1972 — Aug 16, USCG/NWS fail to warn mariners of oncoming gale, N CA/2, So. OR/11–13

–13 USCG/NTSB. Marine Casualty Report Loss of Numerous Vessels…Heavy Weather… 1974.

California waters, near the Northwest Seal Rock off Crescent City, and St. George Reef Light.
–1 M/B Mindy Lynn. Out of Crescent City, fishing ~Northwest Seal Rock off Crescent City.
Owner Robert B. Wilson lost and presumed drowned. Boat not found.

–1 M/B Ro Ann Foundered; fishing out of Crescent City, CA.
Joe F. Leoni, drowned; body recovered ~9M NW of St. George Reef.

Oregon waters, off Brookings, Chetco River Whistle Buoy (LL 73).
–1 Dixie Lee Foundered in vicinity of Chetco River (Brookings), heading for port.
Clayton D. Dooley, boat owner, drowned
Grandson David A Shinkle, survived. USCG memo. report, p. 22.

–5 Karen I Foundered near Brookings; out of Brookings, OR, to fish for salmon.
Brian Coy Friend, son of William and Virginia Friend, drowned.
Virginia Mae Friend, wife of Cpt. William C Fried, Jr., drowned.
William C. Friend, Jr., boat owner, missing.
William C. Fiend III, missing.
Donald Carl Higgins, a neighbor of the Friends, missing.

–2 M/B Bounding Main. Out of Crescent City, OR to fish. Last communication noted she was
trying to make Brookings, OR, the nearest harbor due to weather; lost.
Dennis E. Main. Heart failure due to low temp. water exposure.
Mathew D. Main, 10, son of Dennis. Body not recovered.

–3 F/V Donna N Out of Brookings, OR, to fish near St. George Reef. Last communication
was that the Donna N was headed back to Brookings. Boat nor crew not found – some debris was recovered which was positively identified.
Mr. Richard (Butch) Crook
John M. Crook, son of Richard
Joel M. Crook, sone of Richard?

Narrative Information

USCG/NTSB Synopsis: “On August 16, 1972, approximately 69 small boats operating off the coast of northern California and southern Oregon suddenly encountered high winds and rough seas. Although the U.S. Coast Guard, assisted by numerous private vessels, conducted extensive rescue operations, 13 persons are missing or dead. More than 132,000 worth of damage was incurred by the small boats.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the loss of life and damage to the small boats at sea was (1) The fact that the National Weather Service NWS and the U.S. Coast Guard did not provide timely information about the approaching storm to various small boats, and (2) the inadequate communications between small boats in distress and Coast Guard rescue units.

“Contributing to the fact that timely information was not provided were: (1) NWS did not make sufficient use of available Coast Guard facilities which could have reported weather information; (2) the delay in the receipt of warning advisories by the Portland Weather Service Forecast Office (WSFO), the Eureka Weather Service Office (WSO), and the Crescent City Coastal Warning Display Station; (3) the failure of Coast Guard Group Humboldt Bay and the Cape Carter to inform Coast Guard Station Chetco River of the expected change in offshore weather conditions; and (4) the fact that the NWS did no use Citizens Band (CB) networks at Crescent City and Brookings to disseminate weather information to small boats.

“Contributing to the inadequate communications was the inability of the Coast Guard to monitor requests for assistance that were transmitted on Citizens Band frequencies.” (pp. 1-2)

Analysis

“The Safety Board believes that a disparity exists between testimony give at the Coast Guard Marine Board’s proceedings and Finding of Fact No. 23. Testimony indicates that Mr. Byrum, of the Eureka WSO, on his own initiative, took decisive action during the early morning of August 16. At 0558, Coast Guard Group Humboldt Bay was informed by the Eureka WSO that a small but severe storm was developing and that no boats should be allowed to leave the harbor. Eureka requested that the information be related to the Coast Guard at Crescent City.

Forecasting the Storm

“Information about the storm was available soon enough for a forecast to be made and transmitted to the boast in the accident area. The northerly track of the storm can be traced from the evening of August 154, 1972, when a fishing vessel encountered 50- to 60-knot winds in the vicinity of Cape Mendocino, California, 100 miles south of Chetco River, Oregon. The Coast Guard Cutter Cape Carter, proceeding north from the area, recorded winds of 40 knots before 0400 on August 16. At 0530, the Cape Carter, offshore at Eureka, California, continued to experience 50-knot winds.

“Southerly winds gusting to 40 knots were reported in the Humboldt Bay area at 0500 on August 16. At 0700, winds of 50 to 60 mph prevailed in Orick, California. A sudden wind shift offshore between the Klamath River and Point St. George, California, occurred at 0910. Five minutes later, strong winds suddenly appeared in the area of the St. George Reef [off Crescent City]. At 0930, winds estimated to be more than 70 knots prevailed in Crescent City, California; Brookings, Oregon, experience winds gusting to more than 60 knots at 1045.

“Despite this information, the surface weather chart used by the NWS to forecast the early morning weather of August 16 did not show the storm. The Coast Guard Lightship Blunt’s Reef, previously staqt6ioned offshore of Cape Mendocino, had been used by the NWS to report weather. In June 1971, however, the ship was replaced by a large navigational buoy, which did not contain any weather-recording equipment. If the ship had been in operation on August 16, the San Francisco and Portland WSFO’s would have received earlier notification of the storm.

“Another source of weather information that could have advised the San Francisco and Portland WSFO’s of the storm was the Coast Guard Cutter Cape Carter, on patrol off the northern California coast. Although the vessel was authorized to report abnormal weather conditions, sine the vessel did not usually receive weather reports at sea, the commanding officer could not evaluate the importance of reporting the increasingly severe weather. Not until after discussing the weather with Coast Guard Group Humboldt Bay did the commanding officer send a weather message.

“The failure of the NWS to use Coast Guard resources to collect offshore weather data prevented a more realistic forecast. Use of such information by the NWS in collecting weather information is stressed in Federal legislation. 14 USC 147 states:

In order to promote the safety of life and property on and over the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction and to facilitate the preparation and dissemination by the Weather Bureau of the weather reports, forecasts, and warnings… the Commandant may cooperate with the Chief of the Weather Bureau by procuring, maintaining, and making available, facilities and assistance for observing, investigating, and communicating weather phenomena and for disseminating weather data, forecasts and warnings, the mutually satisfactory terms of such cooperation in weather service to be agreed upon and arranged between the Commandant and the Chief of the Weather Bureau.
[pp. 2-4]

Dissemination of Weather Information

“Coastal Warning Display Stations. On August 16, the San Francisco WSFO issued small-craft and gale warning advisories at 0600 and 0615, respectively. These advisories were not transmitted to the Crescent City Coastal Warning Display Station. Finding of Fact No. 28 in the Marine Board of Investigation Report does not definitely determine who is responsible for relaying the advisories to the Crescent City station. The coastal Warning Display Station Recor for Crescent City (WB Form 530-30) requires that a supervisory office initially send the weather advisory and that ‘Humboldt Bay will send message via USCG radio at no cost to the Weather Bureau.’ Since the record is on NWS form, the supervisory office probably is the Eureka WSO; ‘Humboldt Bay’ is Coast Guard Group Humboldt Bay, situated at Samoa, California.

“The Eureka WSO ‘Small Craft, Gale, and Storm Warning Call List,’ shows that the Eureka WSO first notifies the Coast Guard at Samoa and requests that the warning be relayed to the Coast Guard at Crescent City. The commanding officer of the Cape Carter stated, however that he always receive instructions to raise weather warning flags via Coast Guard Group Humboldt Bay from the Coast Guard Radio Station in San Francisco. Both avenues of communication were available on August 16. At 0558, the Eureka WSO requested Coast Guard Group Humboldt Bay to relay informal weather information about the impending storm to the Coast Guard at Crescent City. At 0607, the San Francisco Coast Guard Radio Station directed Humboldt Bay to relay the San Francisco WSFO small-craft warning advisory to Cape Carter. [p. 4]

“Since the commanding officer of the Cape Carter had already advised Humboldt Bay that he was encountering severe weather, he did not believe that there was any reason for Coast Guard Group Humboldt Bay to relay the 0558 Eureka WSO warning. At 0614, the small-craft warning advisory issued by the San Francisco WSFO was sent to the Cape Carter, and at 0657 the gale warning advisory issued by the San Francisco WSFO was also relayed to the Cape Carter. But even though the Coast Guard Group Humboldt By forwarded this weather information, the harbormaster at Crescent City, who was responsible for hoisting the station display, remained uninformed of the impending storm. There was no requirement that the Cape Carter while at sea notify the harbormaster of weather warnings relayed by Humboldt Bay. The lack of understanding among the NWS offices and the Coast Guard units suggest that the instructions in the Crescent City Coastal Warning Display Station Record need to be reevaluated and clarified.

“The Chetco River Coastal Warning Display Station at Brookings, Oregon, did not receive an NWS advisory soon enough to warn small boats of the impending severe weather. The Marine Board of Investigation did not sufficiently explore the 3-hour delay in the receipt of the San Francisco weather advisories by the Portland WSFAA or the inadequate action taken by the Portland WSFO after receipt of the advisories.…if the existence of the storm had been made known to the NWS during the evening of August 125, when it was in the area of Cape Mendocino, adherence to procedures would have assured that correct weather advisories were disseminated…. [p. 5]

“Most of the 69 boats relied upon CB radios for adverse weather warnings. CB networks in Crescent City and Brookings could have relayed weather information as early as 0615. Early notification would have allowed the boats to return safely to port before the storm. But these networks were not on the call list of the Eureka WSO, As a result, information about the storm was not transmitted on CB networks until its arrival was imminent.

“The National Transportation Safety Board has previously recognized inadequacies in the system used to warn small boats at sea of bad weather. The use of CB networks to disseminate emergency weather information would provide more effective communication.

Distress Calls

“Shortly after the starboard outrigger on the Dixie Lee was damaged, the two persons on board sighted a 44-foot Coast Guard patrol boat. They used a portable ‘fog horn’ hailer, but the hailer was not heard by the crew of the patrol boat. The Dixie Lee was equipped with a CB radio. After the Dixie Lee sank, one of the persons on board was drowned.

“The persons on board the Karen I, the Mindy Lynn, and the Donna N used CB radio to transmit distress messages before their vessels foundered. They did not have radios with authorized distress frequencies. None of the nine persons on board the three boats was rescued. The Coast Guard rescue units were not equipped with CB radios and could not monitor the distress messages.

“In January 1974, the Coast Guard ‘Boating Safety Letter’ reiterated the Coast Guard’s policy regarding the use of CB equipment…The maritime VHF-FM system is the most effective means of communications with small boats in distress. However, the safety mission of the Coast Guard justifies using all types of communication used by the boating public, even if inferior. In declining to utilize CV equipment, even though it may be the most effective means of communication in a particular situation, the Coast Guard reduces the efficiency of its search and rescue capabilities.” [pp. 5-6]

“Commandant’s Action

“The Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation recommended that the Commandant initiate an internal study on the communication capabilities between units of the 12th and 13th Coast Guard Districts. The Commandant replied that the study had been completed and that rapid and reliable communications were available. The Commandant further stated that improved procedures for communicating weather warning and emergency information are not needed, since all Coast Guard units in the relevant area were in constant communication with each other. This comment cannot be substantiated by record of the Marine Board’s investigation.

“The Chetco River Coast Guard Station had a search-and-rescue responsibility for the northern California offshore area whenever the Cape Carter was on law-enforcement patrol. On August 16, both Coast Guard Group Humboldt Bay and the Cape Carter had about a 3-hour advance warning that the storm would strike. This information was not passed to the Chetco River station. The first action taken by the commanding officer of the Chetco River station after he overheard northern California units discussing the gale warning was to attempt to notify small boats offshore. This action suggests that earlier communications of the gale warning to the Chetco River station might have prevented at least some of the founderings and casualties.” [p. 7]

Sources

Dresbeck, Rachel. Oregon Disasters: True Stories of Tragedy and Survival. Chapter 11: “Mayday in August – The Brookings-Harbor Rescues 1972.” Guildford, CT: Insiders’ Guide, an imprint of the Globe Pequot Press, 2006.

Marine Board of Investigation (USCG). Memorandum report to Commandant (MVI). Subject: “Loss of numerous vessels during heavy weather in the vicinity of Chetco River, Oregon on or about 16 August 1972; with loss of life.” 4-9-1973/ Accessed 1-21-2022 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=X8ry2YPQnx8C&pg=PA21&lpg=PA21&dq=%22clayton+d+dooley%22+1972+dixie+lee&source=bl&ots=FohFBM8DTo&sig=ACfU3U0wrI6nAPXSdA03e7232UKmyan8qA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjIw_brucP1AhVtleAKHaVqCjIQ6AF6BAgCEAM#v=onepage&q=%22clayton%20d%20dooley%22%201972%20dixie%20lee&f=true

United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Marine Casualty Report Loss of Numerous Vessels During Heavy Weather in the Vicinity of Chetco River, Oregon on or about 16 August 1972; with Loss of Life (U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation Report and Commandant’s Action. Action by National Transportation Safety Board. Report No. USCG/NTSB–Mar-74-7). Washington, DC: USCG/NTSB, August 28, 1974, 49 p. Accessed 1-21-2022 at: https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/INV/docs/boards/numerousvessels.pdf