1972 — Nov 30, Baptist Towers Home for Senior Citizens (11 floors) Fire, Atlanta, GA– 10
–10 NFPA. A Study of The Baptist Towers Housing for the Elderly Fire. 1973, p. 26.
–10 NFPA. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1972,” Fire Journal, Vol. 67, No. 3, May 1973, pp. 72.
–10 National Fire Protection Association. The Fire Almanac 1984. 1983, p. 137.
–10 Willey. “Fire: Baptist Towers Housing for the Elderly…” Fire Journal, 67/3, May 1973, 15.
Narrative Information
National Fire Protection Association: “The Atlanta, Georgia, fire occurred in the Baptist Towers Home for Senior Citizens. Eight seventh-floor occupants, one-tenth floor occupant, and a guard per¬ished. The fire originated in a seventh-floor apartment and spread into the hall through an open door. A combination of factors was responsible for the deaths — i.e., delayed alarm, the open apartment door, the design of the air-conditioning system, the combustibility of the corridor carpeting, and the origin of the fire on the windward side of the building.” (NFPA. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1972,” Fire Journal, Vol. 67, No. 3, May 1973, pp. 72.)
Willey: “On November 30, 1972 there was a fire at the Baptist Towers Home for Senior Citizens in Atlanta, Georgia. This fire in an 11-story fire-resistive apartment building designed to house the elderly took ten victims – including eight residents and a guard on the floor of origin, the seventh floor. One resident from the tenth floor died six days later. In that the fire occurred in a modern fire-resistive structure that was essentially designed in accordance with local and Federal codes, this presents a highly relevant example of a multi-death fire in a residential occupancy. The fire at the Baptist Towers, which originated from the ignition of combustible contents in a seventh-floor apartment, exposed the adjacent corridor and 29 other apartments. A combination of factors contributed to the fire exposure: delayed alarm; the open door to the apartment of origin; use of corridor to supply make-up air, use of corridor carpeting with fire hazard characteristics beyond what is considered acceptable for the location; and the fact that the apartment of origin was on the windward side of the building. Smoke that spread through the elevator shaft was also a threat to occupants on five other floors….
“The occupancy was classified as residential, since every living unit is a separate apartment and no medical care facilities are provided. The building contains 300 apartments – 210 one-bedroom units and 90 efficiency units. The one-bedroom units have approximately 540 square feet and consist of a bedroom, a living-diving area, a kitchen, a bathroom, and two closets. The efficiency units have approximately 400 square feet and consist of a combination sleeping-living room, a kitchen, a bathroom, and a closet. Each unit has a stove and a refrigerator, and residents provide all other furnishings….. [p. 15]
“At the time of the fire there were 320 residents in the building, including maintenance and staff personnel. Two maintenance men, two college students who perform janitorial duties, building guards, and office personnel reside in the building. A receptionist is on duty in the lobby area during normal office hours, and from 6 pm until 7 am there is a guard on duty…. [p. 16]
Table I. Occupants Who Died [p. 17]
Occupant Age Sex Apt. Per Cent Cause of death Remarks
No. Carbon
Monoxide
A 78 Male 704 20% CO intoxication
thermal burns
B 60 Female 704 55% CO intoxication
And thermal burns
C 81 Female 710 80% Carbon monoxide Suffered from intoxication Parkinson’s;
walked with cane;
heavy smoker.
D 75 Female 709 68% CO intoxication
E 71 Female 711 45% CO intoxication
F 82 Male 713 Less than 5% CO intoxication
G 75 Female 713 82% CO intoxication
H 91 Male 721 50% Thermal burns
I 64 Male guard 40% Thermal burns Lived on tenth floor;
Died on 7th in elevator
J 67 Female 1007 Smoke inhalation Died after six days’
hospitalization.
“….The Fire….Sometime before 2 a.m. the buzzer on the emergency call system activated and the annunciator indicated a signal had been received from Apartment 710. A guard was on duty in the lobby and his wife was up talking with him. The guard told his wife, ‘There is trouble on the seventh floor,’ and then took an elevator to that floor. What action he took is unknown. His body was alter found in the elevator at the seventh floor. The manual fire alarm system had not yet sounded and he did not know that there was a fire on the seventh floor. [p. 17]
“The occupant of Apartment 710, Occupant C, an elderly woman afflicted with Parkinson’s disease, discovered a fire burning in her living room. She left her apartment, leaving the entry door open, and headed toward the south stairway door, first stopping at Apartment 701 to rouse its two female occupants. The three women at first thought they would seek refuge from the fire in Apartment 701, but they changed their minds and entered the adjacent south stairway. Occupant C said that she had forgotten her medicine and went back toward her apartment. Her body was later found in the corridor approximately ten feet from the door.
“The occupant of Apartment 707 was awakened by noises and the smell of smoke. A woman (Occupant C) knocked on her door and said her apartment was on fire. The occupant of Apartment 707 opened the door but smoke and heat knocked her back. She then closed the door and placed towels under it to aid in keeping the smoke out. She decided to wait for rescue in her bedroom and, closing the door, she stood by the window waiting for the Fire Department.
“A man and wife who occupied Apartment 712 awoke to a sound like a cat crying in Apartment 711 (this was later thought to be Occupant E). They smelled smoke and decided to leave the apartment; however, before entering the corridor they put on raincoats and placed wet towels over their heads. As thy left the apartment the man put his arm around his wife’s head and half dragged and carried her down the north corridor. Just outside their door they stepped over a man (Occupant H, from Apartment 721) lying in the corridor partially overcome by smoke and toxic gases. The man had his wife could see fire near floor level in the elevator lobby toward the south corridor. Despite the intense heat and poor visibility they were able to reach the north stairway and escape to the outside.
“On the ninth floor one of the janitors (a college student) heard the fire alarm sounding. He woke his [p. 18] roommate, who notified a secretary residing on the second floor, and she called the Fire Department. One of the students ran up to the tenth floor and awakened one of the maintenance men. When the maintenance man awoke he could hear the fire alarm sounding. Looking out his apartment window in the east wing he saw fire showing on what he thought was the eighth floor. He left his apartment, noting heavy smoke on the tenth floor, and went down the east stairway. He entered the corridor on the eighth floor and as he passed through the elevator lobby he could see fire in the elevator shaft. He removed the fire hose from a nearby standpipe hose cabinet, charge the line, and flowed water into the shaft between the hoistway door and the jamb.
“The fire alarm dispatcher at the Atlanta Fire Department received three simultaneous telephone calls from residents at the Baptist Towers. The first caller was excited and difficult to understand and the dispatcher switched over to the second call. A woman reported, ‘There is a fire at 1881 Myrtle Drive, the high-rise building for senior citizens.’ The first companies, two engine companies, and a ladder company were alerted at 2:18 a.m. and responded at 2:19.
“The first-alarm battalion chief arrived at the Baptist Towers at approximately 2:23. As he pulled into the driveway on the east side of the building he could see one room of Apartment 710 fully involved, and second-alarm companies were dispatched at 2:25. The total response consisted of seven engine companies, seven ladder companies, one rescue, a number of ambulances, and five chiefs….
“It took approximately 20 minutes to knock down the fire in the corridor and in Apartment 710 after crews began fire-fighting operations on the seventh floor. Rescue operations took much longer – up to 50 minutes to complete. The initial rescue objective was to reach first those individuals who were most severely exposed by the fire on the seventh floor. In addition to those rescue efforts from within, aerial apparatus was also used. An 85-foot elevating platform rescued seven persons from Apartments 703, 705, 707, 715, 717, and 719. For several minutes a woman from Apartment 715 straddled the window ledge from her apartment and waited for the elevated platform to be repositioned to reach her. After the rescues from Apartments 717 and 719 had been completed, parked cars had to be moved before the equipment could reach Apartment 715. A 100-foot aerial was also used on the west side to reach occupants above the seventh floor. In addition, two aerial ladders were operated on the east side of the building, one on the east side of the north wing and the other on the north side of the east wing. Because of terrain limitations no other east-side areas were accessible.
“A number of occupants were exposed to smoke conditions on the sixth floor an on floors above the fire. The heaviest smoke concentration was encountered on the tenth floor, and lesser concentrations were noted on other floors. Fire fighters aided many occupants from their apartments through smoky corridors to the stairway. The stairways were also charged with smoke, and the worst conditions noted in the south and east stairways. Fire fighters puts coats and breathing apparatus masks over occupants’ faces because of those conditions as the occupants were led to safety. Of the 95 occupants known to have survived the fire on the six through eleventh floors of the building, at least 60 were rescued by fire fighters, and a majority of them were led through corridors and down stairways.
“….The entry door to Apartment 710 was completely destroyed, and glass in the living room window had been broken by heat. The point of origin was believed to be in the southeast corner of the living room, possibly in an upholstered chair. However, the fire cause was not determined. The occupant of Apartment 710 was a heavy smoker….
“Discussion. In the early stages of the fire, although the fire had been discovered by the elderly occupant, no positive action was taken to sound the internal fire evacuation alarm or to notify the Fire Department. This allowed the fire to grow and reach flashover stage, consuming combustible contents of her living room. When the occupant vacated the apartment the entry door was left open. Built-in compartmentation features provided by the one-hour fire-rated partitions and the solid-core composite door were nullified. At the Baptist Towers the fact that the apartment of origin was on the windward side of the building added to the fire problem. Since the window in the room of origin had broken early in the fire, the direction and velocity of the wind drove the fire toward the corridor and the fire became a serious threat to other occupants.
“The exposure to the other apartments on the fire floor was intensified by use of corridors to supply make-up air and use of carpeting with high fire hazard characteristics. These two factors in combination increased heat level intensities as well as smoke and toxic gas generation in the corridor system and spread these conditions to other apartments.
“Smoke and toxic products of combustion were drawn into other apartments by exhaust vents in kitchen and toile areas. The exhaust system fans and the air supply fan continued to operated during the fire. Entry doors were undercut and each apartment was supplied with make-up air….”
Sources
National Fire Protection Association. A Study of The Baptist Towers Housing for the Elderly Fire. Boston, MA: NFPA, 1973, 63 pages
National Fire Protection Association. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1972,” Fire Journal, Vol. 67, No. 3, May 1973, pp. 71-74 & 102.
National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.
Willey, A. Elwood. “Fire: Baptist Towers Housing for the Elderly, Atlanta, Georgia.” NFPA Fire Journal, Vol. 67, No. 3, May 1973, pp. 15-22.