1943 — Jan 8, Pursglove Coal Mine No. 15 Fire, Pursglove, WV — 13
Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 5-12-2024 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/
— 13 Keenan. Historical Documentation of Major Coal-Mine Disasters…[U.S.]…, 1963, p. 31.
— 13 Rakes. “Casualties on the Homefront: Scotts Run Mining Disasters During World War II.”
— 13 West Virgina Archives & History. “On This Day in West Virginia History…Jan 8.”[1]
— 13 WV Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. WV Mine Disasters 1884 to Present.
Narrative Information
Keenan: “A mine fire occurred in the mine, in which 13 men died. The fire started at approximately 2:55 a.m., January 8, 1943, when a main-line locomotive hauling a train of 23 loaded cars toward the entrance of the mine stopped between No. 2 and 3 north headings on 1 west haulage road. The brakeman, who was riding the rear of the trip, walked outby along the mine cars and saw electric arcing and flashing and a fire burning in the vicinity of the locomotive.
“There were 78 men underground at the time the fire started; 65, some of whom were affected by carbon monoxide, escaped from the mine; twelve men died from smoke and carbon monoxide gas; and one man died, probably from burns, smoke, and carbon monoxide gas.
“So far as is known, the men did not attempt to protect themselves with barricades.
“Unsuccessful attempts were made to fight the fire direct with rock dust and water, then it was decided to seal the fire area underground. Some work had been done on preparations for sealing the fire when it was discovered that the fire had traveled about 3,000 feet from its origin. About midnight January 11, a decision was made to seal the fire by sealing all the surface openings. The last seal was completed at 10 :15 a.m. on January 14.
“The mine is opened by four shafts, three drifts, and two slopes. Seven of these openings were used for intake air and two shaft openings were used as return airways. One slope opening has a coal conveying belt and the other slope was used as a man-way and for repair material. Two drift openings were used for the haulage of refuse, supplies, and man-trips ; the third drift opening was abandoned.
“The mine ventilation was accomplished by two fans operated exhausting; one of the fans is an electrically driven 8-foot multi-blade propeller type that was stated to be circulating about 137,000 cubic feet of air per minute. The second fan is a centrifugal type and was stated to be circulating 100,000 cubic feet of air per minute.
“A mine locomotive, en route to the slope bottom with a train of 23 loaded coal cars, stopped on 1 west haulage entry near the intersection of 3 north. The brakeman, who was riding on the rear of the trip, walked outby along the mine cars and saw electric arcing and flashing and a fire burning in the vicinity of the locomotive. Being unable to proceed farther because of the lack of clearance between the cars and rib, he retreated inby over 3 north entry to a telephone at 8 west intersection and called the dispatcher at the slope bottom. He informed the dispatcher that the locomotive was on fire, and instructed him to pull the trolley-wire switch at the junction of 1 west and 2 north. The brakeman then started back toward the locomotive and cars and encountered dense smoke at about the intersection of 3 west. He then retreated inby over 3 north haulage road and reported the fire to the night foreman, who was in the 16 west working section.
“The foreman, accompanied by three men, obtained a fire extinguisher and proceeded, on a trolley locomotive, toward the fire. A short distance inby 12 west the locomotive ran through an insulated trolley-wire block that separated the 250 volts and 550 volts direct current. The 550-volt circuit had been opened at 2:55 a.m. by an automatic circuit breaker on the surface. The four men proceeded on foot and when they encountered dense smoke the foreman sent one man back with instructions to get help and notify the men in the three working sections and to proceed through the 17 right entry to fresh air and escape through the No. 1 mine to the surface.
“All the employees in 16 west and 17 right sections were notified and escaped. The employees in 15 west section were not notified because the man who had been instructed to notify these men stated that because of previous exposure to the smoke he felt that he was not physically fit to make this long trip. Further, that he had written a note with chalk on a door across the haulage road located in 15 west, a short distance inby the 3 north haulage road, to the effect that the employees in this section should escape to the surface through 17 right and the No. 1 mine. (The company designation of No. 15 mine is a combination of two mines formerly designated as No. 1 and 5 mines).
“The foreman accompanied by the other two men prolodd by foot to the 8 right intersection on 3 north. They could not advance farther on the 3 north haulage road because of dense smoke and proceeded to the fire area through 8 right and 2 north entries to the 1 west haulage way. At the junction of 2 north and 1 west, they were joined by three other workmen. After obtaining fire extinguishers and charged Cardox blasting devices, they proceeded toward the fire in 1 west using self-rescuers. The smoke became so dense that travel was difficult and they returned to the 2 north haulage road.
“The foreman proceeded alone from the 1 west intersection to find out whether or not the men in the working sections had escaped. This trip was made partly by locomotive through the No. 1 mine and on foot to the 17 right section. On arrival at 17 right, about 5 a.m., he was informed that the men in the 15 west section had not been notified. Accompanied by two employees, the foreman started toward the 15 west section on a locomotive to find the missing men. The locomotive was derailed outby 3 north entries on 17 right, and the remainder of the journey was made on foot. The foreman instructed the two men to go into the 15 west section and locate the men, stating that he would go to 14 west off 3 north and open doors in that entry, thus short-circuit the ventilation.
“The 15 west section was explored but the workmen had already left. The two men who had been sent into 15 west to notify the employees on that section returned to 3 north entry on a locomotive that was in the 15 west section. Arriving at the intersection, they encountered dense smoke and proceeded by foot several hundred feet inby on the 3 north entry to where they found the foreman in a state of collapse. The two men assisted the foreman until he could not longer help himself. The foreman instructed the men to abandon him, go to fresh air, and secure help. Later, three men from 17 right attempted to rescue the foreman but were unable to do so because of smoke. The body of the foreman was rescued later and taken to fresh air, where unsuccessful resuscitation was administered for 4½ hours.
“The last of the employees who escaped from the affected area of the mine arrived on the surface about 7 a.m., January 8.
“The general mine foreman accompanied by four other employees descended the intake airshaft at about 6 a.m. This party proceeded to 1 west and 2 north junction through a section of the mine on the outby side of the fire. The party met the State mine inspector and others at the junction of 1 west and 2 north. They were informed that the men in 15 west section were missing.
“A rescue party was organized, consisting of State mine inspectors, company officials, two rescue teams, and several other workmen, to explore the affected area. The rescue party entered the inby end of the 3 north working section through the No. 1 side of the mine, and conducted fresh air to 3 north entries. A Bureau of Mines representative arrived in the 3 north section and met the rescue party, at 15 west, who were on their way to the surface. The State mine inspector reported that all the working sections had been explored to the 14 west entry, and that none of the missing men had been located.
“A second rescue party arrived at 14 west about 5 p.m. and rescue operations were resumed. The ventilation was established to 13 west entries, on 3 north. While exploring in the vicinity of 14 west, three bodies were located on the No. 4 parallel return air course at the third breakthrough outby 14 west on 3 north. The three victims were within 100 feet of fresh air, and it was evident that attempts had been made by these men to reach an overcast nearby which was a part of the return from a section of the No. 1 side of the mine. The three bodies were brought to the surface about 3 p.m., Saturday, January, 9, and operations in the vicinity of 14 west and 3 north were temporarily suspended.
“A third rescue party continued the recovery operations from a point about 250 feet outby the 13 west entries on 3 north. The ventilation was finally established to the 12 west entries off 3 north. The rescue party explored the 3 north headings to the intersection of 9 west. These men were protected by breathing apparatus and gas masks during the exploration. Three additional bodies were located on the haulage road of 3 north headings near 9 west. This same party recovered one of the bodies, loading one on the stretcher, and left the third victim. This rescue party returned to the surface with one body sometime in the afternoon, Saturday, January 9.
“It was later decided to explore the 3 north entries through 8 right. The rescue party left 12 west on 3 north shortly after midnight and proceeded to the intersection of 8 right and 3 north by 2 north. Five additional bodies were located at the junction of the 8 right side-track on the 3 north haulage entry. These bodies were recovered and brought to the surface along with the two bodies that had been located by the previous rescue party. All persons were out of the mine at 6 a.m., January 10, except the body of the motorman in 1 west entry.
“While recovery operations were being conducted on 3 north entries, attempts were being made by company officials and laborers to reach the fire area in 1 west and recover the body of the missing motorman.
“An inspection was made of the outby end of the fire and it was observed that the roof coal had fallen on the haulage locomotive and had completely covered it, with the exception of the outby bumper. A recent cave of roof coal covered the locomotive to within 14 inches of the roof on the inby end, and all of the material beneath this layer was a mass of red coals.
“Two rescue teams arrived at 1 west about 1:20 a.m. Further attempts to fight the fire directly with hand methods of applying rock dust were futile; the heat was so intense that he main roof was caving.
“At about 5:30 a.m., January 9, after applying water to the fire for a short time, the men were driven out of the section by steam and carbon monoxide that had worked its way back through the parallel entries along the left side of 1 west haulage road. Several persons who were near the fire area were in a state of collapse before they could reach fresh air. Carbon monoxide was detected about 300 feet outby the fire.
“A later decision by company officials was made to seal the fire area inside the mine. Preparations for the sealing of the area were under way at the time an exploration trip was made through the Buston Run intake airshaft to find suitable locations for seals and ascertain the extent of the fire on the 3 north entries. It was found that the fire had traveled about 1,500 feet from its origin, which made it decidedly dangerous to seal the fire underground. All the men were withdrawn from the mine at 10 p.m., January 11. The decision to seal the mine at the surface was made about midnight, January 11.
“After the mine had been sealed for 7 days and the oxygen had not been consistently reduced in value, the management decided to flood the mine. Water was let into the mine by gravity flow from the surface, through four 8-inch drill-hole casings. It had been decided that these flooding operations should continue until the water level in the Buston Run air-shift reached a height of 16 feet, at which time dewatering operations will begin.
“From statements made by employees and other evidence, it appears obvious that much delayed action, confusion, and disorganization followed the outbreak of fire. This is borne out by statements made by the brakeman riding the rear of the trip of cars to the effect that because of inadequate clearance around or over the trip of cars, he was unable to reach the fire in its incipient stage. The general mine foreman corroborated the statement that the night foreman did not take immediate steps to notify and endeavor to get the men in the affected area to a place of safety. Further, that from the location and position of the bodies of the men from 15 west section, it is evident that they were badly disorganized. (Had these men turned north on 3 north entry (inby) to 17 right, they could have traveled to the surface in fresh air by the same route taken by the others who escaped.)
“The seals were broken and the mine was officially opened April 12, 1943. Exploration trips were made into the mine by numerous Federal, State, and company officials on April 15, 16, 17, 19, and 20, for the purpose of determining the condition of the mine and to ascertain that the fire area had been effectively sealed by the water. Poor ventilation and high water prevented exploration crews from examining the immediate fire area; however, the information gathered at this time was favorable as there were no indications of an active fire.
“The slow progress made in the unwatering of the mine resulted in several month’s delay in the search for the 13th victim, the missing motorman, and placing the mine back in operation. Some of the delays encountered in unwatering the mine may be charged to the difficulty experienced by the company in obtaining materials.
“At about 1 p.m., on May 20, 1944, the body of the motorman was found by the clean-up crew approximately 6 feet outby the front of the locomotive on the clearance side in a ditch. The crew notified company officials that they had found the body before any attempts were made to remove it from its location. Company officials notified the State mine inspector, and the body was brought to the surface about 5 p.m. that evening.
“After the locomotive was brought to the surface, the controller was found to be in the off position and the reversing lever was in the direction of the outgoing trip. The melting of parts of the controller and holes burned through the controller shield indicated that an electrical failure occurred inside the controller case.
“To state definitely the exact way in which the motorman met his death would be conjecture; however, in the opinion of most of those investigating the cause of the fire, an electrical failure occurred in the controller of the locomotive and the motorman was mortally wounded when he attempted to leave the cab of the locomotive. His body remained in the cab of the locomotive until it came to a stop, and then the body fell out of the cab as the cars and locomotive drifted backward down the grade.” (Keenan. Historical Documentation of Major Coal-Mine Disasters …[U.S.]…, 1963, pp. 31-32; cites F. E. Griffith, et al., Bureau of Mines.)
Rakes: “A confusing series of events early on January 8, 1943, again brought rescue teams into Pursglove for fire-fighting duty. At approximately 3:00 a.m., during the midnight or “hoot owl” shift, motorman Frank Robinette approached a curve near one of the mine’s track intersections. Clarence Hakin, the brakeman on the end of the twenty-three-car trip, saw an electrical arc in the distance and noticed the train slowly come to a halt and begin to drift backwards. Detecting the odor of burning rubber and electrical insulation, Hakin walked a few feet toward the front of the trip where he discovered the haulage locomotive on fire. Robinette was nowhere in sight and the brakeman hurried away to find assistance.[2]
“Although the official recommended response was to direct the bad air away from the working sections, midnight foreman Guy Quinn assembled his available employees and attempted to reach the burning locomotive. The intensity of the smoke forced Quinn’s team to retreat, but an assistant foreman advanced to see the locomotive and the coal beneath it on fire.[3] The probability of the remaining eighteen inches of “top coal” igniting and smoke entering the working sections increased the seriousness of the situation. Positioned midway between two intake fans and the new exhaust fan, smoke from the fire combined with high velocity air to carry lethal gases rapidly toward the men in the operating faces. Although the blaze continued to emit the odor of burning rubber and not coal, Quinn instructed three workers to inform section crews to leave the mine.[4]
“With three separate units to notify, the “alarm” detail divided near the entrance of Section 15 West while Quinn and fireboss Okie Hillberry attempted to approach the burning locomotive from another direction. As Brad Gainer and Charles Jones moved toward Sections 16 and 17, Les McGee attempted to negotiate the smoke and advise Section 15. McGee believed his own situation perilous and wrote the message “go to Section 17” on the inside of a ventilation door at the entrance to Section 15. Quinn realized that circumstances exceeded his available resources and instructed Hillberry to “go for help” while he returned to see if “the men were out.” McGee informed Quinn of his inability to reach Section 15. Quinn decided to return to the smoke-filled area to open ventilation doors that would short-circuit the air and prevent toxic gases from overwhelming the working sections.[5]
“McGee, joined by Brad Gainer, remained in a safe position, waiting for Quinn. When he failed to return, they went back to the smoke-filled entries and discovered the critically exhausted foreman. Quinn had opened one ventilation door but was unable to reach the other door after depleting his self-rescue oxygen apparatus. With their own lives endangered by the surrounding smoke, Gainer and McGee carried Quinn until their weakness forced them to crawl. Convinced that his own condition was fatal, the foreman advised Gainer and McGee to leave him. They located other workers who carried Quinn to fresh air, but the waiting rescue crew failed to revive him after four hours.[6] McGee and Gainer undertook one last attempt to notify the crew of Section 15 and successfully negotiated a route to the section. The absence of the crew and their dinner pails led McGee and Gainer to assume the men were attempting an escape. They retraced their steps to the surface along with the crew of another section.[7]
“Smoke had reached Section 15 at some point during Quinn’s efforts to manage the situation. Apparently the crew abandoned the section to find fresh air or, failing this, a suitable position for a barricade. The group, composed entirely of Scotts Run and Morgantown residents, was led by an experienced miner, but he was new to Pursglove and unfamiliar with the mine’s airways. Two of the three available avenues of escape led to safety, but it was difficult to choose the appropriate route because of the indefinite possibilities of certain sections being closed and others opened. These factors determined the entries that smoke would follow, as well as the avenues of pure air, and anyone not furnished with this information could make a fatal choice. Consequently, the men of Section 15 traveled directly toward the incoming smoke where the strong air current brought increasing volumes of carbon monoxide and the eleven crewmen suffocated.[8]
“Recovery teams initiated a search for the missing men with scant information as to their possible locations. The missing dinner pails contributed to optimistic hopes that the Section 15 crew may have escaped and were somewhere in the mine. From the first moments of the crisis, the fate of motorman Frank Robinette was unknown, and various speculations suggested he may have been enveloped by flames before he could withdraw or had managed to discover an entry with fresh air. Locating the missing men took priority over extinguishing the expanding blaze, and the rescue teams, hampered by heavy oxygen masks and air purifiers, slowly negotiated their way in the low visibility of thick smoke….[9]
“Locating the men proved to be extremely difficult and Jesse Redyard, the new chief of the Department of Mines, expressed increasing concern about the risk to the rescue teams. Rescuers, more concerned with locating the missing workers than with fighting the fire from a safe distance, were hospitalized because of carbon monoxide poisoning.[10] The search continued throughout the day, and early the following morning, recovery workers discovered the bodies of three members of the Section 15 crew. Rescue teams located the bodies of the remaining eight crewmen later in the day, but the fire had expanded nearly five hundred feet during the search. Jesse Redyard determined that motorman Robinette would not be found until the fire was extinguished.[11] After the failure of a two-day attempt to put out the fire with rock dust and chemicals, officials abandoned the search for Frank Robinette and sealed off the affected area. Company officers planned to resume production after construction of forty or fifty underground seals, but the powerful blaze forced inspectors and the company to reconsider and completely seal the mine.[12]
“Closing the mine was lamented as detrimental to the war effort, but the events surrounding the fire provided the area with a local hero. Guy Quinn’s attempt to open the ventilation doors and divert the smoke persuaded community leaders to request that the War Department recognize the foreman’s bravery with a posthumous decoration. A Presbyterian social service facility known as The Shack operated within sight of the mine portal, and when Eleanor Roosevelt visited the building on January 12, she was advised of the appeal for government recognition of Quinn’s efforts. The first lady requested that The Shack’s director Reverend Richard Smith prepare a history of the foreman’s life that she could present to the president. The War Department pointed out that military decorations were reserved for those in active service, and government officials suggested that the community seek the Carnegie Hero Medal from the Carnegie Commission in Pittsburgh.[13]
“Another fund drive was organized to supplement government subsidies, and compensation and social security officials returned to Pursglove to provide on-site assistance. The UMWA forwarded the customary one hundred dollars per family, and Frank Christopher was again among the first contributors to the Pursglove No. 15 Disaster Fund. The aggregate amount of the fund increased slowly compared to the former endeavors. Although the Pursglove company promptly contributed $2,000 following the previous disaster, twenty-seven days passed before it donated $650 to the families of the fire victims. By March 12, continued community support raised the total to more than $3,000.87
“Jesse Redyard proposed that company procedures were responsible for the thirteen deaths at Pursglove No. 15. The chief inspector distributed posters throughout the coal industry which stated that “the period between the time of the ignition and approximate time of their deaths was ample to allow a warning to be given and an orderly escape to be made through an area unaffected by the fire, but such warning was not given nor escape directed.” On February 4, 1943, a coroner’s jury in Morgantown agreed with Redyard’s assessment.[14]
“The financial strains caused by the disasters affected the solvency of the Pursglove company. Officials endeavored to avoid flooding mine fires because of the destruction of expensive mine equipment and long periods of non-productivity. On January 24, despite the obvious costs, Pursglove officials agreed to flood the mine with water from nearby Scotts Run and Wades Run. Samuel Pursglove, Sr. suggested that the fire was already out, but he supported flooding as a precautionary measure to save both time and coal.[15]
“Human and financial misfortune continued to plague the Pursgloves as they attempted to reclaim No. 15. On June 9, 1943, during efforts to repair a damaged air shaft, a welding spark ignited a gas explosion that killed one worker. Unable to absorb the cost of rehabilitating the mine, the Pursgloves obtained a conditional $250,000 advance from Consolidation Coal Company. In consideration of this sum, Consol became the exclusive sales agent for coal produced at Pursglove mines and required the Pursglove company to reorganize. Consol demanded that all executive offices be located at Pursglove and Joseph Pursglove, Jr. became the new company president. Pursglove apparently learned from the disasters. With added coal holdings, the productive life of Pursglove No. 15 was projected to fifty years, and to insure that disasters would not limit further operations, the company intended to install special fire fighting equipment and “stress safety above all else.”[16]
“The investigators’ failure to arrive at consensus regarding the ignition source of the Osage explosion obscured much of the Christopher Coal Company’s responsibility for the accident. Inadequate attention to various coal mine conditions resulted in condemnation of the company. Government agencies understood that these conditions could lead to a chain of circumstances with lethal results, and the series of mine explosions between 1940 and 1941 inspired a national law that required the United States Bureau of Mines to conduct coal mine inspections and publish its findings. The legislation provided no authority for enforcing those recommendations, but officials believed published findings would encourage compliance.[17]
“Although mine executives accepted governmental safety theories, most failed to adopt them in actual practice. During the annual Coal Convention of 1941, one mine executive warned operators that continued use of political influence to resist compliance with government recommendations would result in severe problems for the coal industry. Eugene McAuliffe of the Union Pacific Company agreed and cautioned that failure to employ the recommendations for adequate ventilation, clean roadways, and rock dusting would lead to total government control of the coal industry.[18]
“Other executives refused to accept the wisdom of these warnings. Consulting engineer James F. Brophy contended that operators possessed the inalienable right to manage their mines according to their own interests. In a ridiculous statement that exhibited Brophy’s inability to comprehend the implications of coal mining’s terrible disaster record, the engineer suggested that bestowing a mine foreman with the authority of a “ship’s captain in the olden times” would provide the greatest advance in mining safety.[19]
“It is doubtful that either Frank Christopher or the Pursglove family embraced the philosophy of total autonomy that Brophy advocated, but neither operated in full compliance with governmental recommendations. Perhaps both operators suffered under the common assumption that mining disasters were an unavoidable risk in mining. Many members of the coal industry continued to insist that mining disasters resulted from “the unpredictable stroke of misfortune which may fall in any human endeavor, no matter how well run.” In 1942, Scotts Run acceptance of this contention was exemplified in the observation that “[miners] know that there is the threat of almost unexplainable explosion in even the best protected mines.”[20]
“Members of the United States Bureau of Mines believed operators were often sincere in their safety efforts, but the pressures of daily production inhibited those efforts. Undoubtedly, increased production demands of World War II influenced procedures at the Christopher and Pursglove operations. Joseph Pursglove, Jr. complained that the federal government consistently demanded advances in total production without providing assistance to overcome the industry’s labor and material shortages.[21]
“Pursglove continued his complaint after the disasters by adding that the majority of mine machine failures resulted from the ignorance or neglect of workers, but his attempt to implicate miners could not reduce the company’s responsibility for the disasters. While Frank Christopher demonstrated a visible concern after the Osage catastrophe and extended cooperative efforts to the public, the Pursgloves remained officiously separate and reticent. Public acceptance of “inevitable disasters” depended on industry and community cooperation, and Pursglove No. 2 made the Scotts Run populace aware of the contrast between the operators. Noting the difference, one newspaperman observed that “it wasn’t until recently that we had occasion to really appreciate [Frank Christopher].”[22]
“Whatever the potential social and political ramifications of the loss of eighty-nine lives in nine months, Scotts Run coal production remained an integral component of national efforts to defeat the Axis powers. Clarence E. Smith of the Fairmont Times suggested that Washington should recognize the sacrifice of the Scotts Run miners. He insisted that coal miners waged war against the elements, but their war contribution was not in vain. They were part of a generation called to sacrifice life for a great cause. Perhaps Smith’s patriotic images provided a romantic rationalization for the Scotts Run disasters, but he concluded with a conjecture that when the world was older “things [would] be done differently.” Indeed, Eugene McAuliffe’s warning finally came to fruition in the late 1960s, when legislation empowered government mine inspectors to issue citations for unsafe conditions and provided the authority to halt mine production if certain safety requirements remained unfulfilled. The coal industry had demonstrated that, even with individuals as genuinely concerned as Frank Christopher, it would never adequately regulate itself.”[23] (Rakes, Paul H.. “Casualties on the Homefront: Scotts Run Mining Disasters During World War II.” West Virginia History, Vol. 53, 1994, pp. 95-118.)
West Virgina Archives & History. “On This Day in West Virginia History…Jan 8.”
“On January 8, 1943, a fire in the Pursglove No. 15 coal mine on Scott’s Run, Monongalia County, killed 13.”
Sources
Keenan, Charles M. Historical Documentation of Major Coal-Mine Disasters in the United States Not Classified as Explosions of Gas or Dust: 1846-1962 (Bulletin 616). Washington, DC: Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, 1963. Accessed at: http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc12768/m1/2/
Rakes, Paul H. “Casualties on the Homefront: Scotts Run Mining Disasters During World War II.” West Virginia History, Vol. 53, 1994, pp. 95-118. Accessed at: http://www.wvculture.org/history/journal_wvh/wvh53-6.html
West Virgina Archives & History. “On This Day in West Virginia History…Jan 8.” Accessed 5-12-1943 at: https://archive.wvculture.org/history/thisdayinwvhistory/0108.html
West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. WV Mine Disasters 1884 to Present. MHS&T, October 9, 2008 update. At: http://www.wvminesafety.org/disaster.htm
[1] Includes link to U.S. Bureau of Mines report relating to the mine fire: https://archive.wvculture.org/history/disasters/pursglove.pdf
[2] Cites: Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1942, 13; Morgantown Dominion-News, 12 January and 5 February 1943. The reason for the fire is unclear and two opinions were voiced at the inquest: the trolley wire came in contact with the motor by a roof-fall, or the locomotive controller experienced an electrical explosion. Hakin believed the controller “blew-up.”
[3] Cites: Rinehart, Mine Foreman’s Examination Guide, 1937, 93; Morgantown Dominion-News, 5 February 1943.
[4] Cites: Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1943, 13; Fairmont Times, 10 January 1943; Morgantown Dominion-News, 12 January and 5 February 1943.
[5] Cites: Morgantown Dominion-News, 5 February 1943.
[6] Cites: Morgantown Dominion-News, 5 February 1943; 9 and 12 January and 5 February 1943; Fairmont Times, 12 January 1943; Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1943, 14.
[7] Cites: Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1943, 14; Morgantown Dominion-News, 5 February 1943.
[8] Cites: Fairmont Times, 10 and 11 January 1943; Morgantown Dominion-News, 12 January and 5 February 1943; West Virginia Department of Mines, Quarterly Report, Coal Mining Section, January-March 1943 (Charleston: Department of Mines, 1943), 22.
[9] Cites: Morgantown Dominion-News, 9 January 1943; Fairmont Times, 10 January 1943.
[10] Cites: Rinehart, Mine Foreman’s Examination Guide, 1937, 93; Fairmont Times, 10 Jan 1943.
[11] Cites: Fairmont Times, 10 and 11 Jan 1943.
[12] Cites: Fairmont Times, 10 and 11 Jan 1943; Mine Rescue Association, Questions and Answers, 12; Rinehart, Mine Foreman’s Examination Guide, 1937, 91; Morgantown Dominion-News, 12 and 13 Jan and 4 Feb 1943.
[13] Cites: Morgantown Dominion-News, 13 January 1943, 1 March 1943.
[14] Cites: Department of Mines, Quarterly Report, Coal Mining Section, January-March 1943, 21; Morgantown Dominion-News, 4 and 5 March 1943.
[15] Cites: Rinehart, Mine Foreman’s Examination Guide, 1937, 93; Morgantown Dominion-News, 25 January 1943; Morgantown Dominion-News, 27 July 1943.
[16] Cites: Humphrey, Historical Summary of Coal Mine Explosions, 170; “New Pursglove Organization Plans to Rehabilitate,” Coal Age 48(August 1943): 131-32; Morgantown Dominion-News, 27 July 1943.
[17] Cites: John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety (Albany: Univ. of New York Press, 1985), 34; Humphrey, Historical Summary of Coal Mine Explosions, 227.
[18] Cites: McAuliffe, “Certain Aspects of Coal Mine Safety,” 16-18.
[19] Cites: McAuliffe, “Certain Aspects of Coal Mine Safety,” 16-18.
[20] Cites: Humphrey, Historical Summary of Coal Mine Explosions, 1; Loren Pope, Bituminous Coal Annual (Washington, DC: National Coal Association, 1951), 169; Morgantown Dominion-News, 14 May 1942.
[21] Cites: U. S. Bureau of Mines, Bituminous Coal Mine Safety-Inspection Outline, information circular 6829 (Pittsburgh: Bureau of Mines, 1935), 1; Humphrey, Historical Summary of Coal Mine Explosions, 229.
[22] Cites: Morgantown Dominion-News, 16 and 21 July 1943.
[23] Cites: Fairmont Times, 1 July 1942 and 10 January 1943; William Sievers Graebner, “Coal Mining Safety: National Solutions in the Progressive Period” (Ph. D. diss., University of Illinois, 1970), 1.