1966 — Nov 29, Freighter Daniel J. Morrell breaks/sinks, Lake Huron storm, N of Port Austin, MI-28

— 28 Great Lakes & Seaway Shipping News Archive. “Report News (June 2009).”
— 28 Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours. 1977, p. 707. (Show incorrect loss date of Nov 31.)
— 28 Ratigan, William. Great Lakes Shipwrecks & Survivals (Revised). 1969, p. 153.
— 28 Thompson. Graveyard of the Lakes. 2006, 27.
— 28 USCG. SS Daniel J. Morrell Sinking with loss of life, Lake Huron, 29 Nov. 1966. 1968.

Narrative Information

Thompson: “After the 600-foot steamer Daniel J. Morrell hadn’t been heard from for more than thirty-six hours during a severe storm in late November 1966, officials from Bethlehem Steel finally reported their ship missing. A massive search was immediately launched. A few hours later, the crew of a Coast Guard helicopter searching the shoreline along Michigan’s thumb found the Morrell’s life raft washed up on the beach. On the raft was Dennis Hale, who would prove to be the only survivor from the crew of twenty-nine.

“Hale told his rescuers that the Morrell had broken in half and sunk at about 2 a.m. the previous day. Coast Guard investigators would later conclude that the electrical lines that supplied power for the ship’s radios had been torn apart when the ship broke in half, making it impossible for those aboard to broadcast a distress call. As a result of the lesson learned from the sinking of the Morrell, Coast Guard regulations were changed to require every shipboard radio to be equipped with an emergency power supply.” (Thompson 2006, p. 27.)

United States Coast Guard: “Findings of Fact

At approximately 0200, EST, 29 November 1966, while en route from Buffalo, N. Y. to Taconite, Minnesota in ballast, the SS DANIEL J. MORRELL, broke into two sections during the height of a storm and sank in Lake Huron in the approxi¬mate position of latitude 44°15.9’N and 82°50’W. At the time of the sinking neither lifeboat was launched and no distress message was transmitted by that vessel. The first notification of alarm for her safety was received by the U. S. Coast Guard Rescue Coordination Center at Cleveland, Ohio at 12:15 EST, 30 November 1966, Of the 29 crew members on board at the time, 22 are known dead, 6 are still missing and one person survived.” (USCG. Marine Board of Investigation: SS Daniel J. Morrell Sinking with loss of life, Lake Huron, 29 Nov. 1966. 1968, p. 14 of 49 digital version.)

“The weather in the general area of the casualty was: seas 20 to 25 feet, northerly to north northeast; visibility 4 miles; sea temperature 440 to 47°F; air temperature 33°F; barometer 29.10. A recording of the wind by the Harbor Beach Coast Guard Station, as taken from a Weather Bureau Wind Recorder, indicated that the wind was variable from 2200, 28 November 1966 to 0500, 29 November 1966, ranging from 30 knots to 57 knots and gusty, shifting back and forth from north¬west to east. At 0128, 29 November, the wind shifted from northwest over to east northeast and except for a period of about five minutes when it shifted to north¬west, it generally remained from that direction until 0207. At about 0200 the wind velocity was 35 to 40 knots, with gusts to 57 knots.” (USCG. SS Daniel J. Morrell Sinking 1966. 1968, p. 19 of 49.)

“The lifesaving equipment on the DANIEL J. MORRELL included two 21 person lifeboats aft and two 15 person liferafts; one raft located on the spar deck between No. 3 and 4 hatches and the other located on the boat deck aft….There were no electric boat winches aboard. The lifesaving equipment provided no means of protecting personnel from exposure….

“The DANIEL J. MORRELL departed Buffalo, New York for Taconite, Minnesota on 26 November 1966 and cleared the Buffalo breakwater at 2300 EST that date. She was on her 34th and last scheduled voyage of the 1966 operating season. The vessel was in a ballasted condition at the time of departure because of known rough weather existing in Lake Erie.” (USCG. SS Daniel J. Morrell Sinking 1966. 1968, p. 21 of 49.)

“…at or about 0200, 29 November 1966…he [Dennis Hale] was awakened by what was described as a loud bang. A few minutes later he heard another bang. At this time, books from his book shelf fell out into the deck….He became alarmed and decided to get up. He then learned that his bunk light was inoperative. About this time the general alarm was sounded. He jumped up, grabbed his lifejacket and ran out into the starboard passageway. There were no lights on in the forward section of the vessel, but as he looked aft he could see lights on the after superstructure. He noticed that the center of the vessel was “higher” than the after part of the vessel; that is to say, it was in a hogging condition. He went back into his room to look for his pants, but in the darkness and excitement he could find only his peacoat. He then pro¬ceeded to the forward liferaft….

“When he reached the forward liferaft, there were several men standing around it. He thought the whole forward or deck crew was there at that time. No attempt was made to proceed to the lifeboat area because of the damage in the midship section. Someone said, “get on the raft and hold on tight.” He indicated that virtually all deck force personnel, including the Master, 1st Mate and 2nd Mate sat on the raft to await the sinking of the vessel. No attempt was made to throw the raft over the side and no instructions regarding the use of lifesaving equipment were given by any of the ship’s officers in Hale’s presence. One crew member tried to get men off the raft in order to open the storage locker to reach the distress flares. The master decided to wait until the raft was in the water to use the flares. The crew members assembled at the raft were in vari¬ous stages of dress, some with various items of clothing missing. For example, Hale was wearing only a pair of shorts, lifejacket and peacoat. They were all wearing lifejackets.

“Hale knew that there were two vessels following fairly close behind the DANIEL J. MORRELL earlier and Captain Crawley had indicated that there had been a vessel sighted off the port bow. Hale did not actually see any other vessels immediately prior to or at any time after the sinking, Two men had attempted to tie themselves to the raft with line. Hale saw only one person on the after end of the ship, but he could not be certain of his identity. Although there were no lights in the midship area, Hale indicated he did observe that the crack in the vessel started in the area of the gunwale bar, starboard side, in the general area of hatches 11 and 12, and proceed across to the port side. The forward section’s deck at the starboard side seemed to drop lower than the after section in a twisting effect. Hale could see metal sparks as the two sections of the ves¬sel rubbed together. He could also see steam coming from the parted steam line. Then the vessel broke into two sections and the stern section appeared to be pushing and ramming the forward section. This, together with see and wind action, caused the bow section to work around to port, reaching a perpendicular angle in relation to the stern section…The stern section appeared to be still under power and continued to bump into the port side of the bow section. As the bow section swung to port and parted from the after section, it started settling and very shortly thereafter the forward life raft and several members of the crew were washed over the starboard side.

“Time elapse from the sounding of the emer¬gency alarm until the vessel parted was estimated to be eight minutes. The raft was thrown well clear of both sections of the vessel and no one remained on the raft as it entered the water. Hale came up within approximately 10 feet of the raft. By the time he reached the raft, two deckhands, Arthur E. Stojek and John J. Cleary, Jr., had already arrived. Then Charles Fosbender, wheelsman, reached the raft and they were all able to crawl onto the raft. Hale saw no one in the water prior to his going over the side. After his entry into the water, the only persons he saw were the other three on the raft and one person still on the fore¬castle of the vessel. He never saw a lifeboat or the after raft in the water. Hale was of the opinion when the forward raft entered the water that the after raft was still on the vessel. None of the four men on that raft were on watch at the time of the casualty

“No one indicated to Hale any knowledge as to the cause of the casualty, incidents leading up to the actual sinking or whether radio dis¬tress signals had been transmitted. Hale heard the master state on 28 November that channel 52 was inoperative. There were no other known radio problems on board the DANIEL J. MORRELL. The vessel’s speed or heading, and the direction of the wind and sea in relation to the vessel at the time of the casualty is unknown. He did not know the vessel’s location at the time of sinking. Approximately 15 minutes after Hale entered the water he observed the after portion of the bow section settle evenly beneath the water, followed by the stem. The raft was at a distance of approximately 200 yards from the bow section and an estimated one-half to one mile from the stern section when the bow sank. The stern still seemed to be under power and lights were still visible. The men on the raft did not see the stern section sink. Other than the actual breaking up of the vessel, no fires, explosions or any other material, machinery or equipment casualties were observed by Hale while on board or after going over the side.

“The life raft was provided with the equipment required by Federal Regulations. Hale used several of the distress flares within a short period after sinking as there were other vessels known to be in the general area. Two flares were lost over the side. After having fired the signal pistol two or three times, the handle and barrel separated into two pieces. He was able to hold them together in order to fire off the remaining para¬chute flares. Hale knew of no other deficiencies with lifesaving equipment. All the parachute flares and hand held flares were used within the first 24 hours. The storage locker and other portions of the wood and metal raft structure sustained damages as it went over the side. However, it remained intact and offered adequate support for the four men. The men lay on the raft huddled together on one end, there being no other means of keeping warm. Hale testified that Cleary and Stojek died around 0600, 29 November 1966 and that Fosbender died around 1600 the same day. They were all believed to be conscious until shortly before death, The cause of death for these three men was listed on their Death Certificates as drowning. Exposure was listed as an antecedent cause. The life raft supporting Hale and the three deceased men was located by the Coast Guard at 1600, 30 November 1966. Hale was semi-conscious when he was taken from the raft. He was able to give preliminary testimony to Coast Guard Investigating Officers on 1 December 1966….He suffered from exposure, frost bite of his feet and right hand and sustained other minor injuries. As a result, he is still incapacitated.” [pp. 30-31 of 49 digital version; 16-17 printed]

“In addition to the first body recovered at 1210, 30 November 1966 by CG-30386, additional bodies, the survivor and debris were recovered as follows:

“At or about 1600, 30 November 1966, seven bodies were recovered by CG-30386 and helicopters CG-1401 and CG-1415, within a five mile radius of a position seven miles, 025° true from Harbor Beach Breakwater Light [south of the Pointe Aux Barques lighthouse].

“At about 1600, 30 November 1966, three bodies and one survivor were recovered from the Daniel J Morrell’s forward life raft, on the beach, three miles below Huron City, Michigan by helicopter CG-1395. The survivor, Dennis Hale, was transported by the helicopter to the Harbor Beach General Hospital.

“At about 0930, 1 December 1966, one body was recovered ten and one-half miles, 137° true from the Harbor Beach Breakwater Light by the CGC Mackinaw.

“At about 0945, 1 December 1966, at a position of 43°40’N, 82°20.5’W, two bodies were recovered by the CGC Acacia.

“At about 1355, on 1 December 1966, at a position of 43°37’N, 82°20’W, six bodies were recovered by the CGC Acacia.

“At about 1445, 5 December 1966, one body was recovered under the Daniel J. Morrell’s after liferaft at Pt. Aux Barques by a commercial salvager. The raft was generally in good condition, with only minor damages.

“On the morning of 11 December 1966, one body was recovered by the Ontario Provincial Police on the beach eight miles north of Kincardine, Ontario….” (USCG. SS Daniel J. Morrell Sinking 1966. 1968, p. 33-34 of 49 digital version; 19-20 printed.)

“All persons who are missing or known dead probably lost their lives before the Coast Guard was informed that the Daniel J. Morrell was overdue. A positive vessel reporting procedure is considered highly desirable.” [p. 46 of 49 digital version; 32 printed]

“Recommendations:

1. The required forward and after life rafts on Great Lakes vessels be of the inflatable type to provide for easy launching and protection of personnel against the weather.

2. The capacity of the forward and after life rafts be sufficient to provide protection for all persons normally quartered in each part of the vessel.

3. To improve reliability of radio communication under conditions where the connection with the source of power aft is severed, that:

a. The Federal Regulations be changed to require an emergency source of power forward on Great Lakes vessels which have berthing and/or working spaces located both forward and aft, or

b That consideration be given to recommending to the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D. C. that an emergency radio with a self- contained source of power be required, and

c That there be provided a datum marker buoy with the capacity of trans¬mitting on 2182 kc. And capable of being either manually activated or automatically released and activated at a predetermined depth upon the sinking of the vessel. This could be stored with one of the required life rafts or attached with a pressure-release device to the side of the pilot house.

4. Special examinations of the hull structures of all Great Lakes vessels built prior to 1948 be conducted in order that a determination might be made as to whether weaknesses in hull plating or supporting structure have developed since the date of construction. NOTE: New ship steel specifications were adopted in 1948.

5. The owner or operator of each Great Lakes Bulk Carrier be required to fur¬nish the Master a loading manual which shows the effect of various loaded and ballasted conditions upon longitudinal bending moments. The effects of dynamic forces of free water in cargo holds should be included.

6. Consideration be given to change 46 CFR 113.25 to provide, for typical Great Lakes bulk carriers, regardless of date of construction, which have manned spaces separated by cargo holds, that:

a. The general alarm system shall be operated by means of manually operated contact makers located in the wheelhouse and in the engine room or at another suitable location in the after section of the vessel.

b. A separate source of power for the general alarm system be installed in the circuit at each end of the vessel and the installation be made so that if the circuit be broken the forward alarms and the after alarms may be operated independently.

7. Further evaluation be made of the necessity to install tarpaulins over sliding plate type hatch covers which are properly secured, to determine whether or not the Master of a Great Lakes vessel may be authorized by regulation to sail without tarpaulins in place during all seasons when the vessel is not carrying cargo.

8. Vessel owners and operators he encouraged to initiate a positive vessel reporting system. Reports at 24 hour intervals would be desirable. If the vessel does not report within one hour of the scheduled time the company should take positive action to determine the status of the vessel.

9. Consideration be given to requiring cargo hold compartmentation on newly constructed Great Lakes vessels so that in the event any one main cargo hold should be flooded the vessel will have sufficient buoyancy to remain afloat.

10. A recommendation be made to the U. S. Weather Bureau that some system be I instituted to make possible the inclusion of on scene and forecasted sea condi¬tions into regular marine weather broadcasts.

11. Since the screw joining the two major component groups of many signal pistols is not installed to prevent its working loose and dropping out, it is recommended that 46 CFR 160.028 be revised to require that when such screws are installed there be provision, such as use of lock nuts or peening of the ends, to prevent the screw from backing out.

12. The Master of the SS Daniel J. Morrell Arthur I. Crawley, being deceased, it is recommended that no action be taken regarding his omitting the use of tarpaulins over the sliding plate hatch covers.” (USCG. SS Daniel J. Morrell Sinking. 1968, p. 48-49 of 49 digital version; 34-35 printed.)

“The Board finds the cause of this accident with attendant loss of life was the structural failure of the main hull girder amidships, which caused the vessel to break in two and both sections to sink. Factors which are considered to have contributed to this structural failure are: high longitudinal stress on the hull girder due to height and wave length of the seas; limited original design section modulus for a vessel having such a large length to depth ratio; use in the original construction of the vessel of steel which is highly notch sensitive at the low atmospheric and sea temperatures experienced; a notch in the structure which was the nucleus of the initial fracture; low cycle stress fatigue; and steel of high transition temperature characteristics, relatively susceptible to brittle fracture.

“Factors which are considered to have contributed to loss of life of all but one crew member are (1) no distress signal or communications from the sinking vessel were received, (2) report of the vessel being overdue was received by the Coast Guard a day and a half after the sinking, and (3) lifesaving equipment on the SS MORRELL did not provide the weather protection necessary for survival under existing weather and sea conditions.” (NTSB, in USCG 1968. SS Daniel J. Morrell, p. 1)

The NTSB recommended to the USCG the following:

“A. Strengthen the deck and/or sheer strake structure in the midships area in vessels over 400 feet long constructed prior to 1948, or curtail the operation of these vessels during specific days and period of the fall season when adverse weather and wave conditions approach or exceed those encountered by the SS DANIEL J. MORRELL.

“B. Based on the special inspection program, implement a progressive structural renewal program on an individual ship basis.” (NTSB, in USCG 1968. SS Daniel J. Morrell, p. 2)

Sources

Great Lakes & Seaway Shipping News Archive. Report News (June 2009). Accessed 12-12-2020 at: http://www.boatnerd.com/news/archive/6-09.htm

Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours – A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters from Ancient Times to the Present. New York: Pocket Books, Wallaby, 1977, 792 pages.

Ratigan, William. Great Lakes Shipwrecks & Survivals (New Revised and Enlarged Edition). Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1969.

Thompson, Mark L. Graveyard of the Lakes. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2004.

United States Coast Guard (DOT), Marine Board of Investigation. SS Daniel J. Morrell Sinking with loss of life, Lake Huron, 29 Nov. 1966. U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation Report and Commandant’s Action, released 4 March 1968, 44 pages. Accessed 12-12-2020 at: http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/WI/WI-idx?type=article&did=WI.MORRELL.I0001&id=WI.morrell&isize=M