1958 — Aug 15, Northeast Air Flight 258 crash on airport approach in fog, Nantucket, MA–25

— 25 Aviation Safety Network. Database. Northeast Airlines Approach, Nantucket Mem. AP.
— 25 CAB. AAR. Northeast Airlines…Nantucket, Massachusetts, August 15, 1958.
— 3 Crew (all)
–22 Passengers (out of 31)
— 25 Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJFMP, 3/1, March 1982, Table 1.
— 24 AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 08151958.
— 24 NFPA. “Large Loss Fires of 1958.” NFPA Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 4, April 1959, p. 329.
— 24 Planecrashinfo.com. “Accident Details…1958…Northeast…Nantucket, MA…Aug 15…”

Narrative Information

Civil Aeronautics Board Synopsis: “About 2334, August 15, 1958, Northeast Airlines Flight 258 crashed during an instrument approach to the Nantucket. Massachusetts, Memorial Airport. The crew of 3 and 22 of 31 passengers received fatal injuries. The 9 surviving passengers were seriously injured. The aircraft, which burned after impact, was destroyed.

“The accident occurred during a straight-in VOR (very high frequency omni range) instrument approach to runway 24 (240 degrees). An analysis of all the available evidence indicates that the approach was continued after receipt of a below-minimum visibility report. At low altitude In the area of the “H” facility (a low-power nondirectional radio beacon), the flight encountered heavy fog in which the pilot lost orientation and ground reference. The aircraft contacted the ground almost simultaneously with the initiation of an attempt to discontinue the approach.

“The accident investigation and public hearing by the Board, and an operational inspection of the company by the Civil Aeronautics Administrational (CAA), disclosed discrepancies which reflected adversely on some of the policies and procedures of the company and on the adequacy of the Implementation of these policies and procedures These criticisms am stated in the body of this report.

“The operational factors which were identified as deficiencies during this investigation were generally known and accepted by the local CAA agents prior to the accident. Recognizing that the responsibilities of the CAA were not fully discharged, the Administrator took action to correct the local situation at Boston. He also established an inspection process whereby closer supervision can be maintained over the effectiveness of all local CAA offices throughout the country.

Investigation “Northeast Airlines Flight 258 is a scheduled operation which originates at La Guardia Airport, New York, and terminates at Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts, with one intermediate stop serving Nantucket, Massachusetts. The flight is scheduled to originate at 2020 and arrive Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard at 2128 and 2210. respectively….

“Witnesses at the terminal, about one mile from the crash site, said that fog became evident at the airport about 2300 and thereafter until the crash it became very dense. The fog was described as sea fog which moved in from the ocean in layers and waves. It moved northeasterly from the ocean across the airport Into the approach area of runway 24 Some noted the lights of flight 2289 which was waiting takeoff about one-half mile from the terminal. They stated these lights were visible a few minutes before the crash but at the time of the accident they were blotted out in fog

“One witness at the terminal said that he observed the right or rear side of a heavy fog bank moving with the other fog across the airport. This, he said, blotted out the lights of the DC-3 (Flight 2289) and was moving toward the approach area. While watching for Flight 258 to land he saw a light appear, the beam of which, he said, was triangular, narrow at the top and broad at the bottom. This he thought was the landing lights of night 258. The light appeared only momentarily but It was sufficient to illuminate the fog bank and to outline the right or rear ride and the top; the latter was estimated to be about 200-250 feet above the ground. He said the light emanated from behind or from within the fog bank. Several others saw a light; however, they described it as an explosive-like flash at ground level….

“Investigation at the accident scene disclosed that N 90670 Initially contacted the ground approximately 1.450 feet short of runway 24 end about 650 feet to the left (inbound) of the extended runway centerline. The initial contact was shown by light tire tracks made by the tires of all three landing gear components. The lightness of the tracks in soft ground showed the aircraft had little, if any, rate of sink or descent at initial contact. Because all the tracks began nearly simultaneously it was also evident that the aircraft was nearly level laterally and longitudinally. Tire tracks by all landing gear components continued for about 145 feet along a magnetic heading of 233 degrees and over bumpy but flat terrain which averaged about 50 feet mean sea level….

“The wheel tracks ended after about 145 feet when the wheels contacted a sharp but not high rise in the ground and the aircraft catapulted into the air. It crossed a dirt road and passed through a clump of scrub pine trees. A branch of one of these trees was marked by a blade of the right propeller. Examination of the cut showed it was made at the bottom of the propeller arc and by the tip of a blade. This information and the height of the mark showed the aircraft was rolling rapidly left at this point.

“Approximately 400 feet from the initial ground contact the left wing struck the ground and progressively disintegrated as it dragged for the next 300 feet. The aircraft entered a scrub pine thicket cutting a swath the narrowness of which showed the aircraft was then nearly vertical in its role axis.

“The aircraft veered, left…and reached an attitude slightly past inverted. Nose down in this attitude the aircraft plunged to the ground making simultaneous contact with the right wing and powerplant and the nose section of the airplane. The center section and fuselage then cartwheeled forward to an upright attitude and …slid 125 feet to a stop, same l,100 feet from the Initial contact….

“Fuel from the shattered wings was hurled into the main wreckage area and ignited. The resulting fire consumed a major portion of the wreckage….

“Concurrently with the accident investigation the CAA undertook an operational inspection of the carrier. It was undertaken under the CAA responsibility for the supervision of air carrier operations and was prompted by three fatal accidents experienced by the carrier since 1956. The inspecting team was composed of several air carrier safety inspectors other than those assigned to the Boston office. It functioned under the Regional Administrator.

“The accident investigation by Board investigators and the conclusions reached by the CAA team were similar in several areas, some of which have already, been presented. Of other areas, one of the most important was operational training which was considered inadequate, the result of several factors.

“Testimony of Northeast witnesses indicated that the use of Northeast aircraft in the scheduled operations took priority over their use in training. Board investigators determined that at times this resulted In interruptions of the training function and reduced the overall effectiveness of the program The CAA team concluded that inefficient scheduling of aircraft over the system reduced the availability of aircraft for training. Lack of training personnel also contributed to the problem.

“The CAA team indicated that undesirable factors in the pilot cheek program contributed to the evaluation. It concluded that there was a need for greater standardization of flight check procedures among the check pilots and more explicit instructions to then regarding their duties and responsibilities. The team concluded that supervisory personnel needed delegated authority commensurate with their positions. Allied to the check program was a requirement for greater stress on the Importance and use of recurrent training.

“During the CAA inspection, Northeast captains received flight proficiency checks. The results substantiated the conclusions of the team when a number of these Pilots were graded unsatisfactory on their first check.

“It was the testimony of the local CAA air carrier safety inspectors having responsibility for the supervision of the operational phases of the carrier that, in general., they were satisfactory. Obviously this judgment was not In accord with the CAA inspecting team.

“During the accident investigation Board investigators found it difficult to determine from the available company records, some of the current qualifications of line pilots. It was learned that some of the information on which the company relied was submitted by each pilot rather then being obtained from the record system.

“Analysis….A question of even greater concern is whether or not Flight 258 received the special weather report of “partial obscuration. Visibility 1/8 mile and, if so, when the report was received. This concern is generated because the reported visibility was below the authorized landing minimum for the flight; if as has been explained, the report was received before the flight reached the radio facility on final approach, the captain was required to discontinue the instrument approach. After arduous study and careful evaluation of all the evidence. It is the opinion of the Board that the report was received and at a time when the approach should have been discontinued. This opinion is based on a determination of the time of the accident and again upon the accuracy of the Northeast radio log. Each of these supports the other and the Otis tape supports both….

“The nature of the local weather conditions may have been a factor in Captain Burnhans decision to continue the approach. From the available evidence it is apparent that a heavy rolling sea fog extending to at least 300 feet existed over the airport and into the approach area It is believed that the fog was very heavy to the “H” facility., rapidly decreasing in density northeastward, until in the area of the VOR the conditions were generally clear. It is possible that as Flight 258 passed over the vicinity of the airport. Lights on the airport were clearly visible vertically through the fog. This, together with generally clear conditions in the VOR area, could have led the captain to believe weather conditions were much better at the approach end of runway 24 than at the terminal where the conditions were being measured….

“At low altitude in the area of the “H facility it is believed that the flight entered the heavy fog bank, described by an eyewitness. It is believed that at this time all ground reference was lost and before transition to instruments could be made and the approach discontinued the remaining altitude was lost and the aircraft contacted the ground.

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the deficient judgment and technique or the pilot during an instrument approach in adverse weather conditions in failing to abandon the approach when a visibility of one-eights mile was reported, and descending to a dangerously low altitude while still a considerable distance from. The runway.” (CAB. AAR. Northeast Airlines…Nantucket, Massachusetts, August 15, 1958.)

Sources

AirDisaster.Com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 08151958. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=08151958&reg=N90670&airline=Northeast+Airlines

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation. Database. Northeast Airlines Convair CV-240-2, Approach, Nantucket Memorial Airport, 15 August 1958. Accessed 1-27-2023 at: http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19580815-1

Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Northeast Airlines, Inc., Convair 240, N 90670, Nantucket, Massachusetts, August 15, 1958. Washington, DC: CAB, 26 March 1959, 18 p. Accessed 1-27-2023 at: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Northeast_Airlines_Inc_Convair_240_N_906/ULCnVwhzf6gC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=%22Northeast+Airlines,+Inc.,+Convair+240,+N+90670,+Nantucket,+Massachusetts,+August+15,+1958.%22&pg=PA1&printsec=frontcover

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.

National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Fires of 1958.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 52, No. 4, April 1959, p. 329.

Planecrashinfo.com. “1958…Accident Details…Northeast…Nantucket, MA…Aug 15…” Accessed at: http://www.planecrashinfo.com/1958/1958-38.htm