1951 — Apr 20, Esso Greensboro & Esso Suez collide full speed/dense fog ~200M S of Morgan City LA–39

–39 National Fire Protection Association. Quarterly of the NFPA, V45, N3, Jan 1952, p. 270.
–39 USCG, Marine Board of Investigation. Collision…Greensboro and…Suez…July 23, 1951.
–37 Tanker Esso Greensboro ( 5 survivors)
— 2 Tanker Esso Suez (47 survivors)

Narrative Information

National Fire Protection Association: “Ships….The heaviest loss of life (39 killed) and property damage ($3,032,500) occurred in the Gulf of Mexico, April 20, when the empty Esso Suez collided with the Esso Greensboro loaded with 141,158 barrels of crude oil. Fire was instantaneous and enveloped both vessels. A Marine Board of Investigation found the masters of both vessel failed to comply with international rules on operation in fog.”

United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation Report:
….
“2. The steam tanker Esso Greensboro of 10.195 gross tons with a full cargo of crude oil, departed from Corpus Christi, Texas on 19 April, 1951, bound for an Atlantic Coast port. The steam tanker Esso Suez of 17,061 gross tons, without cargo, departed from Baltimore, Maryland on 16 April, 1951, bound for Corpus Christi, Texas. On 20 April 1951, both vessels were in the Gulf of Mexico. At approximately 0330, 20 April, 1951, dense fog was encountered. Both vessels continued at normal full speed (approximately 15 knots), had each other in sight on the respective radars, and altered their courses to give each other wider passing distance. At approximately 0422 when both vessels heard the fog signals and sighted each other, (still at full speed and in dense fog) collision was inevitable and seconds thereafter both vessels collided…approximately 2000 miles SSW of SW pass Mississippi River. As a result of this collision, explosions occurred and both vessels caught fire. Out of a total crew of 42 on Board the Esso Greensboro, 37 lost their lives and 5 survived, of which 2 were injured. Out of a total crew of 49 on board the Esso Suez, 2 lost their lives and 47 survived, of which 3 were injured….”

“3. The Board made the following Findings of Fact:

“At 0422 on 20 April, 1951, the SS Esso Suez and the SS Esso Greensboro collided in a dense for…in the Gulf of Mexico. Immediately after the collision fire swept the decks and quarters of the two vessels resulting in the death of Master and 36 crew members on the SS Esso Greensboro and 2 crew members on the SS Esso Suez….

“The Esso Greensboro was built in Chester, Pa., in 1945 and is owned and operated by the Esso Shipping Company, 15 West 51st Street, New York, New York….

“The Esso Suez was built at Newport News, Ba., in 1949 and is owned and operated by the Esso Shipping Company….

“A few minutes after 0400 the Master [Suez] observed a targe on the radar bearing two points on the starboard bow and 6 miles distant. After this observation the course was changed from 294⁰ to 270⁰ and vessel’s engine continued at full speed ahead. About 5 minutes later, the Master observed this target bearing 4 points on the starboard bow 3 miles distant. The course was changed again from 270⁰ to 260⁰ and the vessel was allowed to continue at full speed ahead. The Master informed the 2nd Officer who was on the starboard wing of the bridge to keep a sharp lookout and listen for fog signals at the same time indicating the direction of the target as observed on the radar. The Master then returned to the pilothouse. At 0422 the 2nd Officer heard a fog signal and seconds later saw a red light approximately 10⁰ on the starboard bow. He reported the light to the Master who ordered a hard left wheel and stopped the engine. A matter of seconds later the Esso Suez collided with the Esso Greensboro on the port side in the way of No. 8 cargo tank, the angle of collision being about 90⁰. Almost instantly fire broke out and the two vessels were enveloped in flame from burning oil.

“The bow of the Esso Suez cut into the Esso Greensboro for a distance of sixty feet and remained in physical contact for approximately 40 minutes. During this time three explosions on the Esso Greensboro sprayed the Esso Suez with burning oil from forward to aft and ignited all combustible equipment and material on deck and in the forward store-room. Flames from burning oil on the water around the Esso Suez reached a great height and prevented the crew from effectively fighting the fire on the vessel until the Esso Suez cleared the Esso Greensboro and was able to maneuver clear of the burning oil on the water, after which the crew, by using fire hose, portable fire extinguishers and foam, were able to bring the fire under control. This was accomplished by working from after end forward. While fighting fire considerable difficulty was experienced with the canvas fire hose bursting due to having been burned by the fire and intense heat. At about 0800 the fire was restricted to the forward storerooms of the vessel and was completely extinguished at 1100 on 20 April, 1951. The vessel proceeded to Mobile under her own power, escorted by the SS Esso New York, arriving in Mobile at 2100 on 21 April, 1951.

“Immediately after the collision the Master turned on the general alarm, sent the helmsman to call the crew and ordered the 2nd Officer to go aft and turn the steam smothering system on, and remained on the bridge and by maneuvering the engines, succeeded in getting the Esso Suez clear of the Esso Greensboro and the burning oil on the water….

“The Chief Officer, after the collision, was seen by other members of the crew on the after boat deck and in the engine room shortly after the collision occurred. He however made it back to the midship house, and when the fire was put out around this house, his body was found in the starboard passageway of the house. How or why he returned to the midship house could not be explained by any of the other members of the crew.

“The Steward, after the collision, attempted to get to the after house on the port side of the main deck. The door on the port side of the house was closed and he was trapped by the flames, and fatally burned before reaching the upper deck. He died from these burns before medical aid reached the vessel in the afternoon.

“During the time the Esso Suez was in physical contact with the Esso Greensboro, the heat from burning oil in the water around the ship and fire on deck was so intense that the porthole glasses shattered and fell or blew out. This allowed suffocating smoke to enter the crew’s quarters and passageways, and in order to breathe, the men had to lie on the deck.

“The Esso Greensboro sailed from Corpus Christi (Harbor Island), Texas at 0706 on 19 April, 1951, with a full cargo of West Texas crude oil en route to an Atlantic Coast port….Little is known of what actually transpired on the bridge of the vessel preceding the collision, since the entire 4 to 8 watch were lost and only one AB saved from the 12 to 4 watch, and all records that would show what took place were destroyed by fire. The engine room telegraph was put on standby at 0314 and fog signals were being sounded. The AB who stood the midnight to 0200 wheel watch and the 0300 to 0400 lookout watch on the bow stated that he steered a course of 106⁰ by gyro compass during his watch at the wheel; that during his watch at the wheel he saw the Master using the radar and that fog signals were being sounded. He was unable to state whether fog signals were being blown during his watch or lookout from 0300 to 0400.

“The 1st Assistant Engineer relieved the watch in the engine room at 0400. When he relieved the watch, the engine room telegraph was on standby, and the engine was going full speed ahead and at about 0420 he felt the impact of the collision; that immediately after this fire broke out in the upper engine room; the engine was stopped and he attempted to communicate with the bridge, but was unsuccessful; that the fire in the upper engine room prevented the steam smothering system being turned on, and that the fire pump was started but only 30 lbs. pressure could be built up on the line, which would indicate that the fire main had been severed.

“Attempts to escape from the engine room were impossible on account of the fire raging in the passageway and over the after house. The 1st Assistant and three other members of the crew in the engine room were forced to the lower level of the engine room by the smoke and fire. Approximately four hours after the collision, the 1st Assistant Engineer escaped through the engine room skylight and made his way to the stern and swam to the No. 1 lifeboat of the Esso Greensboro which was afloat off the stern of the vessel. Upon crawling aboard the lifeboat, he found that it had been gutted by fire and two charred bodies were in the bottom of the boat. He was rescued sometime later by a lifeboat from the Esso New York. After picking the 1st Assistant up, the lifeboat proceeded to the stern of the Esso Greensboro and picked up the three men from the engine room who made their way to the stern and jumped overboard….

“Immediately after the collision the Esso Greensboro was aflame from forward to aft. All communication and pipelines were severed by the collision damage. Flames fed by burning oil poured through the after quarters and passageways. At 2200 on 20 April, after the Esso Greensboro had been abandoned, the vessel was boarded by crew members from the SS Virginia. At the time of boarding, Nos. 2, 3 and 9 starboard cargo tanks and Nos. 3 and 4 port cargo tanks were burning around the expansion trunk covers. Fires were also in the shelter deck space and lazarette. These fires were extinguished by men from the crew of the SS Virginia and the vessel was taken in tow and proceeded to Galveston, Texas….

“After the ESSO Greensboro arrived in Galveston, Texas, an estimated 97,000 barrels of oil cargo remained in the vessel….

“4. The Board made the following Conclusions:

“The Esso Suez encountered dense fog at about 0330 on 20 April, 1951, and did not reduce speed to moderate. A few minutes after 0400 a target was observed on the radar, bearing two points on the starboard bow and 6 miles off, at which time the course was changed…[and] then changed [again], but the vessel’s engine was not stopped or speed reduced.

“….the vessel [Esso Greensboro] was running at full speed (approximately 15 m.p.h.) up until the collision occurred, and that there was a change of course to the right sometime shortly before the collision occurred….The fact that there was a change of course of the Esso Greensboro shortly before (approximately 10 minutes) the collision occurred, would indicate that there was knowledge of a vessel ahead.

“It is concluded that both vessels failed to comply with Article 16 of the International Rules when they failed to reduce speed to moderate when fog was first encountered, and failed to stop their engines and navigate with caution until they were past and clear when they had knowledge of another vessel forward of their beam.

“The fog was encountered at 0300 and the radar on the Esso Suez had a range of 40 miles. The Master was called and arrived on the bridge about 0335, yet no targe was observed on the radar until after 0400, which indicates that an alert radar watch was not kept.

“It is further concluded that there was no evidence to establish failure of any equipment or machinery or that the improper functioning of any equipment or machinery in any way contributed to the collision.

“The following failures as a result of the fire subsequent to the collision are noteworthy:

The port glasses and window glass on the Esso Suez did shatter and fall out from the fire, while on the other hand, the port glasses on the Esso Greensboro, which no doubt were subjected to much greater heat, although discolored and spiderwebbed, were intact. The canvas fire hose on the Esso Suez where subjected to fire did not stand up when working pressure was applied. The electric circuits of the Esso Greensboro were wired with lead and armored cable. Due to the low melting point of lead, it melted and ran off in everyplace where subject to hear of 600⁰ or over. The electric circuits on the Esso Suez appeared to be armored Navy standard linen covered cable. These circuits in way of fire were in order and still functioned….

“The crew of the Esso Greensboro had no chance. The entire vessel with the exception of the engine room became a raging inferno almost instantly after the vessels collided and only those men who were up at the time had any chance of survival.

“[Name blacked out], 3rd Mate, Esso Suez, was in charge of the navigation of that vessel when fog was encountered. He failed to reduce speed to moderate and allowed the vessel to proceed at full speed ahead in dense fog for approximately 5 minutes until the Master arrived on the bridge.

“[Name blacked out], the Master, arrived on the bridge approximately 5 minutes after being called and allowed the vessel to proceed at full speed in dense fog, and after observing a targe on the radar forward of the beam, he not only failed to stop the engine but allowed the vessel to proceed at full speed ahead.

“5. The Board expressed the following Opinions:

That the cause of this casualty can be directly attributed to the failure of both vessels to comply with Article 16 of the International Rules of the Road.

That although the Board realizes that the use of radar does not relieve the person in charge of a vessel of his obligation to comply with the Rules of the Road, it is the Board’s firm opinion that had an alert radar watch been kept by both vessels, and, had the information the radar gave been skillfully evaluated, the officers in charge of the navigation of the vessels would have been in a position to take the necessary action to avoid this casualty.

“That the Master of the Esso Suez after fog was encountered navigated his vessel in a haphazard manner, and that proper alert watch was not kept; and that there were indications, although not supported by evidence, that it was the custom to merely put the telegraph on standby and to allow the vessel to proceed at full speed during periods of low visibility.

Disciplinary Action

“With the approval of the Board, the Master of the Esso Suez [name blacked out] was charged with negligence and accorded a hearing on 27 April, 1951. He was found guilty of this charge and the Examiner revoked his Master’s license.

“[Name blacked out] 3rd Officer, was charged with negligence and accorded a hearing on 27 April, 1951. He was found guilty of this charge and the Examiner suspended his license for a period of three months….

“It is further recommended that serious consideration be given to the following changes in equipment required on tank vessels;

1. The use of fire resistant lifeboat falls.

2. The use of metal fittings as far as possible in lifeboats.

3. Use of wire ins4rted glass in all ports and windows.

4. Replace canvas covered fire hose with approved fire resistant hose.

5. Replace wooden doors with metal weath4r doors to crew’s quarters, and other weather deck openings to storeroom, etc.

6. Four gas masks for engine room and four for Deck Department, for use in smoke filled areas.

7. First aid kit for engine room and after quarters.

8. Six life preservers to be placed in an easily accessible location in the engine room.

9. That if available, non-combustible paint be used on tank vessels.

Remarks
“8. Paragraphs 1 and 1 of Article 16 of the International Regulations (33 USC 92) provide as follows:

Every vessel shall, in a fog, mist, falling snow, or heavy rain storms, go at a moderate speed, having careful regard to the existing circumstances and conditions.

A steam vessel hearing, apparently forward of her beam, the fog signal of a vessel the position of which is not ascertained shall, so are as the circumstances of the case admit, stop her engines, and then navigate with caution until danger of collision is over.
“….”

(USCG, Marine Board of Investigation “Collision…Esso Greensboro and Esso Suez…”)

Newspaper

April 20, AP: “New Orleans, April 20. – (AP) – Two Esso Standard Oil tankers collided in the Gulf of Mexico about 200 miles south of Morgan City, La., early today engulfing one in fire and the coast guard said it ‘believed no one aboard was alive.’ The stricken ship was identified by the coast guard as the T-2 type Esso tanker, Greensboro, which normally carries a complement of 40 men. The other vessel was identified by the coast guard as the Esso Suez, a new super-tanker of 26,500 tons capable of carrying 9,000,000 gallons of oil. The Esso Suez was reported ablaze but still afloat and making three knots speed….” (AP. “Tanker and All Aboard Lost After Crash. Other Ship Afire Off Morgan City.” The Monroe News-Star, LA. 4-20-1951, p. 1.)

Sources

Associated Press. “Tanker and All Aboard Lost After Crash. Other Ship Afire Off Morgan City.” The Monroe News-Star, LA. 4-20-1951, p. 1. Accessed 6-26-2023 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/monroe-news-star-apr-20-1951-p-1/

National Fire Protection Association. Quarterly of the NFPA, V45, N3, Jan 1952, p. 270.

United States Coast Guard. Memorandum from Chief, Merchant Vessel Inspection Division to Commandant, USCG, subject: Marine Board of Investigation; Collision involving ESSO Greensboro and ESSO Suez, Gulf of Mexico 20 April 1951, with loss of life. Washington, DC: USCG, 7-25-1951. Accessed 6-23-2021 at: https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/INV/docs/boards/essogreensboro.pdf