fire, Union Faith and barge, MS River, New Orleans LA-25

lornajarrettblanchard April 6, 1969

— 25 Flesner. “Oil Recovery from the SS Union Faith., Underwater Magazine, July/Aug 2001.

— 25 Long. Response Operations to the Union Faith Release. Int. Oil Spill Conference, 2001.

— 25 National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 140.

— 25 NFPA. “The Major Fires of 1969,” Fire Journal, Vol. 64, No. 3, May 1970, p. 40.

— 25 USCG. Marine Casualty Report. Collision…Union Faith…M/V Warren J. Doucet… 1970.

Narrative Information

Flesner: “On Easter Sunday, April 6, 1969, the 503-foot Taiwanese freighter, SS Union Faith, sank in the Mississippi River at New Orleans, Louisiana, after an explosive collision with a tank barge carrying 9,000 barrels of crude oil. The explosions and spectacular blaze that ensued lit the New Orleans sky for seven hours before the Union Faith sank beneath the surface in 110 feet (33m) of water. Twenty-five mariners were killed in the accident, including a New Orleans pilot who stayed on board to drop the vessel’s anchors and prevent the burning ship from drifting into the downtown New Orleans wharves. The ship, built in 1942, was headed upriver with a cargo of plywood prior to the collision.

“To dispose of the ship, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers hired contractors to dig a 600-feet long, 100-feet wide, and 50-feet deep trench next to the ship. On October 31, 1970, the ship slid into the trench and rolled onto its port side to give a safe navigational depth of 65 feet (20m) over the vessel.” (Flesner. “Oil Recovery from the SS Union Faith., July/Aug 2001.)

Long: “About 7:15 p.m. on April 6, 1969, the Upbound freight vessel Union Faith collided with the barge IOC No. 7, which was downbound and being pushed by the towing vessel Warren J. Doucet. The IOC No. 7 was the lead barge of a tandem tow of three tank barges, each loaded with approximately 9,000 barrels of crude oil. The total length of the tow was about 705 feet. The tug Cay & Mitch was made up to the port quarter of the lead barge with her engines operating at about one-quarter speed. The tow proceeded at about 3.8 knots and was favoring the bends.

“The Union Faith had 51 persons onboard at the time of the incident, including the pilot and vessel’s master. The remaining 49 individuals were Taiwanese crewmembers. The vessel was bound for a berth about 3 miles from the Greater New Orleans Bridge. She proceeded from anchorage off Algiers Point, favoring this point, and was making good about 10 knots as she cleared the point and headed upstream. Her anchors were on the break, ready to let go, and was being navigated by a licensed pilot…

“The collision occurred just after nightfall, slightly upstream from the Great New Orleans Bridge on the left descending bank side of the river. The IOC No. 7 caught fire on contact and broke loose from the tow. A series of explosions followed almost immediately, and the Union Faith was quickly engulfed in flames… The barge broke into two sections, which drifted down the river ablaze and later sank. Crude oil released from the IOC No. 7 burned on the river and threatened nearby moored vessels and harbor facilities. The Union Faith continued to drift down-river while burning from stem to stern and eventually sank at about 2:00 a.m. on April 7, 1969. Twenty-five persons aboard the Union Faith, including all personnel on the vessel’s bridge at the time of the casualty, were killed in the incident and went down with the ship…”

(Long. Response Operations to the Union Faith Release. Int. Oil Spill Conference, 2001, p. 291)

NFPA: “Twenty-five crew members of the cargo ship S.S. Union Faith died April 6 when the ship was upbound in the Mississippi River and collided with three petroleum barges under tow that were carrying crude oil. The accident occurred at the foot of Canal Street in New Orleans about 10:30 at night. The barges exploded and burned, igniting the Union Faith, which sank in the river about three and a half hours later. The burning barges and an oil slick drifted downstream, to cause some damage to ships tied up along the east bank of the River. Because of the amount of fire underneath it, the Greater New Orleans Bridge had to be closed to traffic, and it sustained some heat damage. It was later reopened to automobile traffic only. The estimated loss to the ship and the barges was $877,000.” (NFPA. “The Major Fires of 1969,” Fire Journal, Vol. 64, No. 3, May 1970, p. 40.)

USCG: “Summary of Facts. About 1915 on April 6, 1969, the upbound freight vessel Union Faith collided with barge I.O.C. No. 7 being pushed by the towing Vessel Warren J. Doucet, downbound in the Mississippi River at New Orleans, Louisiana. I.O.C. No. 7 was the lead barge of a tandem tow of three tank barges, each loaded with approximately 9,000 barrels of crude oil. The total length of this tow was about 750 feet. The tug Cat & Mitch was made up to the port quarter of the face barge with her engines operating at about one-quarter speed. The Warren J. Doucet engines were operating at about one-half speed. The tow was proceeding about 3.8 knots, favoring the bends. This vessel was uninspected, and her pilot was not licensed.

“The Union Faith was bound for a berth about 3 miles upstream from the Greater New Orleans Bridge, on the New Orleans side of the river. She proceeded from anchorage off Algiers Point, favored this point, and was making good about 10 knots as she cleared the point and headed upstream. Her anchors were on the brake, ready to let go. This Taiwanese freighter was being navigated by a licensed pilot.

“Voice radio equipment on board the Warren J. Doucet and that used by the pilot of the Union Faith were not compatible as to operating frequency. The Doucet was equipped with voice radio operating on 2738 kHz at the time of the casualty, but not 156.65 MHz (Channel 13). The pilot of the Union Faith used a portable transceiver operating on 156.65 MHz, but apparently was not monitoring 2738 kHz. Both vessels were equipped with marine radar. The radar was in operation on the towing vessel, but not monitored. It is not known whether the radar on the Union Faith was operating or being monitored. Navigation lights required by the Inland Rules of the Road and Pilot Rules were operating on the Union Faith and the Warren J. Doucet and her tow. The whistles of bot vessels were operated prior to the casualty.

“The casualty occurred after nightfall; however, the weather was clear and visibility was good, with a range of about 10 miles….

“The collision occurred slightly upstream from the Greater New Orleans Bridge on the left descending side of the river. L.O.C. No. 7 caught fire on contact and broke loose from the tow. A series of explosions followed almost immediately and the Union Faith was engulfed in flames. The barge broke into two sections which drifted down the river ablaze and later sank. Crude oil burned on the river and threatened the moored vessels and the harbor facilities. The Union Faith drifted downriver, burning from stem to stern, and sank about 0200 on April 7, 1969. Twenty-five persons aboard the Union Faith, including all personnel on the vessel’s bride at the time of the casualty, are missing and presumed dead…. [pp. 1-2]

Analysis

“The Warren J. Doucet, downbound for Algiers Locks, was favoring the right descending bank in Gouldsboro Bend until she reached a point approximately one-half mile above the Greater New Orleans Bridge. She then changed course to cross the river to the left descending side, with the intention to round Algiers Point in the bend. The course was being directed toward the bridge pier located on the New Orleans side of the river. Shortly before he changed course, the master made a radio transmission on 2738 kHz to contact any upbound traffic in the vicinity. When he received no answer, he announced that he was coming down the ‘two-whistle side’ with three oil barges in tow. Shortly after he changed course, he sighted the lights of the Union Faith as that vessel rounded Algiers Point, about 1½ miles distant, bearing dead ahead.

“When the vessels were approximately 1 1/8 miles apart, and the Union Faith was bearing one point on his starboard bow, the master of the Doucet sounded a two-blast signal proposing a starboard-to-starboard passing but received no reply. The Doucet maintained her course and speed. When the vessel had closed to approximately one-half mile, personnel aboard the Warren J. Doucet noted, by the changing aspect of the Union Faith’s navigation lights, that the freighter was altering her course to her starboard and her bearing remained constant. The master of the Doucet sounded another two-blast signal and again received no reply. Following the second signal, the rate of change of the Union Faith’s course to her right increased. Realizing that collision was imminent, the master of the Warren J. Doucet turned his searchlight on the lead barge, sounded four blasts of the whistle, and placed his vessel’s engines full astern. The Union Faith also sounded a danger signal and put her engines full astern. The speed of the Union Faith had been reduced to about 5.5 knots about 5 minutes before the order for dead slow (about 3 knots) which was in effect approximately 2 minutes before the danger signal was sounded.

“The stem of the Union Faith penetrated the starboard side of I.O.C. No. 7 at an angle of about 45⁰ at a point about one-third the length for the bow of the bridge.

“In analyzing all available causal factors, it is apparent that bridge personnel on the Union Faith did not detect the tow until the meeting situation was in extremis. This analysis is based mainly on the information given by personnel on the Warren J. Doucet, since all bridge personnel on watch on the Union Faith were lost. However, the ordering of dead slow 2 minutes prior to the collision indicates the pilot of the freighter was uncertain of the situation at that time, particularly because the vessel still had 3 miles to go before reaching its destination, and dead slow would have delayed arrival. It is likely that the collision would have been avoided had the pilot of the Union Faith ordered full astern in lieu of dead slow; however, he did not do so until collision was imminent. [p. 3.]

“After the Union Faith rounded Algiers Point, the bridge personnel should have seen the two white lights and sidelights on the Doucet which indicated a towing vessel pushing barges. The navigation lights on the I.O.C. No. 7 may have ben difficult to see; however, bridge personnel using binoculars, under good conditions of visibility, should have been able to see the barge lights in sufficient time to take evasive measures. Background lights and reflections from the water may have made the barge lights difficult to detect. This raises the question of the state of attentiveness on the bridge of the Union Faith…. [p. 4]

Probable Cause

“ The National Transportation Safety Board finds that the probable cause of this collision was the failure of the Union Faith to detect the Warren J. Doucet and the position of its tow until collision was imminent. Factors which resulted in this failure included: inability to communicate on a common radiotelephone frequency; probable insufficiency of the navigational lights on the Barge I.O.C. No. 7 to draw attention to its location; probable insufficiency of the whistle on the Warren J. Doucet to effect communication with the Union Faith at an adequate distance under the existing weather conditions of reception aboard Union Faith; apparent nonuse of available radar by either vessel to monitor the movements of the other vessel; and apparent lack of constant surveillance of the lights on the towing vessel by bridge personnel on the Union Faith.

“A contributing factor was the failure of the Warren J. Doucet to sound immediately the danger signal and take avoiding action when the changing aspect of the Union Faith’s navigation lights indicated that the vessel was altering course to her starboard. The apparent change in the heading of the Union Faith should have been considered of particular importance since the Warren J. Doucet had no passing agreement with the Union Faith and, in fact, had not even received a whistle signal reply. There is no indication that the danger signal would have been heard, but avoidance action would have reduced the probability of collision. [p. 8]

“The major factor contributing to the loss of life was the rapidity with which the fire from the highly volatile crude oil engulfed the Union Faith and blocked the normal exits in the midship house.” [p. 9] ….

(USCG, Marine Board of Investigation and NTSB. Marine Casualty Report. Collision Involving SS Union Faith and M/V Warren J. Doucet and Tow in Mississippi River on April 6, 1969. Dec 22 1970.)

Sources

Flesner, Tom. “Oil Recovery from the SS Union Faith., Underwater Magazine, July/Aug 2001. Accessed at: http://www.underwater.com/archives/arch/julyaugust01.01.shtml

Long, Lt. Michael C. (USCG Marine Safety Office New Orleans). Response Operations to the Union Faith Release. International Oil Spill Conference, 2001, pp. 291-295. Accessed at: http://www.iosc.org/papers/01863.pdf

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.

National Fire Protection Association. “The Major Fires of 1969,” Fire Journal, Vol. 64, No. 3, May 1970, pp. 37-40.

United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Marine Casualty Report. Collision Involving SS Union Faith and M/V Warren J. Doucet and Tow in Mississippi River on April 6, 1969. Washington, DC: DOT, Commandant, USCG, Dec 22 1970, 27 pages. Accessed 2-21-2020 at: https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/INV/docs/boards/unionfaith.pdf