel cars would materially reduce the number of fatalities in accidents of this character. It is also believed that a greater degree of safety would be provided (1) if flagging rules were more explicit and the use of torpedoes were required, and (2) if automatic block signals were properly overlapped and the speed of fast trains was reduced in foggy or stormy weather, unless automatic train-control devices were installed.”

(H. W. Belnap, Chief Inspector of Safety Appliances, Interstate Commerce Commission. Report of the Chief Inspector of Safety Appliances of the Interstate Commerce Commission Covering His Investigation of an Accident Which Occurred on the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Near East Corning, N.Y., on July 4, 1919. Dated July 29, 1912 and reproduced in Schramm.)

Railroad Stories: July 4, 1912. “Rear-end collision of passenger trains on Lackawanna near Corning, N.Y. Engineer runs by flag and automatic block; 40 killed, scores injured.” (Railroad Stories. “July in Railroad History,” July 1935, p. 28.)

Reed: “At sixty-five miles an hour a Lackawanna express crashed into the rear of a stalled excursion train near Corning, New York, on July 4, 1912, killing 39 people.” (Reed, R.C. Train Wrecks: A Pictorial History of Accidents on The Main Line. 1968, p. 79.)

Wickware: “Forty-one persons are killed and over 50 injured in a rear-end collision on the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad near Corning, N.Y.” (Wickware. The American Year Book: A Record of Events and Progress, 1912, p. 826.)

Sources

Interstate Commerce Commission. Investigation of Accident on the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Near East Corning, N.Y. July 4, 1912. Washington: Printed by order of the Commission July 30, 1912. Accessed 12-6-2024 at: https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/47422

Railroad Stories. “July in Railroad History,” July 1935, pp. 27-31.

Reed, Robert C. Train Wrecks: A Pictorial History of Accidents on The Main Line. New York: Bonanza Books, 1968.

Wickware, Francis G. (Ed.). The American Year Book: A Record of Events and Progress, 1912. New York and London: D. Appleton and Company, 1913. Digitized by Google at: http://books.google.com/books?id=lXWCvm9PMSEC&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:LCCN11001626&lr=&as_brr=3#v=onepage&q=&f=false

1912 — July 4, rear-end train collision in fog, Lackawanna Express, East Corning, NY– 39