1975 — June 24, Eastern fl. 66 approach crash; microburst/wind shear, JFK IAP, NY– 113

–115 Emergency Management Net. “Airplane Accidents 1969-1979.”
–115 History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, June 24, 1975. Eastern Flight 66 Crashes…
–113 Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). New York.
–113 NTSB. AAR. Eastern Air Lines…Kennedy Int. AP, Jamaica, NY, June 24, 1975. 1976.
–113 NYCdata. Disasters, New York City (NYC). “Eastern Airlines Flight 66 Crash – 1975.
–113 Wikipedia. “Eastern Air Lines Flight 66.”
–112 Darby. “Cracking the Microburst Code.” Aero Safety World, March 2011, p. 53.

Narrative Information

History.com: “An Eastern Airlines jet [124 on board (NationMaster.com)] crashes near John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City , killing 115 people on this day in 1975. The Boeing 727 was brought down by wind shear, a sudden change in wind speed or direction.

“On the afternoon of June 24, the New York area experienced severe thunderstorms with heavy winds and rain. Thunderstorms often cause microbursts, damaging downbursts of wind that can be immensely destructive and are particularly dangerous to air travel. Two different flights arriving at John F. Kennedy Airport in Queens, New York, reported significant problems with winds as they brought their planes in on runway 22. Air-traffic controllers, however, ignored the warnings and kept the runway open.

“Eastern Airlines Flight 66 from New Orleans was about a mile from the runway when it was lifted suddenly and violently by the wind, then was immediately pushed downward. The plane struck a row of lights that tore off the outer portion of the left wing. It proceeded to crash into more light poles and broke into pieces just above the ground.

“Only seven passengers and two flight attendants survived the fiery crash, all with serious injuries. The remaining 109 passengers and six crew members lost their lives. Wind shear remains a serious threat to flying, but significant advances in identifying areas and times of concern have virtually eliminated deadly crashes caused by sudden winds.” (History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, June 24, 1975. Eastern Flight 66 Crashes at J.F.K.”)

NTSB: “About 1605 e.d.t. on June 24, 1975, Eastern Air Lines Flight 66, a Boeing 727-225, crashed into the approach lights to runway 22L at the John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. The aircraft was on an ILS approach to the runway through a very strong thunderstorm that was located astride the ILS localizer course. Of the 124 persons aboard, 113 died of injuries received in the crash. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the aircraft’s encounter with adverse winds associated with a very strong thunderstorm located astride the ILS localizer course, which resulted in a high descent rate into the non-frangible approach light towers. The flightcrew’s delayed recognition and correction of the high descent rate were probably associated with their reliance upon visual cues rather than on flight instrument references. However, the adverse winds might have been too severe for a successful approach and landing even had they relied upon and responded rapidly to the indications of the flight instruments.

“Contributing to the accident was the continued use of runway 22L when it should have become evident to both air traffic control personnel and the flightcrew that a severe weather hazard existed along the approach path.” (NTSB 1976, 1)

“On June 24, 1975, Eastern Air Lines Flight 66, a Boeing 727-225, N8845E. operated as a scheduled passenger flight from New Orleans, Louisiana, to New York, New York. The flight departed New Orleans about 1319 e.d.t. with 116 passengers and 8 crewmembers aboard. It proceeded to the John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.

“Eastern 66 arrived in the New York City terminal area without reported difficulty, and, beginning at 1535:11, Kennedy approach control (Southgate arrival controller) provided radar vectors to sequence the flight with other traffic and to position it for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 22L at the Kennedy airport. The flight had received a broadcast on the automatic terminal information service (ATIS). which gave in part the 1251 Kennedy weather observation and other data as follows: “Kennedy weather, VFR, sky partially obscured, estimated ceiling 4,000 broken, 5 miles with haze.. .wind 210° at 10, altimeter 30. 15. Expect vectors to an ILS runway 22L, landing, runway 22L, departures are off 22R.. . .”

“At 1551:54, the Southgate arrival controller broadcast to all aircraft on his frequency, ‘ . . .we’re VFR with a 5-mile, light, very light rain shower with haze, altimeter check 30. 13.. . .It’s ILS 22L, also.’ At 1552:43, the controller transmitted, “All aircraft this frequency, we just went IFR with 2 miles very light rain showers and haze. The runway visual range is—not available, and Eastern 66 descend and maintain four thousand…” Eastern 66 acknowledged the transmission.

“Eastern 66 was one of a number of aircraft that were being vectored to intercept the ILS localizer course for runway 22L. At 1553:22, the flight contacted the Kennedy final vector controller, who continued to provide radar vectors around thunderstorms in the area, to sequence the flight with other traffic, and to position the flight on the localizer course. About 1557:21, the flightcrew discussed the problems associated with carrying minimum fuel loads when confronted
with delays in terminal areas. One of the crewmembers stated that he was going to check the weather at the alternate airport, which was LaGuardia Airport, Flushing, New York. Less than a minute later, one of the crewmembers remarked, “…one more hour and we’d come down whether we wanted to or not.” At 1559:19, the final vector controller transmitted a message to all aircraft on his frequency that “a severe wind shift” had been reported on the final approach and that he would report more information shortly.

“Eastern Air Lines Flight 902, a Lockheed 1011, had abandoned its approach to runway 22L at 1557:30. At 1559:40, Eastern 902 reestablished radio communications with the Kennedy final vector controller, and the flightcrew reported, “. . we had.. . a pretty good shear pulling us to the right and.. .down and visibility was nil, nil out over the marker.. . correction.. .at 200 feet it was.. . nothing.” The final vector controller responded, .”Okay, the shear you say pulled you right and down?” Eastern 902 replied, “Yeah, we were on course and down to about 250 feet. The airspeed dropped to about 10 kn below the bug and our rate of descent was up to 1,500 feet a minute, so we put takeoff power on and we went around at a hundred feet.”

“Eastern 902’s wind shear report to the final vector controller was recorded on Eastern 66’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR). While Eastern 902 was making this report, the captain of Eastern 66, at 1600:33, said, you know this is asinine.” An unidentified crewmember responded, “I wonder if they’re covering for themselves”

“The final vector controller asked Eastern 66 if they had heard Eastern 902’s report. Eastern 66 replied, ‘. . .affirmative, ‘ The controller then established the flight’s position as being 5 miles from the outer marker (OM) and cleared the flight for an ILS approach to runway 22L. Eastern 66 acknowledged the clearance at 1600:54.5, “Okay, we’ll let you know about the conditions.” At 1601:49. 5, the first officer, who was flying the aircraft. called for completion of the final checklist. While the final checklist items were being completed, the captain stated that the radar was, “Up and off.. . standby.” At 1602:20, the captain said, ‘.. . I have the radar on standby in case I need it, I can get it off later.”

“At 1602:42, the final vector controller asked Eastern 902, “. . .would you classify that as severe wind shift, correction, shear?” The flight responded, “Affirmative..”

“At 1602:50.5, the first officer of Eastern 66 said, “Gonna keep a pretty healthy margin on this one.” An unidentified crewmember said, “I.. .would suggest that you do.” The first officer responded, “In case he’s right..”

At 1602:58.7. Eastern 66 reported over the OM, and the final vector controller cleared the flight to contact the Kennedy tower. At 1603:12.4, the flight established communications with Kennedy tower local controller and reported that they were, “outer marker, inbound.” At 1603:44, the Kennedy tower local controller cleared Eastern 66 to land. The captain acknowledged the clearance and asked, “Got any reports on braking action. ..?” The local controller did not respond until the query was repeated. At 1604:14.1, the local controller replied, “No, none, approach end of runway is wet.. .but I’d say about the first half is wet–we’ve had no adverse reports.”….

“Both flight attendants who were seated in the aft portion of the passenger cabin, described Eastern 66’s approach as normal—there was little or no turbulence. According to one of the attendants, the aircraft rolled to the left, and she heard engine power increase significantly. The aircraft then rolled upright and rocked back and forth. She was thrown forward and then upright: several seconds later she saw the cabin emergency lights illuminate and oxygen masks drop from their retainers. Her next recollection was her escape from the wreckage.

“Witnesses near the middle marker (MM) for runway 22L saw the aircraft at a low altitude and in heavy rain. It first struck an approach light tower which was located about 1,200 feet southwest of the MM; it then struck several more towers, caught fire, and came to rest on Rockaway Boulevard. Initial impact was recorded on the CVK at 1605:11.4…”

“Five witnesses located along the localizer course, from about 1.6 miles from the threshold of runway 22L, to near the MM, described the weather conditions when Eastern 66 passed overhead as follows: heavy rain was falling and there was lightning and thunder; the wind was blowing hard from directions ranging from north through east….” (NTSB 1976, 1-4)

“Flying Tiger Line Flight 161, a DC-8, had preceded Eastern 902 on the approach and had landed on runway 22L about 1550:15. After clearing the runway, at 1557:30, the captain reported to the local controller: “I just highly recommend that you change the runways and land northwest, you have such a tremendous wind shear down near…the ground on final.” The local controller responded, ,”Okay, we’re indicating wind right down the runway at 15 kn when you landed.” At 1557:50, the captain of Flight 161 said, “I don’t care what you’re indicating; I’m just telling you that there’s such a wind shear on the final on that runway you should change it to the northwest.” The local controller did not respond. At 1557:55, he transmitted missed approach directions to Eastern 902 and-asked “…was wind a problem?” Eastern 902 answered, “Affirmative.”….” (NTSB 1976, 5)

“At 1526 the National Weather Service Forecast Office (NWS), located in midtown Manhattan, issued a strong wind warning which was valid from 1600 to 21000. The warning called for gusty surface winds to 50 kn from the west in thunderstorms in the New York City terminal area. The NWS distributed the warning to various facilities in the area, including the Kennedy control tower and approach control and Eastern Air Lines operations at the Kennedy Airport. There was no evidence that the warning was disseminated to flightcrews operating in the area.”

“About 8 minutes before the accident, the NWS weather radar located at Atlantic City, New Jersey, showed that an area of thunder-storm activity was centered along the northern edge of Kennedy Airport. The area was oriented west-northwest to east-southeast and was 30 to 35 miles long and about 15 miles wide. Several groups of thunderstorm cells in the area had tops which exceeded 50,000 feet. The tropopause was reported at 46,500 feet. About the time of the accident, the largest group of cells, moving east-southeast at a speed of 30 to 35 kn, merged with a smaller group of cells, moving east-northeast at a speed of about 20 to 25 kn; the cells merged over the approach course to runway 22L. There is no evidence that this information was available to either air traffic control (ATC) agencies or flightcrews who were operating in the
New York City terminal area.

“The NWS terminal forecast for Kennedy Airport, which was valid before Eastern 66 departed New Orleans, called for thunderstorms and moderate rain showers after 1800. The forecast was amended at 1430 to include thunderstorms and moderate rain showers after 1515. At 1545, the forecast was further amended to call for thunderstorms, heavy rain showers with visibilities as low as 1/2 mile, and winds from 270° at 30 kn with gusts to 50 kn after 1615. There was no evidence that the flightcrew of Eastern 66 received any of these forecasts.

“At the time of the accident, there was no SIGMET [Significant Meteorological Information] in effect for the New York City terminal area.” (NTSB 1976, 8)

“At 1604:52.6, the captain said, “I have approach lights,” and the first officer said. “Okay.” At 1604:54.7, the captain again said, “Stay on the gauges, ” and the first officer replied, “I’m with it.” N8845E then was passing through 400 feet, and its rate of descent increased from an average of about 675 feet per minute (fpm) to 1,500 fpm. The aircraft rapidly began to deviate below the glideslope, and 4 seconds later, the airspeed decreased from 138 kn to 123 kn in 2.5 seconds.

“N8845E continued to deviate further below the glideslope, and 1605:06.2, when the aircraft was at 150 feet, the captain said, “runway in sight.” Less than a second later, the first officer said, “I got it.” The captain replied, “got it? ” and a second later, at l605:10.2, an un-intelligible exclamation was recorded, and the first officer commanded, “Takeoff thrust.” The sound of impact was recorded at 1605:11.4.” (NTSB 1976,11)

“Most of the passengers died from severe multiple impact injuries. Some of them also suffered varying degrees of burns. Each of the surviving passengers sustained burns which varied from first to third degree over 30 to 70 percent of the body. Some of these passengers also received impact injuries and fractures.

“Fire erupted after the left wing failed and released fuel as the aircraft skidded through the approach light towers. There were numerous ignition sources–hot engine components, electrical wiring in the aircraft, the approach light system, and the street light system–and many friction sources. Destruction of the fuselage caused more fuel to be released, and the fire continued to burn after the aircraft came to rest.” (NTSB 1976,14)

“The fire department’s rapid response prevented fatal burns to the 9 passengers who ultimately survived; some were found lying in pools of fuel and fire-extinguisher foam.” (NTSB 1976,15)

“It is clear from surface weather reports, weather radar data, and witness and pilot statements that a large area of very strong thunder-storms accompanied by strong, variable, and gusty surface winds was moving rapidly along the northern perimeter of Kennedy Airport between 1540 and 1620. The storm area was moving east-southeasterly, and about 1550 it began to seriously affect safe approach operations to runway 22L. Although the weather along the final approach course to that runway deteriorated rapidly from about 1550 to the time of the accident, the approach paths to the northwest runways remained relatively unaffected by the storms. Significant clues (both visual and radar) were available to air traffic controllers and flightcrews alike to indicate the existence of these conditions on and near Kennedy Airport.” (NTSB 1976, 26)

“…the Safety Board concludes that had the thunderstorm activity been evaluated properly, it should have been apparent that the approach to runway 22L was unsafe and that approaches to that runway should have been discontinued. The Safety Board believes that ATC did not consider a runway change either before or after the Flying Tiger captain’s recommendation because a change of runways would have further increased traffic delays and would have increased the already heavy workload.

“When operating at capacity, the air traffic system in a high density terminal area tends to resist changes that disrupt or further delay the orderly flow of traffic. Delays have a compounding effect unless they can be absorbed at departure terminals or within the en route system. Consequently, controllers and pilots tend to keep the traffic moving. particularly the arrival traffic because delays involve the consumption of fuel and tardy or missed connections with other flights, which could lead to further complications. As weather conditions worsen, the system becomes even less flexible.” (NTSB 1976, 33)

“As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board has issued the following recommendations to the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration:

“1. Conduct a research program to define and classify the level of flight hazard of thunderstorms using specific criteria for the severity of a thunderstorm and the magnitude of change of the wind speed components … assured as a function of distance along an airplane‘s departure or approach flight track and establish operational limitations based upon there criteria.

“2. Expedite the program to develop and install equipment which would facilitate the detection and classification, by severity, of thunderstorms within 5 nmi of the departure of threshold ends of active runways at airports having precision instrument approaches.

“3. Install equipment capable of detecting variations in the speed of the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical components of the winds as they exist dong the projected takeoff and approach flightpaths within 1 nmi of the ends of active runways which serve air carrier aircraft.

“4. Require inclusion of the wind shear penetration capability of an airplane as an operational limitation in the airplane’s operations manual, and require that pilots apply this limitation as a criterion for the initiation of a takeoff from, or an approach to, an airport where equipment is available to measure the severity of a thunderstorm or the magnitude of change in wind velocity.

“5. As an interim action, install equipment capable of measuring and transmitting to tower operators the speed and direction of the surface wind in the immediate vicinity of all runway ends and install lighted windsocks near to the side of the runway, approximately 1,000 feet from the ends, at airports serving air carrier operations.

“6. Develop and institute procedures whereby approach controllers, tower controllers, and pilots are provided timely information regarding the existence of thunderstorm activity near to departure or approach flightpaths.

“7. Revise appropriate air traffic control procedures to specify that the location and severity of thunder-storms be considered in the criteria for selecting active runways.

“8. Modify or expand air traffic controller training programs to include information concerning the effect that winds produced by thunderstorms can have on an airplane’s flightpath control.

“9. Modify initial and recurrent pilot training programs and tests to require that pilots demonstrate their knowledge of the low-level wind conditions associated with mature thunderstorms and of the potential effects these winds might have on an airplane’s performance.

“10. Expedite the program to develop, in cooperation with appropriate Government agencies and industry, typical models of environmental winds associated with mature thunderstorms which can be used for demonstration purposes in pilot training simulators.

“11. Place greater emphasis on the hazards of low-level flight through thunderstorms and on the effects of wind shear encounter in the Accident Prevention Program for the benefit of genera? aviation pilots.

“12. Expedite the research to develop equipment and procedures which would permit a pilot to transition from instrument to visual references without degradation of vertical guidance during the final segment of an instrument approach.

“13. Expedite the research to develop an airborne detection device which will alert a pilot to the need for rapid corrective measures as an airplane encounters a wind shear condition.

“14. Expedite the development of a program leading to the production of accurate and timely forecasts of wind shear in the terminal area.”

(NTSB 1976, 40-42)

Darby: “Smith cites as an example of the prevailing attitude in aviation at the time, the accident involving Eastern Air Lines {EA} Flight 66 at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, in June 1975:

Reports to the JFK control tower from an aircraft awaiting takeoff that it was being buffeted by the storm’s high winds were disregarded by the air traffic controllers and, thus, not relayed to the aircraft on approach. Another airplane landing ahead of EA 66 barely avoided crashing. The flight crew of EA 66 know there was bad weather – it was visible on their on-board radar – but pressed on anyway. One hundred and twelve people were killed.

“The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined the probable cause to be [see NTSB report above]….

“But the probable cause was not the sort of adverse winds the NTSB had in mind, Smith says. [Meteorologist Ted] Fujita, called in to investigate the Flight 77 crash, ‘conducted a detailed study of the 11 aircraft that landed safely ahead of EA 66. He studied the weather, the radar and flight paths, and he talked with the surviving crews.’

“That led to a new and unorthodox theory, described in a 1977 paper by Fujita and Horace Byers, describing a previously unknown weather phenomenon they called a downburst – ‘a rapidly sinking column of air that originated in a thunderstorm and then spread out, and accelerated when it reached the ground,’ Smith says. ‘As the air spread out, it could reach speeds of 70 mph (113 kph) or more. A pilot flying through the sinking air, with its rapid change in wind speeds and directions, would be severely challenged to keep control of the plane.’

“Other meteorologists were unconvinced or expressed outright disbelief. No one had seen or recorded such a downburst. Fujita persevered in his research and identified ‘a smaller, more intense form of downburst he named a ‘microburst’. Yet even as Fujita’s body of evidence grew, many in both the meteorological and aviation communities remained deeply skeptical.’

“Smith himself, along with a companion in ‘storm chasing,’ helped provide additional evidence in the form of what he describes as ‘the first microburst ever photographed,’ near Wichita, Kansas… ‘Downbursts were further confirmed by Project NIMROD (Northern Illinois Meteorological Research on Downbursts), conducted in the Chicago area around O’Hare International Airport,’ Smith says.

“The Flight 66 accident helped motivate the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to begin installing the low level wind shear alert system (LLWAS) at U.S. airports.” (Darby. “Cracking the Microburst Code.” AeroSafety World, March 2011, p. 53.)

Wikipedia: “This accident lead to the development of the original low level windshear alert system by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration in 1976 that was installed at 110 FAA towered airports between 1977 and 1987.” (Wikipedia. “Eastern Air Lines Flight 66,” citing Meyer, Darin R. (1999-01-10). Study Of Network Expansion Llwas (Llwas-Ne)Fault Identification And System Warning Optimization Through Joint Use Of Llwas-Ne And Tdwr Data.)

Sources

Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). New York. Accessed 3-9-2009 at: http://www.baaa-acro.com/Pays/Etats-Unis/New%20York.htm

Darby, Rick. “Cracking the Microburst Code – Meteorology Confronts a Mysterious Threat to Flight Safety.” AeroSafety World, March 2011, pp. 52-54.

Emergency-Management.net. “Airplane Accidents 1969-1979.” Accessed at: http://www.emergency-management.net/avi_acc_1969_1979.htm

History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, June 24, 1975. “Eastern Flight 66 Crashes at J.F.K.” Accessed 12-7-2008 at: http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=tdihArticleCategory&displayDate=06/24&categoryId=disaster

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. Boeing 727-225, N8845E, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, June 24, 1975. Washington, DC: NTSB, 3-12-1976. Accessed 4-9-2020 at: http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR76-08.pdf

NYCdata. Disasters, New York City (NYC). “Eastern Airlines Flight 66 Crash – 1975. Accessed 4-9-2020 at: https://www.baruch.cuny.edu/nycdata/disasters/aircrafts-eastern_1975.html

Wikipedia. “Eastern Air Lines Flight 66.” Accessed 10-31-2009 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Air_Lines_Flight_66