1980 — Oct 24, SS Poet leaves Philadelphia for Egypt, lost, probably Oct 25-26 — 34
— 34 NTSB. “Safety Recommendation(s) M-81-55 through -61.” 7-14-1981.
— 34 USCG Marine Casualty Report. SS Poet: Disappearance…Atlantic Ocean… Apr 12, 1982
Narrative Information
NTSB: “At some time on October 25 or 26, 1980, the 523-foot-long U.S. freighter SS POET disappeared in the North Atlantic Ocean about 500 nautical miles east of Delaware Bay. No distress signal was heard from the POET, and no trace of the ship or its 34-person crew has been found. The estimated loss for the ship and its cargo was $4,250,000….
“The institution of a worldwide satellite system such as Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking (SARSAT), which will pick up a distress signal from a new type of EPIRB, should greatly improve the detection of ships in distress. A satellite system should have been able to locate the position of the sinking of the POET within a matter of hours. Both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Coast Guard are working towards achieving such a system. The Safety Board has urged NASA to expedite its SARSAT program and urges the Coast Guard to obtain as soon as possible the necessary legislation to require satellite EPIRB systems on U. S . vessels. [p. 1]
“The Safety Board believes that the air search conducted by the Coast Guard from November 8 to 17 was extensive and exhaustive considering the limited information about the position of the POET and the lack of a distress signal….
“The Safety Board believes that had the air search commenced sooner, the probability of finding survivors or debris would have been greater. When the Coast Guard was notified on November 3 that the POET had not been heard from since October 24, it already may have been too late to rescue any survivors if the POET sank about October 25. However, a search and rescue expert testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on April 9, 1981, that the Coast Guard should have completed its communication checks and begun planning for an air search within 24 hours. Although over 90 percent of unreported and overdue vessels are located through communication checks, the Coast Guard should have made plans for an active search while it was completing its communication checks on November 3, 4, and 5. When Lloyds of London informed the Coast Guard on November 5 that it had no record of the POET passing Gibraltar, the location the ship should have reached by November 3 if it had steamed at 15 knots, the Coast Guard should have then commenced an air search. By November 5, 12 days had passed since the POET had last been heard from. If the POET had suffered a casualty, it was important that the Coast Guard act quickly. The only new information the Coast Guard had on November 7 that it did not have on November 5 was that the POET had an excellent past record for reporting every 48 hours to USMER and that it was likely that the POET had passed through a storm on October 25 or 26…. [p. 3]
“…the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the U.S. Coast Guard:
Establish national and propose international listening watch requirements, in conjunction with the Federal Communications Commission, that would enable the distress signal from an Emergency Position Indicating Radiobeacon to be received by other ships. (Class III Longer-Term Action) (M-81-55)
Seek standby legislative authority at an early date to require satellite Emergency Position Indicating Radiobeacons on U. S. vessels as soon as a satellite system is operational. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-81-56)
Modify the AMVER system so that Coast Guard search and rescue coordination centers are notified when U. S. ships fail to report as required by the U. S. Maritime Administration. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-81-57)
Review the procedures contained in the National Search and Rescue Manual regarding unreported and overdue vessels required by the U.S. Maritime Administration to report every 48 hours. Determine the adequacy of these procedures and make modifications if necessary. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-81-58)
Revise its search and rescue procedures to provide that, when a U. S. ship is unreported or overdue, the search and rescue mission coordinator check with USMER immediately regarding the regularity of the ship’s reporting. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-81-59)…
Conduct further studies to determine if synchronous rolling in quartering seas is a safety problem on ships similar to the POET, and promulgate operational guidance if necessary. (Class III, Longer-Term Action) (M-81-61)…”
(NTSB. “Safety Recommendation(s) M-81-55 through -61.” 7-14-1981, 4 pages.)
USCG Abstract: “At 0120 on 24 October 1980…the general cargo vessel Poet departed Girard Point, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, loaded with a bulk grain cargo of #2 yellow corn. At 0900, Poet sent a U.S. Merchant Vessel Locator Filing System (USMER) message to the Maritime Administration in Washington, D.C., indicating departure from Cape Henlopen, Delaware, on a rhumb line course to Gibraltar and Port Said, and then to Alexandria, Egypt, at a speed of 15 knots. The Poet’s estimated date of arrival at Port Said, Egypt, was 9 November 1980. The last known communication with the Poet was midnight on 24 October when…third mate on board Poet, contacted his wife via ship to shore radio. On 3 November, the Coast Guard Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) in New York was contacted by the vessel’s owners stating that the Poet had not communicated with them since her departure from Cape Henlopen. During the next 5 days, the Coast Guard conducted extensive communication checks with negative results. An air and surface search was commenced on 8 November and the ensuing search, which covered over 296,000 square miles during a ten-day period, proved unsuccessful and was suspended on 17 November. No trace of the vessel, crewmen, or debris was ever found….
“The Commandant has concurred with the Marine Board that the proximate cause of the casualty cannot be determined. Although significant credibility can be assigned to any of the possibilities noted by the Board, the Commandant considers it more probable that some loss of hull integrity occurred.[1] If a loss of hull integrity occurred, the ingress of water could have gone undetected by the crew long enough to lead to the sudden loss of the ship by plunging, capsizing or foundering…. [Pages 1-2 of DOT Technical Report Standard Title Page.]
“Built: December 1944… [p. 2] …C-4 troopship hull configuration… [p. 7]
“Crewmember Information… [34 names]
Leroy A. Warren…Position: Master…
Norman H. Currier…Chief Mate…
William A. King…Second Mate…
Robert W. Gove…Third Mate…
Joseph Vyhnak…Radio Officer…
Edward D. Adams…Bosun…
Rickey A. Sallee…Able Seaman…
Mosel Myers…Able Seaman…
Roland H. Courter…Able Seaman…
Hans P. Zukier…Able Seaman…
Carl L. Goff…Able Seaman…
Shawn T. Gooden…Able Seaman…
Stephen J. Connors…Ordinary Seaman…
Alfred Schmidt…Ordinary Seaman…
Edward E. Bradley…Ordinary Seaman…
Lloyd G. Thayer…Chief Engineer…
Michael S. Canfield…First Assistant Engineer…
Christopher Carrino…Second Assistant Engineer…
Mark S. Henthorne…Third Assistant Engineer…
Anthony J. Bourbonnais…Third Assistant Engineer…
Frank E. Holland…Deck/Engine Utility…
Walter M. Mitchell…Oiler…
Claude D. Berry…Oiler…
Otis R. Hunter…Oiler…
Calvin E. Bethard…Fireman/Water Tender…
Abraham G. Murillo…Fireman/Water Tender…
George E. Ward…Fireman/Water Tender…
Thaddeus M. Simmons…Wiper…
Eddie Sylvester…Chief Steward…
Carl Jackson…Chief Cook…
Noel W. McLaughlin…Chief Baker…
Tracy R. Walker…Messman…
Jerry Batchler…Messman…
Earl K. Whatley…Steward Utility… [pp. 3-7]
“Conclusions….
“The precise time and location of the vessel’s loss are unknown and cannot be determined. The Board concludes that the Poet was most likely lost during the period when it encountered the most severe weather conditions between the morning of 25 October and the evening of 26 October….Poet likely encountered winds of up to 60 knots and seas with a significant wave height of up to 30 feet….Poet’s intended track would have placed the vessel in an area where peak storm conditions were intensified by the effects of the Gulf Stream North Wall…. [p. 56]
(USCG. Marine Casualty Report. SS Poet: Disappearance in the Atlantic…
Sources
National Transportation Safety Board. “Safety Recommendation(s) M-81-55 through -61.” 7-14-1981, 4 pages. [Forwarded to: Admiral John B. Hayes, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.] Accessed 6-15-2017 at: https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/M81_55_61.pdf
United States Coast Guard. Marine Casualty Report. SS Poet: Disappearance in the Atlantic Ocean after Departure from Cape Henlopen, Delaware on 24 October 1980 with Loss of Life (Report No. USCG 16732/ 11486). Washington DC: Commandant, USCG, April 12, 1982, 76 pages. Accessed 6-15-2017 at: https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/docs/boards/poet.pdf
[1] At pp. 51-53, the investigation reports notes, in order, (1) capsizing due to instability in following or quartering seas, (2) capsizing or foundering due to flooding of No. 1 hole, (3) structural failure, (4) capsizing or foundering due to shifting cargo, (5) foundering due to flooding of machinery space, (6) boiler explosion.