1983 – Aug 21, Landry Aviation plane with skydivers stalls/crashes, Silvana, WA — 11
— 11 AP. “Eleven Die in Fiery Crash.” Farmington Daily Times, NM, 8-22-1983, A2.
— 11 NTSB. AAR. Landry Aviation Lockheed Learstar L-18…Silvana, [WA], Aug 21, 1983.
— 11 NTSB. Special Investigation Report on the Safety of Parachute Jump Operations. 2008.[1]
Narrative Information
National Transportation Safety Board AAR Synopsis: “About 1832 Pacific daylight time on August 21, 1983, a Lockheed L-18 Learstar, N116CA, operated by Landry Aviation, Inc., crashed in a field adjacent to a State highway after an uncontrolled descent from 12,500 feet. The airplane had carried 24 sport parachute jumpers and 2 pilots. Fifteen parachutists successfully parachuted from the airplane during the descent; nine parachutists and the two pilots did not and were killed in the crash.
“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the operator and the pilot-in-command to assure proper load distribution during the jumper exit procedure. A more intensive program of surveillance by the Federal Aviation Administration may lead to the detection and elimination of some of the factors in the accident.” [p.1]
NTSB History of the Flight: “About 1810 [PDT] on August 21, 1983, a Lockheed L-18 Learstar, N116CA, operated by Landry Aviation, Inc., as a sport parachute jump flight, departed the Arlington, Washington, municipal airport, on its fourth such flight of the day carrying sport parachute jumpers to a drop zone near Silvana, Washington, about 5 nautical miles west of the airport. This flight was to carry 24 parachutists to 12,500 feet mean sea level over the drop zone where a mass jump was to be made. The airplane was in a cargo configuration with no seats. There were 24 seatbelts in 2 rows of 12 which were attached to seat track/cargo tiedown rails in the floor, and the aft cabin entry door had been removed. For takeoff, the jumpers sat on the airplane floor in rows of three abreast facing aft. One jumper was said to have occupied a jump seat immediately behind the cockpit.
“After departure, the airplane climbed in a large circular track around the drop zone. A Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) regarding the parachute jump had been filed by the pilot with the Seattle Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) that morning before he commenced operations. In accordance with that NOTAM, the crew was in contact with the ARTCC during the climb for traffic advisories and to advise when the parachutists had jumped. [end of p. 1]
“Surviving parachutists stated that takeoff and climb to the jump altitude were normal. All the parachutists remained in the positions occupied at takeoff until jump altitude was reached, Surviving parachutists also stated that none of the jumpers seated on the floor used the available seatbelts. About 1 minute before the airplane arrived over the drop zone, two jumpers moved aft to the door to spot the airplane for the jump run and to relay maneuvering directions to the pilots by hand signal, As the airplane neared the drop zone, the jumpers moved to their pre-jump positions. Two jumpers moved outside the door, one forward of the door on a narrow external step holding on to an external handle, and one on the aft side of the doorway holding on to the aft door frame. A third positioned himself in the doorway by standing on the door sill, facing inboard, and holding onto the top door frame. Five more lined up as close as possible to the door. The other 16 lined up in rows of 8 each along both sides of the cabin.
“The jumpers stationed in the door stated that they were not aware of any airplane problem as they jumped. One of them observed the airplane after he fell away from it. He stated that it was in a steep right bank, that it then rolled over, the nose dropped, and that it entered a steep dive during which it made one or two slow spirals as it continued the steep dive until it struck the ground. Descriptions of the descent offered by several other jumpers were similar.
“Three jumpers, the 9th, 11th , and 12th in the planned jump sequence, stated that they felt the aft end of the airplane drop, then oscillate slightly up and down, after which the airplane rolled to the right before the jumpers were able to reach the door and leave the airplane. Sixteen of the 24 jumpers were able to leave the airplane before and after the upset. One was killed and two were seriously injured when they struck the horizontal stabilizer; 13 were uninjured. All 16 parachutes functioned normally.
“Witnesses on the ground, many of whom had watched previous flights of the airplane that day, stated that, just as the first jumper left the airplane, it rolled to the right, entered a steep dive, and rotated slowly two or three times during the dive. They stated that it struck the ground in a steep nosedown attitude slightly past vertical. They described loud “screaming” engine sounds which continued until the airplane struck the ground. Some witnesses described a light colored smoke trail coming from one of the engines during the latter part of the dive…. [p. 2]
“The airplane crashed on the downslope of the shoulder of State Highway 530 1 mile north of Silvana, Washington. The earth fill was displaced outward and upward, and the asphalt pavement was displaced upward and damaged by an intense gasoline-fed fire…. [p. 2]
“The fatally injured jumper was observed by other jumpers to have descended in a properly opened parachute. Postmortem examination showed that he sustained a through fracture of the L-3 vertebral body, torn back muscles, partial severance of the aorta, and complete severance of the inferior vena cava at the L-3 level. These injuries are consistent with severe impact to the lower back.
“The 10 persons who were unable to leave the airplane were killed by the forces of impact. The bodies were fragmented severely, and no autopsies or toxicological examinations were performed.” [p. 4]
“Landry Aviation began parachute operations in June 1983 after contacting several parachutists who indicated an interest in using that type of airplane. The two pilots who flew most of the parachute flights, including the captain of the accident flight, had flown the airplane regularly in the previous cargo operations. The copilot of the accident flight also had flown as copilot in the cargo operations and occasionally as copilot on jump flights. They did not have any experience in jump operations before June 1983. Between June and the day of the accident, the airplane made more than 40 flights to transport parachutists to the jump site. About 15 of these involved mass drops of 24 jumpers at once.” [p. 5]
“During the investigation of this accident, the Safety Board learned of at least four other instances in which Lockheed L-18 airplanes entered steep nosedown descents while on jump runs with 24 or more jumpers on board. At least one of these was a Learstar modification and one was unmodified. The configuration of the others could not be confirmed, These four events were:
Date Location No. of Jumpers Altitude Recovery Altitude
Nov 10, 1974 Casa Grande, Arizona 24 14,000 7,000
Nov 1975 Roswell, New Mexico 24 10,500 6,000
June 18, 1977 near Toledo, Ohio 25 12,000 10,000
April 1979 Tampa, Florida 24 12,500 3,000
“The pilots involved in these occurrences were interviewed. Their accounts were similar to those given by survivors and witnesses of the accident involving N116CA. The pilots stated that, while on drop runs at airspeeds of 95 to 100 mph, when the jumpers moved aft and gathered at the doorway, an increasing amount of forward elevator was required to maintain level attitude until full or nearly full nosedown elevator was applied. As power was reduced and airspeed slowed, the elevator would no longer control the pitchup. All pilots reported that the tail dropped and the airplane rolled over and entered a steep, nosedown descent. One of the pilots described a fully developed spin, which he stopped with standard spin recovery procedures as described in the airplane flight manual. All of the pilots were able to recover to normal flight after a large altitude loss. The recovery technique was to add power, apply rudder against the roll, then, when the nose
was down and airspeed was increasing, reduce power and recover from the dive. They all stated that their experience caused them to revise their jump run procedures. The revisions most common among the pilots included maintaining higher airspeed on the drop run regardless of jumpers’ requests; keeping the landing gear down, to move the center of gravity forward; and maintaining full forward main fuel tanks.
“The pilot who had performed the original weight and balance computations for Landry stated that on one flight carrying 18 jumpers he had experienced a full nosedown trim and reached the limit of nosedown elevator travel once the jumpers were in place to exit the airplane. To keep the nose from continuing to pitch up, he increased power and regained some elevator effectiveness. Following this, the pilots discussed with some of the jumpers the importance of their staying forward in the airplane and not crowding at the door for exit. They also discussed among themselves the spin recovery procedures set out in the airplane flight manual….” [pp. 9 and 12]
NTSB Analysis: “….The weight and balance computations worked out by Landry personnel for 24 jumpers in their’ takeoff positions showed that the airplane center of gravity would be very near the aft limit based on crowding jumpers in the forward compartment and jump seat. Even so, they did not examine the effect on the center of gravity with the jumpers moved into position for the jump. The Safety Board’s center of gravity computations for the jump position show that the center of gravity would have been 16 inches aft of the aft limit. Typically as an airplane’s center of gravity is moved aft, positive longitudinal stability is decreased to a point of neutral stability. Further aft movement of the center of gravity causes the airplane to become longitudinally unstable and the horizontal stabilizer and elevator to become less effective in controlling the noseup pitching moment. When full elevator travel is reached, any further pitchup is uncontrollable. This uncontrolled pitchup will cause an increase in the wing angle of attack until an aerodynamic stall occurs. The Safety Board is convinced that the loss of control and departure from level flight were the result of an extreme rearward shift in the center of gravity which resulted in a noseup pitch which could not be countered by full nosedown elevator deflection. The position of the elevator trim actuator shows that nearly full nosedown trim had been applied. This evidence, together with the descriptions of similar incidents provided by pilots involved, corroborate the Safety Board’s conclusion….
“During the investigation, it became apparent that most of the parachutists, including the USPA[2] Area Safety Officer, had little or no knowledge of the significance of airplane center of gravity limits. They were generally aware of the need to “stay as far forward as possible” for takeoff, but were not aware of the significant effects on airplane control of their lining up for the jump. They indicated generally that they believed the pilots were responsible for assuring that weight and center of gravity limits were not exceeded and that, because the jump coordinator and the pilots had discussed the jump procedures, those procedures would not lead to unsafe operations.” [pp. 16-17]
“The Safety Board believes that, notwithstanding the low priority given by the FAA to surveillance of parachuting operations, when the FAA District Office inspectors became aware of Landry’s intention to engage in parachuting activities, they should have made some effort to observe those activities and advise the operator of the various applicable regulatory requirements. Based on FAA Operations Bulletin 83-1, the Safety Board believes the inspectors should have ascertained that the original airplane modifications and operations were in accordance with applicable regulations. Had the FAA inspectors reviewed the sport jumping activities with Landry Aviation, it would have been apparent that the operation with 24 parachutists would, of necessity, not be in compliance with several regulations, namely:
The airplane could not be loaded properly with the c.g. [center of gravity] within allowable takeoff limits if the parachutists were seated at locations where they could be restrained by seatbelts as required by 14 CFR 91.14.
The procedures to be used as the jumpers exited the airplane would cause loading greatly exceeding the airplane’s c.g. limits.
The number of parachutists carried aloft exceeded the regulatory maximum number of occupants allowable for the number of emergency exits. (14 CFR 91.47)
The airplane had been modified with the addition of a step and handholds without FAA approval by STC or Form 337. Consequently, there had been no prior analysis or flight tests to confirm that the devices or intended use of the devices during flight would not affect the airplane’s controllability.
“Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the FAA should undertake additional action to further safe parachute operations and has made recommendations to that end…..” [pp. 18-19]
(NTSB. Aircraft Accident Report. Landry Aviation Lockheed Learstar L-18, N116CA, Silvana, Washington, August 21, 1983 (NTSV/AAR-84/06). Adopted 5-17-1984.)
Newspaper
Aug 22, Associated Press: “Stanwood, Wash. (AP) — Skydivers on a parachuting outing with friends were force to dive for their lives when the World War II-era plane went into a ‘classic stall’ and plummeted to earth, killing 11 people, the survivors and authorities said. Fifteen of the skydivers survived but nine parachutists and two pilots aboard the twin-engine Lockheed Lodestar were killed Sunday when the plane slammed into a highway embankment about 45 miles north of Seattle, officials said.
“Some of the survivors who parachuted to safety before the crash said they had to struggle against gravity forces sucking them back inside the spiraling plane….
“Witnesses estimated the plane fell at least 12,000 feet and was approaching 400 mph at its nearly vertical impact….
“…the jumpers were all friends who had been skydiving from the same plane since June…all 24 had planned to form a cluster on the last jump….” (Associated Press. “Eleven Die in Fiery Crash.” Farmington Daily Times, NM, 8-22-1983, A2.)
Sources
Associated Press. “Eleven Die in Fiery Crash.” Farmington Daily Times, NM, 8-22-1983, A2. Accessed 2-23-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/us/new-mexico/farmington/farmington-daily-times/1983/08-22/page-2?tag
National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Landry Aviation Lockheed Learstar L-18, N116CA, Silvana, Washington, August 21, 1983 (NTSV/AAR-84/06). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted 5-17-1984. Accessed 2-23-2017 at: http://reports.aviation-safety.net/1983/19830821-0_L18_N116CA.pdf
National Transportation Safety Board. Special Investigation Report on the Safety of Parachute Jump Operations (Aviation Special Investigation Report, NTSB/SIR-08/01). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted 9-16-2008 at: http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SIR0801.pdf
[1] Table 1. Fatal parachute jump operations accidents since 1980, p. 2.
[2] United States Parachute Association.