1980 — Jan 28, collision, tanker Capricorn & USCGC Blackthorn (sinks), Tampa Bay FL-23

lornajarrettblanchard January 28, 1980

–23 NTSB MAR. Collision of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Blackthorn…Capricorn…, 1980.

–23 NTSB. “Safety Recommedation(s) M-80-64 through -85.” Memo to USCG, 9-11-1980.

–23 St. Petersburg Times/David Ballingrud. “20 Years After Blackthorn…” 1-28-2000.

–23 USCG MCR. USCGC Blackthorn, SS Capricorn; Collision in Tampa Bay… 1980, abstract.

Narrative Information

NTSB MAR abstract: “About 2021 E.S.T., on January 28, 1980, the U.S. Coast Guard cutter BLACKTHORN and the U.S. tankship CAPRICORN collided in Tampa Bay, Florida. As a result of the collision, the BLACKTHORN was capsized and sank, and 23 Coast Guardsmen were drowned. Although refloated, the BLACKTHORN was a total loss. The CAPRICORN experienced hull damage from the collision and subsequent grounding. The cost of repairs to the tankship was estimated at $600,000 and the cost of salvaging the BLACKTHORN was estimated at $1 million.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the BLACKTHORN to keep on the proper side of the channel when meeting another vessel in a bend because the commanding officer failed to supervise the actions of an inexperienced officer-of-the-deck adequately.

“Contributing to the accident were the failure of the commanding officer of the BLACKTHORN and the pilot of CAPRICORN to establish a passing agreement using bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone or whistle signals, and the failure of the commanding officer to keep himself aware of all traffic in the channel.

“Contributing to the high loss of life was the sudden capsizing of BLACKTHORN due to the Capricorn’s anchor getting caught in the cutter’s shell plating.” (NTSB. Marine Accident Report: Collision of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Blackthorn, and U.S. Tankship Capricorn, Tampa Bay, Florida, January 28, 1980. Adopted 8-28-1980.)

USCG: “On 28 January 1980 at approximately 2021 e.s.t. the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Blackthorn and the U.S. tankship Capricorn collided in Tampa Bay near the junction of Cut ‘A’ and Mullet Key Channels. As a result of the impact, the port anchor of Capricorn became imbedded in Blackthorn’s port side. The momentum of the two vessels caused the Capricorn’s port anchor chain to become taut and resulted in the capsizing of the Blackthorn. The Capricorn grounded on the north side of Cut ‘A’ channel and the Blackthorn sank in Cut ‘A’ channel. Twenty seven Blackthorn crew members were rescued, however, twenty three crew members perished. There were no personnel casualties aboard the Capricorn….

“The Commandant has concurred with the Marine Board that the proximate cause of the casualty was the failure of both vessels to keep well to the side of the channel which lay on their starboard side.[1] The primary contributing cause was determined to be the failure of the persons in charge of both vessels to ascertain the intentions of the other through the exchange of appropriate whistle signals. It was also determined that attempts to establish a passing agreement by using only radiotelephone communications failed to be an adequate substitute for exchanging proper whistle signals.” (USCG MCR. USCGC Blackthorn, SS Capricorn; Collision in Tampa Bay… 1980, abstract.)

Action Concerning the Recommendations

Recommendation 1:

“Action: This recommendation is concurred with. A professional Rules of the Road examination has been developed. Successful completion of this examination will be a prerequisite for an officer being assigned to duty as officer of the deck underway, commanding officer, or executive officer aboard Coast Guard vessels. The examination is similar in content to those administered to licensed officers of the Merchant Marine. The initial examinations were administered during October and November 1980. [p. 4, Commandant’s Action] ….

Recommendation 4:

“Action: This recommendation is concurred with. All Coast Guard recruits are now required to be able to swim 100 meters. This is a recent increase from 50 yards. Additionally all recruits receive instruction in ‘drown proofing’. The feasibility of incorporating survival equipment instructions in recruit training is being investigated.

Recommendation 5:

“Action: This recommendation is concurred with. A review has been initiated regarding the use, stowage and maintenance of inflatable liferafts aboard Coast Guard vessels. Certain areas requiring improvement have already been identified and corrected. Specifically, guidance has been promulgated requiring all rafts and hydrostatic release to be serviced annually under the direction of a U. S. Coast Guard Marine Inspector at an approved servicing facility listed in Commandant Instruction M16714,3 (old CG-190). Additionally, all Nave Mark 5 rafts in flexible containers will be replaced by Navy Mark 5 rafts in rigid containers. Navy Mark 3 rafts are no longer authorized due to their age and have been ordered removed from all Coast Guard vessels….

“Finally, procurement of Coast Guard approved 15 person and 8 person rafts is being carried out to replace the Navy Mark 5 and Mark 2 rafts. A study is also being made looking toward improved shipboard stowage arrangements including the use of float free installations or hydrostatic releases. [p.5] ….

Marine Board of Investigation

Findings of Fact [5-1-1980]

“….Blackthorn Built 1944 Duluth, MN… [as Buoy Tender, p. 3]

` Length 180 ft LOA

Breadth 37 ft

Homeport Galveston, TX [p. 2]

“Record of Dead…

Subrino Ibanez Avila, Subsistence Specialist First Class…

Randolph Brent Barnaby, Seaman/Gunners Mate…

Richard Dale Boone, Machinery Technician Second Class…

Warren Renail Brewer, Seaman Apprentice…

Gary Wayne Crumly, Quartermaster Second Class…

Daniel Monreal Estrada, Damage Controlman Second Class…

Thomas Richard Faulkner, Electrician’s Mate, Second Class…

William Ray Flores, Seaman Apprentice…

Donald Ray Frank, Subsistence Specialist Third Class…

Lawrence Daniel Frye, Damage Controlman Third Class…

Richard Weston Gauld, Quartermaster Third Class…

Charles Douglas Hall, Seaman Apprentice…

Glen Edward Harrison, Seaman Apprentice…

Bruce Michael LaFond, Machinery Technician First Class…

Michael Kevin Luke, Fireman Apprentice…

Danny Rinaldo Maxcy, Machinery Technician First Class…

John Edward Prosko, Seaman Apprentice…

Jerome Frederick Ressler, Electronics Technician First Class…

Jack Joseph Roberts, Jr., Chief Warrant Officer…

George Ronald Rovolis, Jr., Seaman Apprentice…

Frank John Sarna III, Ensign…

Edward Francis Sindelar III, Electrician’s Mate Third Class…

Luther David Stidhem, Chief Machinery Technician… [pp. 5-8]

“4. Weather and Tide Weather on the evening of 28 January was as follows: the sky was partly cloudy; visibility was clear and at least 7 miles. Seas were calm….

“5. Radar….There is no evidence to indicate that either Blackthorn’s or Capricorn’s radars were not operating properly on 28 January. However, there is evidence that neither ship was making full use of radar for detecting approaching vessels and evaluating their motion. Blackthorn was using her radar to assist in maintaining a navigation plot…. [p. 8]

“8. Blackthorn’s Outbound Transit….

“h….The four crew members on the bow did not notice the Capricorn until she sounded her whistle and collision was imminent…. [p. 17]

“m. Whistle signals from the oncoming vessel were heard and LCDR Sepel yelled, ‘Right full rudder!’, thereby automatically taking the conn from ENS Ryan. This order was heard by O’Boyle, Capricorn’s bow lookout. LCDR Sepel ordered that ‘standby for collision’ be piped and put the engines back full, using the port bridge wing pilothouse control. Blackthorn’s course had changed about 20° to the right when impact occurred….

Collision

“a. At 2021, according to Capricorn’s bell book, Capricorn and Blackthorn collided port bow to port bow at a relative angle of 180°, It is estimated that collision occurred between 5-15 seconds after Capricorn’s sounding of the danger signal. Immediately after impact Capricorn stopped her engines. Impact forced Blackthorn to an approximate 15° starboard list, after which she rolled to port and settled at an approximate 5° port list. As both vessels continued past each other, Capricorn’s port anchor raked Blackthorn’s side and ripped into the crew’s head and shower area, where it became imbedded as the anchor chain commenced running out. Capricorn placed her engines full astern with her rudder remaining hard left. Blackthorn’s engines had been backing full since before impact and her rudder remained right full.

“b. Capricorn decelerated while in a left turn, towing Blackthorn stern first in Cut ‘A’ at a rate of astern speed never before attained in the Commanding Officer’s memory. Pilot Knight kept the rudder hard left to ground the vessel and avoid colliding with the Sunshine Skyway Bridge. The anchor chain continued to run out, overriding the brake. The bow lookout, O’Boyle, had watched the two vessels collide until dust and debris from impact and the running anchor chain clouded his vision. He also heard the port anchor chain running out immediately after impact. [end of p. 18]

About 20 off duty crew members assembled on Blackthorn’s messdeck, the mustering location of the damage control party, and awaited further instructions. The General Quarters alarm had not been sounded and no further instructions had been piped over the 1 MC public-address system….

There was confusion and panic on the messdeck. New crew members who had reported on board during the yard period froze. During the 3½ month yard period, six new crew members had reported aboard straight from boot camp or via class ‘A’ school…. [p. 19]

“10. Capsizing

“a. Blackthorn suddenly rolled to port and capsized within 15 to 20 seconds. LCDR Sepel, while still handling the pilot house controls on the port bridge wing, shouted, ‘Abandon ship!’ No one had time to pipe the order over the 1 MC public-address system before the vessel rolled on her port beam. As the vessel rolled over, the ship’s service generators tripped off the line and the vessel’s lights went out throughout the ship. No personnel could recall any of the emergency battle lanterns coming on…. [p. 20]

“f. All of the survivors reported difficulty in being able to make full use of their lifejackets. Many of them could not untie the tightly bundled jackets in the cold water and clutched them to their chest for use as a float….In no case did any of the survivors utilize the leg straps and in only one case were the collar straps tied together… [p. 21]

“11. Flooding

“a. After capsizing there was free access for water entry above the main deck through the port side shell damage from frame 68 to frame 98. Flooding occurred through the port side hull damage below the main deck from frame 58 to about frame 66. This small [end of p. 21] penetration opened the hull in way of the main hold and forward berthing. Flooding to after berthing would have also occurred through the damaged watertight door structure…and vestibule at frame 89 port side…. [p. 22]

“12. Search and Rescue

….

“b. The shrimp boat, The Bayou which had been following Blackthorn in Cut ‘A’ Channel, arrived on scene within minutes and commenced rescuing survivors. The Bayou picked up 23 survivors and provided them with clothing, food and warmth….

“d. CG 41452 arrived on scene at 2052 and rescued 4 survivors…. [end of p. 22]

“j. The active Coast Guard search terminated at 1650 on 30 January. Twenty-seven survivors and six deceased had been accounted for. On 3, 5 and 6 February, individual bodies were found within 5 miles of the accident site. On 19 February, the remaining 14 bodies were found on board Blackthorn after it had been raised from the channel bottom…. [p. 23]

Conclusions

“c. The Commanding Officer of Blackthorn failed to keep apprised of the situation, and failed to effectively supervise his relatively inexperienced conning officer, particularly when the ship was departing an unfamiliar port at night.[2] [p. 42] ….

“d. The conning officer of Blackthorn failed to immediately advise the Commanding Officer, who was on the bridge, that an inbound vessel had been sighted.

“e. A port to port passing agreement was not reached due to a total reliance on radio communications which, in this case, were not successful.

“f. Both ships failed to use whistle signals to reach a port to port passing agreement. This was attributed to:

(1) the conning officer of Blackthorn not having a complete understanding of both the use of whistle signals when approaching a bend in a narrow channel and the distinction in situations and signals between the Inland Rules and the International Rules of the Road.

(2) Blackthorn’s policy of not initiating whistle signals as required by Pilot Rule 80.3, if a passing agreement had been previously reached by radio.

(3) Pilot Knight’s deliberate delay and subsequent failure to initiate a one short blast whistle signal in order to ‘leave the options open’ to Blackthorn. If, in fact, Pilot Knight suspected that Blackthorn might proceed across his bow into the IWW [Inland Waterway], resulting in a crossing situation as opposed to proceeding down Mullet Key Channel, he should have initiated a one blast signal as stand-on vessel. Thus, it would appear that a one blast whistle signal would have been appropriate for either a meeting or a crossing situation even though, in the case of the latter, Capricorn would had to alter course to the left to conform to the channel.

“g. Pilot Knight failed to sound the danger signal and to reduce speed as soon as he became in doubt concerning the intentions of Blackthorn.[3]

“h. Captain McShea failed to sound the danger signal and reduce headway when he first voiced doubt as to the intentions of the oncoming vessel, and after observing that the pilot had tailed to take such action.

“i. Both vessels failed to make effective use of their radar for early detection and evaluation of approaching vessels.

“j. Capricorn failed to post a proper lookout by instructing the bow lookout not to report well lighted vessels in the channel. Had he reported Blackthorn upon first sighting as Kazakhstan cleared his arc of vision, advance warning might have been given to the master and the pilot.

‘k. Earlier visual sightings of each vessel by the other were hindered by the brightly lighted Kazakhstan which was positioned between Blackthorn and Capricorn. [end of p. 43] ….

“9. Both ships sighted each other visually approximately 2 minutes before collision….” [p. 44]

(USCG MCR. USCGC Blackthorn, SS Capricorn; Collision in Tampa Bay…, 1980.)

NTSB Safety Recommendations after reviewing USCG Maritime Board of Investigation report: “…According to the report issued by the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation concerning the collision between the USCGC CUYAHOGA and the M/V SANTA CRUZ II,

“Selection for command of a Coast Guard cutter is based on appropriate prior experience. The evaluation is made by the Office of Personnel, which considers rank, career pattern, recency of sea service, and performance marks.”

“The Safety Board agrees that recency of sea service is an important factor in the selection of a commending officer (CO). The Board believes that an officer who had been ashore for as long as the CO of the BLACKTHORN had been should not have been selected for command without first having been assigned to 8 comprehensive refresher course, and direct operational tutelage by a commanding officer of a Coast Guard cutter similar to the cutter to which he is to be assigned. During the almost 5 years ashore since he had last been assigned to a ship the CO of the BLACKTHORN underwent no refresher training. As far as his testimony indicated, the only professional training that he had completed was a rules of the road correspondence course, which he finished after assuming command of the BLACKTHORN. [end of p. 1] ….

“Both the CO and the officer-of-the-deck (OOD) stated that, before impact, the BLACKTHORN was proceeding along the center of the north side of the channel. Since there is no physical evidence to support this contention and since all existing physical evidence points to the fact that the BLACKTHORN actually crossed mid-channel and entered the south side of the channel, the Safety Board can only conclude that these officers did not know precisely where they were. The OOD’s statement that, because he noted a 1° bearing drift to the left between the visual bearings he took of the approaching CAPRICORN no risk of collision existed, dramatically illustrates that the conning of the BLACKTHORN had been left to a novice. The Safety Board believes that an experienced mariner would not consider a 1° bearing change, especially when approaching a large vessel at close range, to be the “appreciable change” referred to in the rules of the road for evaluating the risk of collision. This OOD had the documentation of competence required by the Coast Guard: a letter from the CO designating him as qualified. The Safety Board believes the method used by the Coast Guard for the qualification of underway OOD’s, whatever its merit when it was first adopted is of questionable today. Ideally and theoretically, it can produce competent deck watch officers. In actuality, however, the degree to which each OOD will meet the personnel qualification “standard” will vary from ship to ship. It is entirely up to the subjective evaluation of certifying officers and commanding officers as to what checkoff items will be required and the degree of knowledge of each item that the trainee must demonstrate. It also presupposes that the certifying officers and commanding officers possess the degree of knowledge in all subject items necessary to test other officers, and that the officers come to their ships with a substantial background in ship operations. Even as to Coast Guard Academy graduates this is no longer so in view of the varied curriculum options the cadets are allowed to pursue.

“The Safety Board believes that the method used by the Coast Guard to license merchant marine officers is much more objective and comprehensive than that used to establish the seagoing qualifications of its own officers. All applicants for the same license are tested in the same subject areas. There is no need to caution licensing officials not to “give away” their signature as there is in the current OOD qualification system. The Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard should use the requirements for the testing of merchant marine officers as a guide to tailor a similar program to test the professional knowledge of its officers before they are assigned to ships. (Apart from the increased professionalism such a program would nurture, there would be collateral benefits to the Coast Guard’s marine safety program in that the credibility of officers assigned to the program would be enhanced by their having passed examinations comparable to those taken by merchant marine officers.) The USCG Marine Board of Investigation looking into the sinking of the CUYAHOGA made the following recommendation: [end of p. 2]

“It is recommended that the Commandant consider the need to require appropriate Coast Guard personnel to demonstrate the professional knowledge required for vessel command and deck watch officer duty, and to record individual qualifications in that regard. An objective system such as the present merchant marine licensing program, including the concept of radar observer endorsement, would appear adaptable to this end.”

“In his action addressing this recommendation, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard said, “A pilot project will be initiated utilizing an examination system similar to the merchant marine licensing program to evaluate the feasibility of enhancing this process” (i.e. the current process by which Coast Guard officers are selected for command. The Commandant did not address the portion of the recommendation dealing with deck watch officers.) As of August 1980, the Coast Guard has not put a program of this type into effect. Besides initial qualification, the Safety Board believes that requalification on a periodic basis is necessary to insure a high level of sea-going qualification in Coast Guard officers, especially those officers coming off shoreside assignments.

“The OOD on watch just before the accident had qualified as an underway OOD during the month before the BLACKTHORN entered the shipyard after only 2½ months on board the BLACKTHORN. The ship was not continuously underway during that time. The vessel was in the shipyard for over 3 months during which time this officer had no opportunity to gain experience as an underway OOD. The CO testified that it was his policy that, whenever this officer had the conn in restricted waters, he was to be under close supervision. Newly qualified and trainee OOD’s should have the opportunity to conn their vessels in restricted waters under close supervision by competent officers. The Safety Board believes, however, that it is not a good policy to give inexperienced OOD’s a watch at night in a waterway with which none of the officers is thoroughly familiar. This practice will most likely place in jeopardy not only the Coast Guard vessel and crew, but also other vessels which the Coast Guard vessel might meet in the same waterway, such as the CAPRICORN.

“The overall level of seagoing experience of the crew of the BLACKTHORN was extremely limited. The percentage of crewmen having less than 1 year’s previous experience was inordinately high. Even so, the Safety Board believes that there is no justification for a large number of the crew not knowing where the life preservers were stowed on the BLACKTHORN or how to launch an inflatable liferaft. Such lack of knowledge indicates a breakdown in command responsibility in preparing the vessel for sea after a long lay-up and the need for formal indoctrination of persons reporting aboard ship for the first time.

“In an accident where the vessel capsizes before survival equipment can be utilized, it can be expected that crewmen will find themselves in the water and at the mercy of the elements. It is important, therefore, that they be trained in water survival techniques; e.g. basic swimming skills, how to conserve one’s energy, whether to stay with the vessel, how to don a life-preserver in the water, the importance of staying together, and the dangers of hypothermia. A number of survivors from the BLACKTHORN believed that their water survival training was inadequate; the Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard should review its current water survival training programs.

“All foreign vessels, all U.S. vessels in foreign trade, most U.S. vessels in domestic trade, drawing more than 6 ft and U.S. Naval vessels transiting Tampa Ray employ local [end p.3] pilots. The BLACKTHORN did not, in spite of the fact that this was the first time any officer on board had transited Tampa Bay at night and in spite of the fact that they had not been to sea for 3 months. Pilots transit Tampa Bay constantly, should know the waters well, should be aware of problems such as the front range light on Cut A being out, and should keep themselves aware of inbound and outbound traffic.

“Certainly, the crews of Coast Guard cutters, which are homeported in a particular harbor, should have knowledge of that harbor comparable to local pilots; however, the crews of Coast Guard cutters which visit unfamiliar ports do not. The CO of the BLACKTHORN did not call the Tampa Bay pilots before getting underway to determine what traffic would be in the harbor that night nor did the CO make any securite[4] calls to let other vessels know that the BLACKTHORN was outbound in Tampa Bay.[5] If the CO had employed a pilot, the pilot would have been aware of the inbound CAPRICORN, would have informed other vessels that the BLACKTHORN was outbound, and could have provided the CO with local knowledge. The Safety Board believes that the commanding officers of Coast Guard cutters that are over 100 ft in length should employ local pilots when cutter crews are unfamiliar with the pilotage waters they are planning to transit, should participate with local pilot associations in exchange of information regarding ship movements and should transmit securite calls when appropriate.

“Although the Blackthorn and Capricorn were not subject to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS 72) at the time of the accident, both ships did operate in international waters where COLREGS 72 applies. Even though the Inland Rules of the Road do not require a second masthead light and consequently give no criterion for horizontal separation, COLREGS 72 requires that the forward masthead light and the after masthead light be spaced not less than 50 percent of the length of the vessel apart and that the forward light be placed not more than 25 percent of the vessel’s length aft of the stem. For the BLACKTHORN, this means the lights should have been spaced 90 ft apart and that the forward light should have been not more than 45 ft aft of the stem. However, the Coast Guard has exempted certain buoy tenders from this requirement. The two lights on the BLACKTHORN were spaced only 16 ft apart and the forward light was 68 ft aft of the stern. The Coast Guard certified that the buoy tenders were unable to comply because of their special construction or purpose; however, if on this class of vessel the forward masthead light were to be placed on the forecastle the cutters would nearly comply with the regulations without hampering vessel operations. The placements allowed by the exemption for buoy tenders operating primarily in restricted waters are deceptive to other vessels at night, because the arrangement creates the illusion of a much smaller vessel and one subject to Article 25 of the Inland Rules:

“In narrow channels, a steam vessel of less than 65 feet in length shall not hamper the safe passage of a vessel which can navigate only inside that channel.” …. [p. 4]

“On Board the BLACKTHORN whistle signals were not always blown after a passing agreement had been established over the bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone. The CO said that whistle signals were not blown if the whistle signals would be confusing to other vessels in the area. The Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard should set the example for other vessels by sounding whistle signals in accordance with the appropriate rules of the road….

“Had there been…a regulation prohibiting meeting in bends in the main shipping channel, this accident might have been avoided….

“None of BLACKTHORNS principal survival craft, her own four or the borrowed 15-man inflatable liferafts, was effective in ‘saving lives. Instead, a wooden watch-stander’s shack, wooden planks, and lifejackets were used as flotation until rescue boats arrived. Two of the liferafts, the Mark 3 liferafts, were over 24 years old. U.S. Navy standards (adopted for Coast Guard use) state that Mark 3 liferafts should be disposed of because of fabric deterioration and a civilian liferaft expert testified that they should never be used. The Safety Board urges [end p. 5] the Coast Guard to examine all Mark-5 inflatable liferafts on all Coast Guard cutters and to immediately replace all Mark 3 liferafts with Coast Guard-approved liferafts in accordance with Commandant Instruction M 14070.10 dated January 2, 1979.

“BLACKTHORN9 liferaft installation did not meet the intent of the Naval Ship’s Technical Manual (adopted for Coast Guard use) that liferafts should be located to permit ready manual overboard launching, since the 385-1b liferafts were stowed 7 ft from the side of the cutter and one deck up. This required the liferafts to be carried down from the 02 level to the 01 level before launching. If the liferafts were to be dropped to the 01 level by releasing the stowage baskets, the liferafts probably would be damaged. The Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard should examine the location of liferaft stowage on all cutters to insure that the liferafts can be readily launched in an emergency.

“The BLACKTHORN’S hydrostatic releases for its liferafts were set to activate at water depths within the Navy standard of 10 to 40 ft . However, buoy tenders, operate primarily in water depths of less than 40 ft. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard should adopt the merchant vessel standard that hydrostatic releases be set between 5 and 15 ft for Coast Guard cutters. In this case, the setting of the hydrostatic releases was not a factor in the effectiveness of the liferafts since their flexible containers were not buoyant. The Coast Guard should use buoyant containers for liferafts on Coast Guard cutters.

“Survivors testified that, as the cutter capsized Blackthorn’s lights went out, no emergency lighting came on, and about 15 crewmen were trapped on the mess deck, About nine of these crewmen became disoriented in the dark and climbed into the engine room where they died. As a result of its investigation of the sinking of USCGC CUYAHOGA, on October 28, 1978, the Safety Board recommended that the Coast Guard:

“Provide automatic emergency lighting for egress from all manned spaces on all Coast Guard cutters (R4-79-29).”

“The Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard should examine the reliability of the emergency lighting aboard Coast Guard cutters and make necessary modifications.

“The CAPRICORN was exempted from having a motor lifeboat and gravity davits because it was converted before May 26, 1965. This accident illustrates the difficulty of maneuvering hand-propelled lifeboats during an emergency and the delays involved in launching lifeboats using sheath, screw-type davits. The Safety Board does not believe that outdated lifesaving equipment should be permitted to remain in service indefinitely. The Coast Guard should establish a service life after which all lifesaving equipment on U.S. merchant vessels should be upgraded to meet current vessel standards….” [ p. 6] (NTSB. “Safety Recommedation(s) M-80-64 through -85.” Memorandum to Admiral John B. Hayes, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, 9-11-1980.)

Nunez on Lessons Learned in the Aftermath: “Although the catalyst was a tragic one, the collision has resulted in the taking of some positive steps for both sides of the involved jurisdiction opponents. The Blackthorn incident ended the thinking behind the Coast Guard’s unofficial motto, ‘You have to go out, but you don’t have to come back.’[6] According to Commander Eric Shaw, chief of the Command and Operations School at the Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut, today’s s motto is more like, ‘You have to go out, but does it have to be now?’[7]

“The Blackthorn incident provided the catalyst for the establishment of the Command and Operation School at the Academy. This special school is specifically designed to prevent tragedies like the Blackthorn. Commanding officers are now required to formally assess the risk of different scenarios, such as, embarking at night in unfamiliar waters. Since the Blackthorn incident, every Coast Guard officer who will be directly responsible for the navigation of a ship must attend for two weeks. All who attend will be trained on emergency maneuvers and proper usage of equipment aboard their vessels. As reported on their website, the Command and Operations School was established as the Prospective Commanding Officer/Prospective Executive Office (PCO/PXO) School in 1986. It further states, ‘The sinking of the cutters Cuyahoga and Blackthorn highlighted the need for a course that refreshed the collision avoidance and damage control skills of the senior leadership aboard cutters prior to assuming their duties.’ The school provides several tools to help commanding officers to determine potential risks associated with the responsibility of the authority over a crew, such as navigating an unfamiliar port at night. Safety has become the primary focus….” [p. 40]

Sources

National Transportation Safety Board. Marine Accident Report: Collision of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Blackthorn, and U.S. Tankship Capricorn, Tampa Bay, Florida, January 28, 1980 (NTSB-MAR-80-14). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted 8-28-1980, 78 pages. National Academy of Sciences Abstract accessed 6-17-2017 at: https://trid.trb.org/view.aspx?id=388002

National Transportation Safety Board. “Safety Recommedation(s) M-80-64 through -85.” Memorandum to Admiral John B. Hayes, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, 9-11-1980, 10 pages). Accessed 6-17-2017 at: https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/M80_64_85.pdf

Nunez, Judy Kay. 28 January 1980, Blackthorn and Capricorn: Collision with History in Tampa Bay. The Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Master of Arts Thesis. 2003, 73 pages. Accessed 6-17-2017 at: http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/islandora/object/fsu:180688/datastream/PDF/view

St. Petersburg Times/David Ballingrud. “20 Years After Blackthorn: Three minutes that rocked the Coast Guard.” 1-28-2000. Accessed 6-17-2017 at: http://www.sptimes.com/News/012800/Worldandnation/Three_minutes_that_ro.shtml

United States Coast Guard. Marine Casualty Report. USCGC Blackthorn, SS Capricorn; Collision in Tampa Bay on 28 January 1980 with Loss of Life (Report No. USCG 16732/01279). Washington DC: Commandant, USCG, December 29, 1980, 74 pages. Accessed 6-17-2017 at: https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/docs/boards/blackthorn.pdf

[1] Right side of ship when looking forward.

[2] “Sepel did not leave the Coast Guard after the accident. He stayed in for eight more years and was promoted once, to the rank of commander. The Coast Guard could have promoted him again to captain, he said, but did not because of the Blackthorn.” (St. Petersburg Times/David Ballingrud. “20 Years After Blackthorn: Three minutes that rocked the Coast Guard.” 1-28-2000.)

[3] From Judy Kay Nunez Master of Arts Thesis (FSU): “Based on a report submitted by the NTSB, on 26 September 1980, the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) recommended that Pilot Knight be declared as ‘slightly negligent’ in his handling of the Capricorn, however, a three-member panel of state pilot commissioners, James Phillips, a pilot from Jacksonville, Lucille Churchill of Gulfport, and Julian Fernandez, a pilot from Miami, disagreed.” A footnote reads: “The Board of Pilot Commissioners has never disciplined a member in its entire history. They investigated 239 cases from 1974-1980 and never punished a pilot for wrongdoing.” (p. 29)

[4] In maritime parlance, safety information.

[5] According to the Nunez Master’s Thesis (p. 31, Sepel testified at the USG Marine Board of Inquiry hearings that he did not know how to go about arranging to hire a pilot.

[6] In footnote cites USCG website: http://www.uscg.org.

[7] Footnote citation: Coast Guard Academy, cga.edu/lcd/commandandoperatonsschool/