1950 — Nov 22, Long Island Commuter Trains Collide, Richmond Hill, Queens, NY — 79

— 79 Aldrich. Death Rode the Rails: American Railroad Accidents and Safety… 2006, p. 293.
— 79 Haine, Edgar. Railroad Wrecks. 1993, pp. 32 and 126-127.
— 79 History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, November 22, 1950.
— 79 Nash. Darkest Hours – A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters… 1977, p. 740.
— 79 Shaw, Robert B. Down Brakes: A History of Railway Accidents… 1961, p. 484.
— 78 ICC. Ex Parte No. 176. Accident Near Jamaica, N.Y. ICC, decided 12-18-1950, p. 1.
— 78 Kew Gardens Civic Assoc. Collision. “It was the worst train wreck… 5-6-2020 update.
–>78 Shaw, Robert B. Down Brakes: A History of Railway Accidents… 1961, p. 394.
— 77 Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). 1982, p. 440.
–~75 AP. “75 Estimated Killed in Long Island Wreck; 2 passenger Trains Collide.” 11-23-1950, p. 1.

Narrative Information

History.com: “Two Long Island Railroad (LIRR) commuter trains collide on this day in 1950, killing 79 people. Defective equipment caused this horrific rear-end collision, the worst in the history of the LIRR.

“The accident occurred in the Richmond Hills section of Queens. A 12-car train carrying commuters from Manhattan to Hempstead on Long Island was ordered to slow down as it entered the station in Queens. Engineer William Murphy cut the speed to 15 miles per hour and then to a complete stop. As the train stood still on the tracks, rear flagman Bertram Biggin got off the train with a red lamp in order to warn any approaching trains of its presence.

“Soon, the train got a green light to move on and the Hempstead train attempted to restart its journey. Biggin got back on the train, but the stop had caused the train’s brakes to lock. The express train to Babylon was on the same tracks just minutes behind and had green lights to proceed. It hit the rear of the Hempstead train going 40 miles per hour, smashing into and under the rear car, throwing it high into the air. Benjamin Pokorney, the motorman of the Babylon train, was killed, along with everyone traveling in the rear car. Another 363 people suffered significant injuries.

‘New York City Mayor Vincent Impellitari called the LIRR a “disgraceful common carrier” following the discovery that defective equipment that was not maintained properly was responsible for the accident. Millions of dollars in damages were eventually paid to the victims and their families.” (History.com. This Day in Disaster History, Disaster, November 22, 1950)

Interstate Commerce Commission: “This is an investigation by the Commission on its own motion with respect to the facts, conditions and circumstances connected with an accident which occurred on the line of the Long Island Railroad near Jamaica, N. Y., on November 22, 1950. Hearing was had at New York, N. Y., on November 25, 27, and 28, 1950. The accident was a rear-end collision between two passenger trains and resulted in the death of 77 passengers and 1 train-service employee and the injury of 352 passengers, 8 train-service employees and 3 other employees.

“This accident occurred on that part of the railroad extending between Harold, 3.7 miles east of Pennsylvania Station, New York, and Jamaica, N. Y., a distance of 7.5 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a four-track line, over which trains moving with the current of traffic are operated by signal indications. The tracks are equipped with power rails for the electric propulsion of tramp. The main tracks from south to north are designated as No. 4 and No. 2, eastward, and No, 1 and No. 3, westward. The accident occurred on track No. 2 at a point 6.27 miles east of Harold and 1.23 miles west of Jamaica. From the west on track No. 2 there is a 1 degrees curve to the right 2,408 feet in length and then a tangent 4,665 feet to the point of accident and 1,868 feet eastward. The grade for east-bound trains is 0.3 percent ascending throughout a distance of more than 4,000 feet, then 0.4 percent descending 2,770 feet to the point of accident and a considerable distance eastward.

“Automatic signals 66 and C and semi-automatic signals 114R and 58R, governing east-bound movement on track No. 2, are located, respectively, 1.47 miles west, 3,516 feet west, 819 feet east, and 3,678 feet east of the point of accident. These signals are of the position-light type and are continuously lighted. Signal 66 displays three aspects, signal C displays five aspects, and signal 114R displays eight aspects. Signals 114R and 58R are controlled from the interlocking station at Jay, 7.2 miles east of Harold….

“Description of Accident

“No. 780, an east-bound first-class passenger train, consisted of 12 multiple-unit cars of steel construction. It was being operated from the front control compartment of multiple unit car 1355, the first unit of the train. It passed Win, the last open office, 4.27 miles west of the point of accident, at 6:19 p.m., on time, passed signal C, which indicated Approach, and stopped about 6:26 p.m. on track No. 2 at a point 1.23 miles west of Jamaica. The rear end of the train stopped 3,516 feet east of signal C. About 3 minutes later the rear end of the train was struck by No. 174.

“No. 174, an east-bound first-class passenger train, consisted of 12 multiple-unit cars of steel construction. Eight of the cars were motor cars, and four were trailer cars. This train was being operated from the front control compartment of multiple-unit car 1523, the first unit of the train. It passed Win at 6:23 p.m., on time, passed signal 66, which indicated Approach, and stopped at signal C, which indicated Stop and Proceed. It then proceeded eastward on track No. 2, and while moving at an estimated speed of 30 miles per hour it struck the rear end of No, 780.

“The rear car of No. 780 was deflected upward when it was struck by the first car of No, 174, As a result, the upper portion of the superstructure of the first car of No, 174 between the front end of the car and the rear vestibule was sheared off by the underframe of the rear car of No. 780 and was demolished. There were no separations between the units of No. 174, and none of the units were derailed. The second to the twelfth cars, inclusive, were slightly damaged.

“No. 780 was moved eastward approximately 75 feet by the force of the impact. The trucks of the rear car were moved eastward and stopped in line with the track and underneath the west end of the eleventh car. There were no separations between the units of the train. With the exception of the rear oar, none of the units were derailed. The rear car was destroyed, the eleventh oar was somewhat damaged, and the other cars, except the first car, were slightly damaged.

“The engineer of No. 174 was killed. The conductor, the front brakeman, the flagman, and two ticket collectors of No, 174 and the flagman and two ticket collectors of No, 780 were injured.

“The weather was clear and it was dark at the time of the accident, which occurred about 6:29 p.m. ….
Discussion

“As No. 780 was approaching the point where the accident occurred, the engineer was in the control compartment at the front of the first car, the conductor was in the second car, the flagman was in the rear car, and the other members of the train crew were in various locations throughout the cars of the train. The brakes were in electro-pneumatic operation and had functioned properly when used en route. As the train approached signal C, which indicated Approach, the engineer initiated a light service application of the brakes. When the speed had been reduced in compliance with the indication of the signal, this brake application was released. Power was not being supplied to the traction motors, and the train continued to move at a speed of approximately 30 miles per hour.

“As the train approached signal 114R, which indicated Restricting, the engineer initiated another service application of the brakes. He said that he placed the brake-valve handle in, release position when the speed of the train had been reduced to about 15 miles per hour, but the speed continued to diminish and the train stopped with the front end of the first car 42 feet west of the signal. The engineer was of the opinion that the brakes had not released properly. In order to effect the release of the brakes after the train stopped, he placed the switch in position for conventional automatic operation of the brakes, made a brake-pipe reduction of 20 pounds, and then placed the brake valve, in release position. When ‘the brakes did not release immediately, he made an emergency application. The collision occurred before sufficient time had elapsed for this brake application to be released.

“When the train stopped, the flagman was at the front end of the rear car. He said he proceeded to the rear vestibule, obtained a lighted red lantern, and alighted from the train to provide flag protection. When he was several feet west of the rear end of the train, he heard a sound indicating that power was being supplied to the traction motors. He said he assumed that the train was about to proceed and therefore re-entered the rear vestibule and sounded a proceed signal on the communicating signal system. The train did not proceed immediately, and he repeated the signal. He was about to alight from the car a second time when he observed No. 174 approaching at a distance of about 1,000 feet. He gave a stop signal with a flashlight, but did not take further action to provide protection before the collision occurred. He did not display a lighted fusee at any time after the train stopped. He said that the marker lights were lighted and were in their proper positions on the rear of the rear car before the train departed from New York, but he did not observe them after that time.

“The route was lined for the movement of No, 780 from signal 114R to signal 58R before No. 780 stopped west of signal 114R. However, the block of signal 114R was occupied by an east-bound train immediately west of signal 58R and as a result signal 114R indicated Restricting for No. 780. After No. 780 stopped at signal 114R, the preceding train moved eastward and cleared the block of signal 114R. This caused the indication of signal 114R to change from Restricting to Approach, and the change was observed by the engineer of No. 780. Signal 114R is located on a signal bridge which spans the four tracks, and the aspect can be seen from the operating compartment of an east-bound car at any point between signal C and signal 114R.

“As No. 174 was approaching the point where the accident occurred, the engineer was alone in the control compartment at the front of the first car, and the members of the train crew were in various locations throughout the cars of the train. The brakes of this train had functioned properly when used en route. The headlight was lighted. Members of the crew said that the train was stopped at signal C and then proceeded east-ward. The conductor said that at first the speed was low, but when the second car, in which he was located, was in the vicinity of the station at Kew Gardens, 1,960 feet west of the point of accident there was a noticeable increase in speed. This increase continued until the speed was about 35 miles per hour, then the brakes of the train were applied in emergency. The collision occurred a few seconds later. The engineer of No. 174 was killed, and it could not be determined why the train was not operated at restricted speed throughout the length of the block as required by the indication of signal C. However, the indication of signal 114R changed to a more favorable one after No. 174 passed signal C., and from the manner in which the train was controlled it appears probable that the engineer observed the aspect of signal 114R when the Indication changed from Restricting to Approach, assumed that the train immediately preceding No. 174 had cleared the block of that signal, and immediately increased the speed of his train. Apparently he made an emergency application of the brakes when he first saw the preceding train, but there was insufficient distance in which materially to reduce the speed before the collision occurred.

“After the accident occurred, the brakes of the cars of each train, except the rear two cars of No. 780 and the first car of No. 174, were tested and they functioned properly. The brakes of the above three cars were damaged to the extent that they could not be tested All of the wheels on each unit of No, 174 were inspected and no slid-flat spots or skid marks were found. This indicates that the wheels of No. 174 were not sliding before the accident occurred. The automatic block-signal system was tested and no detective condition was found. Signals 66 and C were under continuous observation by employees of the signal department of the railroad throughout a period of three days after the accident occurred, and they functioned properly throughout that period….

“Cause. It is found that this accident was caused by failure to operate the following train in accordance with a signal indication.

“Recommendation

“It is recommended that the trustees of the Long Island Railroad Company extend the automatic cab-signal system to its line between Harold and Hillside, and install a train-control system on that part of the line above referred to and also on that part of its line now equipped with an automatic cab-signal system which train-control system will automatically and continuously enforce a speed restriction of not exceeding 12 miles per hour for trains when entering and while proceeding through a block occupied by preceding or opposing train. Unless the Commission is advised within 30 days after this report is served that these recommendations will be complied with, consideration will be given to the institution of a further proceeding under Section 25 of the Interstate Commerce Act.” (Interstate Commerce Commission. Ex Parte No. 176. Accident Near Jamaica, N.Y. ICC, submitted 11-28-1950, decided 12-18-1950.)

Shaw: “…on November 22, 1950, this road [Long Island RR] was overwhelmed by a second disaster which, in its casualty toll, dwarfed that at Rockville Center [Feb 17/32 dead]. This one, at Richmond Hill, within the New York City corporate limits, likewise resulted from the disregard of signal indications, although it was a rear-end rather than head-on crash. No.. 780, from Penn Station to Hempstead, a heavily loaded twelve-car multiple-unit train with Motorman William Murphy at the controls, encountered two caution signals about a mile west of Jamaica, and reduced speed accordingly. When Murphy attempted, however, to release the brakes, he encountered difficulty, and the train was brought to a full stop, with its rear end standing 3516 feet beyond the last signal and its forward end only 42 feet short of the next signal in front of it.

“As No. 780 stopped, the rear brakeman took a lighted red lantern and walked a few feet to the rear of his train to provide protection. At this point, however, he heard power being supplied to the motors, assumed that the train was about to start, and climbed back onto the rear vestibule. When the train still did not start, he was about to go back again when he saw a following train approaching at a considerable speed about a thousand feet away. Accordingly, he made violent signals with his lantern, but had no opportunity to light flares or plant torpedoes before the crash occurred.

“The following train was No. 174, also of twelve cars, from New York to Babylon, with Motorman Benjamin Pokorney in the control compartment. Pokorney, fifty-five years old, had been with the railroad for thirty-one years, and an engineer for twenty-three years. He had had an unblemished record for eight years since his last reprimand for a minor infraction of the rules.

“Approaching the point of the accident Pokorney encountered signal ‘C’ about seven-tenths of a mile behind standing No. 780 at ‘stop and proceed’, and accordingly stopped his train and then continued forward at restricted speed. As he passed Kew Gardens, however, he began to pick up speed again, until his train was moving at about 35 m.p.h. when the brakes were applied in emergency. At a speed not more than slightly reduced, Pokorney’s train plowed into No. 780, shoving it forward about seventy-five feet and completely destroying the rear car. Simultaneously, the underframe of that car completely sheared off the superstructure of the first car of No. 174 from its own underframe. The remaining eleven cars in each train were only slightly damaged, but the two cars bearing the brunt of the collision were heavily crowded, and the death toll amounted to no less than seventy-eight persons – all passengers except for Pokorney. Another 352 passengers suffered injuries. Occurring as it did in the midst of a densely populated area, where reporters and bystanders quickly reached the scene, the gruesome consequences were closely observed and the disaster publicized even more widely than its fatality roll alone might have justified. Some of the victims’ bodies were decapitated and many of them severely mangled.

“No satisfactory explanation for Pokorney’s disregard of the signal indication could be given. He had apparently seen signal ‘C’ at its most restrictive indication, and this authorized him to continue, after his initial stop, at a speed not in excess of 15 m.p.h., to the next signal. It was surmised, however, that the motorman might have seen the signal immediately ahead of No. 780 change from ‘stop and proceed’ (i.e., block ahead occupied) to ‘approach’ (one block clear), and interpreted this signal as for himself. It was dark at the time of the accident, and it seemed possible that Pokorney may have seen this signal before he observed the rear markers of the standing train. In this particular section trackside apparatus for automatic cab signals had not been installed, although the trains involved were equipped with the device.

“While greater agility on the part of the flagman of No. 780 n placing torpedoes or dropping flares might have alerted the motorman of the following train, the flagman’s actions were quite sufficient under the rules. In automatic block territory flag protection is required only against trains moving at restricted speed (not above 15 m.p.h.)

“When the brakes of No. 780, all except the last two cars, were tested after the accident, no defect was discovered to account for the sticking which had originally brought the train to an unscheduled stop between stations. But while this brake trouble was apparently the indirect cause of the wreck, it should not have resulted in any serious consequences if the safety system had functioned properly.

“Two other conditions may have been secondary factors in both of these Long Island wrecks. First, these trains, which were more like subway than conventional railroad trains, carried no firemen. Both of the motormen were alone in the operating compartments. The presence of a second employee to observe signals might have prevented either or both accidents.

“Secondly, the densely trafficked main line – during rush hours trains run through Jamaica almost on subway schedules – was not equipped with any automatic train stop or speed control system. Such a device would almost certainly have prevented the Rockville Center crash. It might not have avoided the second, Richmond Hill disaster, as the application of the brakes by automatic stop devices on railroads (as contrasted with rapid transit practice) can usually be forestalled provided the engineer brings his train to a stop or otherwise acknowledges the restriction. As we have seen, the motorman responsible at Richmond Hill did comply initially with the danger signal, but then continued at a considerably higher than authorized speed.

“It is doubtful whether any railroad disaster since Revere, bak in 1871, occasioned the same sense of shock and stimulated the same degree of public indignation as the two Long Island wrecks. As the railroad was already bankrupt it could not be driven anew into that status, but under the spur of public opinion its two trustees resigned just one week after Richmond Hill. Survival of the road was made possible only by special legislation and the creation for it of a unique, quasi-public status.. Death and injury claims in excess of $11 million were paid out.” (Shaw, Robert B. Down Brakes: A History of Railway Accidents… 1961, pp. 393-396.)

Newspaper

Nov 22: “New York, Nov. 22 (AP) – The nation’s worst rail disaster in years, a rear end collision between two Long Island passenger trains jammed with Thanksgiving eve commuters, killed 75 persons tonight. The estimate of the dead came from Police Inspector Joseph A. Curry, commanding rescue work at the scene. He said 33 bodies had been removed with many more still buried in the wreckage.

“More than 125 passengers were injured as the two trains came together with a roar in Eastern New York city on Long Island.

“It was New York City and state’s worst wreck ever. The estimate of dead would make it the worst in the United States since a 1943 disaster at Frankfort Junction, Philadelphia killed 79 persons.

“The motorman of the first train said his brakes locked as he slowed his train at about 6:30 o’clock. A second train roaring in from behind, knifed into the standing train….

“The crash scene is 13 miles from Times Square in the Kew Gardens section of Queens boro. It is on the Long Island’s main line from Pennsylvania station to the island….” (Associated Press. “75 Estimated Killed in Long Island Wreck; 2 passenger Trains Collide.” Post-Standard, Syracuse, NY. 11-23-1950, p. 1.)

Sources

Aldrich, Mark. Death Rode the Rails: American Railroad Accidents and Safety, 1828-1965. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006, 446 pages. Partially digitized by Google. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=W83OY7j-oaEC

Associated Press. “75 Estimated Killed in Long Island Wreck; 2 passenger Trains Collide.” Post-Standard, Syracuse, NY. 11-23-1950, p. 1. Accessed 8-5-2020 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/syracuse-post-standard-nov-23-1950-p-1/

Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982.

Haine, Edgar A. Railroad Wrecks. New York: Cornwall Books, 1993.

History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, November 22, 1950. “Commuter Trains Collide in New York City.” Accessed 11/25/2008 at: http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=tdihArticleCategory&displayDate=11/22&categoryId=disaster

Interstate Commerce Commission. Ex Parte No. 176. Accident Near Jamaica, N.Y. ICC, submitted 11-28-1950, decided 12-18-1950. Accessed 8-5-2020 at: http://www.oldkewgardens.com/ss-lirr-0650-1.html

Kew Gardens Civic Association, Inc. Collision. “It was the worst train wreck in Long Island Rail Road history, and it happened on the night of November 22, 1950.” 5-6-2020 update. Accessed 8-5-2020 at: http://www.oldkewgardens.com/ss-lirr-0650.html

Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours – A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters from Ancient Times to the Present. New York: Pocket Books, Wallaby, 1977, 792 pages.

Shaw, Robert B. Down Brakes: A History of Railway Accidents, Safety Precautions and Operating Practices in the United States. London & Geneva: P.R. MacMillan Limited, 1961.