1949 — Jan 19, USCG Eastwind and SS Gulfstream collide in fog ~60M SE of Barnegat Light Vessel NJ–13

lornajarrettblanchard January 19, 1949

–13 Haley, Alex. “Tragedy Stalks the Sea: An Account of the Eastwind Disaster.”[1]

–13 USCG Commandant’s Action relating to Marine Board of Investigation, Eastwind and Gulfstream.

–13 USCG Eastwind crew

Narrative Information

Haley, Alex. “Tragedy Stalks the Sea: An Account of the Eastwind Disaster.” –

“It was half-past four the morning of January 19th. Off Cape May, New Jersey, long, shapeless tendrils of fog converged to shroud in a vast milkiness the Gulf Oil tanker SS Gulfstream, travelling light from Philadelphia to the Persian Gulf, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s super-icebreaker Eastwind, Boston to Baltimore. At 4:35 they came together with a rasping snarl of steel on steel. Men catapulted from their bunks fought back terror. There came a second jolt when the Gulfstream bucked clear, her bow a huge, snaggled tooth that had left a gaping wound in the Eastwind’s starboard midsection. Almost immediately a fire broke out, filling compartments with stifling, acrid smoke. Through it more than a hundred bewildered Coast Guardsmen groped their way topside. Among them were ambulatory cases, men in varying stages of undress, men suffering from shock, guided more by instinct than reason….

“The United Fruit Company’s new, sleek SS Junior arrived as the Eastwind fire began to get the upper hand. Faced squarely with the possibility of even more appalling disaster should the magazines be set off, Captain John A. Glynn of the Eastwind ordered 83 of his men to board the Junior which would carry them to New York….

“As this is written the death toll has risen to 13. They were:

William E. Barnett, CSC
Ewell Busby, ENC
Harry F. Brown, HMC
Donald W. Bryson, BMC
Stanislaus Coindreau, SA [Died in Marine Hospital, Staten Island, from injuries.]
Robert E. Connors, EN3
Louis Cywinski, DCC
Peter A. Everett, QMC
Kenneth S. King, SKC
Anthony G. Machansky, RMC
Rupert D. Midgette, ENC
John V. Kerr; FA
Albert P. Williams, SA… [Died in Marine Hospital, Staten Island, from injuries.]

“A navigational plot worked back from the time of the collision using the radar ranges and bearings, and estimated speed of the vessels indicates that the vessels closed at a speed of about 44 feet per second.

“The Gulfstream stood by near the scene of the collision until it was established her services were not required. She then proceeded to New York under her own power.

USCG Commandant:

“Charge I Violation of a Lawful Regulation

“In that John A. Glynn, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, while so serving in command of the U, S. Coast Guard Cutter Eastwind, making passage from Boston, Massachusetts, to Chesapeake Light Vessel, through active shipping lanes, did neglect and fail to exercise proper care and attention to the safety of said vessel in that, on January 19, 1949, he permitted an officer with insufficient experience and competence to assume the 4:00 to 8:00 a. m. watch as officer of the deck of said vessel on said date, namely, Lieutenant…U. S. Coast Guard, and he the said Glynn, through said negligence, did suffer the said U. S. Coast Guard Cutter Eastwind to collide with the SS Gulfstream at or about 4:35 a. m., on the said date, with resultant loss of life, and damage to both vessels; this in violation of a lawful regulation issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, to wit, Article 226, Coast Guard Courts and Boards, 1935.

Charge II Neglect of Duty Specification 1

“In that John A. Glynn, Captain, U. 8. Coast Guard, while so serving in command of the U. S. Coast Guard Cutter Eastwind, making passage from Boston, Massachusetts, to Chesapeake Light Vessel, through active shipping lanes, did, on January 19, 1949, neglect and fail to assign an experienced and competent officer to stand the 4:00 to 8:00 a. m. watch as officer of the deck on board the said vessel on the said date, as it was the duty of the said Glynn to do…..

Findings of Facts

“The Gulfstream, Official No. 243852, is a T-2 tanker of 10,195 gross tons, 6,107 net tons, twin screws turbo-electric drive, owned y the Gulf Oil Corporation. The vessel was not fitted with a radar.

….

“The Gulfstream sailed from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania at 6:00 p.m. on January 18, 1949, on a voyage to the Persian Gulf. After taking in ballast in the lower Delaware River the drafts were estimated to be 18 feet forward, 21 feet aft.

….

“About 4:30 a.m. the Gulfstream entered fog which quickly became dense. Immediately thereafter “Standby” was rung up on the engine room telegraph; the fog signal was started and sounded at intervals of one minute; and the master of the Gulfstream…holding license No… who was asleep in the chartroom abaft of the wheelhouse, was called, by the mate on watch, holding

“The master of the Gulfstream, although aware that the vessel was running in a fog at a speed of about 15 knots, failed to order a reduction in speed.

“The mate on watch…although knowing that the vessel had entered fog at a speed of about 15 knots, made no reduction in the speed of the Gulfstream.

“…[name blacked out] ordinary seaman, who was lookout on the port wing of the bridge of the Gulfstream, was absent from his station as lookout during the time that vessel was running in fog….

“The Eastwind entered fog a few minutes before the collision while making a speed of about 14 knots. After entry into fog, Lieutenant [blacked out] failed to sound fog signals, to reduce to a moderate speed, and to notify the Commanding Officer.

“No whistle signals were sounded by the Eastwind at any time…..

“A few seconds after sighting of the Gulfstream the bow of that vessel struck the Eastwind on the starboard side just abaft the bridge penetrating to such a depth that the upper portion of her stem brought up against the stack of the Eastwind. At time of collision both vessels were in a dense fog.

“Immediately after the collision fire broke out on both vessels….

“The fire on the Eastwind spread rapidly with devastating effect in the chief petty officers’ berthing compartment, which had been opened up by the stem of the Gulfstream. From this area fire spread rapidly to the bridge, radio room, and pilot house, forcing all personnel from their stations….

“The standing orders and the night orders issued by the Commanding Officer of the Eastwind required, among other things, that the officer of the deck inform the Commanding Officer if any radar target or vessel would approach within 3 miles of the Eastwind; that the speed of the vessel be reduced to 50 r.p.m. and fog signals be sounded if fog were encountered and that the Commanding Officer be notified; and that in case of any doubt in the mind of the officer of the deck that the Commanding Officer be called.

“Lieutenant [blacked out] officer of the deck, failed to notify the Commanding Officer that a radar targe would approach within 3 miles of the Eastwind.

“Lieutenant [blacked out] failed to notify the Commanding Officer that the Eastwind and a radar targe were approaching each other on collision courses.

“Lieutenant [blacked out] failed to take proper evasive action to prevent collision with a radar targe which proved to be the Gulfstream.

“Captain John A. Glynn, Commanding Officer of the Eastwind who was awakened by the collision while asleep in his cabin, had no previous knowledge of approaching danger.

“There is no emergency cabin in the Eastwind.

“No personnel of the Gulfstream suffered any personal injuries as a result of the collision.

“Of the 8 officers and 152 enlisted men on board the Eastwind all are accounted for; 13 enlisted men died as a result of the collision and 8 officers and 139 enlisted men survived as of January 31, 1949.

“The Gulfstream stood by near the scene of the collision until it was established her services were not required. She then proceeded to New York under her own power.

Opinions

That the Gulfstream was not proceeding at a moderate speed while in a fog between 4:30 a.m. and 4:49 a.m. on January 19, 1949.
That the Eastwind was not proceeding at a moderate speed while in a fog between 4:30 a.m. and 4:49 a.m. on January 19, 1949.

….

Recommendations

That…Master of the SS Gulfstream, be charged with negligence under authority of R.S. 4450
That…Chief Mate of the SS Gulfstream, be charged with negligence under authority of R.S. 4450…
That…Ordinary Seaman of the SS Gulfstream, be charged with inattention to duty under authority of R.S. 4450…
That Lieutenant…U.S. Coast Guard, be brought to trial before a general court on the charge of violation of lawful regulation…
That Lieutenant…U.S. Coast Guard, be brought to trial before a general court on the charge of neglect of duty…

(United States Coast Guard Commandant’s Action by Convening and Final Reviewing Authority (relating to Marine Board of Investigation, collision of USCG Eastwind and SS Gulfstream, 1-19-1949. Washington, DC: USCG, 3-30-1949.)

Sources

Haley, Alex. “Tragedy Stalks the Sea: An Account of the Eastwind Disaster.” Accessed 9-7-2023 at: https://alexhaley.com/2018/08/14/tragedy-stalks-the-sea-an-account-of-the-eastwind-disaster/

United States Coast Guard Commandant’s Action by Convening and Final Reviewing Authority (relating to Marine Board of Investigation, collision of USCG Eastwind and SS Gulfstream, 1-19-1949. Washington, DC: USCG, 3-30-1949, 14 pages. Accessed 9-6-2023 at: https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/INV/docs/boards/eastwind.pdf

[1] Originally published in the U.S. Coast Guard Magazine, March 1949.

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