1941 – Feb 5, Fire, New Haven Quilt and Pad Company, New Haven, CT                    —     10

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 9-29-2024 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

–10  Daily Ardmoreite, Ardmore, OK. “10 Burned to Death in Quilt Plant.” 2-5-1941, p. 1.

–10  Moulton. “The New Haven Quilt and Pad Co. Fire.” NFPA Quarterly, 34/4, Apr 1941, 357.

–10  National Fire Protect. Assoc. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003).[1]

–10  Sunday Herald, Bridgeport CT. “1941 Fire Victim Recalls Horror.” 2-17-1957, p. 11.

Narrative Information

Moulton: “Ten men were burned to death and three injured by jumping from third-story windows in a fire in the New Haven Quilt and Pad Co., New Haven, Conn., shortly after 2 a.m. on February 5, 1941. This fire is of particular interest because the loss of life occurred in a sprinklered building, with two exits in the section involved, and with more than the usual complement of hand fire extinguishing equipment. The fatalities were due to a closed sprinkl4r valve, failure of the employees to leave the fire area promptly, and ill-advised attempts to fight the fire without calling the New Haven fire department.

“The New Haven Quilt and Pad Co., operated by David Levine and Edward I. Levine, was making quilts for the U.S. Army. At the time of the fire deliveries were in arrears and the concern was paying a penalty for not filling the orders within the specified contract time. There was also an unofficial report that a quantity of quilts had been rejected because of underweight. The coroner found, however, no evidence that the sprinkler valve had been shut by the owners, and stated that even if it should appear that the owners or their agents had shut off the sprinkler system it would not be a crime under the present Connecticut laws. There had been thirteen previous reported fires in this factory, with losses ranging from slight to a $20,000 loss in 1929.. The coroner suggested in his report that since the record of previous fires showed that the water loss was much greater than the loss from the fire itself, the owners might have wished to prevent unnecessary water damage by turning off the sprinkler system and extinguishing fires with hand equipment. The last two reported fires were in cotton pickers, one on October^–,21, 1940, when 19 sprinklers opened and extinguished the fire with a loss of $4000, and the other on January 11, 1941, with a loss of $200.

“After the fire of January 11 the sprinkler control valve was sealed open by an insurance inspector and on the day following that sealing, the valve was examined by an inspector of another fire insurance organization and was noted as open and properly sealed. However, during the fire the valve was found closed, with the seal apparently intact and in place. After the fire the seal was so damaged and mutilated that it was impossible to determine whether it had been tampered with or not. The coroner’s report showed that the valve was near a basement washroom accessible to all employees and to outsiders who might have entered unnoticed. The valve itself was of the old-fashioned target variety, and it would have been possible by removing the hand wheel to close the valve without breaking the seal. The circumstances at least suggest that an attempt was made by persons unknown to conceal the fact that the water was shut off from the sprinkler system.

“…The building was a three-story brick structure with timber floors on steel girders, erected in 1933. There was originally a stairway in the center of the room. This was later converted into a chute, which, however, did not prove practical and the opening was floored over at this point.

“….Reports indicate that cotton flyings accumulated in some quantity around the room and that the metal-clad partial partition screening the picker and associated machinery from the balance of the room did not prevent the spread of the cotton flyings throughout the room.

“In addition to the dry pipe sprinkler system with some 50 heads in this room, first aid fire protection was provided for the picker by two hand hose lines with ‘spray nozzles of the garden hose type, One or more 50 lb. carbon dioxide extinguishers and a wheeled soda-acid extinguisher were provided.

“In an adjoining room a similar picker unit was also protected with a carbon dioxide hand hose reel which, it is reported, was brought through the fire door and used on this fire. The presence of such an amount of hand extinguishing equipment suggests the possibility that picker fires were perhaps more fre­quent than indicated by the reported losses and that perhaps it had been a relatively frequent occurrence to have such fires extinguished without reporting them to the fire department or to the insurance companies. There is, however, no definite evidence on this point. There is also no evidence as to the reason for providing carbon dioxide extinguishing equipment, which is not recom­mended for this type of hazard.

The Fire.

“On the night of the fire the fire night shift comprising 26 men in this room had returned to work after the lunch hour period at 2 A.M., when the fire started in or near the picker. This fire was discovered by an employee at about 2:12 A.M.• As had’ been customary in previous fires, employees attempted to extin­guish the fire with hand extinguishers. Other employees from various parts of the factory came to the fire door and also attempted to fight the fire with extinguishers and hand hose lines. In the meantime some men had left the room and others had removed back towards the westerly wall, apparently under the impression that the fire would soon be brought under control and perhaps relying for their safety upon the sprinklers which had operated successfully in previous fires.

“As is usual after any such disaster where many of the men involved lose their lives, there is conflicting testi­mony and it is difficult to establish with certainty the exact sequence of events. There were reports that the employees did not take the fire seriously and that there was some “horse play” in the fire operations Which, however, were-not substantiated in the coroner’s inquest. In any event, it is clear that the fire did not spread dangerously for some appreciable time and that if the employees had left promptly upon the discovery of the fire there would have been ample time for them all to leave the room without danger.

“The fire spread behind the partition and after a few minutes flashed out at both ends, cutting off access to both the fire door into the adjoining section and the fire escape. The continued operation of the blower, which could not be reached to shut down, was a factor in the rapid spread of the fire. As the fire suddenly spread, those near enough to the fire door to do so rushed from the room. One survivor states that he was able to reach the fire door through the flames under the protection of the water spray from a hose line operated by another employee through the fire door. This statement tends to refute rumors that the standpipe lines supplying the hand hose were also shut off in the base­ment. Reports agree that there was some difficulty with the hand hose lines provided for the protection of the picker, but owing to the presence of other fire-fighting equipment, it was not clear that this had any material bearing upon the result.

“At the moment when the fire flashed and the employees rushed from the fire door there was some congestion owing to the presence of other employees standing in or near the fire door opening. Bales of cotton restricted access to the doorway, but did not block it. A foreman was bringing up a wheeled extin­guisher at this time and this was also said to have interfered with the escape, but it is not stated that any employees were thereby actually prevented from getting out.

“Quickly the entire room became a mass of flame. Employees, probably not realizing that there was anyone left in the room, closed the fire door, thus preventing the spread of fire into the adjoining section. This was about five minutes after the start of the fire.

“No one had thought to call the fire department until occupants of near-by dwellings were aroused by the flames and telephoned the fire department at 2:17 A.M. A street box was also operated. The fire department responded promptly, arriving at about 2:20 A.M., but even when the alarm was first given it was already too late for rescue, operations.

“Three of the employees escaped by jumping from the windows on the north wall. These men suffered various degrees of injury, but all survived. Why others did not attempt to jump from windows is not explained. The bodies were all found near the windows, as shown on the plan. The windows were of the tilting factory type which might have made it more difficult to get through than windows of ordinary type with a larger area of opening, but the three men who did escape by way of windows did not mention any particular difficulty owing to the window design, and the presumption is that those who perished were overcome before they could attempt to get through the windows. The autopsies showed that the deaths were due to suffocation by smoke, carbon monoxide poisoning and burns of the body.

“The American District Telegraph Co. received a low air pressure signal at 2:15 a.m. and dispatched a runner to the plant. When he arrived at 2:23 A.M. the fire department was in charge. A water flow alarm was received at 2:37 A.M. It appears that employees opened the sprinkler shut-off valve at this time but were alarmed by the noise of the rush of water and closed it again.

“The New Haven Fire Department fought the fire with hand hose lines and deck guns. Additional companies were brought in by second and third alarms. The fire was confined to the third floor of the section involved, with water damage on lower floors. There is no report of the amount of the loss, but it was obviously considerable.

“On March 5, just a month later, another fire occurred in this factory. General overhauling, repairing operations and work On providing safeguards were under way, but regular manufacturing operations had not been resumed. Two men were at work stuffing strips of cotton felt into rejected quilts to bring them up to the proper weight. An electrically operated hand cutter in some way severed its electric supply cord and the resultant arc ignited the cotton. One sprinkler opened and quickly extinguished the fire.” (Moulton, Robert S. “The New Haven Quilt and Pad Co. Fire.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 34, No. 4, April 1941, pp. 357-362.)

Newspaper

Feb 5:  “New Haven, Conn., Feb. 5. – (AP) – Ten employes of the New Haven Quilt and Pad company died swiftly early today in a fire which swept a room filled with baled cotton.  The men were burned beyond recognition in what, from a standpoint of loss of life, was this city’s worst fire.  Three others saved themselves by jumping from a third floor window, but all were injured.

“Half an hour after the first alarm sounded spectators compared the flaming scene with an opened blast furnace as fire belched from the upper story of the brick factory.

“So great was the confusion that not until at least an hour later was it certain anyone was missing and the list was compiled slowly and only after several conflictions in identifications.

“Seventy-seven men had been at work when the fire started, 23 or 25 in the room where the blaze originated and to which it was largely confined.  Workers in that department were concerned with the production of fluffed cotton….

“Isadore Donner, foreman of the shift then on duty….said the fire started around a garnett, a machine for fluffing cotton, probably from a friction spark on static electricity….” (Daily Ardmoreite, Ardmore, OK. “10 Burned to Death in Quilt Plant.” 2-5-1941, p. 1.)

Sources

Daily Ardmoreite, Ardmore, OK. “10 Burned to Death in Quilt Plant.” 2-5-1941, p. 1. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=206844157&sterm=fire+quilt

Moulton, Robert S. “The New Haven Quilt and Pad Co. Fire.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 34, No. 4, April 1941, pp. 357-362.

National Fire Protection Association. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003). (Email attachment to B. W. Blanchard from Jacob Ratliff, NFPA Archivist/Taxonomy Librarian, 7-8-2013.)

Sunday Herald, Bridgeport CT. “1941 Fire Victim Recalls Horror.” 2-17-1957, p. 11. At: http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2229&dat=19570217&id=-m0mAAAAIBAJ&sjid=XgAGAAAAIBAJ&pg=1538,3162726

[1] Incorrectly have the date as March 5.