1974 — Jan 6, Air East Airlines Flight 317 instrument approach crash, Johnstown, PA– 12

–12 Kimura. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Ed., 1946-1993, V.1. 4-11-1994, p. 3-20.
–12 NTSB AAR. Air East…Johnstown–Cambria Co. AP, Johnstown, PA, Jan 6, 1974. 1975.

Narrative Information

National Transportation Safety Board: “About 1905 e.s.t. on January 6, 1974, Commonwealth Commuter Flight 317, an Air East, Inc., Beechcraft 99A, crashed while making an instrument approach to runway 33 at the Johnstown-Cambria County Airport, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Of the 15 passengers and 2 crewmembers aboard, 11 passengers and the captain were killed in the crash. The four remaining passengers and the first officer were seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

“While on an instrument landing system localizer approach, the aircraft struck approach lights about 300 feet from the runway threshold and then crashed into an embankment about 200 feet from the threshold. Shortly before and shortly after the accident, the reported weather conditions at the Johnstown airport consisted in part of variable 200- to 400-foot ceilings and a prevailing visibility of 2 miles in very light snow and fog.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a premature descent below a safe approach slope followed by a stall and loss of aircraft control. The reason for the premature descent could not be determined, but it was probably the result of: (1) A deliberate descent below the published minimum descent altitude to establish reference with the approach lights and make the landing, (2) a visual impairment or optical illusion created by the runway/approach lighting systems, and (3) downdrafts near the approach end of the runway.” (NTSB AAR 1975, 1)

“Commonwealth Commuter Flight 317, an Air East, Inc., Beechcraft 99A, N125AE, was a scheduled passenger flight between the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and the Johnstown-Cambria County Airport, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, On January 6, 1974, Flight 317 departed Pittsburgh about 1830 with 15 passengers and 2 crewmembers aboard.

“About 1856, Flight 317 reported passing the compass locator outbound on the instrument landing system (ILS) localizer approach runway 33. About 3 minutes later, flight reported passing the same fix inbound to the airport. According to the FSS specialist, Flight 317 reported about 1901 that the approach and runway lights were in sight, and about 1904, the flight requested that the approach lights be dimmed. The specialist dimmed the lights and transmitted the surface wind velocity and altimeter setting. In response to his transmission, the specialist heard several clicks of a transmitter. There were no further communications from Flight 317.

“After completing his last transmission to Flight 317, the FSS specialist attended to other matters in the station. Sometime later, an Air East ramp agent asked if the specialist had radio communication with Flight 317. The specialist replied that he had been communicating with the flight. He attempted without success to reestablish communications with Flight 317. He called Cleveland Center and Altoona Radio on land lines and asked if the controllers there had radio communication with Flight 317. Their replies were negative.

“The Air East agent began a search of the airfield. After looking around the departure end of runway 33, he drove toward the approach end. Near the latter location, he encountered a young man who told him that an airplane had crashed on the embankment near the approach end of runway 33. The Air East agent drove to the FSS and informed the specialist of the accident. The latter notified the police department, and rescue activities began.

There were no eyewitnesses to the accident on the ground. Two witnesses near the passenger terminal saw landing lights off the approach end of runway 33 about the time that Flight 317 was near that location. They described the surface winds as, “very windy at times” and “gusting” with visibility obstructed by “haze” and “blowing light snow.”

“The first officer stated that the captain was flying the aircraft on a normal approach, and that after they had passed the compass locator, inbound to the airport, the aircraft descended at a rate of 300 to 400 fpm and was below the clouds between the altitudes of 3,000 feet and 2,900 feet….

“After the lights were dimmed, he completing the landing checklist, calling out 100 feet above the field elevation, and seeing 115 to 120 knots on the airspeed indicator. Then, while laying his checklist on the floor, he felt the aircraft begin to sink rapidly. He reached for the throttle levers but found that the captain had already advanced them. He felt the control wheel move aft and believed that the aircraft was in a nose high attitude. His next recollection was being on the ground outside the aircraft.” (NTSB AAR 1975, 2-3)

“The maximum certificated takeoff and landing weight for N125AE was 10,400 lbs…. By using standard weights for passengers, crew, fuel, and baggage, the takeoff gross weight of N125AE at Pittsburgh was com¬puted to have been 10,797 lbs., or 397 lbs. over the maximum allowable weight. The load manifest that was filled out by the first officer en route to Johnstown showed only 806 lbs. of fuel aboard at Pittsburgh instead of the 1,203 lbs., which was actually aboard. Also, the load manifest showed a gross weight of 10,391 lbs.

“The first officer and other former Air East pilots testified that it was a regular company practice to enter low fuel weights on the load manifests when a maximum load (15) of passengers were aboard. The low fuel weights were entered to show that the aircraft was within weight and balance limits. They also stated that passenger seats were never restricted from use to keep the aircraft within weight and balance limits. It was an unwritten company policy to accept additional passengers and to fly the aircraft overweight and out of c. g. limits, if necessary.

“Using the actual weights of the passengers and baggage, N125AE’s gross weight at takeoff was computed to have been 10,342 lbs. The land¬ing weight was calculated at 10,088 lbs….

“According to the first officer, before the aircraft departed Pittsburgh, the aircraft had significant formations of ice on the areas that were not protected with deicing equipment. He removed some of the ice with his hands, but the aircraft was not deiced by fluid or by other means.” (NTSB AAR 1975, 5-6)

“The 11 fatally injured passengers had head, chest, and internal injuries in addition to fractured extremities and backs. The four passen¬ger who survived had head injuries and fractures of the back and extremities.” (NTSB AAR 1975, 10)

“Several former Air East pilots testified that the MDA’s [Minimum Descent Altitude] for the published instrument approaches to Johnstown were not adhered to. They stated that the company vice president for operations cleared individual captains for “company minimums” after he was satisfied that the captain was capable of flying the aircraft to lower MDA’s. The “company minimums” involved MDA’s of about 200 feet above the airport elevation, and the approaches were flown with the aid of DME [Distance Measuring Equipment]. The purpose of the lower MDA’s was to achieve a higher completion factor for the flights into Johnstown since the officially reported weather conditions otherwise frequently precluded a success¬ful approach and landing. According to a former Air East pilot, the captain of flight 317 had been cleared by the company to fly. to “company minimums.” (NTSB AAR 1975, 14)

“The Safety Board believes that a combination of two factors most probably was responsible for the captain’s misjudgment of his altitude above the approach lights during the final stages of the approach. These two factors were: (1) The manner in which the approach was conducted, and (2) the visual effects produced by the runway/approach lighting system.” (NTSB AAR 1975, 17)

“The location of Flight 317 remained undetected for a substantial period of time, and about 33 minutes elapsed from the time of the crash until rescue authorities were notified. Because of poor road conditions, another 17 minutes or more elapsed before the rescue equipment arrived at the scene. Based on the nature and severity of the injuries, however, it is doubtful that the delay aggravated the injuries or contributed to the number of deaths. Nevertheless, the rescue problems involved in this accident emphasize the importance of having crash/rescue equipment and personnel available at airports served by air carriers.” (NTSB AAR 1975, 20)

“The manner in which Air East conducted various aspects of its operations and the FAA’s failure to detect the violations and deficiencies suggest the continued need for more stringent surveillance of commuter air carriers. Also, improvements are needed in the FAR’s which regu-late the activities of these carriers. (NTSB AAR 1975, 20)

“Findings….

The aircraft stalled just before impact and struck the embankment in a high noseup attitude.

The aircraft had accumulated significant amounts of ice on areas not protected by deicing equipment; the ice had little adverse effect on the aircraft’s performance.

By applying 2g’s within 1 sec. in a wings-level pull-up, the power-off stall speed for N125AE would have in¬creased from about 90 to 127 KLAS and the power-on stall speed would have increased from about 71 to 100.

The aircraft was improperly loaded and the load manifest did not accurately reflect the aircraft’s weight or c. g. condition….

Light downdrafts probably existed in the approach area to runway 33.

The captain probably descended well below the published MDA before he established clear visual reference with the approach threshold of runway 11, the approach lights, or other markings identifiable with the approach end of runway 33….

Air East captains regularly conducted instrument approaches to lower MDP.’ s than those approved by the FAA.

Prior to the accident he FAA did not detect the improper practices and violations that Air East personnel were systematically involved in.” (NTSB AAR 1975, 21-22)

Sources

Kimura, Chris Y. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Edition, 1946-1993, Volume 1: Jet and Turboprop Aircrafts. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Risk Assessment and Nuclear Engineering Group. 4-11-1994.

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Air East, Inc. Beechcraft 99A, N125AE, Johnstown – Cambria County Airport, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, January 6, 1974 (NTSC-AAR-75-3). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted January 15, 1975, 32 pages. Accessed at: http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR75-03.pdf