1962 — Sep 23, Flying Tiger Military Air Transport Service plane ditches, No. Atlantic– 28

–28 CAB. AAR. The Flying Tiger Line…Ditching in the North Atlantic, September 23, 1962.
–28 Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJ of FM&P, 3/1, Mar 1982, Table 1.

Narrative Information

Civil Aeronautics Board Synopsis: “On September 23, 1962, at 2200 Greenwich Mean Time, a Flying Tiger Line Inc., Lockheed Constellation model 1049H, N 6923C, on a Military Air Transport Service passenger contract flight from McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, to Frankfurt, Germany, was ditched at sea approximately 560 nautical miles west of Shannon, Ireland. Forty-eight of the 76 souls on board survived.

“Approximately three hours after departing Gander, Newfoundland, a fire developed in the No. 3 engine. This engine was shut down and its propeller feathered. A few minutes later the propeller of No. 1 engine oversped when the flight engineer inadvertently closed the No. 1 engine firewall shutoff valve. This engine was also shut down and the propeller feathered. At this time the captain altered course to proceed to Shannon. After flying approximately one hour, the No. 2 engine developed serious trouble and the aircraft subsequently was ditched…..

Investigation “The Flying Tiger line Inc., Flight No….923 was a Military Air Transport Service contract Flight…from McGuire AFB, New Jersey, to Rhein Main Airport, Frankfurt, West Germany, with a scheduled flight crew change and refueling stop at Gander, Newfoundland.

“The aircraft departed McGuire AFB at 1145….

“The flight called Shannon at 2039 for weather conditions at Keflavik, Iceland, and was informed that at 2000 hours surface winds were 240 degrees at 42 knots, with gusts to 58 knots, visibility 8 kilometers (5 miles), rain, stratocumulus clouds at 1,800 feet. Captain Murray stated that in his opinion these weather conditions eliminated the use of Keflavik as an emergency field….At 2054, FT 923 reported its position as 54 degree 05’north latitude, 30 degree 30’west longitude, and at 2058 gave its Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) for Shannon as 0200….

“At approximately 2115, a fire warning on the No. 2 engine occurred. Captain Murray reduced power; the fire warning light went out and the alarm bell stopped ringing. He then reapplied power to approximately one or two inches of manifold pressure less than METO power. At this time he had the passengers don their life-vests altered course for Ocean Station Vessel Juliett, which was 480 nautical miles away…. Again a fire warning for No. 2 engine was experienced, power was further reduced, and the warning stopped. Power was then increased to slightly less than the previous power setting and the copilot called Shannon to inform them that the flight would be unable to maintain flight level 50….

“At 2154, MATS 33246 was in visual contact with Flight 923. Riddle 18H was in visual contact with FT 923 at 2157. At approximately this time the No. 2 engine failed; however, its propeller was not feathered. The captain then turned on the public address system and said: Ladies and gentlemen, this is the captain speaking. We are going to ditch.”….

“Captain Murray stated that half way through the turn to ditching heading, after failure of No. 2 engine, the controls froze. He attributed this to a loss of hydraulic pressure, and started to disengage the hydraulic control boost. However, the flight engineer suggested the use of the hydraulic crossover switch, which was then actuated, restoring hydraulic pressure to the control boost system, after which the controls responded normally. As the aircraft was lined up on a heading of 265 degrees, the captain reduced power on the No. 4 engine so that directional control could be maintained….

“Captain Murray stated that depth perception and visibility were excellent during the final descent; there was a considerable distance between waves, possibly 200 feet. Just prior to impact he used the landing lights, and cut the power on the No. 4 engine to land just past the top of a swell. However, just before impact the nose of the aircraft was brought up to parallel the face of the approaching swell and ditching was accomplished into it….

Preparation Skid Ditching “All of the passengers donned lifejackets and were instructed not to inflate them until they were outside the aircraft. The captain stated that it had been necessary for the copilot to put his lifejacket on him since he could not divert his attention from the controls. None of the lifejackets were equipped with lights.

“Sometime before ditching, two soldier passengers, at the direction of the crew, removed the emergency life raft stowed in the crew compartment and placed it in front of the left rear main exit door where it was tied down. The door between the crew compartment and the main cabin was removed and stowed .in the left forward coat closet. The stewardesses requested the passengers to remove dentures, pens, pencils, glasses, and other sharp objects from their persons and to place them in the pockets of the seatbacks. Passengers were asked if they had any knives or flashlights and those collected were then distributed to certain passengers who had been given special duties such as opening emergency exits and launching life rafts. According to the passengers, most of the stewardesses did not have knives or flashlights, as required. Miss Gould, the surviving stewardess, obtained a flashlight from a passenger but lost it before reaching the life raft. Passengers’ shoes and boots were also collected and these were stowed in the forward lavatory….

“The cabin lights had been turned down so that the passengers might accustom their eyes to darkness. Approximately five minutes prior to contact with the water the captain had announced the decision to ditch. However, no final signal to brace for water contact was given, as outlined in the Flying Tiger ditching pamphlet and required in their operations manual. As a result, several passengers and stewardesses were seated in an upright position at the time of impact.

“After initial impact, there were no skips or subsequent impacts. At impact, the captain said his head went forward and struck the instrument panel. He also recalled that the copilot got out of his seat and called, you all right John?, and that he answered, “Yes.” Then Captain Murray said, “I got up and followed the copilot and the flight engineer out of the cockpit into the main cabin compartment.” Upon reaching the cabin he remembered his flashlight, and went back into the cockpit and, got it. The captain said that he had another flashlight in his kit but that there wasn’t time to get it. Upon his return from the cockpit he said he observed the cabin to be clear of all persons. He said, however, that he noticed some seats piled up in the rear of the cabin on the right side, but blood in his eyes from a 2 1/2-inch cut on his forehead prevented good vision. Captain Murray then left the aircraft through the forward left emergency over-the-wing exit and inflated his lifejacket.

“Survivors stated there was only one deceleration during water contact and it was described as severe.

“During the evacuation of the aircraft some of the survivors said they could see clearly, and others said they could hardly see at all; however, by following other people they were able to find an exit. When the last passengers left the aircraft the water inside was at least waist deep. A passenger who indicated that he was the last one to leave said that he did not see anyone remaining in the aircraft. However, he added it was possible that some of the broken seats may have concealed someone.

In addition to the 25-man life raft stowed in the crew compartment, the aircraft carried four 25-man life rafts which were stowed in four compartments, two in each wing aft of the rear spar….

“The survivors stated that they alternately swam and tread water until they eventually found the raft. Some survivors saw a light, but it could not be established whether they saw the automatically actuated lights on the raft or the flashlight carried by the captain. A total of 51 persons including the captain, navigator and Stewardess Gould swam to the raft and boarded it. As this number exceeded the capacity of the raft by over 100 percent, the crowded conditions restricted movement. Therefore, the position in which many boarded the raft was essentially the position in which they had to remain until rescued. Under the existing circumstances the raft took on water over the sides, and although bailing was almost continuous throughout the entire time on the raft, it was necessary for some survivors to hold the heads of others out of the water. Aircraft were overhead continuously from the time of ditching until rescue approximately six hours later by the merchant ship Celerina. Three passengers on the raft died, either on the raft or shortly after being rescued….

“The following surface weather observations (including the state of the sea) were available from Ocean Station Vessel Juliett at the times indicated:…. air temperature 55 degree F, sea temperature 58 degree F….

Analysis “The engine failures cannot be related to improper maintenance, overhaul, or contamination of fuel. Also, The Flying Tiger Line engine failure rate prior to the accident did not presage such an occurrence. The information available indicates the circumstances of the engine failures were unrelated…

“The overspeed which prompted the stopping of the No. 1 engine is well documented and accepted without question. The only clue to account for the overspeed is the reported “reopening” of the No. 1 emergency shutoff valve control lever, as observed by the captain, with the assumption that it had been closed. It is concluded oil was turned off long enough, probably 30 to 60 seconds, to cause initial “oil starvation damage and subsequent seizing of the engine and concurrently to starve the propeller of oil which is essential to maintaining r.p.m. control. Oil starvation for more than a minute is expected to cause gross engine damage with subsequent seizure at shutdown unlikely….

“As previously noted, the operation of the firewall shutoff valve is in the immediate action portion of The Flying Tiger Line checklist and Captain Murray testified that he would expect the flight engineer to accomplish this operation without command from him. However, in view of the time element between the failure of engines No. 3 and No. 1, it is unlikely that the No. 1 firewall shutoff valve, was actuated prior to the flight engineers return to the cockpit after checking on the fire in the No. 3 engine The delay in operating the firewall shutoff valve was probably due to the fact that the flight engineer had been hired by The Flying Tiger Line only a short while before this flight and had very limited experience with their procedures. This is in marked contrast to his substantial amount of experience with another carrier whose procedures refer to the operation of the firewall shutoff valve in the “cleanup” portion of the checklist. It appears likely that, with residual fire in the exhaust stacks of the No. 3 engine, and the pilots decision not to discharge the second fire bottle, the action on the emergency procedures was resumed upon the flight engineers return to the cockpit. At this time the No. 1 firewall lever was mistakenly moved instead of No. 3. With the resulting overspeed of the No. 1 engine, the flight engineer apparently recognized the mistake and was in the process of correcting it when observed by the captain….

“From the captains testimony it was evident that he was not fully aware of the safety features of the pitch lock system. Had he been aware of this feature he may not have feathered the engine immediately, thereby, retaining power on this engine. Furthermore, Flying Tiger Line operations personnel and the Federal Aviation Agency Air Carrier operations Inspector assigned to the company demonstrated their lack of knowledge arid appreciation for the features and applicability of the propeller pitch lock. Testimony indicated that scope and emphasis on training in this area was lacking. The Board strongly supports the view that crew training should encompass all features of all equipment that may be utilized to cope with emergencies in flight and thus enhance safety….

“While Captain Murray elected to land into the face of a swell, on the basis of his opinion that the interval between swells offered a better ditching situation than those specified in The Flying Tiger Line Manual, this procedure is not recommended because of the potential aircraft destruction. The procedure he used is, as a matter of fact, warned against in the manual. Based upon witness testimony concerning the absence of the left wing, and the evidence of severe deceleration indicated by the failure of the aircraft seats, it is apparent that considerable impact force was encountered in the ditching. Failure of the left wing deprived the survivors of the life rafts stowed therein. Rafts on the right side were never seen by the survivors even though many exited through the right over-the-wing exits. However, these were later recovered and found inflated.

“The reason for loss of the right wing stowed rafts is not clear from the testimony. The difficulty in opening the right rear over-the-wing exit may have contributed to the problem. Extended operation of this airplane at low temperatures could have increased the inflation time for these rafts materially, resulting in the rafts not inflating in time to be useful.

“Details which are either necessary or desirable to be performed prior to ditching were not carried out. Differences in the instructions given to the passengers concerning the correct ditching position, failure of the captain to issue the instruction to brace prior to ditching, and failure to remove the aft over-the-wing exits prior to ditching indicate that preparations for the ditching were not completed. While it is not the Boards intention to criticize an individual who does all that is possible commensurate with the time available for action, it is obvious here that some of the preparations which time and circumstances did permit were not carried out. Further, there is no evidence that such were considered.

“Performance and testimony by surviving crew members indicated a lack of or a low degree of proficiency having been gained from the training program designed to meet emergencies such as were encountered on this flight.

“Under the circumstances of darkness, weather and high seas, which prevailed in the North Atlantic at the time of this ditching, the Board believes that the survival of 48 occupants of the aircraft was miraculous, however, had lights been provided on the lifejackets even more persons might have survived.

“The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the failure of two of the aircrafts four engines, and improper action of the flight engineer, which disabled a third engine, thereby necessitating a ditching at sea.

Recommendations “….The unavailability of the wing life rafts leads the Board to question the advisability of their being externally stowed. Their unavailability can be attributed to the loss of the left wing and/or the increase in inflation time resulting from the decrease in the temperature of the CO2 after prolonged flight at high altitude.

“It was learned that the survivors had considerable difficulty in finding the only available life raft and in locating the other survivors while in the water. Consideration should be given to improving the life raft lighting systems so that in high seas, such as were encountered here, they could more easily be found. In addition, automatically actuated lights should be required on all lifejackets.

“The testimony of many of the survivors casts doubt on the adequacy of the inflation means for the lifejackets installed on this airplane. Many had considerable trouble inflating their jackets since they could not find the cartridge lanyard. There were also many reports of difficulty in swimming with the inflated jackets even though they had been previously checked for tightness by the stewardesses. Consideration should be given to improving the basic design of these jackets.” (CAB. AAR. The Flying Tiger Line…Ditching in the North Atlantic, Sep 23, 1962.)

Sources

Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. The Flying Tiger Line Inc., Lockheed 104911, N 6923C, Ditching in the North Atlantic, September 23, 1962. Washington, DC: CAB (File No. 1-0028), September 10, 1963, 19 pages. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*P%3A%5CDOT%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C092362.pdf [Link broken when checked 9-30-2022.]

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.