1983 — Feb 14, Crab boats Altair & Americus capsize, Altair sinks, Bering Sea, off AK– 14

— 14  Dillon, Patrick. Lost at Sea: An American Tragedy. NY: Dial Press, 1998.[1]

— 14  NTSB. Safety Recommendation M-86-4 through-7. 2-6-1986, 3 pages.

— 14  USCG.  Marine Casualty Report. Fishing Vessel Americas…Altair…Bering Sea.  1985.

 

Narrative Information

 

USCG: “At 0230, February 14, 1983, the fishing vessel Altair departed Dutch Harbor, Alaska enroute to the crab fishing grounds in the vicinity of the Pribilof Islands. The fishing vessel Americus followed six hours later. Both vessels were loaded with crab pots. A fishing vessel returning to Dutch Harbor from the Pribilofs made visual contact with the Altair and passed within 150 yards at around 0330 approximately 20 miles northwest of Dutch Harbor. The next contact with the vessels was made by a freighter at 1510 February 14, 1983, when a capsized hull (later identified as the Americus) was observed about 25 miles northwest of Dutch Harbor. The hull did not appear to have been damaged and continued to float until 1130 February 16, 1985. On March 16, 1983, an inflatable life raft from the Altair was found at a location approximately 11 miles from where the Americus hull was initially observed. This was and remains the only sighting from the Altair. The seven-man crews from each vessel remain missing and are presumed dead. The observations of the Americus in a capsized state with no apparent damage, the lack of distress signals from either vessel, the failure of the search effort to locate anyone in survival suits tend to support the conclusion that both vessels capsized rapidly and without warning. The Commandant has concurred with the Board that the proximate cause of these casualties is improper loading.” (USCG. Marine Casualty Report. Fishing Vessel Americas …Capsizing and Sinking – Fishing Vessel Altair…Disappearance on or about 14 Feb 1983 in the Bering Sea with Presumed Multiple Loss of Life. 1985, p. 1.)

 

NTSB: “….The Americus and the Altair, as originally designed and constructed, had more than adequate stability when carrying 258 crab posts on deck as indicated in the vessels’ stability booklets. In that loading condition, with the crab tanks empty and the double-bottom fuel tanks full as required by the vessels’ stability booklets, both vessels had ore than twice the area under the righting arm curve required by the International Maritime Organization stability criteria. However, during their years of servicer, the vessels’ displacements had been increased by the addition of trawling gear and other items, the deck space available for storing crab posts had been reduced by the installation of the trawling gear, and the captains had developed a procedure of cross-tanking the crab tanks which was not included in the stability booklets….

 

“The lightship characteristics of the Americus and Altair at the time of their loss did not correspond to the data derived from a stability test of their sister vessel Antares and presented in their stability booklets. There is no question that the displacement was increased about 35 tons and the vertical center of gravity was raised about 1 foot. However, there is evidence from the stability tests of several other vessels that other items in addition to the trawling gear added to the displacements of the Americus and the Altair. The stability test of the Morning Star showed that vessel to be about 56 tons heavier than would be expected based upon the original Antares stability test, and stability tests of the Viking Explorer and Andrew Alyeska showed that vessel to be about 60 tons heavier. No single item could be identified to explain these weight differences, and it is very likely that they resulted from a combination of items. Inaccuracies in the trawling gear weights, installation of additional equipment, tools, spare parts, supplies, fishing equipment, and minor differences in vessel construction or in vessel condition at the time of the stability tests are some factors that might cause weight differences. Since the AMERICUS and the ALTAIR were lost and no stability tests had been performed on them, the magnitude of the weight differences for those two vessels will never be known. However, the evidence does indicate that both vessels were heavier than would be expected based upon the original Antares stability test.

 

“Although the extrapolation of lightship data from one vessel to another might have been standard practice within the fishing vessel construction industry at the time, a deadweight survey probably would have been required to verify the lightship characteristics of the AMERICUS and the ALTAIR if those vessels had been required to meet U.S. Coast Guard stability standards for inspected vessels. If stability tests had been performed on the AMERICUS and the ALTAIR after the trawling gear had been installed, the increases in displacement and any inherent reductions of stability would have been discovered and quantified, and the vessels’ stability booklets and stability letters could have been modified appropriately. The revised stability information would have shown the reduced crab pot loading capacity and any other precautions necessary to ensure safe loading. If the stability information had been amended and provided to the captains of the AMERICUS and the ALTAIR, and if the captains had used the information properly, these accidents might have been prevented. The facts and analysis of this case demonstrate that several factors combined to cause the instability that resulted in the capsizing of the AMERICUS and the ALTAIR. The installation of trawling gear reduced the vessels’ stability, but the managing owner and the vessels’ captains believed that the weight of the trawling gear was offset by the reduced deck load because crab pots could no longer be carried in the space taken by the drag stanchions. The managing owner and the captains believed that carrying the previous maximum load of 258 crab pots had the same effect as carrying the trawling gear and 228 crab pots. The vessels’ stability letters cautioned that the crab tanks must remain empty when carrying the maximum load of crab pots, but at least two crab tanks were filled on both the AMERICUS and the ALTAIR and thereby contributed to the vessels’ instability.

 

“When questioned about his use of the stability booklet to determine a safe loading condition for the ALYESKA, the captain of that vessel indicated that he referred to “the maximum capacity of the boat” shown on the stability letter. He also indicated that he was “using the trim of the boat” when he concluded that the vessel could safely carry 171 crab pots when it departed Dutch Harbor on February 14, 1983. However, the stability booklet clearly indicates that the ALYESKA should have carried no more than 116 crab pots with the crab tanks full and the double bottom fuel tanks empty as they were on that day. Like the captain of the ALYESKA, the captains of the AMERICUS and the ALTAIR had no formal training in vessel stability. Although the captains of the AMERICUS and the ALTAIR had extensive experience in the fishing industry and had sailed for many years on the AMERICUS, ALTAIR, ANTARES, ALYESKA, and similar vessels, they apparently had little appreciation for the importance of the loading limitations described in the vessels’ stability booklets and stability letters. As a result, they failed to comply with the loading limitations and contributed to the vessels’ instability by filling crab tanks while carrying a full load of crab pots. If the captains had had formal training in vessel stability, they would have better understood the importance of the loading restrictions, and the accidents might have been prevented.

 

“Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that Jeff Hendricks & Associates, the managing owner of the AMERICUS and the ALTAIR:

 

Require a stability test on each new vessel unless a deadweight survey confirms that the stability data from a sister vessel may be used. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-86-4)

 

Require a stability test or deadweight survey and amended stability information when major modifications, such as the addition of trawling gear, are made to your vessels. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-86-5)

 

Require your vessel operators to comply strictly with the provisions of vessel stability letters and stability booklets, and establish a monitoring system to ensure compliance. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-86-6)

 

Provide formal training for your fishing vessel captains in vessel stability and the use of vessel stability information to establish safe loading conditions. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-86-7) ….”

 

(NTSB. Safety Recommendation M-86-4 through-7. Washington, DC: NTSB, 2-6-1986, pp. 1-3.

 

Dillon: “….The Coast Guard had been advocating safety laws for a dozen years, and the commercial industry had fought tem for just as long. In the mid-1970s, when Senator Magnuson proposed the two-hundred-mile territorial limit and for federally subsidized loants to bolster the U.S. fishing fleet, the Coast Guard had proposed testing and licensing captains, inspecting and registering fishing vessels, and making safety equipment such as life preservers and rafts mandatory. But industry lobbyists protested that the margin of profit was already so tight that each dollar spent loading their boats with safety equipment was a dollar that could be invested in catching fish and paying their crews.

 

“That was bull…What was really at stake was the pride of the fishermen. They fought government intervention of any kind, and well-situated eminencies on Capitol Hill such as Senators Ted Stevens of Alaska, Magnuson of Washington, and Congressman Don Young of Alaska, had given the fishing industry the political backing it needed to keep the Coast Guard at bay. At this point there was not one single law requiring safety equipment or survival measures for any fishing boats in the U.S. commercial fleet.

 

“Backed by hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions — at a time when that amount purchased political impact — the fishing industry upheld its argument even in the face of labor statistics that showed employment in the industry had risen by forth percent since 1974 and per capita income, adjusted for inflation, remained steady during the same time. In fact, the value of the Alaska fishery had nearly doubled in ten years.

 

“Richard Hiscock, a former commercial fisherman who became a marine-safety consultant, had even offered Congress some figures showing costs to equip vessels carrying four- to ten-man crews with life rafts, survival suits, and EPIRBs.[2] As an example, the stated, the overall costs for a six-man crew requiring a raft, exposure suits, and an EPIRB would be approximately $9,000. When averaged over the ten-year life span of the equipment, the cost would be nominal, about $150 annually per man for tem years. ‘That doesn’t seem to me to be a high price to pay to save a life,’ Hiscock testified at a congressional hearing on marine safety in the late winter of 1983, even as the investigation into the loss of the Altair and Americus was about to begin.”[3] [118-119]

 

Dillon on reconvening of joint USCG-NTSB hearing on the loss of the two fishing boats on Dec 19, 1984: “During the twenty-two months that had elapsed since the overturned hull of the Americus was first discovered, 488 commercial fishing vessels were lost and 240 fishermen died — more than one-third of them in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska. More than half of those deaths in Alaskan waters were caused by vessels capsizing.” [p. 180]

 

Sources

 

Dillon, Patrick. Lost at Sea: An American Tragedy. NY: Dial Press, 1998.

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Safety Recommendation M-86-4 through-7. Washington, DC: NTSB, 2-6-1986, 3 pages. Accessed 2-24-2017 at: https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/M86_4_7.pdf

 

United States Coast Guard. Marine Casualty Report. Fishing Vessel Americas, O.N. 595758, Capsizing and Sinking – Fishing Vessel Altair, O.N. 618390, Disappearance on or about 14 February 1983 in the Bering Sea with Presumed Multiple Loss of Life (Report No. USCG 16732/0002 HQS 83).  Washington, DC:  Commandant, USCG, July 19, 1985, 63 pages.  Accessed 2-24-2017 at: https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/docs/boards/amerialtair.pdf

 

 

[1] Names, position, age, experience and next of kin for each crew listed inside pages just before the Contents page.

[2] Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon.

[3] A few pages later Dillon, in discussing a USCG hearing, notes that the owner of the boats, who contributed to their design, Jeff Hendricks, indicated that the boats did have EPIRBs. In Dillon’s words, when asked his theory why they were not used, “He answered that it was  company policy to store the devices in the wheelhouse, to guard against thieves in Dutch Harbor. Once out to sea the skippers usually mounted the beacons in brackets outside the wheelhouse, where they could break free, float, and transmit their location. But…he had no idea why no signal was heard from either of his vessels.” (p. 131.0