1968 — March 16, Collision, SS African Star and barge Intercity No. 11, MS River, LA– 21
— 21 Lipuscek. “Marine Casualties – Prevention Through Legislation.” Proceedings… Jan 1971, p. 7.
— 21 NTSB. “Action by the National Transportation Safety Board.” Proceedings…, 28/1, Jan 1971, 12.
— 21 USCG. Marine Casualty Rpt. Collision…African Star…Midwest Cities…MS Riv…, 1970.
— 21 USCG. “SS African Star and M/V Midwest Cities…” Proceedings…, 28/1, Jan 1971.
— 13 NFPA. “The Major Fires of 1968.” Fire Journal, Vol. 63, No. 3, May 1969, p. 13-14.
— 11 National Fire Protection Assoc. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003).
Narrative Information
Lipuscek: “….Another case on the lower Mississippi River which dramatically demonstrates the need for bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone legislation occurred during the early morning of 16 March 1968. It involved the African Star and the barge Intercity No. II (one of two loaded tank barges being pushed ahead by the towing vessel Midwest Cities, piloted, incidentally, by unlicensed personnel). According to the Marine Board convened to investigate this casualty, the tank barge was loaded with a cargo of highly volatile crude oil. As the vessels were closing prior to the collision, the upbound M/V Midwest Cities was directing her course at an angle across the river toward the left descending bank after passing Pointe a la Hache. The downbound African Star was about mid-river with the intention of conducting a starboard to starboard meeting situation. The pilot on the African Star, using his portable radiotelephone, attempted to contact the Midwest Cities prior to the collision. There was no response. Why was there no response? Simply because the radiotelephones on the two vessels were not designed to operate on the same frequency. The Midwest Cities used 2738 KHz and the African Star was designed for 156.65 MHz. Consequently, it was impossible for the two pilots to communicate by radio.
“The tank barge and the freighter collided and a fire and explosion ensued almost immediately on both vessels. Twenty-one persons aboard the African Star lost their lives, and the tank barge burned and sank in the river. Fiercely burning oil spread to the African Star. With many secondary fires in combustible material on board, the African Star backed out of the barge and was purposely beached on the right descending bank. Heroic members of the crew successfully contained the fire.” (Lipuscek, Commander John S., USCG. “Marine Casualties – Prevention Through Legislation.” Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council (United States Coast Guard). Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan 1971, pp. 6-7.)
NFPA: “On March 16 the S.S. African Star, a general cargo ship outbound from New Orleans, collided with one of two oil-laden barges in tow at Pointe a la Hache on the Mississippi River. Oil from the barge spewed over the ship, engulfing it in flames. Thirteen people died and 44 were injured in the collision and fire. The two barges sank. The ship was intentionally beached until the fire, which burned most fiercely in the No. 2 and No. 5 holds had been extinguished. There was extensive damage to the ship’s superstructure, steel decks, and side shell plating.” (NFPA. “The Major Fires of 1968.” Fire Journal, Vol. 63, No. 3, May 1969, p. 13-14.)
NTSB: “….The collision of the downbound cargo vessel SS African Star and upbound towing vessel M/V (Motor Vessel) Midwest Cities’ tank barge Intercity No. 11 occurred at 0340, c.s.t. March 16, 1968, at about Mile 46 Above Head of Passes (AHP) in a fairly straight and wide part
of the Mississippi River. Fire and explosions caused by this collision resulted in the sinking of the barge Intercity No. 11, and severe damage to the African Star and her cargo. Of a total of 11 passengers and 52 crewmembers in the freighter, two passengers were killed and nine were injured; 15 crewmembers were killed, four are missing and presumed dead, and 31 were injured…. [p. 12]
“The National Transportation Safety Board finds that the probable cause of this casualty was the failure of the pilots of the African Star and the Midwest Cities to reach agreement for a safe passing. The pilot of the African Star interpreted the meeting to require a starboard-to-starboard passing whereas the pilot of Midwest Cities thought it required a port-to-port passing. Contributing to the cause was (a) the lack of a common radiotelephonic frequency on the two vessels, and (b) the failure of both pilots to keep the other vessel’s movement under closer surveillance and to slow or stop and take evasive action when no agreement for passing was reached.
“The fire and subsequent explosions were caused by sparks generated by the shearing of the Intercity No. l l’s steel side and deck by the bow of the African Star. Rapid spread of the fire on the African Star is attributed to the wind’s blowing the burning oil over the bow of the African Star, and the abundance of combustibles on deck. The many fatalities and injuries sustained on board the African Star were due to the rapid spread of fire and heavy smoke in living spaces, and burning oil surrounding the vessel, precluding personnel from jumping overboard….” [pp. 16-17] (National Transportation Safety Board. “Action by the National Transportation Safety Board.” Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council (United States Coast Guard). Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan 1971, pp. 12-17.)
USCG: “Commandant’s Action
“1. The record of the Marine Board of Investigation convened to investigate the subject casualty has been reviewed and the record, including the Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Recommendations, is approved subject to the following comments and the final determination of
the cause of the casualty by the National Transportation Safety Board.
“2. At 0340 CST; 16 March 1968, the dry cargo vessel SS African Star collided in a meeting situation with the tank barge Intercity No. 11, being towed by pushing ahead of the M/V Midwest Cities in the lower Mississippi River at Mile 46 Above Head of Passes.
“3. Approaching Socola Light (Mile 44.8) from New Orleans the axis of the river changes from about 143°T to 113°T at Mile 45 as it rounds Pointe a Ia Hache.
“4. During the early morning hours of 16 March 1968, there was reported some haze and patch fog on the river. At the time of the casualty the weather was clear and the visibility was good. The radar units on the African Star and Midwest Cities were in operation before and at the time of the collision, but were not continuously observed by the watch personnel of either vessel.
“5. The African Star was enroute New Orleans to Newcastle, Australia, with 11 passengers, 52 crew members and 5,364 tons of general cargo. Her speed over the bottom with a one (1) knot following current was estimated to be 16 knots. The Bolivar Maru was also downbound and approximately 10 miles ahead of the African Star proceeding at the same speed. The respective pilots communicated with each other on portable transceivers using the frequency of 156.65 MHZ regarding traffic and weather conditions. The pilot of the Bolivar Maru reported that the African Star could expect to meet two upbound tows about Bohemia Light (Mile 44.9). Approaching Favret Light, Mile 52.5, an upbound vessel, the Hellenic Charm was sighted. Agreement was reached by communicating on 156.65 MHZ to a starboard to starboard meeting. The vessels met at Mile 50 with the Hellenic Charm in mid river and the African Star favoring the left descending bank. At 0324, the vessel’s speed was slowed to half ahead when approaching Pointe a la Hache ferry crossing. Speed was increased to 21 nozzles, equivalent to about 16 knots at 0331. After clearing the Hellenic Charm, as the African Star widened to mid-channel, an upbound tow was sighted above Bohemia Light. Whistle signals for a meeting situation were exchanged for a port to port passing. The tug El Cello Grande and tow favoring the left descending bank met the African Star at Mile 47. When clear of the El Cello Grande the lights of the Midwest Cities came into view. At 0336, while on a heading of 140°T, a green side light and two white lights in a vertical line were first observed off the starboard bow at a range of 1½ miles. The record indicates that the required amber and colored side lights on the lead barge Intercity No. 14, and the white towing lights and colored side lights on the Midwest Cities, were burning brightly. The report, however, does not reveal whether the amber light or which of the side lights on the tow or the tug were seen from the African Star. The African Star’s rudder was ordered left 15° and then midship to open the range lights and to better show the green light to the Midwest Cities. As the vessels closed the African Star sounded a two blast passing signal. This was not heard on the Midwest Cities. The pilot moved to the radar scope to look at the visual presentation when he was alerted by the Third Mate that a vessel was crossing in front of the African Star. The tug and tow appeared to be crossing sides of the river in front of the African Star. Collision was imminent. The danger signal followed by one blast of the whistle was sounded by the African Star. The rudder was ordered hard right, and at 0338 stop was rung on the engine order telegraph followed by full astern at 0339. The African Star started swinging to the right when at 0340 on a heading of 153°T, the bow struck the after port side of the Intercity No. 11 at an angle of 45°.
“6. The Midwest Cities en route from Shell Terminal, Southwest Pass, La., to Texas City, Tex., via the Gulf Intercoastal Waterway was upbound in the Mississippi River making six (6) statute miles per hour over the bottom stemming a one knot current towing by pushing ahead the unmanned tank barges Intercity No. 11 and Intercity No. 14. Each barge was loaded with 19,050 barrels of crude oil. The length of the tug and barges was 611 feet. Approaching Point Michel, Mile 43.8, another upbound tow tug El Cello Grande overtook the Midwest Cities at 0320. A passing agreement was reached by using voice radio, 2738 KHZ, whereby the El Cello Grande was to favor the right descending bank of the river. During this period, as the El Cello Grande was overtaking the Midwest Cities, a downbound freighter, the Bolivar Maru met and passed clear with the El Cello Grande starboard to starboard and with the Midwest Cities port to port. At a distance of 1½ miles the range lights and red side lights of the African Star were sighted. The record and report do not reveal the range light aspect as sighted from the Midwest Cities; it did. however, determine that the port side light on the Intercity No. 14 was being displayed unscreened on an oil drum at the time of the collision. When collision was evident, the rudder of the Midwest Cities was put over to the right and the engine was put in reverse. The danger signal was sounded by the Midwest Cities, and at the same time the danger signal was heard from the African Star.
“7. The crude oil cargo on the barge ignited seconds after the collision. Several explosions on the barge caused oil to be sprayed on the African Star. The fiercely burning oil ignited many secondary fires in combustible material on board the vessel. When the fixed CO² system was discharged to fight the fire in No. 5 hold, a flexible line ruptured between a cylinder valve and the header. This did not prevent the effectiveness of the CO² or the containment of the fire in the hold. The African Star backed out of the barge shortly after the collision and was purposely beached on the right descending bank at Mile 45.9. The Intercity No. 11 sank in 43 feet of water about 700 feet from the right descending bank at Mile 45.8.
“8. As a result of the collision two passengers and fifteen crew members were killed, four members of the crew are missing and presumed dead, and a total of thirty-one crew members and nine passengers were injured from the African Star. There were no injuries or deaths aboard the Midwest Cities.
Remarks
“1. Marked conflict in the record between the witnesses of the two vessels, together with the lack of evidence of the range light aspect and other vital material necessary to establish accurate positions of the vessels, make the reconstruction of events leading up to the collision impossible.
“2. In concurrence with the Board’s Conclusion No. 1, it is considered that the primary cause of the casualty was the failure of the African Star and Midwest Cities to agree on a method of passing.
“3. In further concurrence with the Board’s Conclusion No. 3, it is considered that the responsibility for this casualty rests solely with the pilots of the two vessels. It is concluded, however, that there was a greater degree of culpability on the part of the pilots than the “poor judgment” indicated by the Board.
“4. There is evidence of violation of the Inland Rules of the Road on the part of the pilot of the African Star:
- The failure to reach timely agreement for safe passing when meeting another vessel (33 U.S.C. 203, Rule I ) .
- The failure to sound a timely danger signal in the face of the uncertainty regarding the course and intentions of the Midwest Cities when no answer was received to the initial passing signals (33 U.S.C. 203, Rule I II ).
“5. The pilot of the African Star displayed poor judgment, if not negligence, in shifting from visual to radar observation of the movements of Midwest Cities when he had heard no response to his one-blast passing signal.
“6. The evidence of negligence and violation of Inland Rules of the Road on the part of the pilot on the SS African Star will be forwarded for appropriate action to the American Pilots Association.
“7. There is evidence of violation of the Inland Rules of the Road on the part of the pilot of the M/V Midwest Cities:
- The failure to reach a timely agreement for the port to port passing intended by the Midwest Cities (33 U.S.C. 203, Rule 1) .
“8. There is evidence of violation of the Inland Rules of the Road on the part of the owners of the Intercity No. 14 for navigating the vessel while displaying the port side light unscreened. (33 U.S.C. 157), (Pilot Rules 33 CFR 80.16) .
“9. The evidence of violations on the part of the pilot of the M/V Midwest Cities and on the part of the Intercity No. 14 will be forwarded to Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District for appropriate action under the Administrative Penalty Procedures.
“10. We cannot concur with the Board’s Conclusion No. 7 that there was no evidence of material failure due to the fact that a flexible CO² line ruptured aboard the SS African Star. This, however, did not contribute to the casualty.
“11. It is further considered that the record in this case contains evidence of criminal liability within the purview of Title 18 U.S.C. 1115 on the part of the pilots of the two vessels. Accordingly, this case will be referred to the Department of Justice for possible prosecution.
“12. Appropriate action is being taken to suitably recognize those crew members who demonstrated meritorious and heroic action aboard the SS African Star during the period following the collision.
“13. Legislation for bridge-to-bridge, voice radio communication between vessels, and licensing requirements for persons in charge of the navigational watch of towing vessels, is now pending in Congress.
- J. Smith, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant, 13 March 1970.”
(United States Coast Guard. “SS African Star and M/V Midwest Cities and Tow; Collision and Fire…” Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council, Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan 1971, pp. 10-17.)
Sources:
Lipuscek, Commander John S., USCG. “Marine Casualties – Prevention Through Legislation.” Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council (United States Coast Guard). Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan 1971, pp. 3-8. Accessed 5-17-2015 at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/archive/1971/Vol28_No1_Jan1971.pdf
National Fire Protection Association. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003). (Email attachment to B. W. Blanchard from Jacob Ratliff, NFPA Archivist/Taxonomy Librarian, 7-8-2013.)
National Fire Protection Association. “The Major Fires of 1968.” Fire Journal, Vol. 63, No. 3, May 1969, pp. 12-14.
National Transportation Safety Board. “Action by the National Transportation Safety Board.” Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council (United States Coast Guard). Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan 1971, pp. 12-17. Accessed 5-17-2015 at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/archive/1971/Vol28_No1_Jan1971.pdf
United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Marine Casualty Report. Collision Involving SS African Star and M/V Midwest Cities and Tow in Mississippi River on March 16, 1968. Washington DC: DOT, Commandant, USCG, November 10, 1970, 36 pages. Accessed at: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/docs/boards/africanstar.pdf
United States Coast Guard. “SS African Star and M/V Midwest Cities and Tow; Collision and Fire…” Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council, Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan 1971, pp. 10-17. Accessed 5-17-2015 at: http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/archive/1971/Vol28_No1_Jan1971.pdf