1977 — Feb 4, CTA elevated L trains collide; 4 cars fall onto street below, Chicago, IL– 11

— 12 Axelrod. “180 Are Injured as 4 Cars Plunge to Crowded Street,” Chicago Trib., 2-5-1977.
— 11 Breen. “Worst ‘L’ Crash in CTA History Happened 39 Years Ago Thursday.” 2-6-2016.
— 11 Chicago Civil Defense/E.P.D.S. Brief History of the Chicago Fire Department.
— 11 Chicago “L”.org. “The Loop Crash, February 4, 1977.”
— 11 Hazucha, A. “Chicago on the Brink: Media Trauma and the 1977 L-Train Crash.” p. 251.
— 11 NTSB. RAR. Rear End Collision of Two Chicago Transit Authority Trains…Feb. 4, 1977. 1977, 1.
— 11 Rogers. “‘This Can’t Be Real’: 40 Years Later, Passenger…” NBCchicago5, 2-3-2017.
— 11 Wikipedia. “1977 Chicago Loop Derailment.”
— 11 Wikipedia. “List of Rail Accidents (1950-1999).”

Narrative Information

Chicago “L”.org: February 4, 1977. “On this particular day, switching problems had caused Evanston Express trains to operate counterclockwise around the outer loop track instead of clockwise on the inner, as normal. The problem was corrected at approximately 5:10 pm, but a few Evanston trains that had already begun their trip around the Loop were continuing to operate on the outer track. As can be imagined, the extra trains on the outer track caused some minor delays.

“At approximately 5:25 pm, one such Evanston Express was loading and unloading passengers at the State/Lake station. A Ravenswood train was following and had stopped on the track behind the Evanston Express, waiting for the Evanston to clear the station so that it could pull in. At the same time, an Oak Park-bound Lake-Dan Ryan train was boarding and alighting riders at the Randolph/Wabash station, two blocks away and around the bend from State/Lake.

“The motorman of the Lake-Dan Ryan – one Stephan A. Martin, age 34, a motorman since 1969 – completed his station duties and pulled his train out of Randolph/Wabash. Somehow, it escaped his attention that there was a train stopped on the tracks ahead, although this information was being relayed to him both visually and audibly by the new automatic cab signaling system installed in his motor cab. He proceeded against the restrictive signal at a speed of less than 15 mph (thus staying under signal control), around the Lake & Wabash curve, into collision with the stopped Ravenswood train at 5:27 pm.

“Making matters worse, Martin continued to apply motor power, even after the collision! The 8-car Lake-Dan Ryan, with 2,500 kw of power behind it, pushed against the immovable Ravenswood train. This application of power, coupled with the fact that the train was on a 100 ft. radius elevated curve, caused the tubular coupling bar between the first and second cars to buckle, pushing the rear of the first car and the front of the second into the air. The first three cars were lifted sufficiently upwards and outwards that they jackknifed and crashed to the street below, the fourth car (still coupled to the rest of the train) hanging precariously between the elevated structure and the street below. The last four cars stayed on the tracks, still berthed at the Randolph/Wabash station platform….

“Ambulances and police rushed to the scene in minutes, the ambulances lining up on Lake Street waiting to move the dead and injured. Fire Commissioner Robert Quinn called an immediate extra alarm to hurry needed man power to the intersection, which was blocked by the wreckage. Police and firemen worked for two hours to free persons trapped in the wreckage, chopping holes in the tops of the elevated cars to extricate victims.

“Some people were treated on the street before being loaded into ambulances. Others were taken into nearby stores and restaurants, which were turned into makeshift infirmaries. Joining the city departments already at the scene were Mayor Michael Bilandic and Cardinal Cody, who, along with other priests, administered last rites to some of the victims.

“In all, eleven persons were killed (though the newspapers mistakenly reported twelve, initially) and 180 were injured in what has been the worst “L” accident to date.

“Through the cooperation of several agencies, the site was completely cleared of all wreckage and debris in about twelve hours and normal operations were restored by 6:30am the next morning.

“The cars involved in the accident were impounded at the Skokie Shops yard, pending investigation of the crash. The first four cars, 2000-series unit 2043-2044 and 2200-series unit 2289-2290, were so badly damaged that they were removed from service and eventually scrapped. The rest of the cars were repairable and were eventually returned to service.

“Stephan Martin, the Lake-Dan Ryan motorman, had a poor safety record including such things as a prior derailment and several violations for reading while in motion. He had four marijuana cigarettes in his shoulder bag, and drug tests showed he had used marijuana, but not other drugs or alcohol. His conductor, who had eaten lunch with him, testified they had not smoked marijuana during lunch.

“Martin was ultimately held responsible, though the report from the National Transportation Safety Board did not address the issue of how the accident could have occurred if the cab signal was giving a restrictive indication. Some CTA officials felt the accident could have occurred if Martin had remained at a slow enough speed to override the automatic signal, then quickly applied power when pushing against the immovable Ravenswood train. (The way the cab signals originally worked, a motorman had a couple seconds to slow down or stop — depending on the situation — when he received a restrictive signal or the train’s breaks would automatically engage. But, on occasion, the cab signal system would receive ‘ghost signals,’ an indication that there was a train ahead when there really wasn’t. So, if this was the case, a motorman could proceed ‘on-sight’ at under 15 mph against a restrictive signal as long as he makes a full stop first.)

“The popular theory of what happened goes like so: the motorman, while approaching the Randolph/Wabash station, got a restrictive signal indication and the alarm in his cab went off. But, making the normal station stop, he inadvertently overrode the signal, which allowed him to proceed. He left the station and proceeded under 15 mph, which prevented the automatic braking from engaging. What happened next is open to speculation. Some say that Martin, who was known to talk to passengers (especially female ones) while motoring, was doing just that while approaching the Ravenswood train ahead and didn’t see the impending collision. When his train struck the stopped Ravenswood, it is believed that he either panicked and accidentally applied more power instead of braking or that the sheer force of the impact threw him forward and, as a result of his hand being on the Cineston controller, threw the control forward as well.

“These exact details cannot and perhaps will never be 100% confirmed. But, as a result of this accident, motorman can no longer proceed on their own ‘on-sight’ against a red signal. A new rule, Rule 6.4, was put in the CTA rule book. This regulation says that when a motorman receives a false red signal, he must call the Control Center to get permission to proceed. A light in the cab labeled ‘R6.4’ lights up and only on permission from control can he proceed at under 15 mph against the signal. This situation is often referred to as “getting an ‘R6.4’.”

“Such an accident is unusual for a number of reasons, but especially for how such a complicated automatic signal system was unable to prevent the occurrence. It also stressed that any signal system, no matter how complex, cannot prevent every circumstance and reasserted the importance of proper and thorough training. Thus, this type of incident is unlikely to be repeated any time in the future…” (Chicago “L”.org. “The Loop Crash, February 4, 1977.”)

Hazucha on the collision and derailment: “….It was now 5:29 P.M., the height of Chicago’s rush hour. For reasons never determined, at that moment an eight-car- Lake-Dan Ryan train rounded the northeast corner of the Loop at roughly six miles per hour and rammed into the rear end of the Ravenswood train. The first four cars of the Lake-Dan Ryan train, each filled to standing-room capacity with between and seventy-five commuters, slowly began to sway, and an instant later they heaved and slipped the tracks, toppling to the street twenty feet below. Two of the cars landed on their sides near the intersection of Wabash and Lake; the other two hung at an angle from the tracks, each with one end still on the elevated platform and the other end resting on the pavement at street level. During the ensuing terror and confusion – 266 people were injured and 11 were killed, among whom were two pedestrians crushed by the falling cars….” (p. 251.)

NTSB Synopsis: “About 5:27 p.m., c.s.t., on February 4, 1977, Chicago Transit Authority Lake-Dan Ryan train No. 930 struck the rear of Ravenswood train No. 415, which was standing on the elevated rail structure at the intersection of Wabash Avenue and Lake Street. The four lead cars of the eight-car Lake-Dan Ryan train overturned and fell from the elevated structure to the street. One end of each of the two rear cars of the Ravenswood train derailed. Eleven persons were killed and 266 persons were injured. Property damage was estimated to be $1.2 million.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the motorman to exercise due care in meeting his responsibilities and the unauthorized operation of the Lake-Dan Ryan train into a signal block occupied by the standing Ravenswood train, at a speed that was too fast to stop after the operator sighted the standing train.” (p. 1.)

NTSB Investigation (section), The Accident: “….The motorman [of the offending train] saw the Ravenswood train ahead with its lighted marker lights. Following his usual procedure, the motorman operated his train so that it was one station behind the Ravenswood train. He said that he saw the Ravenswood train with it left the Randolph Street Station and passed through the curce at Wabash Avenue and Lake Street.

“According to the motorman’s testimony, ‘When I stopped at Randolph, I did not see the train prior to my stopping at Randolph and Wabash. I thought he was in State and Lake because I felt assured that he had already cleared the curve because I did not see him in the curve.’ He also know from experience that a Ravenswood train would be diverted to another route at Tower 18 and that it would no longer be of concern to him.

“When the Lake-Dan Ryan train entered the Randolph Street Station, just south of the curve, the cab signal aspect should have changed from a ‘yellow 35’ to a ‘yellow 15’ which would have allowed a maximum speed of 15 mph. However, when the train passed the four-car mark on the [end, p2, continues p.4. after illustration] platform, the motorman said that the cab signal changed directly from a ‘yellow 35’ to a flashing red aspect and that he did not hear an audible overspeed alarm. He continued moving into the station and stopped the train at the eight-car mark.

“When the conductor signalled him to proceed, the motorman applied minimum power and moved out of the station with the cab signal displaying a flashing red aspect; he did not receive authorization to proceed from CTA central control. He stated later that he believed that he was not required to obtain permission to move on the flashing red cab signal because there were other locations on the CTA system where a train could be operated on a flashing red cab signal without first having to obtain permission. He also cited a CTA training brochure on ‘Cab Control Signalling’ which does not state that operators must obtain permission to move on a flashing red cab signal as giving him authority to move…According to his testimony, he believed that flashing red cab signal aspect was the best proceed signal that he could obtain because he said that it was the only signal he had ever received at Wabash Avenue and Lake Street. He also stated that he did not know of a ‘yellow 15’ cab signal aspect, but that he was familiar with a ‘yellow 25’ aspect. A ‘yellow 25’ cab signal aspect is not used on the West-South Line.

“When the Lake-Dan Ryan train entered the offset curve…to the right at a speed of about 10 mph, the motorman moved the cinestom to the coast position. This is a normal operating procedure. He was standing at the car controls, as CTA operating rules required. When the train entered the curve to the left, the motorman saw the rear car of the standing Ravenswood train. He claimed that this was his first view of the train since before he entered the Randolph Street Station. He also said that his view from within the operating compartment was obstructed by the windshield wiper motor, the door at his left, and the train-phone equipment. He further stated that he could not have seen the rear of the Ravenswood train from his location in the cab before he entered the curve, because the train was hidden from his view by a building in the southwest corner of the intersection…When he sighted the train, he testified that he immediately applied the maximum service brakes; he claimed they were not effective, however. He then applied the emergency brakes. He said he heard the magnetic track brakes drop but that the train still did not seem to slow, and it struck the Ravenswood train at 7 to 9.5 mph…” [end of p. 4]

NTSB “Crew Information” section: “The motorman’s operating record contained several rule violations, such as not being on train at scheduled time; improperly displaying the front marker lights; not securing safety chains; improper use of emergency brakes; rough stops; wearing an improper uniform; reading while train was in motion; and failing to stand in cab at required locations. In two instances he operated past a stop signal; the train derailed in one case. He had been reinstructed in operating rules several times and he had been suspended from duty at times because of rule violations. One accident was attributed to him. His record contains at least one commendation for alertness and his work record had shown some improvement during 1975. The motorman indicated that he had rested well the night before the accident, and that he was not under any emotional or mental stress at the time….” [p.9.]

NTSB Analysis section: “….From some point between Tower 12 and Randolph Street Station, he [motorman of the Lake-Dan Ryan train] saw the lead cars of the Ravenswood train as it began to round the curve at Wabash and Lake. He testified that he knew that the train would be diverted at Tower 18 and that it would no longer be a concern for him. However, he failed to observe that the train stopped before clearing the curve. The train was standing where it was visible from the Randolph Street Station, even though he testified that, ‘When I stopped at Randolph, I did not see the train prior to my stopping at Randolph and Wabash. I though he was in State and Lake because I felt assured that he had already cleared the curve because I did not see him in the curve.’ The test train run reenacting the events leading up to the accident could only lead the participants to the conclusion that the motorman of the Lake-Dan Ryan train should have seen the Ravenswood train. Since he did not see the train until just before the collision, he obviously was not fully alert to the conditions ahead. He stated it was his belief that the train ahead was gone. This belief may have been strengthened by his receiving proper cab signal aspects for a clear track condition on his entry into Randolph Street Station….

“The stopping test made with a train consist similar to that of the Lake-Dan Ryan train indicates that even if the motorman had not sighted the standing train until after he left the Randolph Street Station and had accelerated up to 15 mph, his train could have been stopped short of the collision point….” [pp. 15-16]

“A dynamics analysis based on the fact that the lake-Dan Ryan moved the standing Ravenswood train forward 25 feet when they collided indicates that the Lake-Dan Ryan train was moving at 9.5 mph into the curve. The resulting potential energy and the location of the cars in a sharp curve led to jackknifing between cars. The dynamic forces reacted greatest between the first and second cars, since their coupling was in the sharpest portion of the curve. When these cars began to jackknife because of the forward force from the rear, they began to fall over the side of the elevated structure. The second car apparently pulled the first car backward causing it to fall; while it was being pushed by the third car, the second car forced the third car to the right. The third car pulled the fourth car off the structure and the fifth car apparently was being pulled off by the fourth car when it was stopped by the station platform….” [p. 18.]

“The motorman said that he operated the train around the Wabash and Lake curve in a normal manner. It is unlikely that an eight-car train that entered the curve at from 8 to 10 mph could coast completely through the curve. Therefore, it is logical to assume that at some point, propulsion power was reapplied to maintain the train’s speed. If power was being applied at the time of the impact, it more readily explains the heavy electrical arc that was reported. It also would account more readily for the reaction of the cars following the collision. It is possible that the motorman could have inadvertently applied power instead of the brakes when he first saw the Ravenswood train, or he may have struck the cineston with his body when the trains collided….” [p. 19]

Wikipedia: “February 4, 1977 – Chicago Loop derailment Chicago, Illinois, United States: In the worst accident in the system’s history, a Chicago Transit Authority elevated train motorman disregards cab signals and rear ends another train on the Loop curve at Wabash and Lake Streets during the evening rush hour. Eleven people are killed and over 180 injured as four cars of the rear train derail and fall to the street below. The motorman was discovered to have marijuana in his possession, although it was never determined if he was impaired in any way.” (Wikipedia. “List of Rail Accidents (1950-1999).”

Hazucha on reactions: “”The editorials that appeared in the newspapers in the wake of the disaster were on balance quite unforgiving in their criticisms of the CTA and its operations. Noting that the L’s ‘fail-safe’ cab signaling system did not prevent the crash, the Sun-Times bluntly declared ‘It should be modified to prevent Titanic-like failures.’ Arguing that elevated trains represent an outdated and unsafe technology, the editorial concluded, ‘the day of trains above Loop trees should be over. We can’t think of a better time to begin the transition to a Loop subway system.’ Five days later the Sun-Times reiterated its appeal that CTA build a Loop subway, pointing out that CTA leaders ‘spent $25 million for a ‘fail-safe’ system that was supposed to guarantee that such crashes couldn’t happen.’ The L disaster, said the Sun-Times, ‘is a reminder to all CTA employees that their own lives and others are in their hands.” A third editorial appearing more than a month later criticized the CA for failing to train its motormen properly in the safe operation of elevated trains. Citing the National Transportation Safety Board’s report that gave CTA employees a failing grade for ‘confusion and a lack of understanding of operating rules and of the cab signal indications,’ the Sun-Times argued that CTA official ‘may have been too quick…to put sole blame on one man.” (p. 261.)

Breen or Aftermath: “….’The transit authority installed barrier girders on the four sharpest curves of the rail system; retrained train operators cited for moving violations; and began requiring its train operators to get permission from the control center before proceeding past a red signal ‘on sight,’…‘Also, the CTA conducted a fairly large safety study.’” (Breen, Justin. “Worst ‘L’ Crash in CTA History Happened 39 Years Ago Thursday.” DNAinfo.com, 2-6-2016.)

Newspaper

Axelrod and Enstad: “….The dead and injured included pedestrians who were crushed beneath cars that slammed to the pavement at Lake Street and Wabash Avenue. ‘I saw a couple of people who were underneath the car trying to run, but they didn’t make it,’ said Renel Conner, 25, an attendant at a nearby parking garage….

“Police and fire units worked for two hours to free persons trapped in the wreckage, chopping holes in the tops of the elevated cars to extricate victims. Edward Nelson, 2d battalion fire chief said several of the dead were pedestrians. ‘The first victims we saw were sisters who were thrown out of the train and onto the street,’ said Thomas Drish, Nelson’s driver. ‘One was dead and the other had back, leg and arm injuries and was too shocked to say anything’.” (Axelrod and Enstad. “180 Are Injured as 4 Cars Plunge to Crowded Street,” Chicago Tribune, Feb 5, 1977.)

Sources

Axelrod, David and Robert Enstad. “180 Are Injured as 4 Cars Plunge to Crowded Street,” Chicago Tribune, Feb 5, 1977. Accessed 9-29-2021 at: http://www.chicago-l.org/articles/1977crash1.html

Breen, Justin. “Worst ‘L’ Crash in CTA History Happened 39 Years Ago Thursday.” DNAinfo.com, 2-6-2016. Accessed 9-30-2021 at: https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20160204/downtown/worst-l-crash-cta-history-happened-39-years-ago-thursday-video/

Chicago Civil Defense/E.P.D.S. Brief History of the Chicago Fire Department. Accessed 5-7-2009 at: http://www.chicagocivildefense.org/historyofthecfd.html

Chicago “L”.org. “The Loop Crash, February 4, 1977.” Accessed 1-8-2010 at:
http://www.chicago-l.org/mishaps/loop.html

Hazucha, Andrew. “Chicago on the Brink: Media Trauma and the 1977 L-Train Crash.” Chapter 9, pp. 247-276 in: Biel, Steven (Ed.). American Disasters. New York: New York University Press, 2001.

National Transportation Safety Board. Railroad Accident Report. Rear End Collision of Two Chicago Transit Authority Trains, Chicago Illinois, February 4, 1977 (Report Number: NTSB-RAR-77-10). Washington, DC: NTSB, 11-29-1977, 37 pages. Accessed 9-30-2021 at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR7710.pdf

Rogers, Phil. “‘This Can’t Be Real’: 40 Years Later, Passenger Recalls Deadly CTA Derailment of ’77.” NBCchicago5, 2-3-2017. Accessed 9-29-2021 at:

‘This Can’t Be Real’: 40 Years Later, Passenger Recalls Deadly CTA Derailment of ’77

Wikipedia. “1977 Chicago Loop Derailment.” Accessed 9-29-2021 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977_Chicago_Loop_derailment

Wikipedia. “List of Rail Accidents (1950-1999).” Accessed 7-18-2018 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_1950-1999_rail_accidents