1946 — Oct 3, American Overseas Airline takeoff crash/fire, Harmon Field AFB, Newfoundland–39

Last edit 11-1-2022 by Wayne Blanchard for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

–39  Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. American Overseas Airlines 03 Oct 1946

–39  Baugher. 1944 USAAF Serial Numbers (44-001 to 44-30910). 10-15-2011 revision.

–39  CAB. Supplemental Data (American Overseas Airline, 10/03/1946). May 23, 1947, p. 2.

–39  Haine. Disaster in the Air. 2000, p. 253.

–39  National Fire Protection Assoc. “Large Loss Fires of 1946.” Quarterly, 40/3, Jan 1947, 239

–39  Smith. A History of Disaster. 2008, p. 142.

–39  Wikipedia. “American Overseas Airlines.”

Narrative Information

Aviation Safety Network: “The DC-4, named “Flagship New England”, departed New York-LaGuardia (LGA) at 12:14 on October 2, 1946 bound for Shannon (SNN). Prior to crossing the Atlantic, an intermediate stop was planned at Gander. Poor visibility at Gander forced the crew to land at their alternate, Stephenville-Harmon Field. The DC-4 arrived there at 16:30. In order to provide the necessary crew rest, a 12-hour stopover was made with a scheduled departure at 04:45.

“The flight was cleared to taxi to runway 30 for departure. As the wind appeared to be from 90 degrees at 9 kts, the tower operator advised the crew to taxi to runway 07 instead. At the time of the takeoff the ceiling was reported 5,000 feet, overcast; visibility 10 miles. Neither moon nor stars were visible through the overcast as the flight took off towards unlit terrain. It was general practice for flights using runway 07 to turn right immediately after takeoff to avoid rising terrain. After takeoff the DC-4 continued in a straight line and collided with a steep ridge at an elevation of 1160 feet, 7,1 miles past the runway….” (Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. American Overseas Airlines 03 Oct 1946.)

Baugher: “Douglas C-54E-5-DO Skymaster….9064 (c/n 27290/DO236) to American Overseas Airlines registered as N90904, named ‘Flagship New England’. October 03, 1946 w/o Earnst Harmon AFB, Newfoundland when it crashed 7 miles after takeoff into a ridge line, 8 crew 31 passengers all fatal.” (Baugher. 1944 USAAF Serial Numbers (44-001 to 44-30910). 10-15-2011 revision.)

Civil Aeronautics Board:  “Investigation and Hearing

“Supplemental Data

“….American Overseas Airlines is incorporated under the laws of the, State of Delaware and maintains its headquarters at New York, N. Y. At the time of the accident American Overseas Airlines was operating as an air carrier under a certificate of public convenience and necessity and an air carrier certificate, both issued pursuant to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended. These certificates authorized the company to fly persons, property and mall between various points in the United States and the British Isles, including New York, N. Y. and Shannon, Ireland.

Before “….scheduled departure the flight crew was briefed at the United States Army Air Forces Operations at Harmon Field concerning the weather involved in the proposed flight. At approximately 0445 the captain requested take-off clearance from the control tower operator at Harmon Field and was instructed to proceed to Runway 30. As the aircraft was being taxied toward the take-off end of Runway 30, the control tower anemometer indicated the wind from 90 degrees at 9 mph. The control tower operator, therefore, advised the flight that a change in runway would be necessary and cleared the aircraft for takeoff on Runway 7.

“At 0500 the aircraft departed Harmon Field on a magnetic bearing of approximately 70 degrees. About one minute after take-off the control tower operator requested a ceiling check from the flight and, in acknowledgment, was advised to “wait”. This was the last radio contact with the flight.  Personnel on the airport who witnessed the take-off observed that about 2 minutes and 30 seconds after the ship had left the ground a glow of fire appeared approximately 7 miles from the field almost directly in line with the runway on which Aircraft 904 took off.  Several attempts were made to contact the aircraft by radio and, inasmuch as none of these was successful, it was presumed that it had crashed.  Search operations were initiated immediately by the United States AAF personnel at Harmon Field. The first search party arrived at the scene of the accident several hours after the accident had occurred and found that the aircraft had been demolished as a result of impact and subsequent fire and that all 39 occupants had been killed instantly….

“Investigation

“The aircraft…crashed against a steep ridge at a point 7.1 miles from the take-off end of Runway 7 at a magnetic bearing of 76 degrees 45 minutes from the center of the airport and at an elevation of 1,160 feet.[1] The elevation of Harmon Field is 22 feet. An inspection of contour charts of this area indicates that the terrain northeast of Harmon Field rises to an elevation in excess of 1,500 feet through an azimuth extending from approximately 20 degrees magnetic to 90 degrees magnetic. Directly in line with Runway 7 and approximately 7-1/2 miles from the airport lies a depression the lowest elevation of which is slightly under 1,000 feet. The terrain toward the southeast is relatively flat. The field is bounded by St. George Bay toward the south. Toward the northeast several hills rise to an elevation between 1,000 and 2,000 feet.

“The evidence at the scene of the accident disclosed that impact had been made against the side of a hill, the slope of which was approximately 80 degrees. It was apparent that fire had broken out immediately after impact and the aircraft burned severely for approximately 9 hours after the time of the accident. The destruction resulting from impact and fire was so complete that inspection of the wreckage provided little information as to the condition of the aircraft immediately prior to impact. However, marks of contact with the hall indicated that the aircraft was approximately in straight and level flight at the moment of impact and no evidence was observed which indicated structural failure or malfunctioning prior to impact.

“No take-off restrictions or any special procedures to be employed after take-off from any runway at Harmon Field had been established.  Investigation disclosed, however, that the Air Transport Command of the AAF had restricted the use of this runway and required its DC-4 operation to take-off over water in all instances in which the wind velocity was less than 10 mph. Testimony of control tower personnel indicated that it was a general practice for flights utilizing this runway to make a right turn shortly after take-off….

“At the time of the take-off of Aircraft 904, the weather was being reported as: Ceiling 5,000 feet, overcast; visibility 10 miles; wind northeast 10 mph. Approximately 15 minutes later, the wind was reported 4 mph but no changes in other weather elements were observed. Neither the moon nor stars were visible through the overcast, and the unlighted terrain in the vicinity of Harmon Field was therefore not visible either in flight or from the airport.

“Captain William R. Westerfield had considerable experience in DC-4 type aircraft both when he was flying with the Air Transport Command and in the preceding nine months with the company.  A substantial portion of his flight experience had been accumulated over this particular route including several operations into and out of Harmon Field. The other members of the crew were also experienced in DC-4 operation involving flight over the North Atlantic route….

“Discussion

….

“Irrespective of whether this particular flight had been complicated by some mechanical malfunctioning not apparent in the investigation, with a normal rate of climb following take-off from Runway 7, a safe margin of clearance over the terrain northeast of Harmon Field could not be obtained.  From the facts disclosed during the investigation it must be concluded that take-off from Runway 7, under the conditions which existed the morning of October 3, was hazardous unless the flight crews were aware of the high terrain northeast of the airport and so maneuvered as to avoid it.  Regardless of the wind, safe take-off procedure when using Runway 7 requires a turn shortly after take-off and a climb to a safe altitude away from the high terrain.

“It is the responsibility of the carrier to supply the pilot with all the navigational data required to provide a safe operation. The navigational data carried in the cockpit of this aircraft adequately described the terrain in the vicinity of Harmon Field, and all the information necessary to permit the pilot to determine a climb procedure which would avoid obstructions in the direction of take-off was available to him. Since the direction of climb following take-off, which was 35 degrees to the left of the proposed route, was maintained toward the high terrain northeast of Harmon Field, it can be concluded that the captain was not alert to the procedure necessary for a safe climb from this runway.

“It is apparent that modern air carrier operation is burdening the pilot with the necessity for evaluation of an increasing number of details. Since this problem is particularly critical during the take-off and climb, it appears that some provisions must be made to assure the execution of a safe climb procedure regardless of the complexity of such other factors as aircraft instrumentation, weather, navigation, and traffic control. In this respect, it appears that the burden upon the pilot may, to a large measure, be relieved in operations of this nature by clearly defining the procedures required for climb after take-off at night or under instrument conditions. Such procedures have been established by the air carrier since the date of the accident, however, none were in existence at the time of this flight. While the Civil Air Regulations are not intended to regulate all details of air transportation and, therefore, have not specifically required that climb procedures be established at such airports as Harmon Filed, some regulatory direction may be required in instances such as this. Because the necessity for climb procedures exists at several domestic airports as well as at fields employed in international operation, the Board has circulated proposed regulations which are designed to indicate specifically the responsibility of all U. S. air carriers in this regard.  Those regulations would require the carrier to define clearly the procedures for climb from each airport in the vicinity of which terrain or other obstructions present a hazard to flights at night or under instrument conditions. Furthermore the Board is reviewing the subject of airport approval for scheduled air carrier operations with a view toward revision of the Civil Air Regulations in order to assure a complete understanding throughout the industry of the nature and extent of airport surveys and the areas to which take-off limitations apply….

“On the basic of the foregoing, the Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the action of the pilot in maintaining the direction of take-off toward higher terrain over which adequate clearance could not be gained.” (Civil Aeronautics Board. Supplemental Data (American Overseas Airline, 10/03/1946, Docket SA-125). Washington, DC:  CAB, adopted May 23, 1947.)

Haine: “The worst airplane disaster in the history of commercial aviation [at the time] occurred on 3 October 1946 when an American transatlantic airliner crashed near Stephenville, Newfoundland, killing thirty-nine people….The airplane carried a crew of eight and thirty-one passengers, mostly women and children of [U.S.] military or War Department civilian employee husbands in Germany, many of whom were long separated from their families. In all eleven mothers perished with their six children….”[2] (Haine. Disaster in the Air. pp. 253-254.)

National Fire Protection Association: “Oct. 3, near Stephenville, Newfoundland. Air­craft. $460,000. The worst commercial airline accident in his­tory occurred when the American Overseas Air­lines plane crashed into the side of a hill near Stephenville, exploded and burned, carrying 39 persons to their deaths. Flying conditions were good, the ceiling was 4,000 ft. and visibility 10 to 12 miles, The take-off had been normal, there was no indication of engine trouble and the plane would have easily cleared the obstacle if it had had another 10 feet of altitude. The scene of the crash was a bare 8 airline miles from the end of the runway. The heavy load of gasoline exploded and cascaded down the side of the mountain and burned for several hours. Passenger liability losses could reach $257,000 based on the maximum of $8,291 per person under the terms of the Warsaw Conven­tion, to which the United States adheres.” (National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Fires of 1946.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 40, No. 3, Jan 1947, pp. 179-248, p. 239.)

Sources

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. American Overseas Airlines 03 Oct 1946.  Accessed 8/20/2009 at:  http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19461003-0

Baugher, Joseph F. 1944 USAAF Serial Numbers (44-001 to 44-30910). Oct 15, 2011 revision. Accessed 12-21-2011 at: http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1944_1.html

Civil Aeronautics Board. Supplemental Data (American Overseas Airline, 10/03/1946, Docket SA-125). Washington, DC:  CAB, adopted May 23, 1947, 12 pages. Accessed  11-1-2023 at: 

https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/33278

Haine, Edgar A. Disaster in the Air. New York: Cornwall Books, 2000, 394 pages.

National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Fires of 1946.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 40, No. 3, Jan 1947, pp. 179-248.

Smith, Ken. A History of Disaster: The Worst Storms, Accidents, and Conflagrations in Atlantic Canada. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Nimbus Publishing, 2008.

Wikipedia. “American Overseas Airlines.” 8-20-2009 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Overseas_Airlines

[1] About 50 feet below the crest at the point of impact.  (Smith 2008, 142.)

[2] So intense was the fire that it consumed all bodies except two which had been thrown from the plane. (Smith 2008, 143.)