1960 — March 8, Island Creek Coal Co. No. 22 Mine Fire, Holden, Logan County, WV– 18
— 18 Bond, Horatio. “Underground Buildings.” Fire Journal, Vol. 59, No, 4, July 1965, p. 56.
— 18 Bugbee. “Fire Protection Developments in 1960.” NFPA Quarterly, 54/3, Jan 1961, p.211.
— 18 Keenan. Historical Documentation of Major Coal-Mine Disasters…[U.S.]…, 1963, p. 39.[1]
— 18 NFPA. “Large Loss of Life Fires of 1960.” Quarterly of the NFPA, 54/3, Jan 1961, p. 268.
— 18 National Fire Protection Association. Spreadsheet of 10+ Fatality Fires, as of 3-15-2013.
— 18 U.S. Mine Rescue Association. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Island Creek…”
— 18 WV Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. WV Mine Disasters 1884 to Present.
Narrative Information
Keenan: “A mine fire was discovered at 8:30 a.m., Tuesday, March 8, 1960, immediately inby[2] the 3 left overcast on the west-main haulageway in the No. 22 mine. As a direct result of the fire, 18 men died from asphyxiation and/or carbon monoxide poisoning. Two men escaped from the No. 4 unit section (4 left barrier ) 1,600 feet inby the fire area, and 30 other men were in scattered sections of the mine outby[3] the fire area. All men were withdrawn from the sections outby the fire; these men assisted with the recovery and firefighting operations. Sixteen men died while traveling inby from the fire area and their working sections in the direction of the Elk Creek slope. These men had erected a partial brattice-cloth barricade 950 feet inby the junction of 4 left and west main entries and approximately 3,500 feet inby the fire area. Two other men died near the entrance to the No. 7 unit section, 1,700 feet inby the fire area.
“Access into the mine was through a slope and 3 shafts. The slope. (Elk Creek) 525 feet in length on a 16-degree pitch, had been used as an escape-way and intake airway. The 3 shafts were namely, a coal- hoisting shaft, a man-and-material hoisting shaft, and a return air shaft. The return air shaft was 210 feet in depth; the other 2 shafts were approximately 483 feet in depth. Mining was being done in the high-volatile bituminous Cedar Grove coal bed, which averaged 60 inches in thickness in the areas being mined….
“The day-shift crew, consisting of 52 employees, left the surface about 7 :30 a.m., Tuesday, March 8, 1960. About 7:35 a.m., two production crews, consisting of 15 men, including officials, left the shaft bottom in special self-propelled man cars for No. 4 left barrier and No. 7 right barrier sections. These man-trips were followed about 4 or 5 minutes later by the two section haulage men, each operating a “light” locomotive; a track crew, consisting of 3 men, shortly thereafter followed the “light” locomotives with a locomotive and 3 tool cars enroute to No. 7 section. Twelve of the remaining 32 underground employees were engaged in the production of coal in 2 right section outby the fire area; 20 employees engaged in haulage and maintenance left the man-shaft bottom for their respective work areas shortly after the man-trips.
“The Nos. 4 and 7 section locomotives followed the Nos. 4 and 7 man-trips to No. 4 sidetrack, located just outby 3 left entries to take 10 empty mine cars from the No. 4 sidetrack to No. 7 section. They had reached their working sections when the fire was discovered at 8:30 a.m. The track crew pushed the 3 cars from the shaft to the No. 7 section, and therefore, they did not travel as rapidly as the “light” locomotives. The Nos. 4 and 7 section man-trips reached their respective working sections without incident, and these crews were producing coal when they learned of the fire.
“Three mine electricians worked in the No. 7 barrier section during the 12:00 midnight to 8:00 a.m., shift, March 8. These men worked their shift repairing the face electrical equipment and greasing. They were a few minutes later than usual leaving the section on the morning of March 8, and they called the haulage dispatcher and asked for travel instructions about 7 :40 a.m. The dispatcher instructed the electricians to travel to 3 left entries and wait in 3 left until the Nos. 4 and 7 section man-trips passed. When the man-trips passed the entrance to 3 left, one of the electricians called the dispatcher and asked for clearance to the shaft bottom after advising that the two man- trips had cleared 3 left. The dispatcher instructed the electricians to wait until the two “light” locomotives and the track crew were clear of 3 left and then proceed to 2 right and clear the main haulage road.
“The 2 section locomotive operators switched 10 empty mine cars from the No. 4 sidetrack and proceeded towards No. 7 section. The electrician was on the main haulageway at the 3-left switch observing the locomotives and cars as the two motormen traveled inby. As the lead locomotive hauling the mine cars reached the 3-left overcast, a large electric arc or flash occurred that filled the entry from rib to rib. The electric arc and flash appeared to begin on the trolley-wire side of the entry. The motorman did not stop his trip and the other motorman following two or three car lengths behind the trip failed to stop and continued inby the overcast.
“Although the electricians did not know what caused the large flash of flame and arc, they did not investigate because the two locomotives continued traveling inby without interruption. Examination of the two section locomotives in July 1960 showed that the trolley pole immediately adjacent to the trolley harp on the No. 25 locomotive had been burned and charred. Also, an electrical blister was present on the harp casing. The trolley pole and harp on No. 27 locomotive did not show evidence of burning or charring. After the two section locomotive and the track crew cleared the 3-left switch, the electricians traveled to 2 right entries where they waited about 10 minutes until the main-line locomotive passed.
“The dispatcher’s record for March 8 shows that the mainline motorman left the shaft bottom at 8:05 a.m., with 85 mine cars enroute No. 4 sidetrack, which is about 2 miles inby the shaft bottom. He arrived at No. 4 sidetrack without mishap, but then had to wait for a locomotive to return to the sidetrack to help clear the main line. While waiting he saw a locomotive traveling on the main haulageway inby 3 left entries and he then heard a noise which he thought made by loading or unloading of tools into or out of a mine car. The locomotive after about a 4- or 5-minute stop proceeded inby. About 5 minutes after the locomotive left the overcast area, he observed a light or flame in the area; and advised the dispatcher that a fire was burning just inby the 3-left overcast. The fire appeared to have started on the trolley-wire side of the haulageway about 5 feet inby the 3-left overcast. The fire had spread along 4 or 5 wooden crossbars, the supporting legs, and the accumulations of dust on the ribs. The dispatcher instructed him to move the trip of empty cars and get the chemical fire truck to the fire.
“The locomotive and mine cars observed at the 3-left overcast were being used by a 3-man track crew. It will never be known why the track crew stopped at the 3-left overcast, and no one will ever know what activities or duties were performed by the track crew at the location. It is possible that the trip or part thereof was derailed at the overcast location, and the noise heard by the main-line motorman was caused by the rerailing of the cars; it is also possible that the crossbars and legs were ignited by arcs or sparks from the trolley wire during the derailment and the noise was made by the crew attempting to extinguish the fire. Examination of the locomotive used by the track crew showed that the trolley pole adjacent to the harp was burned and charred, and the pole cable was in two parts. The locomotive and cable were energized by wrapping several strands of feeder wire cable around the harp casing and then fastening these wires to the pole cable. The cable blow-up, repairs to the cable, and igniting of the roof supports could have caused the trip stop at the overcast.
“Another possible explanation for the track-crew stop at the overcast is that they observed flame or smoldering fire resulting from the arcs and sparks made by the locomotive crew that preceded them. If the observance of fire was the reason for the track-crew stop, the crew failed to extinguish the fire completely, as it was relatively large when discovered about 5 minutes after the track crew left the location. The mine foreman, who was on the surface, was informed of the fire; he immediately instructed the dispatcher to have the doors in 3 left opened and the power disconnected. Immediately after being advised of the fire, the dispatcher was in conversation by trolley phone with a section motorman, who was inby the fire. The dispatcher instructed him over the trolley phone to travel outby the fire and help procure the fire truck and fight the fire. He replied that he would help immediately but shortly thereafter, he informed the dispatcher that the fire was too large for him to travel through it. He was then advised by the dispatcher to proceed to and take the men from No. 7 section to No. 4 section and get in touch with the safety engineer and go to fresh air. About this time, the electric power was “cut off” and there was no further communication with anyone inby the fire.
“The superintendent and mine foreman arrived on the scene and took charge of the fire-fighting operations. An 80-gallon chemical truck and a water-car were moved to the scene of the fire where water and chemicals were applied until the supplies were exhausted. A high-pressure rock-dusting machine was moved up and rock dust applied; however, very little headway was made in controlling the fire along the heavily timbered entry. The roof material fell as the burning crossbars collapsed. They arrived at 3 left about 20 to 30 minutes after the fire was discovered and estimated that the fire had spread along the haulageway for a distance of about 80 feet when they arrived. The air line was disconnected at 2 right and water was obtained by tapping the 5-inch line and starting a 600-gallon-a-minute pump located at a “sump” in 2 right. Fittings and materials were assembled and a 3-inch diameter water hose was laid to the fire area by 11:00 a.m., the same day. Water was directed on the burning material, which had fallen to a height of about 4 feet and for a distance of about 200 feet. A temporary stopping was erected across the haulageway outby the fire area to exclude as much as possible air from passing over the fire. Later, an additional 3-inch water line was laid to the fire area.
“About 12:25 p.m., on the day of the fire, a continuous-miner operator and a ventilation man, each of whom had been working in the No. 4 left barrier section inby the fire, arrived at the junction of the main haulageway and 3 left entries where they met men fighting the mine fire. They learned of the fire while loading coal at the face of a working place in No. 4 section; they traveled to the mouth of the section where they found the men with the safety engineer and the section foreman. There was much discussion about the possibility of escaping through the Elk Creek slope. The ventilation man maintained that it would not be possible to travel to the slope, as the west main entries between the slope and their location was closed. The safety engineer listened carefully concerning escape routes and then instructed the section foreman to take his crew and travel towards the Elk Creek slope. The two men then left the other men and traveled to 4 left entries. Heavy smoke was encountered when the door at the 4-left overcast was opened and considerable smoke was encountered in Nos. 1 and 2 entries of west main entries inby the airshaft headings, a distance of about 1,200 feet. After passing the air shaft headings, they found the air of good quality; however, extensive falls of roof in Nos. 1 and 2 entries made travel slow, difficult, and hazardous. After traveling a distance of about 3,000 feet in several hours they arrived at the entrance to 3 left entries about 12:25 p.m., without injury. None of the other employees, 18 men, entrapped by the fire escaped.
“About 1:15 p.m., March 8, a party of State and Federal inspectors and company officials entered the mine through the Elk Creek slope, which had been closed with a stopping fitted with a man-door several months prior to the fire. The door was opened to permit about 47,000 cubic feet of air a minute to enter the mine and enable the crew to explore the area and determine conditions therein. This party traveled about 900 feet along the west main entries, when they were forced to withdraw because of hooved bottom, standing water, and concentrations of carbon monoxide. Before leaving for the surface, changes were made to divert the intake air from west mains to the main fan through 5 left entries.
“A second trip was made through the Elk Creek slope about 5:00 p.m., of the same day to explore further, but the crew returned to the surface and no further attempts were made to enter the Elk Greek slope opening. During the evening of March 8, tapping sounds were made on the borehole casing from the surface to the underground workings about 2,000 feet from the fire area, but there was no response. The Nos. 1 and 2 entries of the west main entries were originally used as return airways; however, these entries were changed to intake airways previous to the fire and they were to be used as escape-ways and travelways. The No. 2 entry was separated from Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 entries by cinder-block stoppings. The Nos. 7 and 8 entries of west main entries were used as return airways and were separated from No. 6 entry by masonry stoppings.
“Work was started on the evening March 8 to advance in Nos. 1 and 2 entries of west main entries as far as possible inby the fire located on No. 4 entry ; this work was done to permit travel inby the fire and permit the installation of temporary stoppings in Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 entries at locations inby the fire. Crews were also engaged in timbering No. 2 entry and in repairing and reinforcing the permanent stoppings in crosscuts between Nos. 2 and 3 entries adjacent to the fire area. A 3-inch plastic water line was connected to the 5-inch water line in No. 4 entry and then extended along the No. 2 entry. Two-inch branch water lines fitted with valves were tapped into the 3-inch water line and placed through the stoppings into the fire area. Test pipes equipped with valves were placed in the stop- pings to determine the quality of air in the fire area.
“A rescue crew equipped with gas masks traveled in Nos. 1 and 2 entries for a distance of about 1,200 feet inby 3 left entries where they encountered difficult traveling because of roof falls, dense smoke, and concentrations of carbon monoxide. A rescue crew also attempted to travel through crosscuts from No. 2 entry to No. 4 entry inby the fire area; dense smoke and fumes prevented the crew from reaching No. 4 entry. A crew of men equipped with gas masks made a trip into the air-shaft headings and explored the area. During this trip and about 510 feet inby the fire, smoke and heat were encountered when an opening was made in a stopping between Nos. 2 and 3 entries.
“Because of the difficulty of traveling from 3 left entries through Nos. 1 and 2 entries of west main to the area inby the fire, providing supplies for the erection of checks, temporary stoppings, line curtains, and installing roof supports was slow, difficult, tedious, and hazardous. The absence of open travelable openings at the inby end of the fire made the containing of the fire at the inby end almost impossible. To facilitate the erection of temporary stoppings across the Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 entries of west main entries inby the fire, an attempt was made to reverse the direction of air flow through the fire area by directing the intake air to the inby end of the fire through Nos. 1 and 2 entries and returning such air over the fire through Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 entries and through a metal tubular overcast into 3 left entries. Unfortunately, although this change was beneficial, it failed to permit a complete air reversal through the fire area. While this ventilation change was being made, water was being applied to the fire area at all critical points and temporary stoppings were installed across Nos. 2 and 3 entries inby the fire area to divert the intake air to No. 4 entry. Temporary stoppings were erected in crosscuts between Nos. 4 and 5 entries for a distance of approximately 600 lineal feet in No. 4 entry inby the fire area. This work was accomplished by crews wearing gas masks. A fresh-air base (No. 5 station) was established on the haulageway (No. 4 entry) 500 feet inby the line of temporary stoppings.
“Exploratory crews traveled Nos. 7 and 8 entries of 2 west main entries in intake air over heavy falls of roof for a distance of about 1,500 feet; at this location, they found both entries closed by wooden stoppings. Later, a crew opened these stoppings, which permitted intake air to ventilate the active working places in No. 7 section. This crew, in their search of the area for the trapped men, found two full lunch buckets. The crew returned through Nos. 7 and 8 entries to the fresh-air base at 3 left entries. A gas mask crew reached the No. 7 section from No. 5 station on the haulageway at almost the identical time that the men traveling in intake air through Nos. 7 and 8 entries reached No. 7 section. During the same shift, a gas mask crew traveled the haulageway to the 4-left overcast, where 2 locomotives and a man-trip car were found. The working places in 4 left barrier section were explored before the crew returned to the fresh-air base. Shortly after these exploratory trips were made with gas masks, a fresh-air base (No. 6 station) was established on the haulageway (No. 4 entry) inby the entrance to No. 7 section. Additional exploration trips in the 4 left section, the 4 left storage tracks, and No. 7 section confirmed the belief that the entrapped men had moved from and were not in these areas. Crews wearing gas masks or oxygen breathing apparatus continued making exploratory trips into open areas inby No. 6 station, and about 3:20 p.m., March 15, 1960, the bodies of 14 of the trapped men were located approximately 950 feet inby the junction of 4 left and west main entries, a distance of about 3,550 feet inby the fire area.
“About 8:35 p.m., on March 16, 2 additional bodies were located in Nos. 6 and 7 entries approximately 120 feet inby the 14 bodies. During the afternoon of March 17, a rescue team probing in the vicinity of No. 7 section located the last two bodies of the trapped men in Nos. 5 and 6 entries of west main entries. The body of the last victim was brought to the surface about 4:45 p.m., March 17, 1960.
“Immediately after the bodies of the victims were brought to the surface, all work consisted of enclosing the fire area with masonry stoppings or seals. Such seals were completed in Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 entries inby the fire on March 25, 1960. On March 27, crews on a 3-shift a day, 7 days a week basis began loading out the burning fire materials at the 3-left overcast on No. 4 entry (haulageway).
“Hot materials, fire, smoke, and carbon monoxide were present in the loading areas from March 27 until June 9, when loading of the burning materials was discontinued. The fire material was removed from No. 4 entry for a distance of 400 feet. At this time, it was decided that loading of the fire material should be discontinued, as the fire appeared to be traveling inby in Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 entries of west mains entries faster than the fire materials were being loaded, and the fire area should be completely sealed as rapidly as possible. As either masonry seals or incombustible stoppings were erected in all entries, except No. 4 entry, outby the fire, between Nos. 2 and 3 entries and between Nos. 6 and 7 entries from 3 left entries to inby the fire, seals were needed only in Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 entries inby and in No. 4 entry outby the fire to completely close the fire area. As the only travel-ways from 3 left entries to inby the fire were restricted to difficult walking and/or crawling, it was decided that seals inby the fire could be installed most rapidly if a tracked haulageway was provided from 3 left entries to the west mains entries inby the fire. Accordingly, conventional loading machine crews began driving three entries through the left barrier pillar adjacent to west main entries from 3 left entries to a point inby the fire. The driving of the entries was begun June 13 and completed July 10. Seals were completed in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 entries of west main entries outby the fire while the barrier entries were being driven. Seals in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 entries inby the fire were completed July 10, 1960.” (Keenan. Historical Documentation of Major Coal-Mine Disasters… [U.S.]…, 1963, pp. 39-42; cites W. R. Park et al., Bureau of Mines.)
NFPA: “…8:30 A.M. A slate fall is believed to have broken a trolley wire in the mine and resulting arcing started a fire in the coal, probably first involving supporting timbers. A telephone call for help alerted rescuers and described the situation. The trapped miners were cut off from the shaft by toxic gases produced by the fire. Two of the miners were directed by a safety engineer in the trapped group to try to escape through neglected tunnels paralleling the fire area and they barely got out after crawling a distance equal to three city blocks on their stomachs. After more than a week’s rescue operations those trapped were reached, but all had been killed by asphyxiation.” (National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss of Life Fires of 1960.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 54, No. 3, January 1961, p. 268.)
Sources
Bond, Horatio. “Underground Buildings.” Fire Journal, Vol. 59, No, 4, July 1965, p. 56.
Bugbee, Percy (General Manager, National Fire Protection Association). “Fire Protection Developments in 1960.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 54, No, 3, Jan 1961, p. 211.
Keenan, Charles M. Historical Documentation of Major Coal-Mine Disasters in the United States Not Classified as Explosions of Gas or Dust: 1846-1962 (Bulletin 616). Washington, DC: Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, 1963. Accessed at: http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc12768/m1/2/
National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss of Life Fires of 1960.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 54, No. 3, January 1961, pp. 233-268.
National Fire Protection Association. Spreadsheet of 10+ Fatality Fires, as of 3-15-2013. Email attachment to Wayne Blanchard.
Park, William R., James T. Whalen, William M. Cordray. Final Report of Major Mine Fire Disaster, No. 22 Mine, Island Creek Coal Company, Pine Creek, Logan County, West Virginia, March 8, 1960. Mount Hope, WV: Bureau of Mines, Health and Safety District C, United States Department of the Interior, 1960. Accessed 2-12-2020 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/island_creek_1960.pdf
United States Mine Rescue Association. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Island Creek Coal Company No. 22 Mine Fire.” Accessed 2-12-2020 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/holden_news_only.htm
West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. WV Mine Disasters 1884 to Present. MHS&T, October 9, 2008 update. At: http://www.wvminesafety.org/disaster.htm
[1] This is taken from the original 1960 Bureau of Mines report, which we did not see until after reading Keenan.
[2] Mining engineering term meaning away from the shaft or mine entrance and therefore toward the working face. McGraw-Hill Science & Technology Dictionary.
[3] Mining engineering term meaning toward the mine entrance or shaft and therefore away from the working face. McGraw-Hill Science & Technology Dictionary.