1984 — Dec 6, Provincetown–Boston Airlines fl. 1039 takeoff crash, Jacksonville AP, FL–13
–13 Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Provincetown-Boston Air, 6 Dec 1984.
–13 NTSB. AAR Provincetown-Boston Airlines Flight 1039…Jacksonville, FL, Dec 6, 1984.
–13 UPI. “A Provincetown-Boston Airways plane crashed, burned…disintegrated.” 12-6-1984.
Narrative Information
ASN: “At 18:12, flight 1039 was cleared for takeoff from runway 31. At 18:13, while over the departure end of the runway and climbing through 600 feet, the crew acknowledged a frequency change. Thirty seconds later, the airplane was seen in a steep a descent near the extended centerline of the runway.…” (ASN; citing NTSB/AAR-86/04.)
NTSB: “SYNOPSIS
“Provincetown-Boston Airlines Flight 1039, an Embraer Bandeirante[1], was cleared from the Jacksonville International Airport, Jacksonville, Florida, to Tampa Florida, at 1805 eastern standard time on December 6, 1985, in visual flight conditions. There were 11 passengers and 2 crewmembers aboard the scheduled domestic passenger flight operating under 14 CFR 135. At 1812, flight 1039 was cleared for takeoff, and, at 1813, while over the departure end of the runway and climbing, the crew acknowledged a frequency change. Thirty seconds later, about 1814, the airplane was seen in a steep descent near the extended centerline of the runway.
“Flight 1039 struck the ground 7,800 feet beyond the departure end of runway 31 and 85 feet to the northeast (right) of the extended runway centerline in an inverted nose down attitude, after which it caught fire and burned. The airplane was demolished, and all 13 persons aboard were killed. Before ground impact, the horizontal stabilizer, including bulkhead No. 36, had separated from the fuselage. Both elevators and elevator tips, the tail cone assembly, and the aft portion of the ventral fin also had separated in flight.
“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a malfunction of either the elevator control system or the elevator trim system, which resulted in an airplane pitch control problem. The reaction of the flightcrew to correct the pitch control problem overstressed the left elevator control rod, which resulted in asymmetrical elevator deflection and overstress failure of the horizontal stabilizer attachment structure. The Safety Board was not able to determine the precise problem with the pitch control system.” (NTSB, p. 1)
“Wreckage Description….The upper fuselage structure, from the main cabin door aft to the baggage door, was subjected to intense fire which consumed a major portion of the cockpit and center fuselage structure. The area between the baggage door and bulkhead No. 33 (the forward attachment point of the horizontal stabilizer) exhibited severe and extensive impact damage with moderate fire damage.” (NTSB 1984, 4)
“The flightcrew and passengers died from traumatic injuries. Post-mortem fire injuries of varying degrees were noted in all cases….This accident was nut survivable due to severe impact forces which exceeded human tolerance.” (NTSB, p.16) “The accident was nonsurvivable because the top of the fuselage collapsed downward to the seat pans with a measured 50 percent reduction in cockpit and cabin volume. This resulted in massive blunt trauma injuries to the occupants that precluded the possibility of survival.” (NTSB, p. 28)
“The Safety Board believes that a flightcrew that has received training for a runaway trim emergency, which includes a simulator demonstration of the control forces required to prevent the airplane from accelerating out of control and the actions required to stop the runaway, would be likely to react more quickly to the emergency than an untrained crew. Therefore, the Safety Board supports the efforts of the Regional Airline Association to promote the development and use of training devices acceptable to the FAA for the class of airplanes used in its operations.” (NTSB, p. 37)
“The Safety Board believes that the facts and circumstances of this accident further illustrate the need for a requirement that flight data recorders (FDR) and cockpit voice recorders (CVR) be installed in multiengine, turbine-powered, fixed-wing airplanes. Recorded flight parameters and CVR conversation would have provided significant clues regarding the cause of this accident and permitted more timely and positive identification of the remedial action needed to prevent recurrence. Although the Safety Board is encouraged by the FAA’s notice of proposed rule making (NPRM) concerning the installation of CVRs on multi-engine, turbine-powered, fixed-wing aircraft operating under 14 CFR 135, it is concerned that a final rule has yet to be issued and urges the FAA to expedite its implementation….
“Between 1971 and 1980 there were 180 fatal general aviation accidents in the US. involving multiengine, turbine-powered aircraft. In 88 percent of these, the aircraft was destroyed, and in 53 percent of those destroyed the aircraft suffered fire after impact. We maintain that the condition of the wreckage in these cases coupled with the lack of cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder information has prevented the Safety Board from fully and accurately assessing all of the factors associated with these accidents. Although the Safety Board assigned a probable cause for most of these, the body of the NTSB accident reports explains the degree of uncertainty associated with each, and the necessity for recorders.” (NTSB, pp. 40-41)
UPI, Dec 6: “Jacksonville, Fla….PBA, the nation’s largest commuter airline, had just resumed full service Tuesday [Dec 4] after being grounded by the FAA Nov. 9 for safety violations….
“Identities of the victims were not available immediately, but…most of the passengers were businessmen…no children or families were believed aboard the aircraft….
“T e FAA pulled PBA’s license Nov. 9, charging the airline with improper aircraft maintenance and the use of unqualified pilots. PBA resumed limited flights on Nov. 26 as FAA inspectors began recertifying its planes and pilots and supervised the rewriting of its safety manuals. The airline reported Tuesday it had resumed full service with its fleet of 105 aircraft ranging from nine-seat, twin-engine Cessna 402s to 30-passenger DC-3s and Martin 404s.
“Prior to being grounded, the 34-year-old airline with headquarters in Boston and Naples, Fla., flew about 4,000 passengers daily, serving 35 cities in the Northeast and Southeast. It employs 1,500 people, including 300 pilots.” (UPI/Kenneth A. Soo. “A Provincetown-Boston Airways plane crashed, burned and disintegrated in…” 12-6-1984.)
UPI, May 6, 1986: “Tampa — Provincetown-Boston Airlines will be taken over by People Express Airlines, which said it would be able to finance the reorganization of BPA’s despite posting a first-quarter loss last week of $58 million….People Express already has invested $2.6 million to buy the airline and pay off its immediate debts…”
Sources
Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Provincetown-Boston Airline Flight 1039, 6 December 1984. Accessed 2-15-2017 at: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19841206-0
National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Provincetown-Boston Airlines Flight 1039, Embraer Bandeirante, EMB-1 10P 1, N96PB, Jacksonville, Florida, December 6, 1984 (NTSB/ AAR-86/04). Washington, DC: NTSB, June 24, 1986.106 pages. Accessed at: http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR86-04.pdf
United Press International (Kenneth A. Soo). “A Provincetown-Boston Airways plane crashed, burned and disintegrated in…” 12-6-1984. Accessed 2-15-2017 at: http://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/12/06/A-Provincetown-Boston-Airways-plane-crashed-burned-and-disintegrated-in/2111471157200/
United Press International. “People Express Buys Bankrupt Line.” Chicago Tribune, 5-6-1986. Accessed 2-15-2017 at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-05-06/business/8602010907_1_pba-people-express-airlines-provincetown-boston-airlines
[1] A Brazilian “light, twin engine turboprop airplane with a maximum seating capacity of 21, including 19 passengers and 2 pilots.” (NTSB 1984, 3)