–17 AP. “Three Marylanders die in air crash in Maine.” The Post, Frederick, MD, 6-1-1979, A3

–17 NTSB AAR. Downeast Airlines, Inc. …Rockland, Maine, May 30, 1979. 1980, Abstract.

— 7 Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJFM&P, 3/1, March 1982.[1]

Narrative Information

NTSB Abstract: “About 2055 e.d.t., on May 30, 1979, Downeast Airlines, Inc., Flight 46 crashed into a heavily wooded area about 1.2 mi south-southwest of the Knox County Regional Airport, Rockland, Maine. He crash occurred during a nonprecision instrument approach to runway 3 in instrument meteorological conditions. Of the 16 passengers and 2 crewmembers aboard, only 1 passenger survived the accident. The aircraft was destroyed.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the flightcrew to arrest the aircraft’s descent at the minimum descent altitude for the nonprecision approach, without the runway environment in sight, for unknown reasons.

“Although the Safety Board was unable to determine conclusively the reason(s) for the flightcrew’s deviation from standard instrument approach procedures, it is believed that inordinate management pressures, the first officer’s marginal instrument proficiency, the captain’s inadequate supervision of the flight, inadequate crew training and procedures, and the captain’s chronic fatigue were all factors in the accident.” [p. i] ….

NTSB Factual Information

“1.1 History of the Flight. On May 30, 1979, Downeast Airlines, Inc., Flight 46, a DeHavilland DHC-6-200 (N68DE), was a scheduled flight from Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, to Knox County Regional Airport, Rockland, Maine. The flight was scheduled to depart Boston at 1850; however, because of adverse weather encountered en route by Flight 45, the earlier flight from Rockland to Boston, Flight 46’s departure from Boston was delayed. Both flights were flown by the same flightcrew. [end of p. 1]

“1.5 Personnel Information. Other pilots stated that the captain enjoyed flying, but that he seemed uncomfortable and unsuited to his role as chief pilot. He had no previous experience as a chief pilot or training officer with an airline the size of Downeast. These pilots also said that he was not an assertive person, that he felt he had a great deal of responsibility but no real authority, and that he was under pressure constantly from the airline president. Persons testified that the president was a difficult man to work for, and that the captain was in a particularly vulnerable position. He was criticized frequently and feared for his job. According to testimony, he had repeatedly told other pilots that he felt powerless to make any changes because of the attitude of the president.

“By the spring of 1979, most of the senior pilots had already quit or had given notice of their intention to leave the airline. Thus, the captain had to recruit, select, train, and check out the many new pilots for the coming busy summer season. The weather had been extremely poor that spring, especially during the month of May, which complicated his training tasks because visual flight conditions were required to complete them.

“Written statement of a close friend and two of his relatives with whom he lived revealed that in the weeks just before the accident the captain was suffering from loss of appetite, exhaustion, preoccupation, and was complaining of chest pain and difficulty with breathing, all of which they associated with his job pressures and poor flying conditions…. [p. 4]

“Three different pilots said that on three different occasions they observed that the first officer had significant problems while making instrument approaches. These problems involved errors in judgment, which they believed illustrated his lack of basic instrument proficiency and skills. These situations resulted in his ‘getting behind the aircraft,’ ‘chasing the needles,’ and/or developing excessive descent rates. One such incident occurred 5 days before the crash on a round-trip to Boston in the DHC-6 when another pilot observed that the first officer had allowed himself to ‘get behind’ the aircraft during an instrument approach. There is no evidence that any of the pilots who observed the first officer having difficulties informed either the captain of Flight 46 or the airline manager of these problems. The first officer had made a total of five actual instrument approaches at night into Knox County Regional Airport in the DHC-6. Because of an engine overhaul, the first officer had not flown in the DHC-6 for 4 weeks, except on the round-trip to Boston 5 days before the accident….

“1.6 Aircraft Information …. The aircraft’s records and the public hearing testimony revealed that many of the company pilots had been concerned about the performance of N68DE’s right engine. The complaints contended that, even though they were within limits, the right engine’s fuel flow and oil temperature were higher, and the oil pressure and torque values were lower, than those of the left engine. These problems continued even after the engine’s recent expensive overhaul…. [p. 5]

“1.6 Aircraft Information …. The aircraft was equipped with conventional 3-pointer altimeters at the captain and first officer’s stations. Statements from former Downeast pilots suggested that two types of problems were encountered occasionally with these altimeters: (1) ‘sticking’ of the displays during ascents or descents, and (2) significant differences of about 100 ft between the two indicators. These problems apparently were discussed among various pilots, but no formal maintenance write-ups were recorded in the logs. The chief of maintenance stated that the altimeters had been tested satisfactorily during a previous inspection.

“The most detailed account of the altimeter sticking problem on N68DE was contained in a written statement by a former Downeast first officer who stated that on several occasions the first officer’s altimeter had been erratic (i.e., it moved in jumps of 50 ft to 150 ft) and was in error by as much as 350 ft. He further noted that the captain of Flight 46 was aware of this problem and that he relied more on the captain’s altimeter during ‘tight’ instrument approaches. He stated that the chief of maintenance was also verbally informed of this problem. A former Downeast captain testified that there was about a 100-ft difference between the two altimeters…. [p. 6]

“1.7 Meteorological Information …. Knox County Regional Airport is located on a peninsula where sea fog is common much of the year, especially in the spring. Seventy-two observations made by company weather observers during May 1979 showed that the airport was under instrument flight conditions 64 percent of the time with ceilings less than 400 ft 46 percent of the time and visibility less than ¾ mi 22 percent of the time. Rain, drizzle, or ran showers were reported 19 percent of the time, while fog was reported 60 percent of the time…. [p. 7]

“1.10 Aerodrome Information …. There is no control tower or flight service facility at the airport. The airport is located 3 mi south of Rockland. The terrain south of the airport is characterized by low, rolling, heavily wooded hills….

“1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information. The aircraft first struck two trees about 80 ft above the ground with its left wing. These trees were located about 35 ft inland from the shoreline at a ground elevation of 10 ft and about 340 ft from the point where the wreckage came to rest…. [p. 8]

“1.13 Medical and Pathological Information …. The 17 persons who were killed in the crash died from impact trauma. Sixteen persons had obvious head injuries and 8 received crushing injuries to chest area. The majority of the passengers received various internal injuries…. [p. 12]

“The sole survivor of the accident was a healthy, 155-lb, 16-year-old male who was seated in seat 5C in the aft of the cabin. He stated that he awoke during the aircraft’s descent into Rockland and saw the trees close to the aircraft. He grabbed the seat in front of him, ducked his head, and braced his knees against the seatback in front of him. When he regained consciousness, he found himself free of his seat and he crawled through the open air stair door. He crawled away from the aircraft and waited for help to arrive….

“About 2100, after Flight 46 did not land at Rockland, company personnel notified approach control at Navy Brunswick. Navy Brunswick then alerted a U.S. Navy P-3 patrol aircraft which was airborne near Rockland at the time. About 2120, the P-3 began a search of the area but was hampered by the thick fog layer in the Rockland area. About 2125, the crew of the P-3 heard an emergency locator transmitter signal and, using onboard direction-finding equipment, were able to narrow the signal’s origin to an area south of Knox County Regional Airport. About 2150, this information was relayed to search vehicles on the ground. A surface rescue unit located part of the aircraft at 2203. Because of the inaccessibility of the accident site, the main wreckage was not located until about 2212. Shortly thereafter, units from the sheriff’s department, a local ambulance service, and a fire department converged on the scene….The sole survivor was located about 2216. At 2250, he was taken to a hospital 5 mi away. Physicians pronounces all victims dead at the scene…. [p. 15]

“1.17.2 Crew Training. According to former Downeast pilots, minimal training was provided the flightcrews. Testimony at the public hearing indicated that flight training time was logged on ‘dead head’ flights when there were no passengers onboard even though no training was administered on the flight. Also, there was no indication that crew coordination procedures were taught at any time. One of the Downeast captains said.

There was no delineation of responsibilities or workload especially with two captains up front. In addition, with two captains up front, neither one know who was pilot-in-command in the event a time-critical decision had to be made. Neither was any training given on the ground or in the air as to how a two-pilot crew was supposed to function, nor were any basic guidelines written down and given to the pilots. The general rule was: the copilot functioned at the pleasure of the pilot-in-command but it was easier to fly the airplane yourself than to train or brief someone every day…. [p. 17]

“1.17.4 Alleged Company Unsafe Practices …. During the course of the investigation and public hearing, 14 former Downeast pilots and several other employees provided written statements and/or sworn testimony which were critical of the Downeast president’s management practices and policies as they related to safety.

“A brief summary of these alleged practices and policies includes the following:

(1) Establishing ‘company minimums’ between 200 to 350 ft, which is below the legal FAA minimums for the Knox County Regional Airport.

(2) Using unapproved instrument approaches.

(3) Avoiding the mandatory procedure turn (which was previously required for the NDB approach to Knox County Regional Airport).

(4) Ignoring takeoff and lading visibility minimums.

(5) Directing pilots to make repeated instrument approaches and to ‘get lower’ during adverse weather conditions.

(6) Directing pilots to go to a particular alternate airport solely on the basis of ground transportation availability, regardless of the reported weather conditions at that airport.

(7) Pressuring pilots not to carry ‘extra’ fuel, especially IFR reserve requirements.

(8) Pressuring pilots into flying over gross weight limits and repeatedly permitting ground personnel to overload aircraft and provide pilots with knowingly inaccurate baggage weights and counts.

(9) Failing to provide pilots with current training materials and company operating manuals.

(10) Discouraging the training officers or chief pilots from providing adequate flight training by suggesting that training is unnecessary.

(11) Permitting grossly exaggerated or inaccurate flight and ground training records to be presented to FAA inspectors.

(12) Offering to pay fines of pilots who recveived violations and suggesting that FAA enforcement actions were unlikely.

(13) Ridiculing pilots in front of others and suggesting that pilots who were unable to land when others had landed were less skilled or were cowardly.

(14) Failing to report incidents as required by 14 CFR 135.57 and 135.59.

(15) Using an aircraft with a history of propeller feathering problems in 14 CFR 135 passenger operations.

(16) Pressuring pilots into flying aircraft with known mechanical defects contrary to the 14 CFR 135 requirement…or contrary to good operating practices…

(17) Threatening a pilot for cancelling a revenue flight because of a mechanical defect which had occurred away from Downeast maintenance facilities (e.g. landing gear problems at Boston) and generally insisting that aircraft …always be brought back to Rockland.

(18) Firing a pilot for cancelling a revenue flight which in his judgment could not be conducted safely because of weather conditions.

(19) Firing a pilot for deicing an aircraft without prior approval.

(20) Providing only minimal training to mechanics on equipment with which they were unfamiliar (e.g., DHC-6 aircraft).

….

“The Safety Board’s investigation determined that past and present company personnel perceived the company president as a particularly strong-willed individual who dominated the course of day-to-day operations of the company and who was the final authority in all matters. These same company personnel stated that employees who did not unquestioningly accept the president’s decisions were often subjected to various types of coercion ranging from ridicule and verbal abuse to fines, seasonal layoffs, and, in some cases, dismissal. They stated that these factors, along with their observations of the president’s explosive temperament, created an atmosphere of hostility, intimidation, and fear of loss of employment…. [pp. 18-20]

“2.4. Management Practices ….much of the testimony [taken by NTSB] indicated that these unsafe practices had occurred for many years before the accident and had, in fact, continued after the accident.

“Another important factor related to this accident was the lack of emphasis placed by management on training in general and on crew coordination in particular. Virtually all the pilots who testified or signed statements agreed that training was minimal…. [p. 26]

“The Safety Board concludes that the evidence of record shows clearly a pattern of unsafe practice fostered by management that, in conjunction with a lack of emphasis by management on training, are conducive to generating accident situations. Several factors of particular significance were manifested by the reluctance of the crew to cancel the flight, even though the aircraft reportedly had an engine problem and the weather was poor. Also, the crew knew of the president’s propensity for hostility toward employees after a major problem had occurred. The flightcrew of Flight 46 knew that the recent major overhaul of the aircraft’s engines was expensive, that the right engine reportedly still was not running right, and that it had required the further expense of a replacement bleed-air valve the day before the accident. Thus, the crewmembers would have been reluctant to subject themselves to criticism, especially since they would have been cancelling a revenue flight and grounding the aircraft away from the Downeast maintenance facility for a seemingly minor mechanical problem. This would have been against the unwritten but well understood policies of the airline president which limited the authority of flightcrews and caused them to operate the aircraft against their better judgment…. [p. 26]

“2.7 FAA Surveillance. The Safety Board believes that the FAA’s surveillance of Downeast Airlines’ operations practices should have detected, and caused to be corrected, the deficiencies discovered during the Safety Board’s investigation of this accident. The FAA also should have acted when it was informed by a Downeast captain of the questionable company practices. The Safety Board realizes that the same FAA operations inspector responsible for the surveillance of this company was also responsible for about 23 other Part 135 operators in the New England area. The size, and more particularly, the distant locations of these operators would have created a heavy workload and, therefore, made it difficult to accomplish thee inspections adequately. Nevertheless, the detection and correction of operations such s the one uncovered during this investigation are vital to safe operations in the commuter/air taxi industry, particularly with the advent of deregulation and introduction of larger, more sophisticated aircraft into the industry.” [p. 28] ….

Safety Recommendations

“During its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board, on March 26, 1980, recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Insure that lighted visibility markers are installed south of the Knox County Regional Airport, Rockland, Maine, within sight in clear visibility conditions of the normal weather observation position. One of the markers should be placed about ¾ statute mile from the point of observation…

Establish guidelines on the location and number of visibility markers necessary at airports to assure representative surface visibility values for airport runways and the airport runway environment…. [p. 30]

(NTSB. Aircraft Accident Report. Downeast Airlines, Inc. DeHavilland DHC-6-200, N68DE, Rockland, Maine, May 30, 1979. 1980.)

Newspaper

June 1: “Owls Head, Maine (AP) — James Merryman, the most experienced pilot flying with Downeast Airlines, was about to change his mind about landing at Owls Head shortly before his DeHavilland Otter crashed in a heavy fog on the coast of Maine, killing 17 people including three Marylanders, authorities said. ‘I don’t think we will make it…Get me a clearance to Augusta,’ he radioed at 8:55 p.m. to the Brunswick Naval Air Station, which control air traffic in the area. Those were the last words heard from Merryman, 35, before the twin-engine commuter flight, en route from Boston, went down about a mile and a half short of the airport runway….

“The 17 victims, crushed together in the nose of the plane as it slammed into a rock ledge and flipped over, apparently died on impact, said…state medical examiner….” (AP/Peter Slocum. “Three Marylanders die in air crash in Maine.” The Post, Frederick, MD, 6-1-1979, p. A3.)

Sources

Associated Press (Peter Slocum). “Three Marylanders die in air crash in Maine.” The Post, Frederick, MD, 6-1-1979, p. A3. Accessed 6-28-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/frederick-news-post-jun-01-1979-p-11/?tag

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Downeast Airlines, Inc. DeHavilland DHC-6-200, N68DE, Rockland, Maine, May 30, 1979 (NTSB-AAR-80-5). Washington, DC: NTSB, 5-12-1980, 36 pages. Accessed 6-27-2017 at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR8005.pdf

[1] From Table One — the figure of 7 is probably a typo and meant to be 17.

1979 — May 30, Downeast Airlines # 46 approach crash, Owls Head ~Rockland, ME — 17