1962 — Nov 30, Eastern Air Flight 512 approach crash in fog, NY Int. AP, Jamaica, NY– 25

–25 AirDisaster.Com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 11301962.
–25 CAB. AAR. Eastern Air Lines…New York Inter. Airport, Jamaica, NY, Nov 30, 1962.
–25 Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJ of FM & P, 3/1, Mar 1982, Table 1
–25 NFPA. “Multiple-Death Fires of 1962. Quarterly of the NFPA, V56, N4, Apr 1963, p. 295.

Narrative Information

Civil Aeronautics Board Synopsis: “Flight 512, regularly scheduled from Charlotte, North Carolina, non-stop to New York International Airport, entered a fog condition near the threshold of runway 4R. A go-around was initiated; however, the aircraft struck the ground in a slightly nose-high attitude and was virtually destroyed by impact and subsequent fire.

Investigation “Eastern Air Lines (EAL) Flight 512, a Douglas J-7B, N 815D, a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Charlotte, North Carolina, nonstop to New York International Airport (Idlewild), crashed at approximately 2145 on November 30, 1962. Flight 512 was attempting a go-around following an instrument approach to runway 4R at Idlewild. Of the 51 persons aboard, 21 passengers, 3 crew members and an additional crew member occupying the jump seat did not survive….

“Flight 512 departed Charlotte at 1941…

“The Idlewild forecast was amended at 1927 by the Weather Bureau. This amended forecast was to be valid for the period from 1940 to 0600; it called for ‘ceiling zero obscuration, visibility zero, fog, variable to clear, visibility 1½ miles ground fog.’ There is no evidence that Flight 512 was advised of this forecast.

“Following a chronological sequence, the next events o relevance occurred at the Idlewild Airport. At about 2015 the TEL-autograph transceivers in the FAA control tower cab and IFR room became inoperative. This equipment is utilized to communicate written weather information between the Weather Bureau office and the control tower cab and IFR room. Also, it was discovered that the direct voice communication line (hot line) between the control tower and the Weather Bureau was inoperative.

“At 2023 the flight was advised by EAL flight dispatch that ‘If Idlewild below on arrival, you are cleared to Philadelphia . . . .’ EAL 512 acknowledged this message and during the ensuing conversation was informed ‘. . . several other flights diverting to Newark.’….

“By 2045 the flight was in radio communication with the New York ARTCC on VHF frequency 123 6 and was then cleared to the Sandy Hook holding pattern at 11,000 feet. At 2052, an Expected Approach Clearance (EAC) time of 2207 was issued to EAL 512 and acknowledged. At 2057, detailed holding instructions were issued to the flight with the advice: ‘ . . .delay indefinite due to weather.’….

“EAL 512 was laddered down to 6,000 feet in the Sandy Hook holding pattern, and, at 2133, the flight was identified on radar and was given radar vectors to the ILS final approach course. At about this time, the last weather report available to EAL 512 was broadcast by Idlewild Approach Control to all aircraft: ‘…sky partially obscured; visibility one mile with ground fog; and wind is northeast at six, altimeter setting 30.31.’ At 2134, American Airlines Flight 910, a turbojet aircraft, landed on runway 4R.

“The Idlewild Weather Bureau observer recorded a special weather observation at 2136 which described the official visibility as 3/4 mile and contained the following notation in the remarks section: ‘surface visibility 1/4 mile.’ Shortly thereafter, at 2137, Trans World Airlines Flight 46, a turbojet aircraft, landed on runway 4R. At 2139:11, EAL 512 was advised of its position as nine miles southwest of the ILS outer marker and was instructed, to contact the tower on 119.1. At 2139:59, Approach Control gave a new weather broadcast of 3/4 mile visibility in ground fog on frequency 119.7. At about 2139, UAL Flight 950, at DC-7 aircraft, landed on runway 4R….

“As EAL 512 was approaching the outer marker, at 2141, UAL Flight 164 was landing on runway 4R. The captain of UAL 164 described his landing as follows: ‘Either at or shortly after passing the outer marker the glow of the approach lights was visible through the fog…The flight was, until this point, made in clear air with clear skies above. Lights were clearly visible either on or very near the airport. Prior to reaching the middle marker, the threshold lights were observed…Landing was effected at 2141 EST in visibility that I would judge to be somewhat less than 3/4 mile. An accurate appraisal of visibility during the last 20 feet before touchdown was virtually impossible due to the brilliance of the runway lighting.’ At approximately this time, a Sabena turbojet aircraft, located on the ground at Idlewild one mile northwest of the threshold of runway 4R, was cleared for takeoff on runway 7R. The Sabena crew informed the control tower on VHF radio frequency 119.1 that visibility was ‘…a bit too poor…’ and, requested a delay….

“At 2143, the local controller cleared EAL 512 to land. The crew then acknowledged with ‘OK, dim the flashers.’ The tower controller replied: ‘Roger, I have to shut them off.’ He then turned off the flashers. This was the last radio contact with EAL 512….At this time, the RVR recorder trace in the Weather Bureau office indicated the runway 4R visibility was virtually zero. This information was available to the Weather Bureau observer but was not communicated to the tower personnel.

“The crew of EAL 512 did not report the runway in sight passing the middle marker, a required report. Two tower controllers observed the red rotating beacon light on the aircraft disappear in a fog condition 1/2 mile from the end, of runway 4R. At 2144 the local controller requested that EAL 512 advise when it was clear of runway 4R. There was no response….

“At approximately 2145, tower personnel observed a bright orange flash emanating from the vicinity of the PAR antenna building which is located approximately 400 feet to the left and 4,200 feet beyond the threshold of runway 4R. Emergency procedures were immediately initiated by the tower personnel. American Airlines Flight 8, which had just reported passing the outer marker, asked ‘…we got a bright light ahead of us, appears near the airport – you got any information?’ The tower requested that they overfly the runway and report. While over the runway, American 8 advised ‘…Runway four right appears to be clear, we got a fire in sight down there…to the left of the runway.’

“EAL 512 crashed approximately 2,500 feet beyond the ILS touchdown point 9 on the left side of runway 4R at 2145….Breakup of the wings and fuselage occurred on a mound of earth approximately 3 feet high, located 3,600 feet from the threshold center of runway 4R, on a bearing of 37 degrees. The left wing failed near the wing root, between the Nos. 1 and 2 engine nacelles, and at the tip. The left wing fuel tanks ruptured, resulting in ground fire which burned a large area just beyond the mound. The right wing separated at the wing root with portions of the upper and lower fuselage skin fairing and structure still attached.

“The aircraft fuselage separated at impact in the vicinity of the aft wing spar with the forward portion coming to rest 90 degrees to the wreckage path. This break occurred approximately at the cabin partition between the forward tourist and aft first-class sections. All survivors, 6 tourist, 18 first-class passengers and 2 stewardesses, exited through the main passenger door, aft emergency exit door or windows, or through breaks in the fuselage. They reported seeing fire from the wings immediately on impact, followed by fire inside the cabin a few seconds later. As a result of this fire both stewardesses, who had been seated in the aft lounge, were unable to see forward of the galley area by the main loading door….

“Analysis The information furnished to EAL 512 did indicate that the weather situation at Idlewild was deteriorating. These reports included notification of indefinite delays due to weather; alternate airport information; that company traffic missed an approach and that the visibility was one mile when the flight departed Sandy Hook holding pattern. The information contained in the remarks section of the Weather Bureau observations which indicated that the ‘surface visibilities’ were less than the reported official visibility were not furnished to the crew of EAL 512….

“Owing to the vertical and horizontal separation of the tower cab from the approach end of runway 4R, the tower visibility observation was not representative of the condition along the runway. However, since the tower RVR was considered inoperative, the governing visibility factor applicable to landing minimums of 1/2 mile visibility was that observed by the tower controller. It was on this basis that the airport remained ‘above minimums’ while EAL 512 attempted an approach.

“There were two indications of poor visibility which the crew of EAL 512 should have heard during their approach. The crew of an aircraft clearing the runway reported experiencing visibility of 50-60 feet. In addition, the jet flight awaiting departure from runway 7R requested a takeoff delay for weather improvement. These transmissions all took place on tower frequency, which EAL 512 had been instructed to monitor shortly prior thereto. However, if the crew of EAL 512 was aware of these reports, the knowledge that company traffic had landed immediately ahead of them, at 2144, could have offset any apprehension they may have had regarding the successful completion of their approach….

“The ‘surface visibility’ observations of the Weather Bureau were not communicated by the FAA tower personnel to EAL 512 on any recorded communications frequency. Tower personnel stated that the Weather Bureau observations for the period 2108 to 2150 were not received by them. The Weather Bureau observer at Idlewild did not recall specifically advising any person in the control tower of the ‘surface visibility.’ He said: ‘I do not remember sending out any observation. The only thing I can say is I do not remember not sending out any observations.’….

“The amount of power application and, the degree of aircraft rotation used by the crew of EAL 512 should have been adequate to accomplish the pull-out, had, the flaps and gear remained extended. However, inasmuch as flap and gear retraction was effected prior to establishing a positive rate of climb, either one of two actions by the crew would have precluded the aircraft settling into the ground:

1. Additional aircraft rotation, commensurate with the power utilized.

2. Use of the remaining power available.

“The Board concludes that additional aircraft rotation was not effected due to a lack of immediate instrument orientation, and that additional power was either not requested, or delayed because of other duties.

“The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the technique employed by the crew during abandonment of the approach under fog conditions not adequately reported.”

Recommendations

“Following this accident the Board sent recommendations to the Federal Aviation Agency and the United States Weather Bureau. These recommendations and the responses thereto were as follows:

1. It was recommended that the Air Traffic Control procedures require the transmission of all operationally significant weather information in terminal areas to approaching aircraft. The FAA, by letter dated January 8, 1963, stated that the necessary procedural changes were being prepared.

2. It was recommended that the RVR instrumentation in the recently commissioned IFR room of the Idlewild tower was inadequate. Also, the Board requested a study of the physical arrangements in all towers where PAR is installed. On January 11, 1963, the FAA stated that corrective action was being taken and that a new program would permit installation of five RVR indicators in a tower facility.

3. The Weather Bureau was informed that the staffing plan of the Weather Bureau Airport Station at Idlewild was inadequate to maintain proper surveillance of all the weather recording devices available. On January 8, 1963, the Weather Bureau indicated, that corrective action would be taken.” (CAB.AAR. Eastern Air…NY…Jamaica, NY, 30Nov1962.)

Sources

AirDisaster.Com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 11301962. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=11301962&reg=N815D&airline=Eastern+Air+Lines

Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., DC-7B, N 815D, New York International Airport, Jamaica, New York, November 30, 1962. Washington, DC: CAB (File No. 1.0033), October 10, 1963, 30 pages. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*P%3A%5CDOT%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C113062.pdf

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.

National Fire Protection Association. “Multiple-Death Fires of 1962. Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 56, No. 4, April 1963, p. 295.