1985 — Dec 16, Gas Explosion, Rocky Mt. Natural Gas Co., Glenwood Springs, CO — 12
–12 Kyte. LP Gas Explosion, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, December 16, 1985. NFPA.
–12 Post Independent (John Stroud), Glenwood Springs. “30 years after…” 12-19-2015.[1]
–12 Post Independent, Glenwood Springs. “An explosion that rocked Glenwood.” 12-15-2005.[2]
Narrative Information
Kyte/NFPA: “At approximately 9:15 a.m. on December 16, 1985, an explosion and subsequent fire occurred at the Rocky Mountain Natural Gas Company operations office in Glenwood Springs, Colorado. The blast caused the structural collapse of the facility and left twelve employees dead and fifteen injured.
“Although the company’s business dealt primarily with natural gas distribution, customers located in remote areas where natural gas was not available were supplied with Liquefied Petroleum Gas. On the morning of the explosion, an 853-gallon water capacity LP-Gas tank containing an undetermined quantity of product had been brought inside the building for servicing. The tank’s liquid level gauge was not functioning correctly and was in the process of being repaired. During a repair procedure, the gauge suddenly separated from the tank, releasing propane under pressure and within one minute, an explosion occurred….
“The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), with assistance from the International Conference of Building Officials (ICBO), investigated the LP-Gas explosion which occurred at the Rocky Mountain Natural Gas Company operations office in Glenwood Springs, Colorado in order to document and analyze significant factors that resulted in the loss of life….
“The Rocky Mountain Natural Gas Company operations office, located at 934 County Road 164 in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, was a two-level structure erected in 1974 with plan dimensions of approximately 48 feet by 96 feet. Originally built as a contractors office/warehouse in the unincorporated portion of Garfield County, the building served as the operations office for distribution of natural gas. In addition, the company distributed LP-Gas to a small number of remote customers. The lower level served as a repair, maintenance, and storage area for the company’s vehicles and equipment. The upper level was used for dispatching and monitoring activities, labwork, and general offices….
“At the time of the explosion a fork lift, truck tractor, pickup truck, automobile, and a truck tractor with flat bed trailer and an 853-gallon water capacity LP-Gas tank secured by chains to the flat bed were in the lower level. This area was used as a repair garage and had the ancillary equipment generally used such as acetylene and electric arc welders, solvent parts cleaner, tool and work benches, tire changing equipment, etc. From time to time spray painting was reportedly conducted in the repair garage….
“The outside temperature on the morning of December 16, 1985 was approximately 20°F as employees of the gas company operations office arrived to work. During the early morning hours, there were 27 employees located in various parts of the building. Twenty-one persons were occupying the upper level offices and six were in the lower level when the explosion occurred.
“One of the tasks to be performed that morning was the affixing of decals to an LP-Gas tank. The tank was anchored by chains to a flat bed trailer parked outside in the service yard. Classified as a stationary container, the tank was in the process of being located from one site to another with a brief stopover at the operations office. Due to the cold temperature and a layer of ice on the container shell, the decals would not adhere. The decision was made to pull the trailer into the lower level maintenance shop in order to warm the container so decals could be applied. Apparently this decision was made by repairmen with the knowledge that the tank contained a quantity of product. At approximately 8:30 a.m. the rig, consisting of a tractor and flatbed trailer with the tank, was driven headfirst into the shop area leaving a portion of the trailer remaining outside. To help reduce heat loss in the garage, the overhead door was pulled down to rest on the top of the flatbed trailer.
“After being indoors for some thirty minutes, work began on the container although a layer of ice remained on the tank shell. One of the repairmen, using a hand held hair dryer, proceeded to warm and dry off a section of the tank shell in preparation for affixing the decal. Another repairman examined the gauges and valves located at the end of the container nearest the truck cab. In doing so, a gauge used to determine the level of the liquid propane inside the tank appeared to be malfunctioning and in need of repair. The exact amount of liquid propane inside the tank is unknown; however, best estimates are that it was at least 5% full. As one of the repairmen proceeded to install decals, another began removing the gauge by loosening four bolts that secured it in place. As the last bolt was removed, a third occupant later recalled that he recognized the hazardous condition presented by the repair procedure. Just as he started to warn the repairman working on the gauge, the gauge assembly suddenly released, discharging propane under pressure, throughout the shop. The repairman who had been fixing the gauge was hurled back against the truck cab by the force of the escaping propane.
“An estimated 500 cubic feet of gas was released into the building’s lower level creating a shrill noise as it escaped. Those persons occupying the lower level immediately recognized the danger of the situation. Many of them chose to evacuate the premises because of the extreme explosion potential. Others risked their lives attempting to eliminate potential ignition sources during the brief moments before the explosion. The twenty-one employees located on the upper level received little or no warning to respond to the emergency. An estimated one minute after the initial leak, a large explosion suddenly occurred in the lower level of the building.
“Two by-standers, who had witnessed the building collapse from a distant vantage point, were subsequently interviewed. Both persons described hearing first a loud, sonic-type boom that caused their attention to be drawn toward the gas company operations building. One of the witnesses stated that the northwest wall section blew out and the roof was raised straight up. When the roof came down, the entire building collapsed and a cloud of dust rose above the scene. Both witnesses stated that the ensuing fires did not appear until an estimated 2-3 minutes after the explosion….
“…some survivors were pinned in the building collapse. It was essential to perform fire fighting activities while conducting rescue operations as fire was threatening those trapped…. Emergency personnel working to extricate victims were in constant danger of falling wall sections…. It took nearly 2 1/2 hours to extricate these employees….
“Eventually, a list of missing persons was compiled, and it was determined that 12 persons were still unaccounted for. Access to portions of the wreckage was extremely difficult due to fires burning deep within the rubble….
“Approximately 107 fire, rescue, and construction personnel were utilized at the scene to extinguish fires, rescue survivors, and recover victims. Over 30 law enforcement officers provided controlled access to the scene during the entire operation. A total of 7 emergency personnel were transported to the hospital for treatment of injuries received while in the performance of their duties….
“Rescue crews worked through the night to recover those who were killed in the incident. By 1:30 a.m. on the morning of December 17th, eleven victims had been located and transported to the coroner’s office for identification and autopsy. The search was suspended and scheduled to resume after day break at 7:30 a.m. At around 1:20 p.m. that afternoon, the twelfth and final victim was located and removed from the wreckage. All but one of the fatalities had been located on the upper level of the building when the incident occurred….
“The most probable source of ignition was a gas-fired space heater suspended from the ceiling located on the southwest end of the shop. This opinion was based on the proximity of the heater to the tank and statements by surviving employees indicating the direction from which the explosion came. Although attempts were made to shut this unit down, only the electrical supply to the fan blower was switched off prior to the explosion. There was not sufficient time to locate and shut off the gas supply and extinguish the pilot light, which is believed to have been the source of ignition….
“Following the explosion, the U.S. Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration conducted an investigation that resulted in a citation and proposed fines amounting to $2,000. The violations concern:
- Working on an LP-Gas tank containing propane inside the operations office building,
- Permitting an employee not trained in such functions to work on an LP-Gas tank containing propane inside the operations office building….
“The significant factor contributing to the loss of life in this incident is considered to be the use of improper procedures for the repair of appurtenances on a vessel containing LP-Gas inside a structure.” (Kyte. LP Gas Explosion, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, December 16, 1985. NFPA.)
Sources
Kyte, Greg. LP Gas Explosion, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, December 16, 1985 (Fire Investigation Report). Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 17 pages. No date.
Post Independent (John Stroud), Glenwood Springs. “30 years after gas blast: ‘When is a political favor worth 12 lives?’” 12-19-2015. Accessed 1-23-2017 at: http://www.postindependent.com/news/local/30-years-after-gas-blast-when-is-a-political-favor-worth-12-lives/
Post Independent, Glenwood Springs. “An explosion that rocked Glenwood.” 12-15-2005. Accessed 1-23-2017 at: http://www.postindependent.com/news/an-explosion-that-rocked-glenwood/
[1] Names of fatalities are given in the article.
[2] Some details differ from the Kyte report for the NFPA.