1960 – Sep 19, World Airways, Military Air Transport, crash/fire, Mt. Barrigada, Guam– 80

–80 AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 09191960.
–80 CAB AIR. World Air…Agana Naval Air Station, Guam, Mariana Isl.… Sept. 19, 1960.
–80 Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJFMP, 3/1, Mar 1982, Table 1.

Narrative Information

CAB Synopsis: “On September 19, 1960, at approximately 0602 local time, a Douglas DC-6AB, N 90779, operated by World Airways, Inc., as Military Air Transport Flight 830/18, bound for Wake Island and the United States. crashed and burned on Mt. Barrigada approximately two nautical miles from the departure end of runway 6L, Agana Naval Air Station, Guam, Mariana Islands. Of the 94 occupants on board, seven crew members and 73 passengers received fatal injuries; one crew member and 13 passengers survived.

“The flight received FAA Air Route Traffic Control route and departure clearances and took off into night VFR weather conditions. It made a right turn after takeoff and although making a-continuous climb over the distance flown. it struck Mt. Barrigada at a point approximately 300 feet above the elevation of the airport, and slid into the thick-underbrush cutting a Swath for nearly 1,100 feet before it came to rest. Damage and injury were more attributable to fire than impact forces.

“The Board determines that this accident occurred because of the failure of the pilot to comply with published departure procedures applicable to runways 6 left and 6 right.

Investigation

“Flight 830 was a passenger flight provided pursuant to contract between the Military Air Transport Service of the United States and World Airways, Inc., of Oakland, California. The flight originated at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands, and departed there at 1857 1 on September 18, 1960, and arrived at Agana Naval Air Station, Guam, at 0150, on September 19, 1960. The flight on which the accident occurred was a continuation of Flight 830 to Wake Island, Honolulu, Hawaii, and Travis Air Force Base, California. The flight from Clark Air Force Base was reported to be routine….

“The latest radio facility charts, maps. and other a-ids to pilots were available there to the crews. A poster, printed in large lettering, lay under the glass on top of the dispatch counter. It read as follows: “ATTENTION PILOTS! REF: Radio Facility Charts page 72 – Directory of Airdromes; Aircraft departing runway 6L will not make a right turn until a minimum of 1,000 feet has been attained. This poster was on display at the time Captain Holman’s crew was using the dispatch office. It should be noted, however, that the notice referred to by the poster did not appear in Radio Facility Charts, page 72, as advertised. That publication had been re-entitled USAF/USN Flight Information Publication En Route Low Altitude Pacific and Far East” and the referenced notice appeared on page 78 of that document. Further more, there is no indication that the obsolescence, or even the existence, of the poster was known to Captain Holman.

“Immediately following the accident, Agana Naval Air Station instituted the practice of having the tower advise pilots prior to takeoff on runway 6L to climb straight ahead to 1,000 feet before turning….

“The takeoff as observed by several witnesses appeared and sounded normal. The aircraft became airborne at approximately the 5.000-foot point on the 7,986-foot runway. As the aircraft passed over a brightly lighted construction area at the end of the runway, it was observed to make an immediate shallow right turn and take up a climb heading.

“Approximately 50 seconds after takeoff the aircraft first struck trees on Mt. Barrigada at an elevation of 580 feet m.s.l., or 300 feet higher than the elevation of the takeoff runway, and at a bearing of 087 degrees magnetic from the end of the runway. After cutting a slightly curved swath 975 feet in length in a direction averaging 120 degrees magnetic the aircraft came to rest. According to survivors, the first portion of the impact with the trees was slight but the forces then increased in severity and fire broke out just before the aircraft came to rest. The fire seemed to come forward through the cabin from behind. The survivors left the aircraft through a hole in the left side of the cabin, an escape hatch on the right side over the wing, and the copilot’s window. According to the navigator, the sole surviving crew member, nothing unusual occurred in the cockpit and to the best of his memory all checklists were called out and followed, and nothing was indicated by the crew’s actions or by their voices which reflected anything but a normal condition….

“Inasmuch as the flight had made a predawn takeoff, much consideration was given to the question of the adequacy of the flashing red beacon light upon the summit of Mt. Barrigada, It was determined that the beacon was in operation during the takeoff and short flight. The beacon was mounted on top of an 84-foot tower – well above all trees or other obstruction. It however, operated on acetylene gas and was of much lower intensity than the electric beacons on top of several radio antennas which were situated slightly to the right of the flightpath but lined abreast with the acetylene beacon and about 200 feet lower in altitude. Since the accident the acetylene beacon has been replaced by a red electric obstruction beacon containing two 600-watt bulbs, which combine to produce 2,000 candle power. This beacon flashes 32 times per minute and is actuated by a photoelectric cell….

Analysis and Conclusions

“Since the takeoff was made during the hours of darkness it may be assumed that the outline of Mt. Barrigada was not visible to the captain. However. the location of the mountain was well known to most pilots and the procedure to avoid it was clearly posted in the dispatch office.

“In addition, World Airways operations manual stated that radio facility charts, current flight information manuals. and other documents which indicated the correct departure procedure for runway 6L. must be carried in the airplane. These documents advise pilots when taking off in this direction to climb to an altitude of 1,000 feet before turning to the east. It is therefore difficult to understand why this procedure was not followed. Owing to the low intensity of the single red flashing beacon on the summit of the mountain and the likelihood of early morning mountain haze, it is questionable whether the beacon would have been visible to the crew, thus alerting them to their precarious position in sufficient time for evasive action to be taken.

“Although information concerning the climb restriction was available in publication form, a more effective procedure for dissemination of this information would have been the inclusion of the restriction in the departure instructions issued by ARTC. This procedure was adopted subsequent to the accident. at this facility….

“All of the evidence conclusively indicates that the aircraft did not collide with any object (other than the mountain), nor was there any in-flight fire or structural disintegration prior to initial impact. All the systems of the aircraft are believed to have been operative prior to impact….

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the pilot to comply with published departure procedures applicable to runways 6 left and 6 right.” (CAB AIR. World Air…Agana Naval Air Station, Guam… Sep 19, 1960.)

Sources

AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 09191960. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=09191960&reg=N90779&airline=World+Airways

Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. World Airways, Inc., Douglas DC-6AB, N 90779, Agana Naval Air Station, Guam, Mariana Islands September 19, 1960 (File No. 1-0029). Washington DC: CAB, July 18, 1962, 8 pages. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*S%3A%5CDOT_56GB%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C091960.pdf

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.