1977 — May 28, Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire, Southgate, Kentucky — 165
— 165 Cincinnati Enquirer. “The Beverly Hills Fire – The Fire That Still Rages.” 5-28-1997.
— 165 New York Times. “The Century’s Worst Fires.” 3-26-1990.
— 165 Greenpeace. PVC Fires List. June 1994.
— 165 National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996.
— 165 National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 137.
— 165 NFPA. U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State. December 2008, p. 23.
— 165 OJP DOJ. Community Crisis Response Team Training Manual: 2nd Ed. (Appendix D).
— 165 Robinson. “The Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire, 1977.” NFPA Journal, May/June 2011.
— 165 Swartz, J. A. “Human Behavior in the Beverly Hills Fire.” Fire Journal, May 1979, p. 73.
— 164 Best, Richard L. “Tragedy in Kentucky.” Fire Journal, Jan 1978, p. 19.
— 164 NFPA. Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire, Southgate, KY, May 28, 1977. Fire Investigations.
— 164 National Fire Sprinkler Association. F.Y.I. 1999, 7.
Narrative Information
Best: “….On Saturday, May 28, 1977, a disastrous fire occurred at the Beverly Hills Supper Club in Southgate, Kentucky, that claimed the lives of 164 patrons and employees, and injured some 70 other people. This fire was the worst multiple-death building fire in the United States since the Cocoanut Grove night club burned in Boston, Massachusetts, on November 28, 1942, taking 492 lives.
“The Beverly Hills Supper Club, classified according to the NFPA Life Safety Code, NFPA 101, as a place of assembly, was a sprawling, mostly one-story restaurant and night club that covered an area of about 1½ acres. A small part of the building was two stories high, and there was a basement under approximately half of the complex. The original two-story portion was constructed in 1937 and additions were added at various times; a major rebuilding…took place following a fire in 1970. There were no deaths in that 1970 fire.
“The building was basically of unprotected, noncombustible construction and did not have automatic sprinkler protection or a fire detection and alarm system. The Club was occupied by about 2,400 to 2,800 people on the night of the fire, with approximately 1,200 to 1,300 people attending a show in the Cabaret Room, a large showroom that featured well-known entertainers. Nearly all of those who died had been in the Cabaret Room when the fire broke out.
“The fire originated in the Zebra Room, a small, unoccupied function room on the opposite end of the Club from the Cabaret Room, and burned for a considerable time before it was discovered. The probable cause was determined to be electrical in nature; combustible material in a concealed space in the ceiling of the Zebra Room was the first material ignited. When the fire was discovered, the Beverly Hills Supper Club staff unsuccessfully attempted to fight the fire before notifying the fire department or alerting occupants to leave the building. Most of the patrons were evacuated with the assistance of employees. However, by the time the Cabaret Room occupants were made aware of the fire emergency, they did not have adequate time to escape. Even if they had been notified sooner, there was not sufficient egress capacity provided for occupants to escape. Many were overcome by fire gases and smoke.
“Following the fire, an examination and analysis of the facts revealed many facility and operational deviations from national consensus fire codes and standards…. (p. 19)
(Best, Richard L. “Tragedy in Kentucky.” Fire Journal, Jan 1978, pp. 18-22, 27-35.)
Cincinnati Enquirer, May 28, 1997: “Beverly Hills Supper Club, which touted itself as the Showplace of the Nation, captured attention the night of May 28, 1977, as fire destroyed it and eventually killed 165 people. It has been 20 years since that dreadful night, but for many, the memories are as bright as the flames.
“The fire at the Beverly Hills Supper Club was a night of horror and heroism, of unspeakable carnage and unshakeable courage. Whether or not you witnessed the blaze, which eventually killed 165 people, your life was affected by it.
“The revolution in class action litigation, the exposure of the dangers of certain kinds of construction materials and the revision of building and fire codes have reached every community in America.
“For those who were touched by the horror, memories of the fire at the Northern Kentucky club on May 28, 1977, torments like an unfinished novel. It may be the absence of criminal charges against those responsible for the causes of the fire. It may be lack of a permanent memorial to the victims. And it may be the painful realization that the passage of years, population growth in the Tristate and fresher, bigger national tragedies will inevitably blur the memory of that red-eyed, red-skied night….” (Cincinnati Enquirer, May 28, 1997)
“The Beverly Hills Supper Club was a mecca for high-roller gamblers and a stage for well-known performers. It had all the glitz and glamour that would one day define the Las Vegas Strip…. Celebrities such as Frank Sinatra and Dean Martin were visitors to Beverly Hills in the 1950s….” (Cincinnati Enquirer, May 28, 1997)
“Sept. 16, 1977: Gov. Julian Carroll’s special task force files a report calling the Beverly Hills building ”an electrician’s nightmare” and concludes that ”the only participants in the tragedy who were clearly ignorant of the latent danger hidden behind walls and within concealed spaces were the patron-victim.” Structural problems, the report said, included substandard wiring, flammable building materials and a shortage of exits. It said that ”many of these code violations were known by the insurer, the operators and owners, and were noted as concerns as a matter of record in the fire marshal’s office.” Other problems it identified included ”gross overcrowding” and ”myopic” inspection efforts. The task force found it ”baffling” how the state fire marshal’s staff failed to communicate adequately with the state Insurance Services Office that repeatedly inspected Beverly Hills during the 1970s and reported fire hazards….
“Aug. 2, 1978: The grand jury concludes that neither criminal negligence nor structural problems were responsible for the deaths. The jury report blames the victims’ ”panic” and notes that Cabaret Room patrons, ”even though notified to evacuate, failed to react and remained seated until the conditions of the room itself indicated the need to exit. By this time in some instances it was too late.” (Chronology, Cincinnati Enquirer, May 28, 1997)
Greenpeace: “The Beverley Hills Supper Club was a large multi-function entertainment center in the northern Kentucky near Cincinnati. The night of the fire over 2000 patrons were in the Cabaret Room. There was approximately 6000 feet of PVC insulated wiring in the plenum of the Cabaret Room alone. The fire was initially fueled by the PVC wiring….
“Although the fire was discovered in the Zebra Room about 8:40-8:45 p.m., it had been building in the wall undiscovered for about one-two hours. By this time, the process of thermal decomposition, which is the initial stage of a PVC fire, had already spread through the wiring to the Cabaret Room.
“The reservationist of the Supper Club noticed white-to-gray wispy smoke whirling down from the ceiling of the Zebra Room. When she entered the room, it wound around her head, and she stumbled out of the room immediately. Her eyes were so irritated and watery that she could not see, and her nasopharyngeal area burned and filled with fluid. Her fingernail polish reacted with the smoke and her fingernails were eaten through. She developed second-degree burns wherever the wispy grey-white smoke touched her….
“Between the time the fire was discovered and the time it was announced in the Cabaret Room, the hall between the Cabaret Room and the Zebra Room was used by employees and patrons for exiting. No flame was openly spreading via the wall surfaces in that hall. The white and grey-white smoke resulted from processes hidden in the ceilings. The one surviving lighting technician who saw the Cabaret plenum from his box described the grey-white smoke in the plenum turning dense and black. No flames were visible until very late in this change, nor was wood or another structural building material burning visibly.
“With the announcement, the patrons began to exit rapidly and in an orderly fashion, but a dense black cloud of smoke descended within three minutes on those remaining in the room. Those who came in contact with it fell to the floor. Those near one of the exits were again assaulted by the smoke because the air conditioner blew recirculated air from the Cabaret Room directly into the little exit hall. As soon as the black smoke descended, the patrons still in the Cabaret Room began to scream, which brought the patrons and employees who had already exited around to the outside of the Cabaret Room where they began dragging people out of the exitways and out of a hole punched in one of the walls.
“After the Fire Department had been on the scene several minutes, the fire fighters were directed to the rear of the Club outside the Cabaret Room and joined rescue operations. By this time, the smoke had dissipated and rescuers could actually enter the room to drag bodies out. The great majority were dead already, although very little material in the room was visibly burning, and rescuers could actually drag bodies out for a long time after the killing smoke had descended. Often the same pile of bodies contained both dead victims and an unconscious survivor. After this interval, flames did reach the Cabaret Room which later experienced vast explosions of combustible gases.
“A total of 161 people died that night without any direct involvement with the flame and long before carbon monoxide had reached a concentration which affected the rescuers most of whom wore no respiratory masks. Some of the nonrespiratory symptoms are noteworthy. Three of the four autopsies revealed kidney damage, one of which was identified as nephrocalcinosis, a common result of acidosis. Four survivors died within two weeks and nine months primarily from severe respiratory impairments: bronchopneumonia, tracheobronchitis, and, in one case, bronchitis obliterans, pulmonary emphysema, pulmonary vasulitis, and pulmonary edema. The four delayed deaths brought the total to 165….” (Greenpeace. PVC Fires List. June 1994; cites Journal of Combustion Toxicology.)
Robinson: “Despite the confusion of the moment, there was no chaos, a waitress said later, “no screaming, no panicking.” Not until the patrons of the club saw the smoke, that is. “It just rolled into the room,” she said. “It was the blackest smoke I’d ever seen.”….
“The patrons in the Cabaret Room didn’t learn of the fire until 9:06, when a busboy interrupted the opening act and told the guests to leave the building through the exits he indicated. As a survivor noted, however, the warning “just didn’t register with people,” many of whom were slow to react. About four minutes later, smoke and flames filled the room, killing those who had not yet left. Nearly all of those who died were in the Cabaret Room when the fire broke out.
“Among the factors contributing to the large number of casualties were delays in discovering the fire and notifying patrons to evacuate, the club employees’ lack of emergency training, the lack of fire detection and suppression systems, overcrowding, and the lack of adequate exits.
“As of 2007, the site of the Beverly Hills Supper Club remained vacant, a stark reminder of one of the deadliest nightclub fires in U.S. history.” (Robinson, Kathleen. “Slow to React. The Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire, 1977.” NFPA Journal, May/June 2011.)
Swartz: “Two years ago this month – on May 28, 1977 – a fire ripped through the Beverly Hills Supper Club in Southgate, Kentucky, eventually killing 165 people.
“After the fire, the Kentucky State Police interviewed 630 survivors to determine, among other things, how people in the Club acted after being told of the fire. In addition, the State Police mailed a 22-item questionnaire to a large number of other individuals to find out about occurrences on the night of the fire. Of the questionnaires mailed out, 1,117 were returned to the State Police. The interviews, which were taped, and the completed questionnaires formed the basic data source for an NFPA analysis of human behavior during the Beverly Hills fire….
“Staff and patrons alike underestimated the severity of the emergency in almost every case, right up until the last seconds, or even until they were outside the building and looked back at the fire…. (p. 73)
“What Was Learned of Importance?
“It is my belief that this fire has taught us many things beyond the fact that one must build and maintain public places of assembly in accordance with existing building and fire safety codes. Principal among these, I would put the following:
(1) Fire reports or other accounts of fires should delete the term ‘panic’ and report
factually what happened or what people said.
(2) Fire safety plans for places of public assembly should examine the roles that people
normally play, and not seek to prescribe emergency actions that are contrary to these
roles.
(3) The impact of ‘role assumption’ on expected fire emergency conduct should be
examined.
(4) Fire safety education should consider and be based upon people’s erroneous
conceptions about distance being related to safety, and the time needed to escape
from a fire emergency.” (p. 108)
(Swartz, Joseph A. “Human Behavior in the Beverly Hills Fire.” Fire Journal, May 1979, pp. 73-74 and 108.)
Sources
Best, Richard L. “Tragedy in Kentucky.” Fire Journal, Jan 1978, pp. 18-22, 27-35. Accessed 5-29-2015 at: http://www.nfpa.org/newsandpublications/nfpa-journal/2011/july-august-2011/news-and-analysis/looking-back
Cincinnati Enquirer. “The Beverly Hills Fire — The Fire That Still Rages,” 5-28-1997. Accessed at: http://www.enquirer.com/beverlyhills/index2.html
Greenpeace. PVC Fires List. June 1994. Accessed at: http://archive.greenpeace.org/toxics/reports/gopher-reports/pvcfires.txt
National Fire Protection Association. Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire, Southgate, KY, May 28, 1977. Fire Investigations. Batterymarch Park, MA: NFPA, no date. Accessed 5-29-2015 at: http://www.nfpa.org/newsandpublications/nfpa-journal/2011/july-august-2011/news-and-analysis/looking-back
National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996, 2010. Accessed at: http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1
National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.
National Fire Protection Association (John Hall, Jr.). U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 31 pages, December 2008.
National Fire Sprinkler Association, Inc. F.Y.I. – Fire Sprinkler Facts. Patterson, NY: NFSA, November 1999, 8 pages. Accessed at: http://www.firemarshals.org/data/File/docs/College%20Dorm/Administrators/F1%20-%20FIRE%20SPRINKLER%20FACTS.pdf
New York Times. “The Century’s Worst Fires.” 3-26-1990. Accessed at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE2D9113CF935A15750C0A966958260&n=Top%2FReference%2FTimes%20Topics%2FSubjects%2FF%2FFires%20and%20Firefighters
Office of Justice Programs, United States Department of Justice. Community Crisis Response Team Training Manual: Second Edition (Appendix D: Catastrophes Used as Reference Points in Training Curricula). Washington, DC: OJP, U.S. Department of Justice. Accessed at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/crt/pdftxt/appendd.txt
Robinson, Kathleen. “Slow to React. The Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire, 1977.” NFPA Journal, May/June 2011. Accessed 5-29-2015 at: http://www.nfpa.org/newsandpublications/nfpa-journal/2011/july-august-2011/news-and-analysis/looking-back
Swartz, Joseph A. “Human Behavior in the Beverly Hills Fire.” Fire Journal, May 1979, pp. 73-74 and 108. Accessed 5-29-2015 at: http://www.nfpa.org/newsandpublications/nfpa-journal/2011/july-august-2011/news-and-analysis/looking-back