1954 — Dec 18, Italian Airlines 451 airport approach (4th) crash, NY Idlewild IAP, NY– 26

— 26 Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Linee Aeree Italiane, 18 Dec 1954.
— 26 CAB AIR. Italian Airlines…NY IAP, Jamaica, NY, Dec 18, 1954 (File No. F-105-54).
— 26 NFPA. “Large Loss Fires of 1954.” Quarterly of the NFPA, Vol. 48, N. 3, Jan 1955, p. 313

Narrative Information

Aviation Safety Network: “The DC-6 was on its 4th attempt to land at New York-Idlewild when it struck the pier which supported the left row of runway 04 slope line approach lights. The aircraft crashed in flames and sank in Jamaica Bay. The aircraft was on a flight from Roma-Ciampino to New York via Milan, Paris, Shannon, Gander and Boston.

“PROBABLE CAUSE: “An erratic approach which resulted in a descent to an altitude too low to avoid striking the pier. A contributing factor to this accident was pilot fatigue due to the particular and difficult circumstances.”” (Aviation Safety Network. Linee Aeree Italiane, 18 Dec 1954.)

Civil Aeronautics Board: “At approximately 1400, 1 December 18, 1954, an Italian Airlines DC-6B, Italian registry 1-LINE, crashed into the pier which supported the left row of slope line approach lights to runway 4 at the New York International Airport (Idlewild). The accident occurred during the flight’s fourth instrument approach to the airport. The entire crew of 10 and 16 of the 22 passengers were killed; 4 of the 6 survivors received serious injuries. The aircraft was demolished by impact and sank in Jamaica Bay. An intense fuel fire followed the impact and spread over the water surface and pier.

History of the Flight

“Flight 451 is one of tour Italian Airlines flights scheduled weekly over the Worth Atlantic between the Rome-Ciampino Airport, Rome, Italy, and the New York International Airport, Jamaica. New York, with scheduled intermediate stops at Milan, Italy; Paris, France; Shannon, Ireland; Gander, Newfoundland, (technical stop); and Boston, Massachusetts. Scheduled elapsed time for the flight is 23 hours and 50 minutes, of which 20 hours and 45 minutes is flying time.

“Flight 451 of December 17-18, departed Rome at 1810 G. c. t. (Greenwich civil time), December 17, 1 hour and 10 minutes behind schedule because of a late connecting flight. The multiple flight crew of 10 consisted of… The stops at Milan and Paris were canceled because of local ground fog and the flight reached Shannon at 2320 G. c. t. There the aircraft was refueled and checked.

“Flight over the North Atlantic was uneventful. Routine position reports were made and the flight periodically received and logged en route and destination weather reports. This and the previous segments were described as very smooth, little or no actual instrument flight, and no apparent mechanical difficulties. Arrival and departure times at Gander were 0945 and 1038 G. c. t.

“As the flight neared Boston instrument conditions were encountered but were of little consequence and I-LINE landed at 0928. Nine passengers deplaned and the aircraft was serviced with 804 gallons of fuel, making the total fuel on board approximately 2,415 gallons, sufficient for about 7 hours of flight…. The flight departed Boston at 1013.

“After an uneventful instrument flight involving no Air Route Traffic Control routing and control, Flight 451 reported at 1122 to the Idlewild Approach Control as being aver the Mitchell Radio Range Station at 7,000 feet. The flight was then cleared to enter the Scotland holding pattern (located approximately 13 nautical miles southwest of the airport) and was subsequently “laddered down” to the number one position to approach.

“Between 1147 and 1159 weather conditions deteriorated below the ceiling minimum of 400 feet for landing on runway 22, the runway then in use. The flight continued to hold.

“At 1159 reported weather conditions improved and I-LINE was cleared for an approach to runway 22 using the back course of the ILS (Instrument Landing System). At 1218 the flight reported it had discontinued this approach. It was then issued missed-approach instructions and returned to the Scotland holding pattern. Shortly thereafter weather conditions were again reported below minimums for runway 22. They were then reported as: Ceiling 300 feet, broken, 2,500 feet, overcast; visibility 2-1/2 miles, light rain and fog; wind south-southeast 20 knots.

“While holding, the flight was asked by Approach Control if it would be able to make an approach to runway 4, the ILS runway, considering the tailwind component. The flight accepted runway 4 and was cleared at 1307 for an ILS approach. At 1313 the tower was advised by 451 that the approach had been missed.

“The flight was next offered, and it accepted, a GCA (Ground Controlled Approach). This approach was abandoned at 1324, a missed-approach procedure was followed, and the flight returned to Scotland.

“At 1327 the Italian Airlines Station Manager, in a message relayed by the tower, asked the flight its remaining fuel, and received the reply that there was three hours of holding fuel. The Station Manager then suggested that the flight hold for 1-1/2 hours and if unable to land to proceed to Washington, D. C. At 1329 the flight acknowledged this message.

“At 1349 the flight was again cleared for an ILS approach, the third approach to runway 4 and its fourth to the airport. At approximately 1400 the aircraft struck the left pier. The impact was accompanied by a violent explosion and followed by an intense fire. Tower personnel immediately sounded the crash alarm and initiated emergency procedures.

Investigation

“Investigation at the accident scene disclosed the aircraft struck the left inbound pier. The pier, primarily constructed of heavy wooden piles, extended approximately 2,000 feet into Jamaica Bay with its offshore end 2,530 feet from the approach end of runway 4. The floor of the pier was approximately 14 feet above the water level in the Bay at low tide. At the offshore end a vehicular turnaround was constructed of numerous piles forming each of its four corners, the tops of which were about six feet above the pier floor.

“First contact was with the pier only a few feet above the water. At impact the aircraft was moving nearly parallel with the pier toward runway 4. The Impact shattered the east half of the end of the pier, breaking and splintering the tops of most of the 11 piles composing the southeast corner. The bulk of the aircraft wreckage then sank in approximately 30 feet of water, mainly along the right side of the pier, over a distance of approximately 1,550 feet toward shore. The nature of damage to the pier, its closeness to the water, and the fact that little wreckage came to rest near the point of impact indicated the aircraft struck without an appreciable rate of descent.

“A propeller slash mark made by a blade of the number one propeller was found in the center pile at the offshore end of the pier. This cut disclosed that the number one engine nacelle was nearly centered with that position and the aircraft was slightly nose-up at impact. This propeller axis having been established made it apparent that the number two engine crashed into the southeast corner of the pier. Comparison of the heights of damage marks across the end of the pier revealed that the aircraft was nearly level laterally at the instant of impact.

“Following the initial impact the left outer wing panel wrapped around the piling and shattered. The center section of this wing want forward above the pier deck, destroying several light installations before it veered off to the right.

“At initial impact the fuselage was to the right side of the pier and thus the main portion of the aircraft continued on making additional contacts with the pier during this travel. These impacts disintegrated the right wing outer panel and forward fuselage. During this time number three and number four engines were torn out. As the remainder of the fuselage moved forward it turned approximately 180 degrees and when about 1,300 feet beyond the initial impact point it was moving backward.

“The six surviving passengers were seated at various positions in the main passenger cabin. Two were able to extricate themselves from the wreckage and climb onto the burning pier, but ahead of the fire, enabling them to proceed immediately to safety. The others were forced into the Bay and were rescued by a private boat operator or helicopters dispatched by the New York Port Authority, the New York Police Department, and the Coast Chard. Smoke, fire, and the location of the accident presented great difficulty in rescue activities; however, they were accomplished as quickly and efficiently as possible under these circumstances….

“Recovery operations. Undertaken in extremely difficult conditions, produced about 80 percent of the aircraft. The wreckage was laid out for data examination, the result of which disclosed no evidence of fatigue cracking, structural failure, or malfunctioning controls prior to impact….

“During the initial portion of the ILS approach radar contact was established and as the aircraft approached the four-miles-from-touchdown point it was observed to be somewhat to the right of the localizer path drifting left. Before reaching this position the flight was slightly left of course and lower them normal. During this time it was advised to maintain altitude; the flight continued to descend.

“At approximately the three-mile point the radar controller advised the flight that it appeared to be at 500 feet altitude and still descending. He then emphatically advised the pilot to level off.

“While the aircraft approached the two-mile point the controller advised the flight as follows, “Item Nan Easy level off, your altitude shows as 200 feet. About to intercept the glide path, 150 feet below glide path.” In explanation of this advisory the controller stated that the flight descended to 200 feet, or lower, then it arrested the descent and began to climb….

“The controller stated that as he observed the aircraft climbing he gave course information. “Two miles from touchdown, 400 feet left of course, 300 feet left of course.” While he was offering this information the aircraft entered another descent to a very low altitude. He advised, “Your altitude is very, very low pull up. Item Nan Easy pull up unless you have the runway in sight.” At this time the controller stated the aircraft began a sharp ascent turning right. The angle of ascent was decreased momentarily, then resumed. The climb continued until the aircraft was at or above the glide path altitude. At this time the controller believed the flight had begin a missed-approach procedure and he continued, “Item Nan Easy I see you’re pulling up, 500 feet left of course, a right turn heading 130….

“A second eyewitness, positioned approximately 1-1/4 miles north of the approach end of runway 4., stated that he saw the aircraft descend below the overcast in what appeared to be a slightly steeper than normal nose-down attitude. He then say the nose rise quickly to a nearly level position. He said the aircraft at this moment appeared to be slow and seemed to wobble. The aircraft continued to descend throughout his observations until he could no longer see it behind slightly higher terrain. Seconds later he heard a roar of the engines and almost simultaneously saw fire and smoke spout vertically upward. He then heard another roar of the engines….

“Investigation revealed that the crow of the flight was qualified and experienced; the captain had made 150 flights over the Atlantic, 75 of which terminated at the New York International Airport….

Analysis

“….During the Board’s investigation and analysis of this accident careful consideration was given the possible misinterpretation of the approach lights or an illusion associated with them. Evidence regarding misinterpretation or illusion would be primarily the testimony of the crew. This was not available for consideration, the entire crew being fatally injured….

“Although the entire crew was lost and actual rest periods are unknown there is no reason to believe that normal rest procedures were not followed. It is nevertheless believed fatigue was a factor in this accident. It was not only present as a result of the time on route, approximately 22-1/2 hours, but mostly a result of the additional extended 2-1/2-hour period devoted to the four approaches and the high mental and physical demands made upon the pilots. The element of fatigue is strongly suggested especially during the last approach. Fatigue is evidenced by the pilot’s poor adherence to the localizer path, the last descent to a very low altitude before the sharp pull-up, and the evidence of abrupt control action. It may also be noted in some degree in the pilot’s slow response to the wind shift and the probable loss of airspeed which caused the sinking descent before the aircraft struck the pier. These factors lend credence to the belief that the pilot’s efficiency and normal ability were seriously impaired by fatigue….

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was an erratic approach which resulted in a descent to an altitude too low to avoid striking the pier. A contributing factor to this accident was pilot fatigue due to the particular and difficult circumstances.” (Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. Italian Airlines (Linee Aeree Italiane), at New York International Airport, Jamaica, New York, December 18, 1954 (File No. F-105-54). Washington, DC: Cab, September 19, 1955, 14 pages.)

NFPA: “Dec. 18, New York, N. Y. Italian Airlines, DC-6B, $1,250,000, 26 killed.

“A missed approach at the New York In¬ternational Airport resulted in this accident when a DC-6B en route from Rome struck a pier supporting the “slopeline” approach lights and burst into flames. Intense fire followed an initial and second impact on the pier and only six survivors Could be rescued. The 2,000-foot-long pier presented difficult fire fighting problems and rescue work was hampered by the smoke and flames on the wooden pier and in floating gasoline on the water surface. The crash came after the pilot had made three previous attempts to land on Runway 22 at Idlewild but each time he was advised that his aircraft was im¬properly aligned to make a safe landing.” (National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Fires of 1954.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 48, No. 3, Jan 1955, pp. 201-326.)

Sources

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Linee Aeree Italiane, 18 Dec 1954. Accessed 2-20-2009 at: http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19541218-0

Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. Italian Airlines (Linee Aeree Italiane), At New York International Airport, Jamaica, New York, December 18, 1954 (File No. F-105-54). Washington, DC: Cab, September 19, 1955, 14 pages. Accessed at http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*S%3A%5CDOT_56GB%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C121854.pdf

National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Fires of 1954.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 48, No. 3, Jan 1955, pp. 201-326.