1959 — Nov 25, capsizing, M/V National Pride, Gulf of Mexico off Galveston TX coast –all 11

— 11 USCG. Commandant’s Action…capsizing…NATIONAL PRIDE, 25 Nov 1959…, 1962.

Narrative Information

USCG, Eighth Coast Guard District, Galveston, TX, Marine Board of Investigation, 1960:

“Subj: M/V National Pride, Official Number 273771; capsizing in Gulf of Mexico en route to or from ammunition dumping area after departing from San Jacinto Ordnance Depot, Channelview, Texas at 1432 on 25 November 1959 resulting in the deaths of Ramon Samuel Nowell, John Albert Falch, Paul Herbert Brown, John J. Ocraman, Tony Floyd Burnett, Walter Zane, Hamilton Cornelia Moon, William Edward Massenburg, Jose Maria Gonzales, Ray Coward and Ronald M. Geithmann.

Findings of Fact:

“The M/V National Pride, Official Number 273771, a freight vessel of 196 gross tons and 135 feet in length with a crew of eleven persons, having departed from San Jacinto Ordnance Depot, Channelview, Texas on 25 November 1959 at 1432 was located in a capsized condition at 1607 on 27 November 1959 at Latitude 28-28 North, Longitude 94-20 West by UFIG 1263, a Coast Guard Aircraft from the Coast Guard Air Detachment, Corpus Christi, Texas after the National Pride had been reported overdue by its owner. The National Pride at the time of its departure carried a deck cargo consisting of 438 short tons of obsolete ammunition loaded at the San Jacinto Ordnance Deport, Channelview, Texas. It was bound for an explosives dumping area approximately 122 miles south of the Galveston Sea Buoy in the Gulf of Mexico. This casualty resulted in the deaths of the eleven persons on board. The bodies of two of these crew-members were found remaining on board the vessel upon its being towed to Galveston and righted.

“2. The vessel involved: National Pride – Official Number 273771, oil screw freight vessel; U.S. nationality; home port Wilmington, Delaware….owner and operator, National Boat Corporation…Houston 1, Texas. The National Pride was constructed in 1957….

“16. The National Pride on 3 December 1959 was boarded…[anchorage No. 2, Bolivar Roads, where it had been towed] by the Marine board of Investigation designated by the Commandant which found the hull of the vessel intact and no cargo on board or cargo securing gear in place. The cross-over valve between No. 1 part and starboard ballast tanks was found to be open. The cross-over valves between No. 2 ballast tank and No. 3 port and starboard ballast tanks were found to be closed. The engine room access doors were found open. The scuttle through the hatch leading to the after steering gear room was found to be open and in a damaged condition. The securing lid to the two engine room ventilators were found to be missing. The starboard gate and the tail gate were found to be missing. Only two bodies were found to be on board….

“19….The life preservers were stowed in racks over the bunks in the quarters with the proper number of life preservers for the occupants of the bunks located in that compartment. Additional loose life preservers were carried on the vessel so it was not necessary to remove the ones from the racks. The life preservers in racks remained in place with the racks intact when the vessel was towed into Galveston after capsizing. The 15 man life-float was secure on the forward pilot house bulkhead by means of steel straps with a toggle pin. The teen-man life-float was stowed above thee pilot house. The workboat was secured one deck above the main deck aft of the pilot house on a set of brackets. There were davits with a lifting mechanism provided in the event that it might be necessary to use that to launch the boat; however, it was a light boat and two or three men could pick it up by hand to launch it. The 15 man life-float at the forward part of the deckhouse was still in place after the vessel was righted. The life raft that had been stowed on top of the pilot house was apparently not in place abut floated free when the vessel was righted. The workboat was missing and has not been recovered. When the National Pride was righted the starboard engine control was found to be full or well ahead and the port engines control to be in neutral or slow astern. Both rudders and the rudder angle indicator were found to be full left.

“21….To the owner’s knowledge the communication equipment on the National Pride was in good condition. Along with the other frequencies on the radio-telephone it was capable of contacting the Coast Guard on 2182 KCS and capable of communicating with the Galveston Marine Operator and the New Orleans Marine Operator.

“22. The vessel upon being righted appeared to have sustained only superficial damage in addition to that inflicted by the salvage operation and water damage to the engines, electrical gear and equipment….

“27. No parties present at the Marine Board of Investigation or witnessed called by the Marine Board were aware of any vessels similar to the National Pride having any difficulty such as capsizing nor was there any question of stability raised prior to the casualty involving the National Pride. Captain Engstrom, the former master of the National Pride who had been employed on that vessel for approximately seven months, while it was in the oil field service trade as well as during the ammunition dumping operation, was of the opinion that the only loading condition at which the National Pride might likely to capsize was in a light condition with no load whatsoever during extremely bad weather conditions. His only explanation or hypothesis for the casualty was that the vessel might have been in a freak squall as he had often experience in the Gulf of Mexico, many of which lasted not more than 20 to 45 minutes, when the wind velocity increased to 75 or 80 miles per hour. Under those conditions he felt that the vessel might run upon a sea causing it to pitch violently allowing the wind to catch underneath the bow and that this combined with the momentum of the hull on a rising angle would possibly cause the vessel to keep rising and lay over on its side causing it to capsize. Captain Engstrom was on the opinion that with some ballast in the vessel he did not see how it was possible for it to capsize….

“Conclusions:

“1. That the M/V National Pride capsized in a loaded condition while en route from the Galveston Sea Buoy to the ammunition dumping area. When the first three clocks were found on board the vessel, two of them showed the time to be 22 minutes until six and 18 minutes until six and since there was no cargo gear remaining on board, there was a presumption that the vessel had capsized in a light condition while returning from the dumping ground at 1542 or 1548 on the 26th of November 1959. This would correlate the running times, dumping time and the position at which the vessel was first located by the UFIG 1272….

“This would leave approximately six hours and six minutes or six hours and ten minutes for the vessel to go from the dumping ground back to the position at which it was first sighted by the UFIG 1272 which is about 72 miles from the dumping ground and about 54 miles from the Galveston Sea Buoy. This presumption however, was overcome when the curves of form had been prepared on the National Pride and the stability data from a sister hull obtained showed the vessel to be extremely stable in a light loaded condition coupled with the fact that although the weather was extremely rough and unusual in some respects there were no mountainous seas or hurricane force winds reported which would be likely to capsize the vessel by sheer force as hypothesized by the former master of the National Pride…Coupled with this was the fact that it was never determined that the cargo securing wires and gear were in fact ever made fast to the padeyes and nothing to show even if they had been so secured that they had not been removed prior to arriving at the dumping grounds as was the custom when the weather conditions so permitted. The fact that the engine doors and engine room ventilator covers were not secured for bad weather is further indicative that the captain of the National Pride might not have thought the weather to be extremely bad.

“2. Cause of capsizing of the vessel cannot be attributed to any one specific item such as stability, partial flooding of the cargo deck or flooding of a space below deck, but is believed to be the result of two or more unusual events occurring at the same time. The following conditions or events could have contributed to the capsizing:

“….b. The cargo deck of the vessel was sheathed in such a manner as to prevent adequate drainage of water from the deck. The original drainage ports in the steel bulwarks had all been block off with sheathing. In addition, the aft tailgate of chain had been replaced with a solid tailgate with a small opening at the bottom.

“c. When the vessel is loaded to its load line with deck cargo, the inherent trim by the stern which is impossible to eliminate in this particular design of vessel results in a very low freeboard (less than one foot) at the stern. This makes it relatively easy for any heavy sea to break aboard the vessel and in extreme cases flood the aft steering room (if hatch is open) of the machinery space through the access hatches on deck.

“d. It is possible that a sudden local squall came up in in the Gulf where the vessel was located and caught the vessel in confused seas and wind. Under these conditions the vessel might have gotten into the trough of the sea and had difficulty getting out. With the stability and freeboard of the vessel in the marginal condition that they were, it is possible that adverse weather conditions could have resulted in the vessel taking a list and capsizing shortly thereafter.

“e. There might have been a machinery failure either of a main propulsion engine or of the steering gear right at the crucial time when the vessel was encountering bad weather conditions. Since no bodies were found in the engine room, such a failure probably occurred less than a minute or two before the vessel capsized. Failure of a main engine due to water in the fuel would be the most likely cause of difficulty.

“3. The vessel capsized suddenly with little or no advance warning. This is evidenced by the fact that all life preservers were still in place in their racks in the quarters and both life-floats were still in place on the vessel when it was righted. It appears, however, that there was enough warning of difficulty for a helmsman to put the wheel hard left and to put the starboard throttle full ahead.

“4. That the vessel was engaged in a violent maneuver at the time of the casualty is evident by the full left position of both rudders, the full left position indicated by the rudder angle indicator and the positions of the throttles with the port throttle control in neutral or slightly astern with the starboard throttles full ahead indicating that the vessel was being turned or that the helmsman was attempting to turn the vessel rapidly to the port. The violent maneuver to port is possibly attributable either to maneuvering the engines and rudder in an attempt to keep the vessel from rolling in the trough of a heavy sea, a frequent maneuver described by Captain [blacked out] who had previously served on that vessel…

“5. The first impression that the weather was relatively good after the vessel departed, due to good weather existing on shore as indicated by the Galveston Weather Bureau at Galveston, Texas, was overcome by later reports…from various vessels in the vicinity indicating that severe weather conditions had been encountered in positions offshore. These conditions were such as to cause super tankers to heave to while Thanksgiving dinner was being prepared and causing other large seagoing cargo vessels to slow down or change course.

“6. The loading of the vessel, the cross connecting of the two forward ballast tanks, the blockage of the freeing ports from the cargo deck, the operating condition of the machinery and thee type of watches stood by the crew were all the final responsibility of the master. Other responsibilities of the master were ballasting and trimming of the vessel as well as loading and lashing of the cargo Since the condition of the vessel and its cargo resulted in its capsizing, it must be concluded that the capsizing is attributable to the master. It is true that some of the items were indirectly the responsibility of the owner or operator who possibly should have furnished the master with information as to any restrictions on loading or operating conditions.

“7. Evidence indicates that the vessel capsized by rolling over to starboard rather than to port. This is based on the fact that the ladder leading from the cargo deck to the pilot house on the starboard side was found to be severely damaged or crushed as if the fork lifts had come up against it. In addition, splinters of wood in the center T bar holding down the deck sheathing ere on the port side of the T bar thus indicating that the pallets had slipped from port to starboard. Also, the fact that the rudder was at hard left and the starboard engine was full ahead would indicate that the vessel was trying to head up into the seas. Under these conditions, the vessel would almost certainly capsize to starboard.

“That the vessel did not capsize solely as a result of being overloaded by cargo appears probable since the vessel had previously made many trips with loads in excess of that carried on the 22nd voyage. In addition to the problem of weight those prior cargos were stacked higher above the deck than the palletized cargo thereby raising the center of gravity more than the cargo on the 22nd trip….

“11. That offshore supply vessels of the type similar to the National Pride suffer from the following weaknesses all of which affect their seaworthiness:

“a. The design is basically a poor one for sea going vessels. It represents a compromise with primary emphasis on convenience and adaptability to conditions peculiar to the offshore oil industry. Seaworthiness was not a primary consideration in the design of these vessels.

“b. The vessels are not designed to carry deck cargo exclusively. They must either ballast or carry some kind of liquid cargo in their tanks. When the amount of cargo carried on deck exceeds approximately 2/3 of the total carrying capacity of the vessel, the vessel starts to approach an unseaworthy condition due to stability considerations, the low freeboard involved and the possibility of flooding a space below deck.

“c. The general practice of leaving machinery spaces unmanned is undesirable. This is particularly true since flooding of engine rooms is possible due to the low freeboards of these vessels and if such flooding is not corrected immediately and steps taken to prevent it, the vessel can lose more freeboard and stability to the point where they can capsize. Also loss of propulsion or auxiliary power can create a dangerous condition if it occurs at a critical moment.

“d. Vessels of this type with nothing but tanks under the main deck and which can carry all or almost all of their cargo capacity above deck can readily be loaded so that they are unstable. The large amount of free surface possible in the tanks as well as the possibility of a high center of gravity on the deck cargo can all contribute to dangerous conditions.

“Although the load line assigned to the National Pride was in accordance with existing laws and regulations, it is believed that for vessels of this unusual shape, wide beam and shallow draft the load line assigned permits loading the vessel too deeply. Certainly, the load line assigned is too deep for indiscriminate loading and operation of the vessel….”

Sources

United States Coast Guard. Commandant’s Action on Marine Board of Investigation; capsizing of the MV National Pride, 25 November 1959, Gulf of Mexico, with loss of life. Washington, DC: USCG Commandant Headquarters. 3-2-1962. Includes USCG Eighth Coast Guard District, Galveston, Texas, Marine Board of Investigation report, dated 1-26-1960.