1972 — Oct 30, Rear-end Train Collision, IL Central Gulf Commuter Rail, Chicago, IL– 45

lornajarrettblanchard October 30, 1972

— 45 Chicago Tribune. “Commuter Train Wreck Still Haunts a Survivor.” 11-9-1997, p. 1.
— 45 Hanzell. “Loop Tragedy…Second…Crash In 13 Months,” Chicago Tribune, Feb 5, 1977.
— 45 NTSB. RAR. Collision of [IL] Central Gulf [RR]Commuter Trains, Chicago… 1973, p. I.
— 45 Wikipedia. “1972 Illinois Central Gulf Commuter Rail Crash”
— 44 Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). 1982, p. 443.

Narrative Information

NTSB Abstract: “This report describes and analyzes the collision of two Illinois Central Gulf Railroad commuter trains in Chicago, Ill., on the morning of October 30, 1972. A train consisting of four new Highliner cars overran a station stop, attempted to back up to the platform, and was struck from the rear by another train operating on the same track. The first car of the following train overrode the underframe of the last car of the lead train and telescoped the car.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the reverse movement of train 416 (the lead train) without flag protection into a previously vacated signal block and the failure of the engineer of train 720 (the following train), while operating faster than the prescribed speed, to perceive the train ahead in time to avoid the collision. Ambiguous rules which caused confusion among employees regarding the necessity to flag within automatic-block signal system limits and the reduced importance of flagging in suburban service implied by the management’s failure to enforce Rules 7, 35, 99, 896, and 1003 also contributed to the accident.

“The report recommendations to the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, the Chicago South Suburban Mass Transit District, the Federal Railroad Administration, and the Urban Mass Transportation Administration.” (p. ii.)

“I. Synopsis

“During the morning rush hour on October 30, 1972, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad (ICG) commuter train 416, which consisted of four new bi-level Highliner cars, overran the 27th Street station at Chicago, Ill. While backing up to the station platform, at 7:38 a.m., train 416 was struck from the rear by ICG commuter train 720, which consisted of six older cars and was operating on the same track as the train 416. A third train, passing on an adjacent track, sideswiped the wreckage.

“The collision destroyed the rear half of the last car on train 416 [front train] and the first 10 feet of the lead car on train 720 [following train]; 45 passengers were killed, and 332 persons were injured.

“II. FACTS

“The Accident

“….The train’s brakes seemed to operate perfectly at each of the 12 station stops between South Chicago and 53d Street….

“The train approached the 27th Street statin in daylight under an overcast sky. The engineer testified that when he applied the brakes, 416 was traveling at 62 m.p.h. The train, however, passed the station platform at a speed estimated by several witnesses as between 20 and 50 m.p.h. When the train finally stopped, the rear car was about 600 feet north of the platform and about 400 feet north of Signal 3-3.10.

“The conductor proceeded to the center vestibule of the rear car, opened one of the doors on the platform (west) side of the train, and plugged his microphone into the train’s intercom system. The engineer buzzed the conductor for permission to back up, and the conductor told him over the intercom to do so.

“While the train backed toward the platform at a speed of between 5 and 15 m.p.h., the conductor remained in the center vestibule, maintained contact with the engineer, and learned out the open door. The engineer simultaneously learned out the east side of the train and looked back until he was forced to pull has head in by the approach of train 718 on the adjacent track….” (p. 2.)

“When the rear of train 416 came alongside the station platform, the conductor repeatedly instructed the engineer to stop. The train had almost stopped when it was struck from the rear at 7:38 a.m. by northbound train 720, which was also operating on track 3. The conductor remained on 416 until just before impact.

“Train 720. Train 720 had started its revenue run at South Chicago 9 minutes after the departure of train 416. Train 720 consisted of six ‘old’ cars and was manned by an engineer, a collector, and a conductor. The crew, like the crew of 417, had reported to work that morning at the 83d Street yard….All seats were occupied, and some passengers were standing.

“At 67th Street, train 720 was routed onto track 3. Because all signals enroute to Signal 3-3.60 (at 31st Street) displayed clear aspects, the engineer accelerated the train to the maximum attainable speed, which he estimated to between 55 and 60 m.p.h. The train was not equipped with a speedometer.

“Signal 3-3.60 displayed a yellow aspect as 720 approached. At that time, the collector was in the vestibule at the rear of the second car, and the conductor was in the fourth car. The engineer stated that because he expected to catch train 416, he had already set the brakes before he observed Signal 3-3.60. He said that he then further reduced air pressure, and 720 passed the signal at a speed which the engineer estimated to be about 40 m.p.h.

“The engineer’s view of Signal 3-3.10 from 31st Street was obstructed by an overhead walkway at 27th Street. The engineer first observed train 416 when 720 was ‘four to six car lengths from the (27th Street) platform.’ At that time, 416 was alongside the platform and still backing. The engineer of 720 applied the emergency brakes, threw the operating lever to the reverse position, blew the horn, and evacuated the operating compartment. He warned the passengers in the first car that a crash was imminent, and had just entered the passenger area when the collision occurred.” (p.4.)

….

“Accident Losses

“Fatalities and injuries. The collision killed 45 passengers and injured 332 persons. Most of the fatalities and serious injuries occurred in the rear car on train 416….” (p. 12.)

III. ANALYSIS

“Operation of Train 720

“An expert witness calculated that the deformation of metal in the two demolished cars absorbed about 40 million foot-pounds of energy. This same witness concluded that the speed of train 720 at impact must have been between 44 and 50 m.p.h. This estimate is corroborated by a comparison of the movements of trains 720 and 718 before impact….

“…if the emergency brakes on train 720 had been applied at the time 416 first should have been discernible to the engineer of 720, the train should have stopped before the point of impact. Furthermore, if 720 had been running, as required, at 30 m.p.h., prepared to stop short of Signal 3-3.10, an emergency brake application at the time the engineer stated he first saw 416 would have stopped 720 in sufficient time.” (p. 24.)

“The large difference between the 30m.p.h speed required by the operating rules and the 50 to 55-m.p.h. speed indicated by the evidence suggests that the presence of a speedometer on 720 perhaps would have reduced the overspeed but probably would not have prevented the collision. However, if the rear of train 416 or the red aspect of Signal 3-3.10 had been visible to the engineer as he passed Signal 3-3.60, the possibility of his taking effective preventive action would have been increased. Passengers on 718 stated that he appeared to be alert and looking ahead at that time.

“Operation of Train 416

“The only know equipment deficiency which could have contributed to the overrun of the station platform was the speedometer on 416, which registered a maximum of 63 m.p.h. If the train was going faster than 63 m.p.h., and the engineer applied the brakes at the normal spot for a station stop from 63 m.p.h., the train probably would have overrun the platform. Even a 10-m.p.h. overspeed, however would not have resulted in an overrun of the entire train of the distance that 416 experienced.

“Since October 30 was the first day the engineer was assigned to train 416 and since 27th Street was a flag stop, it is probable that the engineer forgot about the conductor’s instructions to stop until it was too late to prevent a station overrun.

“Once the overrun occurred, Rules 106 and 886 made the conductor responsible for assuring that the reverse movement was accomplished safely. Furthermore, since the train stopped north of Signal 3-3.10, Rule 515 required that the reverse movement be protected by flagging. The conductor failed to comply with these rules.

“The engineer should have known that the rear of his train had passed beyond the limits of the block of 3-3.10 and that flag protection would be required to return to the platform. He also should have known the conductor was in a center vestibule from the conductor’s use of the intercom. The engineer did not question whether the train had passed beyond Signal 3-3.10 or whether a flagman had been sent out. At not time did he sound the whistle for a flagman. Therefore, the engineer did not take the precautions prescribed by Rules 106 and 1022…..” (p. 25.)

“Management Practices

“On September 8, 1970, an Illinois Central (IC) train collided with an Indiana Harbor Belt train on IC track at Riverdale, Ill. The accident occurred as the IC train was backing under the authority of a restricted proceed signal in automatic-block signal territory. Rules 99, D-99, 106, 106(a), and 291 were involved in the collision, and the Safety Board determined that inadequacies in operating rules, practices, and personnel training contributed. That these same factors contributed to the accident at 27th Street suggests that the railroad management had not eliminated the inadequacies in the intervening 2 years.

“Employees who are advanced to positions of responsibility have the right to believe that their performances meet company standards. Train and engine crewmembers working on the Chicago Division failed to comply with Rules 7, 35, 896, and 1003 with full knowledge of their supervisors. This failure by management to discipline or reprimand employees for not carrying flagging equipment led to the degradation of the rules. Management’s laxity in failing to provide flagging equipment on suburban trains further indicated to employees that the importance of flagging had diminished.

“Station overruns and short backing movements had been accepted in the past by railroad management. This acceptance by ICG supervisors of questionable operating practices and the degradation of flagging rules may have contributed to the failure of the crew of train 416 to protect their train by flagging as it backed at the 27th Street station. Furthermore, the lack of rule understanding and enforcement disclosed during the Board’s investigation is not consistent with the 99.54-percent efficiency in rule compliance claimed by ICG for Chicago Division employees.” (p. 27.)

“Systems Failure

“In order for this accident to have occurred, a number of things, involving crewmembers, management, operating rules, train equipment, and environmental factors, had to go wrong. Since these factors are interrelated, the accident indicates a system breakdown….

“Because the ends of the Highliner cars were painted black, they were difficult to distinguish from the station platform and other appurtenances at 27th Street under the overcast sky on the morning of the accident. The end marker lights on train 416 were very small. If train safety depends on thee ability of an engineer or conductor to ‘stop short of train,’ then the markings of the car ends were incompatible with safety.

“Although there is no prescribed sight distance for a train approaching a signal, the visibility of Signal 3-3.10 was a factor in this accident. Because the authority conveyed by a signal is not applicable until the signal is passed, the signal theoretically does not need to be visible until a train is directly upon it. However, since a signal is supposed to convey information to employees operating trains, a man-made obstruction such as the walkway at 27th Street inconsistent with the purpose of the signal.” (p. 28.)

“The engineer of train 720 did not comply with the yellow aspect displayed by Signal 3-3.60. The message conveyed by the aspect was ‘Caution! Train ahead.’ The engineer, however, was not particularly concerned that there was a train ahead – it was ahead every day.

“The signal system was working as intended but did not prevent the accident. Traffic scheduled through the accident area during rush hours resulted in very close headways. Trains were commonly operated under the authority of red and yellow aspects. This system was safe as long as the rules were obeyed; there was no margin for disrespect. There are signal systems available (e.g., cab signals, automatic train control, automatic train stop) that place less reliance on rule enforcement to ensure safety.

“The reverse movement of trains into previously vacated signal blocks was incompatible with the scheduled 2 to 3 minute headways of ICG commuter operation and the time required to implement flag protection. The more logical procedure after a train overruns a station more than a train length or overruns a signal was to continue on to the next station. The Safety Boar’s Recommendation No. 2 included as part of Appendix F proposed that ICG commuter trains be restricted from reentering a signal block unless protected by train order….” (p. 29.)

IV. PROBABLE CAUSE

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the reverse movement of train 416 without flag protection into a previously vacated signal block and the failure of the engineer of train 720, while operating faster than the prescribed speed, to perceive the train ahead in time to avoid the collision. Ambiguous rules which caused confusion among employees regarding the necessity to flag within automatic-block signal system limits and the reduced importance of flagging in suburban service implied by the management’s failure to enforce Rules 7, 35, 99, 896, and 1003 also contributed to the accident.

“Contributing to the high incidence of fatality was the overriding of the underframe of the Highliner car by the older car, which allowed the older car to telescope the Highliner car.” (p. 34.)

(National Transportation Safety Board. Railroad Accident Report. Collision of Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Commuter Trains, Chicago, Illinois, October 30, 1972. Washington, DC: NTSB, Report Number NTSB-RAR-73-5, adopted June 28,1973.

Chicago Tribune 1997: “The doomed rear car was packed with people, said Chicago lawyer Morris Gzesh, also a survivor. When Gzesh boarded the train at 53rd Street, he couldn’t even find a place to stand in the last car. He moved to the third car, a decision that probably saved his life….

“When the trains collided, the front car of the express train telescoped the rear car of the bi-level train, killing 45 people and injuring 332.

“The wreck occurred two blocks from the emergency room of Michael Reese Hospital, which responded quickly. Fifty doctors were assigned to treat victims. A surgeon quoted the next day in the Tribune recalled the crash’s aftermath as ‘grotesque beyond belief’….

“The first commuter, a shiny, four-car, double-decked HighLiner overshot the 27th Street station and was backing up when it was rammed by the second train. The second train was made up of six 1926 vintage coaches. Each train carried about 500 passengers.” (Chicago Tribune 1997.)

Wikipedia: “The 1972 Illinois Central Gulf commuter rail crash, the worst in Chicago’s history, occurred during the cloudy morning rush hour on October 30, 1972….

“Train 416, made up of newly purchased bi-level cars, overshot the 27th Street Station on what is now the Metra Electric Line, and the engineer [J.A. Watts] decided to back the train up to the platform. ….

“Unfortunately, his train had tripped signals which cleared express train 720, made up of more heavily constructed single level cars, to continue at full speed on the same track. Since Illinois Central Gulf trains were painted dark green at the time, the engineer of the express train did not see the bi-level train backing up until it was too late….

“After the accident, the ends of all commuter rail cars and locomotives in the Chicago area were painted with orange and white stripes for better visibility.” (Wikipedia; Cites Chicago Public Library.)

Newspapers at the Time

Oct 31/AP: “Chicago (AP) — Federal safety officials investigating the commuter train collision which killed 44 persons raised questions today about the strength of the lightweight steel cars used by commuter lines.

“In addition to the dead, more than 300 were reported injured Monday when an Illinois Central Gulf Railroad commuter backing into a South Side station was rammed by a second IC electric commuter during the morning rush hour.

“Transportation Secretary John Volpe inspected the wreckage in a 40-minute tour. He… said the strength of the lightweight steel and aluminum cars would be studied….Volpe headed a federal investigation team dispatched from Washington to study the collision, the nation’s worst rail disaster since 1958 when 48 persons were killed in Elizabethport, N. J.

“It took six hours to extricate the last of the dead and injured from the crumpled wreckage of two of the cars, which were crushed like empty beer cans.

”President Nixon expressed his sorrow and canceled plans for a downtown campaign motorcade scheduled for today in Chicago. Sen. George McGovern, campaigning in Pittsburgh, called off a torchlight parade scheduled for Wednesday in Chicago….

“Officials said that when the first train overshot the station it may have tripped a switch which changed a signal observed by the second train from red to yellow. They said the yellow signal permitted the second train to travel toward the station at approximately 30 miles an hour, but also indicated to the engineer that the track was clear for 2,000 yards….

“Harold Melcher, 21, who was in the first car of the approaching rear train, said he heard the conductor [Robert W. Cavanaugh] shout: “We’re going to crash. Everybody get down.” He said he dropped to the floor and escaped without injury.” (Spencer 1972) “Cavanaugh, who was injured, was among the last victims freed from the wreckage. He was removed by one of four helicopters which joined a dozen ambulances in speeding victims to hospitals.” (Anderson Daily Bulletin, IN. “Safety officials checking train crash.” 10-31- 1972, p. 1.)

Oct 31/UPI (Spencer): “H. G. Mullins, the IC’s [IL Commerce Commission] superintendent of passenger service, said Watts told him he overshot the platform by about 250 feet. Mullins said he didn’t know why the engineer passed the platform, but speculated: ‘Maybe he was going faster than he should have’.”

“Dr. Edward Goldberg, staff surgeon at Michael Reese Hospital, was the first doctor at the scene. ‘Human limbs were hanging out the windows,’ he said. ‘There was one 22-year-old fellow whose heart stopped, but he was revived. About the only thing doctors and nurses could do at the scene was apply tourniquets and splints, and give sedatives’….

“Hundreds of motorists also stopped to lend assistance, jamming the nearby expressway. The platform of the 27th street station was turned into an “outdoor hospital” where the injured were treated until they could be removed to hospitals.” (Spencer. “Chicago Train Crash Death Toll Increases. UPI, October 31, 1972.)

Sources

Anderson Daily Bulletin, IN. “Safety officials checking train crash.” 10-31- 1972, p. 1. Accessed 3-9-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/anderson-herald-bulletin-oct-31-1972/?tag

Chicago Tribune. “Commuter Train Wreck Still Haunts a Survivor,” November 9, 1997, p. 1. Accessed at: http://www.rm59.net/Train_wreck_survivor.doc

Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982.

Hanzell, Wesley. “Loop Tragedy Was Second Major Crash In 13 Months,” Chicago Tribune, February 5, 1977. Accessed at: http://www.chicago-l.org/articles/1977crash2.html

National Transportation Safety Board. Railroad Accident Report. Collision of Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Commuter Trains, Chicago, Illinois, October 30, 1972. Washington, DC: NTSB, Report Number NTSB-RAR-73-5, adopted June 28,1973. Accessed 8-6-2020 at: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Railroad_Accident_Report/IlW22uCwpH8C?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq= &pg=PP140&printsec=frontcover

Spencer, Frank L. “Chicago Train Crash Death Toll Increases. UPI, October 31, 1972. Accessed at: http://www.gendisasters.com/data1/il/trains/chicago-trainwreck-oct1972.htm

Wikipedia. “1972 Illinois Central Gulf Commuter Rail Crash.” Accessed 12-27-2008 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Illinois_Central_Gulf_commuter_rail_crash