1965 — Nov 8, Approach Crash, American 383 ~Cincinnati/No. KY AP, Constance KY– 58

–58 Airdisaster.com. Accident Database. “Accident Synopsis 11081965.”
–58 CAB. AAR. American Airlines…Greater Cincinnati AP, Constance KY, Nov 8, 1965.
–58 Kimura. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Ed., 1946-1993, V.1. 4-11-1994, p. 2-50.
–58 Time. “The Hills of Hebron,” December 1, 1967.

Narrative Information

AirDisaster.com: “The aircraft was on a visual approach for runway 18 at the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport in rain and clouds when the crew lost sight of the runway. While attempting to tune in the ILS frequency and become stabilized on the approach, the aircraft descended below glideslope and impacted the southern bank of the Ohio River, four miles short of the runway.” (Airdisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 11081965.)

CAB: “American Airlines Flight 383, Boeing 727, N1996, a regularly scheduled passenger flight nonstop from LaGuardia Airport, New York to Cincinnati, Ohio, crashed and burned near the Greater Cincinnati Airport on November 8, 1965, at approximately 1902 e.s.t. Fifty-eight of the 62 persons on board were fatally injured in the accident…. There were 56 passengers and six crewmembers on board….

“The flight was conducting a visual landing approach to runway 18 when it crashed into a wooded hillside approximately two miles north of the runway. Initial impact occurred at an altitude 225 feet below the published airport elevation of 890 feet m.s.l. At the time of the approach a line of rain showers and thunderstorms was moving into the Cincinnati area from the northwest. Rain was reported at the field shortly before the accident….

“1901:19 Tower “American three eighty three approach lights, flashers and runway lights are all high intensity.

“1901:22 AA 383 “Okay.”

“The acknowledgement, “Okay” at 1901:22 was the last known radio transmission made by American 383.

“Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) tower personnel first observed the aircraft at a point approximately four miles east-southeast of the airport as it proceeded on the downwind leg in a northerly direction. (See Attachment #1.) It was stated that the aircraft’s navigation lights were clearly visible and that the flight appeared to be operating at a normal traffic pattern altitude. One of the controllers stated that the aircraft passed about one mile to the east of the WCKY radio towers (located three miles east-northeast of the control tower), then commenced a left turn onto the base leg and started a gradual descent. The controller continued to watch the aircraft as it proceeded west on the base leg; however, at a point between two and three miles northeast of the airport it disappeared from his view. He stated that he believed the aircraft was lost from his view because it,” . . . appeared to fly into or behind weather phenomena.”

“Weather conditions at the time of initial contact with AA 383 were described by the tower controllers as being clear to the east and northeast with “clouds” and “lightning” observed to the northwest. As the aircraft proceeded on the base leg the clouds had moved over the field with light rain blowing on the west and north quadrants of the tower cab windows….

“At a point approximately 2-1/2 miles from the end of runway 18 the aircraft was observed to start a turn toward the field. One witness located one-half mile west of the accident site observed the aircraft for approximately the last 10 seconds of flight. He stated that he first saw four bright landing lights coming from the east toward his position. He then observed the aircraft bank rapidly to the left, crash into the hillside and burst into flame. He observed nothing unusual about the aircraft except that its position was too low to clear the terrain….

“Witnesses located near the accident site reported heavy rain in this area at the time of the accident. None of the witnesses saw lightning strike near or on the aircraft.

“There were four survivors of this accident, a stewardess, two revenue passengers and a non-revenue AA pilot. The latter survivor was occupying the most forward window seat on the right side of the first-class cabin section. His testimony indicated that the flight an route from LaGuardia was routine, the initial descent into the Cincinnati area seemed rapid and that the lights of Cincinnati were visible to the north after level off. He further stated that the next time he looked out the window. “It seemed like we were very low . . . I, then, sat there unconcerned, and it seems like we were on approach, after I looked out the window, and, yet it seemed we had started another left turn and we were in maybe a 10 to 15 degree bank . . . I heard what I thought at the time to be hydraulic flap motors actuating, unwinding toward the rear of the airplane and it was just immediately after this that we made contact with the ground, with quite a large bang, and it seemed like the destruction of the airplane.”

“He stated that on impact he was thrown to the floor of the cabin with a great deal of debris piling on top of him. Although momentarily stunned he remembered seeing flame coming from the rear of the cabin and after extricating himself from the debris made his way forward and stepped out of the front of the aircraft which was completely missing. A few moments later the aircraft exploded and began to burn intensely.

“During the final portion of the approach he remembered seeing strobe light reflections from scud clouds below the aircraft and a little water running horizontally along his window. He stated that when he first left the aircraft it was not raining but that a heavy downpour commenced approximately 30 seconds later….

“Initial impact was made by the right wing of the aircraft with a tree at an altitude of 665 feet m.s.l.; 225 feet below the published airport elevation of 890 feet m.s.l.

“The accident occurred at 1901:27 during the hours of darkness….

“After an exhaustive review and evaluation of all available evidence, the Board has become convinced that the cause of the accident is directly related to the manner in which the crew operated the flight and indirectly related to certain specific factors that may have influenced or affected the crew during the landing approach.

“Based on an evaluation of airspeed bleed-off and descent rates, as well as the metal impingement pattern found in the engine turbines, the Board concludes that, except for the brief level period at 2,000 feet m.s.l., the entire descent was probably conducted at or near idle thrust. In this case, the only logical explanation for conducting the approach at such low engine power settings would have been an attempt by the pilot to expedite airspeed reduction to the appropriate approach/flap extension speeds. However, it can be seen that if the downwind leg altitude had been maintained or if a considerably lesser descent rate had been used while extending flaps in conformance with normal flap extension speeds, airspeed bleed-off would have been more rapid and the appropriate flap extensions could have been achieved further back on the base leg. Thus, with the aircraft slowed down and approach flaps extended, utilization of higher more desirable thrust settings would have been possible earlier in the approach. As it was, a number of aircraft configuration changes and landing checklist items remained to be completed as N1996 was turned onto the final approach course….

“Because…a descent was continued below field elevation it can only be concluded that the crew, possibly distracted by or preoccupied with the exigencies associated with continuing the visual approach into deteriorating weather conditions, did not give proper or sufficient attention to the primary altitude reference instruments during the approach.

“It is difficult to reconcile how two experienced captains could spend almost two minutes descending below 1,200 feet a.f.l., at night, under adverse weather conditions and not properly monitor altitude. Even if both pilots were primarily concerned with maintaining visual contact with the airport it would be logical to assume that an occasional cross-check of the flight instruments would be conducted by one or both pilots.

“It is concluded that the 20-minute delay incurred by the flight in departing LaGuardia, combined with the forecast and inflight observations of thunderstorm activity in the Cincinnati area, prompted the crew to conduct the flight in a manner so as to greatly expedite their arrival at the Cincinnati Airport. Once in the Cincinnati area there can be no doubt that the crew was aware of the rapidly deteriorating weather situation both through visual observations and radio communications with the tower as they proceeded on the downwind and base legs. In view of the total weather picture known to the pilots and despite the fact that VFR conditions existed at the airport, it is believed that a more prudent judgment would have been either for the flight to have conducted an instrument approach, or to have delayed the approach until the storm had moved beyond the airport.

“It is further concluded that after the flight turned onto the base leg inflight visibility was sharply reduced and that both pilots became preoccupied in maintaining visual contact with the runway, resulting in inattention to, and improper monitoring of, the altitude reference instruments.

“The last point at which this accident could have been averted was approximately 13 seconds prior to impact. At this time the aircraft was descending below the level of the airport and any visual contact with the field or approach lights would have been lost immediately. The flight then should have, and could have accomplished a pull-up and go-around within the operating capabilities of the aircraft. However, at that point, as previously stated in the analysis, the accumulation of many factors either delayed or precluded proper recognition of the situation.

“Regardless of the possible mitigating circumstances there can be no valid excuse for such a gross deviation from safe operating altitude as was presented in this accident. The approach procedures outlined in the carrier’s manuals, the number of cockpit altitude reference instruments and related monitoring procedures, the approach aids available, and the skills expected of airline pilot, are all protective devices designed to prevent the development of such a situation. However, it is apparent that these devices were not fully utilized in the conduct of this approach.

“While the circumstances and conditions of this accident are greatly different from those involved in another Boeing 727 accident which occurred at Salt Lake City, Utah, and for which the Board has already issued a report, there are some elements in common relative to pilot/crew judgment. For this reason the Board must re-emphasize that the responsibility and authority committed to an airline captain requires the exercise of sound judgment and strict adherence to prescribed practices and procedures. Any deviation can only result in a compromise of aviation safety. Airline management, too, has a heavy responsibility for devising, developing, and implementing methods and procedures designed to insure that all of their pilot personnel constantly exercise a conservative, prudent, approach to their daily work.

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the crew to properly monitor the altimeters during a visual approach into deteriorating visibility conditions.” (CAB. AAR. American Airlines…Greater Cincinnati AP, Constance KY, Nov 8, 1965.)

Sources

AirDisaster.Com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 11081965. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=11081965&reg=N1996&airline=American+Airlines

Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. American Airlines, Inc., Boeing 727, N1996, Near the Greater Cincinnati Airport, Constance Kentucky, November 8, 1965. Washington, DC: CAB (File No. 1-0031), October 7, 1966, 33 pages. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*P%3A%5CDOT%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C110865.pdf

Kimura, Chris Y. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Edition, 1946-1993, Volume 1: Jet and Turboprop Aircrafts. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Risk Assessment and Nuclear Engineering Group. 4-11-1994.

Time Magazine. “The Hills of Hebron,” December 1, 1967. Accessed at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,712003,00.html