1953 — Sep 16, American Air 723 hits two towers in fog, AP approach, Albany, NY –all 28

— 28 Aviation Safety Network. American Airlines Flight 723, 16 Sep 1953.
— 28 NFPA. “Worst No. American Aircraft Fires – 1953.” Quarterly, V.47, N. 3, Jan 1954, 309.
— 28 CAB. AIR. American Airlines, Inc., Near Albany New York, September 16, 1953.

Narrative Information

Aviation Safety Network:
“Date and Time: Wednesday 16 September 1954, 08:34
“Type: Convair Cv-240-0
“Operator: American Airlines
“Registration: N94255
“MSN: 116
“First flight: 1948
….
“Crew: Fatalities: 3 / Occupants: 3
“Passengers: Fatalities: 25 / Occupants: 25
“Total: Fatalities: 25 / Occupants: 25
….
“Location: 5 km (3.1 mls SW of Albany Airport, NY
“Phase: Approach (APR)
“Nature: Domestic Scheduled Passenger
“Departure airport Windsor Locks-Bradley Field, CT
“Destination airport: Albany Airport, NY
“Flight Number: AA723
“Narrative:

“American Airlines’ Flight 723 was a scheduled flight between Boston, and Chicago, with intermediate stops among which were Hartford (BDL), and Albany (ALB). The CV-240 arrived at Bradley Field at 06:57. Weather at the next stop, Albany, at this time was below the company’s landing minimums, but was forecast to improve to within limits by the time the flight arrived there. Departure from Bradley Field was made at 07:14. Because of poor visibility at Albany, several aircraft were in a holding pattern. The special Albany weather report issued at 07:50 indicated thin obscurement, ceiling estimated 4,000, overcast, fog, visibility 3/4 miles. Two aircraft left the holding pattern, attempted to land, but both executed a missed approach procedure. A third airplane landed at 08:16 following an instrument approach to runway 19. Immediately following this landing, Flight 723 was cleared to make an instrument approach to runway 19. Three minutes later the flight advised the tower that its approach was being abandoned because the aircraft’s flaps could not be lowered.

“At 08:30 Albany Tower reported: “All aircraft holding Albany. It now appears to be pretty good for a contact approach from the west. It looks much better than to the north.” Flight 723 was then cleared for a contact approach to runway 10. On finals for runway 10, the Convair descended too low. The right wing of the aircraft struck the center tower of three radio towers at a point 308 feet above the ground. The left wing then struck the east tower. Seven feet of the outer panel of the right wing including the right aileron and control mechanism from the center hinge outboard together with 15 feet of the left outer wing panel and aileron separated from the aircraft at this time. Following the collision with the towers, ground impact occurred a distance of 1,590 feet beyond the tower last struck. First ground contact was made simultaneously by the nose and the left wing with the aircraft partially inverted.

”The weather reported at the time of the accident was thin scattered clouds at, 500 feet, ceiling estimated 4500 feet, broken clouds, visibility 1-1/2 miles, fog.

(Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. American Airlines Flight 723, 16 Sep 1953.)

Civil Aeronautics Board: “An American Airlines Convair 240, N 94255, struck two of three radio towers located 3.1 miles southwest of the Albany Municipal Airport, Albany, New York, and crashed at approximately 0834, September 16, 1953. The aircraft was executing an approach to the airport when the accident occurred. All three crew members and 25 passengers on board were killed; the aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire.

“American Airlines Flight 723 of September 16, 1953, was a scheduled operation between Boston Massachusetts, and Chicago, Illinois, with intermediate stops among which were Hartford, Connecticut, and Albany, New York….

“When Flight 723 arrived at Albany, it was necessary because of a law ceiling and restricted visibility to hold, together with a number of other aircraft, at least 500 feet on top of clouds north of the Albany Range Station. Weather conditions were changing rapidly and were expected to improve sufficiently in a short time to permit landings. A few minutes after the flight entered the holding pattern, two of the aircraft were cleared, in turn, to make standard instrument approaches to Runway 19. Both of these aircraft, however, executed missed approaches because they were unable to establish visual reference with the round within their authorized minimums. A third flight, however, made a landing, whereupon Flight 723 was cleared to make the same type of approach. This was abandoned because the wing flaps could not be extended and since the flight was still 500 feet on top, it continued in the No. 1 position in the holding pattern.

“Approximately 10 minutes after abandoning the instrument approach, Flight 723 was informed by the tower that the weather was clearing to the west and was asked it if would accept a contact approach to Runway 10 from that direction. After requesting and receiving current weather, altimeter setting, and length of Runway 10 Captain Stentz replied in the affirmative. His specific request for the length of this runway was undoubtedly made to ascertain if it was of sufficient length for the flaps-up landing, with its attendant higher approach speed and additional landing roll. His acceptance of this runway indicated that he was fully satisfied that a safe landing could be made.

“At the time Captain Stentz accepted this contact approach, it appears to have been a reasonable decision; the weather was clearing to the west of the airport and the bases of the scattered clouds were reported at 500 feet. Why the captain decided in executing the approach, to fly in a general southerly direction and then make a wide right hand turn to align with the runway is not known. It is entirely possible that from his position in the holding pattern, the weather in that area appeared to be better.

“The course which the pilot chose carried the flight into intermittent areas of fog and haze. Confronted with these conditions the captain should have pulled up and discontinued the approach, however, he flew the aircraft at an extremely low altitude probably in an effort to maintain or regain visual flight and to be able to touch down as near the approach end of the runway as possible….

“The Board views with concern the practice of some aircraft operators of making contact approaches to airports during very poor weather. It is intended that this matter be investigated further to determine ‘whether some limitations upon contact approaches should be made in Part 60 of the Civil Air Regulations. A contact approach is made as an alternative to the instrument approach specified by the Administrator in order to expedite the flow of traffic. The need for some such alternative approach procedures, particularly in areas of high traffic density, is recognized. However, the Board is considering whether such alternative approach procedures should be explicitly specified by the Administrator and adhered to by all pilots under weather conditions less than the minimums specified for VFR approach and landing….

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was that during the execution of a contact approach, and while maneuvering for alignment with the runway to be used, descent was made to an altitude below obstructions partially obscured by fog in a local area of restricted visibility.” (CAB. AIR. American Airlines, Inc., Near Albany New York, September 16, 1953.)

National Fire Protection Association: “The fires reviewed herein are a very small sample of the aircraft fire experience of 1953 but were selected as being the major losses predicated on the $250,000 minimum established by the NFPA in its annual summary of large loss fires. Omitted are a number of civil and military accidents where crash impact was primarily responsible for the loss of life an the extent of damage, as, for instance, the American Airlines crash near Albany, N.Y. on Sept. 16, 1953, fatal to 28. In this accident all deaths were caused by fractured skulls (according to a report by the Albany County coroners) and despite that fact that fire followed the final impact, fire obviously was not a major factor.” (National Fire Protection Association. “Worst No. American Aircraft Fires – 1953.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 47, No. 3, January 1954, p. 309.)

Sources

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation. Accident Description. American Airlines Flight 723, 16 Sep 1953. Accessed 2-19-2009 at:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19530916-0

Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. American Airlines, Inc., Near Albany New York, September 16, 1953. Washington, DC: CAB, March 19, 1954, 9 pages. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*P%3A%5CDOT%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C091653.pdf

National Fire Protection Association. “Worst No. American Aircraft Fires – 1953.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 47, No. 3, January 1954, pp. 309-311.