1946 — June 9, Fire, Canfield Hotel, Dubuque, Iowa — 19
Latest edit 11-7-2023 by Wayne Blanchard for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/
–19 Jones, Jon C. “A Brief Look At The Hotel Fire Record.” Fire Journal, May 1981, p. 39.
–19 McElroy, James K. “Dubuque, Iowa, Hotel Fire.” Quarterly [NFPA], 40/1, July 1946, 19.
–19 National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. NFPA, 1983, p.138.
–19 National Fire Protection Assoc. “Large Loss Fires of 1946.” Quarterly, 40/3, Jan 1947, 221
–19 NFPA. Summary of Fire Incidents 1934-2006 in Hotel Fires in the United States. 2008.
–19 Ward. “Hotel Fires: Landmarks in Flames…,” Firehouse, March 1978, p. 41.
Narrative Information
McElroy: “A fire which cost the lives of fourteen men and five women, and seriously injured twenty other guests of the Hotel Canfield, Dubuque, Iowa, in the early hours of June 9th, 1946, occurred just three days and four minutes following the holocaust at the LaSalle Hotel in Chicago. The tragic similarity of many factors in these recent hotel fires in which there was loss of life is of more than academic interest to the public, whose lives and property are exposed to human and structural failures which are within the limits of common sense protection.
“A coldly technical report is not enough, while standing in the ruins of the Hotel Canfield, watching firemen carefully probing beneath tons of debris for scarcely recognizable bodies which may still be buried. The Dubuque Fire Department, and all who came to their assistance, rendered heroic service to their community and to the traveling public temporarily and horribly dependent on their skill. The odds at the Hotel Canfield were overwhelmingly against the fire department when they “rolled” at 12:39 A.M. on June 9th, as they will be against other fire departments whose communities do not take the necessary steps to give them an even break in providing structurally sound buildings, adequate automatic sprinkler or fire alarm protection, and trained hotel personnel who know what to do when a fire emergency arises.
“For the fifty years of its existence, the open wood stairway to the three upper floors of the unsprinklered, ordinary brick-joisted section of the Hotel Canfield had been an invitation to any rapidly burning fire in the first floor or basement to involve the corridors in heat, smoke and flame and trap those occupants of the hotel who were not immediately cognizant of their danger.
The New Addition.
“When the 6-story fire-resistive annex was built in 1925, there was constructed an interior, non-combustible stairwell with safe passage to the outside at the ground floor and with automatic fire doors on the openings into it….At the time of the investigation it had not been determined whether or not this shaft was used for escape purposes after the heavy doors had latched shut. There was no indication of heat or smoke in this stairwell following the fire.
“Normal access for guests to the hotel rooms on the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth floors of the fire-resistive section from the hotel lobby on the first floor of the brick-joisted section was either by a passenger elevator in the lobby (in a substandard enclosure) or the open stairs in the four-story section. Access to the fifth and sixth floors of the fire-resistive section was from elevator landings in. a frame, ironclad passage built above the roof of the four-story combustible section. Corridors from the old to the new section were continuous on all floors. The corridors were protected with automatic flue doors at the wall separating the brick-joisted and the fire-resistive sections, except for an unprotected opening in the first floor and in the basement, but as it happened neither unprotected opening contributed to the loss of life or the spread of fire out of the lobby or the lounge. Following the Cocoanut Grove disaster, the Dubuque building official required that additional exits to the outside be provided from the Red Lounge on the first floor, which were later installed by the owners, and would no doubt have been used to save many lives had the Red Lounge been crowded with customers at the time the fire occurred.
Origin and Spread.
“Investigation of the fire disclosed that it was the practice of the bartender of the Red Lounge bar of the hotel to require waitresses to collect cigarette butts in paper napkins left on table tops and deposit such refuse in a paper container in a small closet on the street side of the bar pending later disposal. In accordance with Iowa law, the bar had closed at midnight on Sunday night. At 12:10 A.M. four young people came in to play the juke box. They noticed a crackling noise, similar to the gnawing of a mouse, which seemed to come from the direction of the closet. One of the young men also smelled smoke and investigated. On opening the closet door he discovered that the wall was burning behind the paper carton used for cigarette butt disposal.
“Initial efforts to extinguish the fire by a patron with a wet towel and by the hotel manager, using a portable extinguisher, were unsuccessful. The fire spread rapidly out of the closet to the highly combustible fibre board interior finish of the bar room. The Red Lounge had been “modernized” several years ago by the installation of the fibre board glued to 3-inch plaster board, which in turn was nailed to suspended 2 x 4’s. The concealed spaces above the suspended ceiling and the closet spaces in the lounge were not protected by automatic sprinkler or fire alarm systems.
“The substitute night clerk on duty reported that he first noticed the fire from the unprotected door opening in a brick wall into the Red Lounge from the lobby of the hotel. The manager attempted to warn guests on the upper floors. A telephone alarm from the hotel was received at fire department headquarters at 12:39 A.M., which was fifteen minutes or more after the fire was discovered. After telephoning the alarm, the night clerk escaped unharmed by descending basement stairs off the lobby, passing through the basement and to the outside through a rear exit in the fire-resistive section of the hotel.
“The lobby of the hotel, also in the old section, had likewise had its interior finish “modernized” with a different type, though also highly combustible, fibre board, which permitted flames to spread rapidly over its surface. The spread of fire is reported to have been extremely rapid from the Red Lounge through a doorway to the lobby of the hotel, so rapid that when the first company of the Dubuque Fire Department arrived fire was belching forth from the street entrances to the lobby and Red Lounge.
Rescue Imperative.
“The “invitation to death” which for years had existed in the unsprinklered building with the highly combustible fibre board interior finish and the open combustible stairway, had to be accepted by nineteen persons on the night of the fire. It was immediately apparent on the prompt arrival of the first fire company that many of the occupants were still alive and that life saving was of primary importance before actual fire-fighting operations could begin.
“A second alarm was transmitted by police radio at 12:42 A.M. and all remaining city apparatus, all off-shift firemen, all firemen in the city who were on vacation, and two off-shift fire alarm headquarters operators responded. In all fifty-six men were on duty at the fire, including seventeen firemen who had rejoined the fire department since Y-J Day. Countless civilians, the police department and National Guardsmen assisted in rescue operations which were imperative the moment the fire swept up the open wooden stairway from the lobby to the upper floors. There was insufficient manpower in the Dubuque :fire department for fire fighting and rescue operations to proceed simultaneously. The only member of the Dubuque Fire Department not at the scene was the fire alarm operator on duty at alarm headquarters.
“Firemen and many helping hands using life nets saved twenty-seven persons. Ladders were employed to rescue thirty-five of the 129 permanent and overnight guests. Many escaped by using the safe exterior fire escape on the rear of the adjoining fire-resistive section. An exterior fire escape on the street side of the four- story brick-joisted section could not be used, as flames broke through the entrance- to the Red. Lounge directly under it. One man died in an attempt to use this means of escape, and another died just inside his window which opened directly on to the fire escape at its second floor landing. Several jumped from second-story windows to the ground.
The Attack.
“A period of approximately 15 minutes elapsed after their arrival before firemen were able to make an attack on the inferno of fire sweeping through the older section of the building, but they eventually brought the fire under control….
Loss of Life.
“Following the…battle to bring the fire under control…the search for bodies could begin, it was found that lives had been lost in both the combustible and fire-resistive sections of the hotel. The body of a woman patron, present when the fire was discovered, was found under the debris of the Red Lounge. Most of the loss of life occurred in the upper floors of the four-story section, either from burns or asphyxiation. Fire raging up the open stairway in the older building mushroomed, driving heat and smoke into the corridors of the fire-resistive section of the hotel Until the fusible links in the fire doors operated to close all but one of the fire doors. One woman was found dead in the corridor of the fifth floor, just inside the fire door separating her from the frame, ironclad passage to the elevator. This fire door was wedged open with luggage, which indicated that she had tried to get out of the building the way she came into it, without knowledge that there was a fire-escape which would have been safe for her to use less than 75 feet away around a corner at the end of the fifth floor corridor. A man was found dead in a third floor room of the fire-resistive section adjacent to a light court in which all windows, both in the older and newer walls of the court, were protected with metal sash and wired glass. Doors to rooms off the corridors in the fire-resistive section were wood paneled, with metal ventilating grilles. In those outside rooms in which the doors and transoms were closed there was very little evidence of smoke or fire damage. Corridors on the fifth and sixth floors were encrusted with soot and condensation marks to a level of approximately 5 feet above the floor, presenting an appearance similar to the corridors in the Hotel LaSalle. The condition of the corridors is considered proof that the fire doors which were located in the passages from the burning wood-joisted section of the building did not operate quickly enough to enable guests unfamiliar with the location of the safe fire escape and the safe, interior, non-combustible stairway enclosure, to use them.
“Without question, the guests who lost their lives in the Hotel Canfield disaster trusted their lives to those who had jurisdiction over their safety. The vulnerability of the brick-joisted section of the building to destruction by fire from whatever cause, once under way, is easily recognized by the merest tyro[1] in the fire protection and fire prevention profession. Little did the hotel owners realize that their “modernization” program of a few years back, which was responsible for the installation of highly combustible interior finish materials in the lounge and lobby, would only increase the vulnerability of the older building to a fire which would spread throughout the building with lightning-like rapidity. There is no doubt that the installation of automatic sprinkler protection for the four floors and basement of . the 50-year-old building would have had a very high probability of extinguishing the fire in the lounge in its incipient stage. Sprinklers in the corridors alone would have made it possible for the guests in the older section of the building to find a place of refuge.
“Even with the probability of a flash fire in the highly combustible fibre board interior finish installed in the lounge and lobby, had an automatic fire alarm system been provided which would inform hotel personnel that fire existed in the structure, all guests might have easily made their way to safety, provided they had been informed on checking into their rooms that the building offered two safe means of egress totally aside from the open stairways and the unsafe fire escape over the entrance to the Red Lounge.
“Those who have placed reliance on ordinary automatic fire doors to prevent loss of life have reason to be skeptical as a result of this fire. In this case smoke and hot gases passed through doorways before the fire doors closed, and one door was blocked open.” (McElroy, James K. “Dubuque, Iowa, Hotel Fire.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 40, No. 1, July 1946, pp. 19-25.)
National Fire Protection Association: “June 9, Dubuque, Iowa. Hotel. $407,000. The second serious hotel fire in less than a week (see June 5, Chicago, Ill., LaSalle Hotel) caused the death of 19 persons in the Hotel Canfield. (Details in the July, 1946, QUARTERLY, page 19.) The loss indicated above is divided: $135,000 to building; $45,000 to contents; $37,000 use and occupancy, and $190,000 to cover liability for loss of life ($10,000 per person).” (National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Fires of 1946.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 40, No. 3, Jan 1947, p. 221 in pp. 179-248.)
Sources
Jones, Jon C. “A Brief Look At The Hotel Fire Record.” Fire Journal, May 1981, pp. 38-41.
McElroy, James K. “Dubuque, Iowa, Hotel Fire.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 40, No. 1, July 1946, pp. 19-25
National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Fires of 1946.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 40, No. 3, Jan 1947, pp. 179-248.
National Fire Protection Association. Summary of Fire Incidents 1934-2006 in Hotel Fires in the United States as Reported to the NFPA, with Ten or more Fatalities. Quincy, MA: NFPA, One-Stop Data Shop, Fire Analysis and Research Division, January 2008, 4 pages. Accessed at: http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/Press%20Room/Hotelfirefatalitiesreport.pdf
Ward, Neale. “Hotel Fires: Landmarks in Flames, History’s Famous Hotel Fires,” Firehouse, March 1978, pp. 40-45.
[1] A beginner in learning. (Merriam-Webster.com)