1967 — June 23, USMC Sea Stallion & Huey helicopters collide over Camp LeJeune, NC-22

–22 Baugher. US Navy…Marine Corps BuNos Third Series (150139 to 156169). 10-29-2011.
–22 Baugher, Joseph F. 1963 USAF Serial Numbers. 1-16-2012 revision.
–22 Florence Morning News, SC. “Copter Collision Probed.” 6-25-1967, p. 7.
–22 Gero, David. Military Aviation Disasters: Significant Losses Since 1908. 1999, pp. 93-94.
–22 Hellman, Paul T. Historical Gazetteer of the United States. 2005, p. 815.
–22 NYT. “22 Marines Killed and 13 Hurt as 2 Copters Collide in Carolina.” 6-24-1967, p. 19.
–22 Sturkey, Marion. “670623 VMO-1 HMH-461 Training Loss – Preparation for Combat.”
–22 Sturkey, Marion F. Mid-Air: Accident Reports and Voice Transcripts.. 2008, p. 188.

Narrative Information

Baugher: “153305 collided with UH-1B 63-8572 while attempting to land near Jacksonville, NC Jun 23, 1967. 22 of 35 onboard killed.” (Baugher. US Navy…Marine Corps BuNos Third Series (150139 to 156169). 10-29-2011.)

Gero:
“Date: 23 June 1967 (c.09:00)
“Location: Near Jacksonville, North Carolina, US

“First aircraft
“Operator: US Marine Corps
“Type: Bell UH-1B (638572)

“Second aircraft
“Operator: US Marine Corps
“Type: Sikorsky CH-53A (153305

“The two turbine-engine helicopters collided in mid-air, and both then crashed and burned at the New River Marine Corps Air Facility, located on the grounds of Camp LeJeune. Including both pilots (and the only occupants) of the smaller UH-1 and two members of the crew of four assigned to the twin-engine CH-53A Sea Stallion, 22 American servicemen were killed in the accident; with the exception of one victim who succumbed to the effects of the post-crash fire, the fatalities resulted from impact trauma. The 13 survivors from the CH-53, among them the pilot and co-pilot, suffered various injuries. At the time of the collision, 638572 was engaged in a syllabus instructional flight, and 153305 on a troop lift exercise. The crew of the former, planning a touch-and-go landing, received authorization to turn down-wind and also acknowledged a traffic advisory from the control tower concerning the latter, which was preparing to land, but the pilot apparently took no action in response to this information. He evidently was not ready to make the turn at that point, however, and chose to continue straight ahead until a more advantageous position could be attained.

“The UH-1 was on or near the ground about two minutes before it proceeded in accordance with the original clearance, flying parallel to Runway 23, while starting to ascend. Meanwhile, the CH-53, which had been authorized for a straight-in landing approach, similarly flew parallel to the same runway and started to descend with its undercarriage extended.

“As indicated by an evasive roll to the right initiated by the aircraft, one or both pilots of 638572 probably saw 153305 at the last instant, but the helicopters nevertheless collided at an approximate height of 500ft (150m). Losing its tail rotor, the UH-1 fell to the ground immediately, while the CH-53 descended to about 100ft (30m) before plunging out of control after losing its tail boom and rotor.

“Considered the primary factor in the accident was the inexperience and lack of perception on the part of the tower controller, who, not fully aware of the inherent dangers associated in the controlling aircraft with a wide variation in speed, did not accurately perceive the impending conflict until it was too late. Aggravating this shortcoming was the fact that the pilots involved in the disaster had developed confidence in tower personnel to exert strict supervision of air traffic operating within the control zone. Additionally, tower personnel did not at first realize that the landing site the CH053 pilot had intended to utilize was directly off the end of the runway, believing it to be some 1,000 to 1,500ft (300-500m) off to its right side, with the aircraft thus following a corresponding line of flight. Neither was the pilot of the UH-1 himself aware of the landing site to be used by the CH-53; such knowledge might have led to a different reaction on his part. The lack of available information on the zone was considered a contributing factor in the accident.

“The pilot of 153305 was aware of 638572, but he assumed the tower controller would maintain adequate clearance through timely traffic advisories, since he had been cleared directly into the landing zone. Neither crew apparently had visual contact with each others’ aircraft in the final seconds before the accident until it was too late.

“The weather was not a factor in the collision. Noted in the investigative report was that the delay between its clearance and the time 638572 proceeded on the originally-planned touch-and-go landing had been too long for such an authorization to be considered still valid, and that a simple clearing turn on the spot from a hover would have been the minimum effort by its crew to maintain a safe level of flight. It was therefore recommended in the report on this accident that a definite regulation be established and published concerning the length of time a helicopter may remain on or near the ground when cleared for such a procedure. Another recommendation was to clearly describe and label in the Marine Corps’ air operations manual the landing sites within the control zone of the New River facility.” (Gero, David. Military Aviation Disasters: Significant Losses Since 1908. 1999, pp. 93-94.)

Sturkey: “…Naval Aviation Safety Center Investigation No. 70-67 [9-6-1967]…findings…are synopsized below:

1. Pilots in both aircraft had relied on the tower controller.

2. The Huey had been cleared to take off, and the H-53 had been cleared to land.

3. After getting takeoff clearance, the Huey pilots hovered over the grass by the runway for about two minutes before beginning to accelerate and climb.

4. On final approach the H-53 pilots could not see the Huey below them, and the Huey pilots could not see the H-53 above them.

5. PROBABLE CAUSE: “Personnel factor in that tower personnel did not continuously monitor the approach of the H-53 in order to take more positive action to prevent the mid-air collision.”

6. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE: “Pilot factor” in that the Huey pilot, after being warned, “caution, fifty-three directly overhead,” continued to climb.

7. The board noted that the tower controller “did not accurately perceive the impending conflict until it was too late”.” (Sturkey, Marion. “670623 VMO-1 HMH-461 Training Loss – Preparation for Combat.”)

Sturkey: “Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion, Bureau No. 153306. U.S. Marine Corps combat assault training flight. 33 aboard, 20 killed.

“Bell UH-1 Iroquois (Huey), Bureau No. 638572. U.S. Marine Corps pilot training flight. 2 aboard, 2 killed.

“The Sikorsky CH-35 Sea Stallion Flight: A huge Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter (call-sign, Camel Driver 101) took off from MCAF New River, North Carolina, at 0836 Hours. The U.S. Marine Corps transport helicopter carried 4 crewmen plus 29 troops on a combat assault training mission. The pilots planned to descend parallel to Runway 23 and land in Landing Zone (LZ) Earle beyond the end of the runway. Then the troops would charge out and conduct a mock infantry assault on a simulated bunker complex….

“The pilot, a Marine lieutenant colonel, had logged 4,604 hours of flight time. He was the commanding officer of squadron HMH-461. The co-pilot, a captain, had 2,732 hours of flight experience. Their CH-53 had flown a mere 36 hours since the squadron had accepted it from the Sikorsky factory earlier that month….

“The Huey had been cleared for takeoff two minutes earlier, but it remained in a hover over the grass by the runway. Suddenly, without making further radio transmissions, the Huey accelerated skyward. The Huey pilots could not see the big CH-53 descending from above and behind them. The CH-53 pilots could not see the Huey climbing up under them….

“…the CH-53 crash had killed 20 Marines. An autopsy would show that one had succumbed to the fire. The 19 others had died as a result of impact trauma.” (Sturkey, Marion F. Mid-Air: Accident Reports and Voice Transcripts… 2008, p. 188.)

Newspaper

June 24, NYT: “Camp Le Jeune, N.C., June 23 (UPI) – A small Marine helicopter darted skyward during lading practice today and sliced into a huge troop-carrying coper, killing 22 marines and injuring 13 others. Five of the injured were in critical condition.

“It was one of the worst helicopter tragedies in history. The worst previous helicopter crash in the United States happed in Chicago on July 27, 1960, killing 13 persons. Pentagon officials said they could not recall any Vietnam helicopter crash taking as many lives as today’s accident.

“The collision sliced the tail off the larger copter, a huge Sea Stallion carrying 33 persons, and it spiraled to earth. All aboard were either killed or injured.

“The smaller craft, a Huey HU-1B that had been making the practice landings, plunged to the ground and witnesses said it ‘looked like it completely burned up in 20 seconds.’ Its two occupants were killed….

“The two ships collided at an altitude of about 500 feet and landed about 150 yards apart off the runway.

“Aboard the Sea Stallion were two pilots and 31 combat trainees who were on their way to make a mock attack against a pill box. Many of the trainees were apparently fresh from boot-camp and were being schooled for fighting in Vietnam.

“The rotors of the Huey bit into the rear undersection of the Sea Stallion. The Sea Stallion fell near a clump of oak trees. Burned field packs, dented and scorched helmets and rifles with their stocks burned off were scattered in the wreckage….

“The Sea Stallion, or CH-53A, is the largest copter in use in the Western world. It has a single roto blade 72 feet in diameter, and has seats for 38 troops or passengers. It cruises at 170 miles an hour, has a ceiling of 16,000 feet and a range of 280 miles. The Huey seats four men, in addition to its pilot, and has been extensively used as a gunship and for medical evacuation in the Vietnam fighting….” (New York Times. “22 Marines Killed and 13 Hurt as 2 Copters Collide in Carolina.” 6-24-1967, p. 19.)

Sources

Baugher, Joseph F. 1963 USAF Serial Numbers. 1-13-2016 revision. Accessed 4-7-2016 at: http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1963.html

Baugher, Joseph F. US Navy and US Marine Corps BuNos Third Series (150139 to 156169). Oct 29, 2011 revision. Accessed at: http://www.joebaugher.com/navy_serials/thirdseries19.html

Gero, David. Military Aviation Disasters: Significant Losses Since 1908. UK and Newbury Park, CA: Patrick Stephens Limited, an imprint of Hayes Publishing, 1999.

Hellman, Paul T. Historical Gazetteer of the United States. NY: Routledge, 2005, p. 149. Partially Google digitized: http://books.google.com/books?id=EQ-R4O2L3nEC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

New York Times. “22 Marines Killed and 13 Hurt as 2 Copters Collide in Carolina.” 6-24-1967, p. 19. Accessed 4-18-2022 at: https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/06/24/83124502.html?pageNumber=18

Sturkey, Marion. “670623 VMO-1 HMH-461 Training Loss – Preparation for Combat.” Accessed at: http://www.popasmoke.com/kia/incidents.php?incident_id=349&conflict_id

Sturkey, Marion F. Mid-Air: Accident Reports and Voice Transcripts from Military and Airline Mid-Air Collisions. Plum Branch, SC: Heritage Press International, 2008.