1942 — May 12, Christopher No. 3 Coal Mine gas and dust explosion, Osage, WV     —     56

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 6-14-2024 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

 –56  Dillon, Lacy A.  They Died in Darkness. 1976, p. 229.

–56  National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History.  1996. 

–56  Rakes. “Casualties on the Homefront: Scotts Run Mining Disasters During World War II.”

–56  U.S. Bureau of Mines. Final Report of Mine Explosion, No. 3 Mine, Christopher Coal…

–56  United States Mine Rescue Association. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Christopher.”

–56  West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. WV Mine Disasters. 2006.

            [Contains an unofficial listing of the fatalities and injured.]

Narrative Information

U.S. Bureau of Mines. Final Report of Mine Explosion, No. 3 Mine, Christopher Coal…:

“A gas and dust explosion occurred in the No. 3 mine of the Christopher Coal Company at about 2:25 p.m. on May 12, 1942. There were 117 men in the working sections of the mine at the time of the explosion and 107 men were on an inbound mantrip about 3,000 feet from the mine portal.

“The explosion was local in character, having been confined almost entirely to the portion of the mine in which it originated. Fifty-six men were killed in the explosion. Of this number 53 men were killed in the explosion area by violence, burns, and afterdamp, and three others were killed by afterdamp outside of the explosion area, along the main haulage road.

….

“The explosion was caused by the ignition of a body of methane by means of an electric arc inside the contactor box of a cutting machine and was propagated throughout the affected portion of the mine by gas and coal dust….”

Dillon:  “About one hundred and twenty-five men inside the mine were scheduled to quit for the day at 3:00 P.M.  The afternoon shift was to go into the mine and be at their working places at the same hour.  A man trip of one hundred and fifteen men, riding the mine cars pulled by an electric motor, was barely inside the drift mouth at 2:20 P.M. when the power failed.  The men thought this to be only a temporary stoppage and sat waiting… Only a short time elapsed until notice came to the waiting men that the mine had blown up….

“Three miles underground in the 1 ½ entry at the heading, the blast was most terrific.  Mine timbers blew out, and the roof fell in to the huckleberry roots, making it a horrible task to hunt for bodies….

“…it was estimated that over a thousand people…most of them curious spectators, swooped upon the little coal town….

It “took ten more days…to get the last of the bodies…. one of the victims, left a wife and eleven fatherless children.”  (Dillon 1976, pp. 229-233)

Rakes: “Perhaps the most significant change affecting the miners’ safety [during WW II] was the increased volume of coal dust.  Prior to mechanical production, hand-loaders tended to work their shift without a coating of dust on their faces, but the men at Christopher No. 3 breathed the fine particles of coal suspended in the mine atmosphere and exited the mine with begrimed faces. State officials voiced concern about the amount of suspended dust produced by Osage machinery because particles from the mine’s Pittsburgh seam were extremely volatile and would readily contribute to a methane or dust explosion.[1]

“The increased speed of mining at Osage and other mechanized operations exposed rock strata and virgin coal faces at a rate unobtainable during the hand-loading era and increased the possibility of releasing dangerous amounts of methane into the working areas. The same machinery that rapidly exposed methane and produced volatile coal dust could also provide an electrical spark for ignition.  Five of the nation’s six major explosions in 1940 occurred under mechanized conditions.  Because only one-third of the nation’s coal was mechanically mined, knowledgeable officials were aware that the increased hazards associated with technologically advanced mines were responsible for a greater percentage of major disasters.[2] However, informed operators knew that proper ventilation of mining faces practically eliminated the potential for catastrophe.  Sufficient volumes of fresh air prevented the accumulation of volatile methane mixtures, and regardless of the lack of proper maintenance of face equipment, no amount of electrical arcing would result in a methane ignition.[3]

“The Osage operation depended on trapdoors across haulageways to direct ventilating currents, and any time a door remained ajar, the air supply to certain working sections of the mine was interrupted. During the afternoon of May 12, 1942, a door remained open for approximately ten minutes in an area of the mine known as 1 Right while a locomotive shifted mine cars onto and off No. 1 Section. Ventilation was halted to No. 3 Section and either the unit’s gathering locomotive cable short-circuited against the shields of the machinery or the cutting machine operator engaged the “cutter’s” start switch, releasing an electrical arc into a methane-filled atmosphere.[4]  The volatile air mixture and surrounding coal dust ignited, blowing the locomotive and its empty cars on No. 3 Section from the track. Explosive flame and forces of expansion spread through all three working sections on 1 Right. Roof falls in intersections covered the bodies of several workers killed in the blast and blocked the entries leading to the sections. Besides the destruction of roof supports, the explosion destroyed air regulators and doors, halting ventilation to the entire area. Without incoming fresh air, “afterdamp,” an atmosphere lacking oxygen and usually containing lethal amounts of carbon monoxide, spread throughout the affected area.[5]

“The explosive forces traversed all three sections of 1 Right, and the velocity of the blast swept the floor clean along much of the area. Reaching the entrance to the 1 Right area, the explosion expanded in all directions for several hundred feet before losing momentum. Fifty-three men had died on the working sections, and three others along the main haulage way soon suffocated in the noxious fumes created by the blast….[6]

“Destruction of underground electrical facilities caused a general power failure, and on the surface, Mine Superintendent Edward O’Neill detailed an individual to investigate the electrical substation. Someone near the surface tool shop reported that a “big blast of wind just stopped the fan and knocked off the fan belt,” and the individual investigating the substation telephoned the superintendent to say that the circuit breakers had disengaged, an unusual odor was escaping from the borehole where the power cables entered the mine, and smoke was issuing from the same opening.[7]

“Underground, an assistant foreman who had walked to the main haulage entries to investigate immediately noted the odor of afterdamp caused by the suspension of quantities of creosote, benzol, and ethylene. Hurriedly returning to a telephone, he notified O’Neill that “something terrible had happened” and asked that the superintendent not engage the electrical power or restart the fan until further information was reported….

“The removal of bodies began in earnest early on May 13….

“The fatalities removed during the night of May 13 raised the body count to forty-five, and officials declared that there were at least eleven more remaining inside. Despite an exhaustive records examination, officials could not be certain of the number of men unaccounted for because there was no positive check-in-and-out system for workers. Matters were further complicated by the condition of the mine, where recovery teams were hindered by accumulations of explosive methane, slate falls, concrete blocks, and the twisted wreckage of trolley wire and other debris. The remaining casualties were trapped beneath the wreckage and rescue workers had to remove the slate to search for bodies.  Frank Christopher insisted that the recovery crews advance methodically so every casualty could be found and an accurate body count obtained….[8]

“The prolonged recovery process at Osage attracted a degree of national attention. In Washington, President Franklin Roosevelt was aware of the extended efforts but ignorant of the structural devastation that required the removal of slate falls, repair of ventilation systems, and construction of roof supports to protect the recovery workers….

“While disaster fund officials canvassed the area for donations, recovery workers continued slowly advancing through the debris of rock falls, tangled timbers, and twisted electrical wiring on 1 Right. Workers entering the portal to search for the remaining casualties were practically in sight of the funeral services conducted for some of the Osage victims. As recovery teams approached completion of their task, mine officers remained unsure how many bodies were still hidden in the wreckage. Confusion increased with the gruesome reality that bodies were dismembered and total recovery improbable, a horror more akin to foreign battlefronts of World War II than an industrial disaster.…[9]

“State and federal mine inspectors remained at Osage until the last victim was found and then turned to determining the cause of the disaster. The two government organizations successfully cooperated during the recovery period, despite a tradition of conflict, but arrived at different conclusions as to the explosion’s ignition source. At the coroner’s inquest in Morgantown’s Circuit Courtroom on July 8, the senior engineer for the Bureau of Mines remarked that the probable cause was a matter of opinion. There was no resolution of these differences because the Scotts Run mine Pursglove No. 2 demanded attention the following day….”[10] (Rakes. “Casualties on the Homefront: Scotts Run Mining Disasters During World War II.”)

Sources

Dillon, Lacy A. They Died in Darkness.  Parsons, WV:  McClain Printing Co., 1976.

National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. Accessed 2010 at:  http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1

Rakes, Paul H. “Casualties on the Homefront: Scotts Run Mining Disasters During World War II.” West Virginia History, Vol. 53, 1994, pp. 95-118.  Accessed at:   http://www.wvculture.org/history/journal_wvh/wvh53-6.html

United States Bureau of Mines. Final Report of Mine Explosion, No. 3 Mine, Christopher Coal Company, Osage, Monongalia County, W. Va., May 12, 1942. 48 pages. Accessed 6-15-2024 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/1942_Christopher_Report.pdf

United States Mine Rescue Association. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Christopher Coal Company. Christopher No. 3 Mine Explosion.” Accessed 6-15-2024 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/christopher_news_only.htm

West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. WV Mine Disasters 1884 to Present. MHS&T, October 9, 2008 update. At: http://www.wvminesafety.org/disaster.htm

[1] Cites: Dix, What’s a Coal Miner to Do?, 84, 106; Morgantown Dominion-News, 13 May 1942; Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1942, 15; Bureau of Mines, Final Report, 8.

[2] Cites: United Mine Workers Journal, May 15, 1942.

[3] Cites: Interview by the author, James Lively (Superintendent, Meadow River Mine), Lookout, 23 October 1992; Bureau of Mines, Final Report, 8; Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1942, 18.

[4] Footnote 16:  Government agencies failed to arrive at a consensus concerning the ignition source. Both agencies supplied convincing evidence for their conclusions. See Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1942, 17-18 and Bureau of Mines, Final Report, 38; Morgantown Dominion-News, 9 July 1942.

[5] Cites:  N. P. Rinehart, Mine Foreman’s Examination Guide, 1937 (Charleston: Jarrett Printing Co., 1937), 8; Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1942, 16-18 and map of “Mine No. 3 First Right Section Explosion Area” following page 18; Bureau of Mines, Final Report, 8, 36-38, 43; interview with James Lively; UMWJ, 1 August 1942; J. J. Forbes and G. W. Grove, Mine Gases and Methods for Detecting Them (Washington, DC: GPO, 1954), 17. Evidence suggests that at least twelve men survived the initial explosion on 1 Right but quickly suffocated in the poisonous atmosphere.

[6] Cites: Bureau of Mines, Final Report, 35-38; Dept. of Mines, Annual Rpt.t, 1942, 16-18 and map of “Mine No. 3.”

[7] Cites: Morgantown Dominion-News, 13 May 1942; Bureau of Mines, Final Report, 30.

[8] Cites: Bureau of Mines, Final Report, 34; Morgantown Dominion-News, 5-14-1942; Fairmont Times, 5-14-1942.

[9] Cites:  Morgantown Dominion-News, 23 May 1942.

[10] Cites: UMWJ, 1 August 1942 and 15 May 1951.