1916 — June 13, Grain Elevator Dust Explosion, Central Elevator Co., Baltimore, MD– 9

–9 Pennsylvania Railroad Co. “Elevator Fire and Explosion,” Quarterly, V10/N1, Jul 1916, 93.
–7 NFPA. Report of Important Dust Explosions…in the United States and Canada… 1957, p47.

Narrative Information

NFPA: “Grain Dust (Grain Elevators)….June 13, 1916 Baltimore, Md. Choke in elevator leg 7 [killed] 22 [injured] 1,500,000 [loss].”

PA RR Co.: “On June 13, 1916 fire followed by explosion destroyed the following properties at Canton, Baltimore, Md. — Grain elevator No. 3, wharf, grain dryer, marine tower, upper and lower belt conveyor galleries con¬necting grain elevator with concrete storage tanks, power plant, carpenter shop, men’s building, office building, all machinery and contents of these buildings exclusive of grain in elevator, and eight freight cars on track floor of elevator. The grain from elevator will be salved for the best interests of all concerned. The trestle approach to elevator and the ore pier for No. 3 yard were damaged. The steamers Wilhelm van Driel and Welbeck Hall, tied up alongside elevator loading grain cargoes, were also badly damaged….

“This disaster resulted in serious loss of life and personal injuries. The total deaths to June 17, 1916 were seven (five missing being included in this number) and the total number of injured, twenty-two, thirteen of whom are still confined to various hospitals in Baltimore. Of the dead, four were employes of the Central Elevator Company, two of the Chamber of Commerce and one a stevedore on the Wilhelm van Driel. Of the injured, twenty-one were employes of the Central Elevator Company and one of the Chamber of Commerce. It is exceedingly fortunate from the standpoint of life that the disaster occurred in daytime thereby allowing a number of the employes to escape. The loss of life, had the disaster occurred at night, would undoubtedly have been enormous as the extinguishment of the electric lights by the explosion would have prevented escape.

“Cause. A careful investigation to determine the cause has been made and the testimony taken of officials and employes of the Central Elevator Company, conclusively establishes the fire to have been due to sparks or heat from friction igniting grain dust in suspension which was followed by a violent explosion.

“The detailed events causing the disaster were the choking of one of the elevating belt-bucket conveyors preventing moving of the belt, the resultant friction of revolving head pulley against the stationary belt causing it to burn through; the temperature and sparks produced from the friction ignited interior of wooden housing enclosing conveyor, the descent of the belt and buckets disturbing accumulations of grain dust in interior of wooden housing, the wrecking of a portion of housing by the falling conveyor, the ignition of grain dust in suspension in interior of conveyor-housing by sparks from the smouldering fire caused by the friction — this was followed by a violent explosion. The primary cause was a misunderstanding through a speaking tube conversation of the particular elevating conveyor which was out of order, — elevating con¬veyor No. 2 was first reported choked but investigation determined that conveyor No. 3 was choked and inoperative, the employe receiving the message having misunderstood the number of the conveyor reported out of order. The necessary delay occasioned by this error allowed sufficient time to elapse for the burning through of conveyor belt in No. 3 by revolv¬ing head pulley before clutch disengaging power at this point was operated.

“In most instances of explosions of grain dust in elevators, there are usually two separate explosions involved, the first being slight and caused by ignition of fine grain dust in suspension in immediate vicinity of sparks or temperature causing the ignition, the concussion produced by this explosion disturbing and dislodging dust that is settled and packed on surrounding ledges and projections, which shaken into suspension makes an additional explosive mixture which becomes ignited by the heat or flame from the first explosion, resulting in the second explosion which propagates throughout a very large area until the entire dust zone is covered. The testimony taken in the examination of employes does not definitely determine the occurrence of two explosions; it is believed, however, that the noise of the first or small explosion was muffled by falling of the bucket- conveyor, which, in its descent wrecking a portion of the housing around same, created sufficient openings for the concussion of the first explosion to disturb quantities of grain dust within a large area.

“The investigation as to the cause of the disaster covered all common and special hazards liable to be productive of fire such as smoking, hot journals, static electricity from machinery, spontaneous ignition of oily waste, sparks from boats lying alongside, sparks from locomotive, electric light wiring, heating arrangements, presence of foreign material in grain being elevated, temperature of elevator, incendiarism, malicious intent by war sympathizers, dissatisfaction among employes and labor troubles, but it was found that none of these hazards could have contributed in any way to the fire.

“Narrative. Shortly after 2.00 P. M., June 13, 1916, Adam Schmidt, one of the weighers on scale floor, now among the missing, reported to the millwright that elevating bucket-conveyor No. 2 was choked due to over-feeding of buckets, but upon investigation this conveyor was found to be operating satisfactorily and the millwright was then informed that the trouble was in No. 3 elevating bucket-conveyor (Schmidt, who received the information from speaking tube conversation, having misunderstood number of con¬veyor which was not operating). An examination was made of No. 3 conveyor which showed belt conveyor to be at a standstill and before the clutch disengaging the power from the head pulley could be operated, belt had burned through from friction of revolving head pulley and parted — this was in the neighborhood of 2:15 P. M. When belt parted and fell, carrying with it the bucket conveyor, a considerable portion of housing surrounding No. 3 conveyor was wrecked, allowing several openings through which belt and conveyor buckets protruded.

“An examination of the interior of conveyor housing was made by the millwright who had detected a peculiar odor indicating burning of canvas, presumably the belt, but he was unable to discover any evidence of fire. Upon examination of the belt at track floor it was found that it had not parted at the splice, but at another point due to burning of belt from friction of revolving head pulley. This belt was installed June 20, 1915, was twenty-two inches wide and eight ply, and had been inspected within a week — the life of these belts varies from thirteen to fourteen years and one belt of the six contained in the elevator was inspected every day. Before the millwright could obtain necessary tools from car¬penter shop, for purpose of repairing belt, a terrific explosion took place about 2:30 P. M., as near as can be determined.

“About 2:25 P. M. elevator foreman detected odor of smoke on track floor of elevator while working at elevating bucket-conveyor No. 2 and upon lifting trap of No. 2 hopper feeding this conveyor, discovered a strong gust of hot air, whereupon he threw a bucket of water down hopper and slammed trap door down and in less than a minute from the time he had opened trap heard a loud rumbling sound which was the explosion taking place on the upper floors of the elevator. He immediately attempted to escape and on his way out pushed button on electrical fire alarm system from one of the stations on track floor — before he could escape from the building, the explosion occurred. The receiving hoppers at track floor are not flush with underside of flooring, allowing communication whereby hot gusts of air from explosion communicated from hopper of No. 3 elevating conveyor to hopper of No. 2 elevating conveyor.

“The hopper boss on track floor of elevator discovered smoke about 2:25 P. M. at the same time elevator foreman had detected odor of smoke. About the same time one of the laborers on track floor was told that a spark of fire had fallen down No. 3 elevating conveyor. He attempted to get a bucket of water to pour into hopper but before accomplishing same the explosion occurred. Also four employees on scale floor, two of whom are now dead, dis¬covered fire on machinery floor above; one of these men pushed button on electrical fire alarm system from one of the stations on scale floor and another taking a chemical extinguisher attempted to go to machinery floor to extinguish fire. As near as can be determined these events took place about 2:25 P. M. When about half way to machinery floor, employee with chemical extinguisher discovered from reflection on stairway landing that entire machinery floor appeared to be on fire and before he could return to scale floor the explosion took place.

“Just before the explosion occurred probably about 2:29 P. M. gong and indicator in engine room of tower plant registered (from alarm turned in either by foreman on track floor or employee on scale floor) and “Gulland” valve controlling water supply to interior standpipe system operated, but as the explosion followed the fire with such rapidity none of the fire extinguishing apparatus in elevator could be brought into service. Upon receipt of alarm in engine room, plant whistle was tied down to summon aid from locomotives equipped with fire extinguishing apparatus in vicinity and agent’s office at Canton Piers was telephoned to summon city and county fire departments from alarm boxes at that point.

“Several locomotives equipped with fire extinguishing apparatus arrived promptly, two county land fire departments and city fireboat “Deluge” are said to have arrived approximately one-half hour later. As the explosion completely wrecked elevator and the flames from the fire were spreading to adjacent buildings on pier, locomotives confined their efforts to removal of a number of freight cars from the danger zone. The fire spread from elevator to grain dryer, thence through upper and lower belt-conveyor galleries to marine tower and superstructure over concrete storage tanks; also from elevator to power plant thence to carpenter shop, men’s building and office building — all of these structures were located on pier directly north of elevator. Falling walls and burning debris from elevator as it collapsed from the explosion fell into boats tied up on either side of elevator. The intense heat from the burning wood¬work of elevator set fire to the ore pier for No. 3 yard on the west; the damage however, to this pier was slight owing to the good work of the fireboat, which also rendered good service in preventing the spread of the fire from the upper conveyor gallery to the superstructure over the con¬crete tanks until the steel members supporting this conveyor gallery buckled from the intense heat from elevator fire and collapsed.

“It would appear that the fire originated in the neighborhood of 2:15 P. M., the woodwork having smoldered from the temperature developed by the friction until resultant flames ignited the grain dust.

“Amount of Loss. The loss to buildings, machinery and contents, including grain, is estimated at $935,000, all of which is assumed by the Pennsylvania R.R. Co.’s insurance fund; the fund, however, had reinsurance with under¬writers of $647,500, which makes the net loss to the fund approximately $287,500.

“Description. The elevator was of frame construction, covered with corrugated iron, 181 feet high x 242 feet x 98 feet, having a rated capacity of 1,000,000 bushels. The first floor was brick enclosed to a height of about 25 feet, the window openings therein being protected by iron shutters — all window openings above this point were protected by ½-inch mesh wire screening. The elevating legs were frame and hoppers frame lined with metal. The elevator was carried on stone and concrete piers built upon grillage supported by wooden piles in clusters cut off at low water and consisted of track, bin, mezzanine, scale, machinery and top floors. There were two tracks for cars on ground floor. The elevator was situated at the foot of 13th Street, Canton, Patapsco River, Baltimore, Md., owned by the Northern Central Railway Company, leased by the Pennsylvania R. R. Company and operated by the Central Elevator Company. There were six elevating bucket conveyors provided, these conveyors consisting of a vertical belt with elevator buckets spaced approximately 13 inches apart, the belt extending from receiving hopper 15 feet below the track floor to within 6 feet of the top of building, running over a head pulley 84 inches in diameter enclosed in wooden casing; the buckets discharged into scale hoppers; the head pulley was driven by rope from friction clutch on line shaft situated on machinery floor; (dust-proof bearings examined four times every twenty-four hours were used) — it was in one of these conveyors, No. 3, where the fire started. A Warren Ehret roofing was provided on elevator.

“The power plant consisting of brick engine and boiler rooms, com¬municated with elevator through engine shaft passing through division wall, opening for which was sealed with iron sheathing. Engine and boiler rooms were 24 x 26 and 24 x 16 approximately, 50 feet in height, also equipped with Warren Ehret roofing.

“There was a 3-story brick grain dryer building 47 x 29, built on con¬crete foundations supported on piling, separated six feet from elevator but connected therewith by a belt conveyor.

“There are thirty-two reinforced concrete tanks located on the main¬land having a rated capacity of 1,000,000 bushels, each tank having 29,000 bushels capacity with additional storage space of 8,000 bushels for each interstice between tanks. There is a 2-story superstructure built over tanks of metal frame, terra-cotta walls and concrete floors. These tanks are located about 400 feet from elevator and 159 feet from marine tower and were connected to elevator by two belt conveyor galleries, one from bin floor of elevator to top of tanks and the other from track floor of elevator to their base — the upper gallery was corrugated iron throughout and the lower one frame covered with corrugated iron; cement floors were provided and tile roof covered with paper. Metal partitions were provided on both sides of marine tower for draught stops in upper gallery, but as stated in previous reports these partitions did not cut off the draught through gallery owing to conveyor openings; wooden partitions were provided in lower gallery on each side of the marine tower….

“Dust Collecting. A system of floor sweeps supplied from trunk lines running the length of elevator by large suction fan was provided for dust collecting purposes and in addition, four reliable men were employed for sweeping purposes exclusively, to keep down as far as possible accumulation of dust in portions of elevator not accessible to the floor sweeps.

“Operation and Maintenance. This elevator had been operating day and night since September, 1915. The general order and cleanliness of the elevator has been found to be particularly good for this class of risk in the various inspections made from time to time by this Department; however, owing to the operation day and night, dust accumulations throughout the elevator were greater than under normal conditions. Formerly a dust collector system was provided which kept the elevator as free of grain dust as was possible in this class of occupancy, but due to an arbitrary ruling of the Baltimore Chamber of Commerce in forcing the removal of canvas ducking from spouting bins on the claim that it interfered with securing accurate weight, the system was disconnected.

“Previous Fires. This is the third elevator at this site to be destroyed by fire, fires occurring January 13, 1890, December 31, 1902, and June 13, 1916, the first two fires being due to sparks from boats adjacent to the elevator.

“Damage to Boats: The damage sustained to the Wilhelm van Driel and the Welbeck Hall tied up alongside the elevator on the west and east docks respectively is unknown, but both caught fire and were considerably damaged including their cargoes. These vessels were not taken out into the stream until several hours after the fire had started….

“Investigated June 14 and 15, 1916. G. C. Williams, Inspector.

“P. S. — Since writing the above report, one of the Central Elevator Company’s injured employees has died and the body of a stevedore recover¬ed from water, making the total deaths to date, 9. (July 8, 1916).” (Pennsylvania Railroad Co., Insurance Department. “Elevator Fire and Explosion, Canton, Baltimore, Md., June 13, 1916.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association. Vol. 10, No. 1, July 1916, pp. 93-100.)

Sources

National Fire Protection Association. Report of Important Dust Explosions: A Record of Dust Explosions in the United States and Canada Since 1860. Boston: NFPA, 1957.

Pennsylvania Railroad Co., Insurance Department. “Elevator Fire and Explosion, Canton, Baltimore, Md., June 13, 1916.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association. Vol. 10, No. 1, July 1916, pp. 93-100.