1945 — Feb 23, American Air 9 flying too-low VFR, crash, Glade Mt. ~Rural Retreat, VA–17

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard for: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/  Last edit 12-11-2023.

–17  Aviation Safety Network, Accident Description, American Airlines Flight 9, Feb 23, 1945

–17  CAB AIR, American Airlines – Rural Retreat, Virginia – February 23, 1945. 2-1-1946, 1.

–17  Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJFM&P, 3/1, Mar 1982, p.53.

–17  Lethbridge Herald (Alberta Canada). “Five Survivors of Plane Crash,” February 24, 1945

Narrative Information

Civil Aeronautics Board Accident Investigation Report (File No. 875-45):

“American Airlines Flight 9 [NC18142] en route from New York to Los Angeles departed New York at 2139…on February 22, 1945 and subsequently crashed about 0225 on February 23, 1945, approximately 5 1/2 miles southwest of Rural Retreat, Virginia. The airplane crashed on the wooded summit of Glade Mountain killing fifteen of the nineteen passengers and both pilots. The four remaining passengers and the hostess received serious injuries and the airplane was demolished.

“The site of the crash was approximately 3910 feet above sea level, 64 miles northeast of the Tri-City Airport and about 1½ miles to the left of the center of the airway. The nearest local community was Rural Retreat. Virginia, 5 1/2 miles to the northeast of the site of the crash. The wreckage was strewn over a path of 450 feet and was not found until it was slighted from the air 1240 on February 23. A rescue party arrived at the scene shortly thereafter.

“Subsequent investigation disclosed that the first impact evidently occurred s the airplane was in approximately level flight and proceeding straight ahead at cruising power. From the first point of impact and for approximately 425 feet in the general direction of the course, trees were broken at decreasing heights until the plane struck the ground. Parts of the airplane were strewn along this whole path. A check of the airway radio facilities indicated that no irregularities prevailed at the time of the accident.

“Passengers later testified that the plane had been passing through rain and clouds and encountering considerable turbulence for some time prior to the crash. Competent testimony as to the current weather supported the passengers’ testimony. Survivors also stated that a freezing rain fell soon after the crash occurred….

Departure from Washington had been at 0011 of February 23 and routine position reports from the airplane had given no indication of difficulty up to the time of the crash. At 0150 a radio message had been received and acknowledged by the Captain reclearing the flight on instruments from Tri-City to Smithville and contact flight rules from Smithville to Nashville. The last radio message from the flight at 0205 gave its position as 4000 feet over Pulaski, Virginia. The evidence would indicate that between this time of 0205 and the time the flight would have proceeded on an  instrument flight plan at Tri-City, the airplane had crashed into the mountain while in normal cruising flight on its normal southwesterly course. This, taken together with the testimony of the passengers that the flight was in rain or clouds prior to the crash, would indicate that the Captain had neither turned the flight around nor proceeded to a safe altitude which would adequately clear the terrain existing along the Pulaski-Tri-City leg of the flight.*[This footnote reads: “Airway Traffic Control assigns altitude levels for instrument flights for the purpose of flight separation only and does not accept responsibility of flight control in respect to terrain clearance.”] “In the absence of difficulties not disclosed by the evidence, it appears that the flight was being conducted contrary to the Civil Air Regulations.** [This footnote reads “CAB.61.7401 NIGHT. ‘No scheduled air carrier aircraft shall be flown at an altitude of less than 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle located within a horizontal distance of 5 miles from the center of the course intended to be flown, except during take-ffs and landings or when operating in accordance with specific procedures for definite localities approved by the Administrator.’”] In other words, either an emergency had occurred of which no evidence could be found or else the pilot was using poor judgment in not having adequate terrain clearance. Testimony of some other company pilots disclosed their unfamiliarity with the Civil Air Regulations pertaining to minimum altitudes for night contact flight and the procedure for changing from contact to instrument flight in the event an instrument altitude had not been previously requested or assigned.

“Further evidence disclosed that it had been customary for the company to dispatch night contact flights through this region at the 4000-foot altitude although the region cannot be flown at 4000 feet if a 1000-foot clearance is to be maintained over all terrain for 5 miles to either side of the center of the airway. There is evidence which indicates that the Civil Aeronautics Administration, due to a shortage of personnel, had not kept a close enough check on the company’s operating and dispatching procedures. It may be noted here that Flight 7, which took off from Washington shortly after Flights 9, flew at 6000 feet although cleared to fly at 8000 feet over the same terrain. The company’s approved minimum instrument altitude throughout this whole region is 7000 feet.

“All of these facts taken together would seem to indicate a general laxity in dispatching and flight supervision and a need for continued training and checking of pilots in proper flight planning.

“In this particular accident the evidence indicated that the company’s dispatcher at New York had approved the Captain’s plan to fly the route from Washington to Tri-City according to contact flight rules at 4000 feet and prior to the departure of the trip from a New York. While on the ground at Washington the Captain had discussed the weather ahead with a company dispatcher and had been informed that other pilots had been planning instrument flights because of existing and forecast weather and the fact that the flight was being conducted at night. Evidence was offered that the Captain decided that he could fly contact as he expected an improvement in the weather, and chose an altitude of 4000 feet ostensibly to avoid headwinds and possible icing conditions at higher altitudes. This plan was approved although weather indications showed the ceilings en route and forecast to be below contact flight minimum with a trend toward less favorable weather. Also, as has been previously stated, contact flight clearance at 4000 feet over this terrain was in violation of the Civil Air Regulations….

“Discussion and Findings

“Taking all the evidence as a whole the Board finds that:

“1. Existing and forecast weather known to the company and the crew at both Washington and New York indicted the inadvisability of attempting the conduct of the flight under contact flight rules…

“2. Civil Air Regulations were violated in conducting the flight at all between Pulaski and Tri-City at an altitude of 4000 feet.

“3. The company exercised poor judgment and laxity in both dispatching and flight supervision.

“4. The pilot used questionable judgment in his flight planning.

“5. Because of a shortage of personnel the Civil Aeronautics Administration had not kept a close enough check on the company’s operating and dispatching procedures over this route.

“6. The pilot either used poor judgment or was experiencing undisclosed mechanical or operational difficulties on that leg of the flight between Pulaski and Tri-City.

….

Probable Cause

“The Board concludes that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s failure to properly plan the flight and remain at a safe instrument altitude under existing conditions. A contributing cause of the accident was the company’s laxity in dispatching and supervising the flight.”  (CAB AIR, American Airlines – Rural Retreat, Virginia – February 23, 1945)

Newspaper

Feb 24: “….The five injured were brought to a hospital at Marion, Va., after being carried more than three miles through steep, heavily-wooded country.  Some of them were reported to be suffering from cold and exposure…. The injured remained in the freezing weather for about 12 hours from the time the twin-engine plane plunged into the trees of Glade Mountain at 2:30 am until about 3 pm when Willie Vaught, a rural retreat farmer who had joined in the search for the big plane, met Mrs. Violet Ulen of Washington, one of the injured, who had started out barefooted to bring aid to the others.” (Lethbridge Herald (Alberta Can.).“Five Survivors of Plane Crash,” Feb 24, 1945)

Sources

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation, Database, 1945, p. 35. American Airlines Flight 9 Douglas DC-3-277 crash 5.6M SW of Rural Retreat, VA. 23 February 1945. Accessed 12-11-2023 at: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19450223-0

Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. American Airlines – Rural Retreat, Virginia – February 23, 1945 (File No. 875-45). Washington, DC: CAB, February 1, 1946. At: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiNrKXawIiDAxV5FFkFHZmYCvcQFnoECBQQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Frosap.ntl.bts.gov%2Fview%2Fdot%2F33251%2Fdot_33251_DS1.pdf%3F&usg=AOvVaw08CdWvN3m9JHqW_xGxxROy&opi=89978449

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.

Lethbridge Herald, Alberta Canada. “Five Survivors of Plane Crash,” 2-24-1945.  Accessed at:  http://www.newspaperarchive.com/freepdfviewer.aspx?img=6257299