–290 Barry, John and Roger Charles. “Sea of Lies.” Newsweek, 7-12-1992.

–290 Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Iran Air flight 655. Aviation Disaster…Persian Gulf (1988).”

–290 Evans, Marine LTC. “Vincennes: A Case Study.” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, 1993.

–290 Fisher. “The forgotten story of Iran Air Flight 655.” Washington Post, 10-16-2013.

–290 Hammond. “The ‘Forgotten’ US Shootdown of Iranian…655.” Foreign Policy Journal, 7-3-2017.

–290 Kaplan. “America’s Flight 17…the United States blew up a passenger plane…” Slate, 7-23-2014.

–290 Sturkey. Mayday. Accident Reports… from Airline Crash Investigations. 2005, p. 260.

–290 US Navy. Formal Investigation… (Rear Admiral Fogarty Report), 7-28-1988, p. 6.[1]

Narrative Information

Sturkey: “Overview: A big Airbus A-300[2] took off from Bandar Abbas in southern Iran.[3] On course and on schedule, the airliner flew over the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to the Persian Gulf. By chance its flight path took it directly toward a U.S. Navy warship which was engaged in a battle with Iranian gunboats. The warship crew believed the airliner was an attacking Iranian F-14 fighter,[4] and they shot it down.[5] All 290 people on board were killed.”[6]

U.S. DOD Investigative Report (from Admiral Crowe letter of transmittal): “The downing of civilian Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July was a tragic and regrettable accident and, as is so often the case in a combat environment, there were a number of contributing factors. It is first important to put the events of that day in the local context.

“The U.S. Government committed naval forces to the convoying of American flag tankers in the spring of 1987. From the outset, the Administration [Reagan] emphasized that while our forces could achieve this mission, it would involve risks and uncertainties. This prediction was borne out by several incidents, e.g., the indiscriminate laying of Iranian mines, the Bridgeton explosion,[7] the STARK tragedy,[8] the Samuel B. Roberts striking a mine,[9] the capture of the Iran Ajar,[10] Iranian firing on U.S. helos, and the incidents of April 18 when Iranian ships and aircraft attempted to damage U.S. units. Throughout this period and especially in the wake of the above events, the Government of Iran issued inflammatory statements threatening retaliation against American personnel and interests. Reinforcing the high level of tension, both Baghdad and Teheran have continued to attack unarmed merchant ships, the former with aircraft and the latter with small boats, ships and aircraft. Iranian assaults have been largely concentrated in the southern gulf and on occasion have taken place in the presence of foreign warships.

“As a result of the STARK incident, our commanders were given a revised set of ROE[11] which clarified their authority to take positive protective measures when hostile intent was manifested. It was emphasized that they do not have to be shot at before responding and that they have an unambiguous responsibility to protect their units and people. To facilitate these measures a Notice to Airmen was reviewed and reissued in September 1987. It advised all nations who operate aircraft in the Persian Gulf region that U.S. Navy ships were taking additional precautions. In particular the need for aircraft operating in those waters to be prepared to identify themselves on specific circuits and to state their intentions was emphasized. Additionally, they were advised that failure to respond to requests for identification, as well as operating in a threatening manner, could place aircraft at risk by U.S. defensive measures. These practices, despite some grumbling, have been generally accepted in the Gulf. Unfortunately, few commercial airlines saw fit to reroute their aircraft or to make any other significant allowances for the hostile environment. Still, it is clear that all concerned were aware that U.S. ships were deployed in the area nod that those units fully intended to defend themselves when necessary. [end of p. 1]

“For several months preceding the Air bus shootdown, the U.S. had received reports of Iranian efforts to improve their ability to attack U.S. men-of-war[12] and other types of aircraft to carry a variety of air-to-surface missiles, and to develop small boat ‘swarm’ tactics which could break through a warship’s defensive gunfire. Special occasions, such as Moslem or American holidays, inevitably precipitated intelligence reports that the Iranians were preparing a particular operation directed at Americans. In fact, we had been warned of the possibility of some type of unusual assault on the 4^th of July weekend.

“Of especial interest was the recent was the recent shift of Iranian F-14’s from Bushehr to Bandar Abbas. In the few days preceding this incident several F-14 flights, operating from Bandar Abbas, took place in the southern Gulf. On 2 July, USS HALSEY[13] had to warn away a potentially threatening Iranian F-14.

“Upon arrival in the region every unit, including VINCINNES, was briefed on our past experience, the current ROE, and most recent intelligence. It is fair to say that incoming ships approach Gulf operations aware of the uncertain environment and with an appreciation of the need for vigilance. Similarly, they have been impressed with their responsibility to defend themselves in a forehanded manner….

“The events that led up to the tragedy on 3 July were typical of the everyday patterns in the Gulf. On 2 July, Iranian gunboats in the Gulf had positioned themselves in the western approaches to the Straits of Hormuz and were challenging transiting merchantmen. MONTGOMERY[14] was located sufficiently close to a ship attack in progress to respond to a request for distress assistance and to fire warning shots to ward off IRGC[15] units attacking a merchant vessel.

“On the morning of 3 July, MONTGOMERY observed seven IRGC small boats approaching a Pakistani vessel. The number shortly thereafter grew to 13 and they began to challenge nearby merchantmen. VINCNNES was ordered to the area to support MONTGOMERY and launched a helicopter to reconnoiter the scene. In the process the helicopter was fired upon. VINCENNES and MONTGOMERY closed the general areas of the small boats. Two of the boats turned toward VINCENNES and MONTGOMERY while the others began to maneuver erratically. These actions were interpreted as manifesting hostile intent and both ships, after being given permission, engaged. This action, involving high speed course changes and gunfire at close range, was still in progress when Air Bus 655 took off from the joint military/civilian airfield at Bandar Abba and headed toward Dubai. It is hard to overemphasize the fact that Bandar Abbas is also a military airfield. The Air Bus was probably not informed of the surface action taking place in the Strait. Informed or not, Flight 655 logically appeared to have a direct relationship to the ongoing surface engagement. [end of p. 2.]

“Even this brief and simplistic description, leads to the opinion, which the investigation drew, that Iran must share the responsibility for the tragedy. Given the fat that the surface engagement was initiated by the Iranians, I believe that the actions of Iran were the proximate cause of this accident and would argue that Iran must bear the principal responsibility for the tragedy. By any measure it was unconscionable to ignore the repeated warnings of U.S. forces concerning potential hazards of flight in the Gulf. It was especially reprehensible to allow an airliner to take off from a joint ‘military/civilian’ airfield and fly directly into the midst of a gunfight. As for the aircraft itself, its failure not to monitor the international air distress net and not to respond to challenges was significantly negligent….

“During the critical seven minutes that Flight 655 was airborne, Captain Rogers[16] and his CIC[17] watch team were integrating a multitude of ongoing events. Specifically, VINCENNES was engaged in a high-speed surface battle with at least two groups of Iranian small boats — all of which had the capability to inflict serious personnel and equipment damage on VINCENNES and MONTGOMERY. Any one of these could have been a terrorist platform prepared to make a suicide run against either ship. At the same time, she was monitoring one of her helos which was airborne and had already come under attack from the Iranian small boats. CIC was also tracking an Iranian P-3 military aircraft airborne approximately 60 nautical miles to the northwest which was presenting a classic targeting profile. (i.e., furnishing information to an attack aircraft.) Captain Rogers was given and assumed tactical command of the MONTGOMERY and SIDES.[18] He was also prepared to assume tactical command of U.S. combat aircraft ordered in and approaching the scene from outside the Persian Gulf. Additionally, VINCENNES was dealing with a fouled gun mount and maneuvering extensively to keep her remaining gun unmasked to engage the multiple target threat. At one point she was forced to make a full rudder turn at 30 knots which caused the ship to heel sharply and added to the drama.

“In the midst of this highly charged environment, an unknown aircraft took off from a joint military/civilian airport on a flight path headed directly toward VINCENNES and MONTGOMERY. This was the same airfield from which Iran had launched F-4’s in support of an attack on U.S. naval forces on 18 April and from which Iran had repeatedly launched F-14 fighter aircraft during the prior week. This unknown aircraft was 27 minutes behind any scheduled commercial airline departure from Bandar Abbas airport.[19] Although it was flying within a known commercial air corridor, it was off the centerline some 3 or 4 miles, which was not the usual centerline profile for commercial air traffic previously monitored by VINCENNES. Moreover, its mid-range altitude was consistent with either a hostile or commercial aircraft.

“VINCENNES could detect no radar emanations from the contact which might identify it,[20] but was reading a MODE III IFF.[21] This situation [end p. p.3] was confused somewhat when a Mode II IFF[22] squawk was detected and the aircraft was identified as an F-14[23]….the unknown contact continued at a gradually increasing speed on a course headed toward VINCENNES and MONTGOMERY. It failed to respond to repeated challenges from VINCENNES over both the military and international emergency distress frequencies[24]….the threatening contact was closing abut 5-6 miles a minute…his decision time [Captain Rogers] was less than 5 minutes…. [p. 4]

“The Commanding Officer [Rogers] did not put emphasis on the air corridor [for civilian aircraft from the Bandar Abbas airport] being 20 miles wide. In fact, his experience in the Gulf suggested that commercial aircraft normally tried had to stay directly on the center line. He believed that 3 to 4 miles off the center axis as unusual and should be considered. In actual fact, however, it is again a peripheral point. An attacker would probably prefer to be in an air corridor if it confused his target. The Persian Gulf is blanketed by air corridors; they cover over 50% of the Gulf. Being in an air corridor is secondary information at best and must be combined with altitude, voice transmissions, etc., to be conclusive.

“By far the most puzzling mistake to me was the ultimate misreading of altitude. The investigation established that the range and altitude information passed to the Commanding Officer was correct until the contact reached approximately 15NM. The time was 0653:45Z. Shortly thereafter, at a range between 15 and 12 miles, the Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC) reported that the altitude (which he estimated had previously reached 11,000 feet) was decreasing.[25] At that moment, the Commanding Officer was rapidly reaching a point of no return with his Standard missiles and was inside the potential Iranian air-to-surface missile threat envelope….the investigation concluded that the time from the first report of decreasing altitude to the decision to fire was in the neighbourhood of 20 to 30 seconds…. [p. 5.]

“The Commanding Officer testified that it was only one piece of information among many. In this reviewing officer’s opinion, it is unlikely that this one piece of information would have settled the issue one way or another given the uncertainties that remained and the extremely short time left….[26]

“Given the time available, the Commanding Officer could hardly meet his obligation to protect his ship and crew and also clear up all of the possible ambiguities. It is not unusual in combat to have to deal with uncertainties and conflicting information. Although it might not seem fair, commanding officers do not have the luxury of reconciling all such questions before committing themselves.[27] They have to go with the weight of evidence. These are the realities of combat and the commanding officer, if he is to function effectively, must be given some latitude to deal with them….[28] [p. 6.]

“…I recommend that some additional human engineering be done on the display systems of AEGIS. The objective would be to better equip it for assisting with rapid decisions in a situation such as VINCENNES confronted. Secretary Carlucci[29] and I visited. The AEGIS mock-up at Wallop’s Island [VA] for a briefing on AEGIS and a partial reconstruction of the Flight 655 shootdown. It seemed to our inexperienced eyes that the Commanding Officer should have some way of separating crucial information from other data. Moreover, the vital data should be displayed in some fashion on the LSD[30] so the Commanding Officer and his main assistants do not have to shift their attention back and forth between displays….” [p. 8.] (Signed: William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

Barry and Charles: “The modern navy has many ladders. Its officers can earn their stripes at sea or in the air. They can prosper by navigating the shoals of technocracy. But the one sure path to glory is the same as in Roman times: victory at sea. Sailing in harm’s way is a matter of vocation.

“Capt. Will Rogers III, USN, spent his career preparing for combat. Winning his commission in December 1965 at the age of 27, Rogers came late to the navy, but he made up for lost time with a gung-ho attitude and-after a spell on the staff of the chief of naval operations –friends in high places. In 1987, Rogers won command of the navy’s most prized high-tech hip, an Aegis cruiser. The billion-dollar Vincennes seemed a sure ticket to flag rank. But Rogers, who, like many peacetime naval officers had never been under fire, longed to see action.

“On July 3, 1988, Captain Rogers got his wish. He sought out and engaged the enemy in a sea battle in the Persian Gulf. From the captain’s chair of a warship’s combat information center, he made life-and-death decisions in the heat of conflict. It was the moment he had yearned and trained for, and it should have been the apex of his life in the service.

“Only it wasn’t much of a battle. Rogers had blundered into a murky, half-secret confrontation between the United States and Iran that the politicians did not want to declare and the top brass was not eager to wage. The enemy was not a disciplined naval force but ragtag irregulars in lightly armed speedboats. Fighting them with an Aegis cruiser was like shooting at rabbits with a radar-guided missile. And when it was over, the only confirmed casualties were innocent civilians: 290 passengers and crew in an Iranian Airbus that Captain Rogers’s men mistook for an enemy warplane.

“The destruction of Iran Air Flight 655 was an appalling human tragedy…. For the navy, it was a professional disgrace. The navy’s most expensive surface warship, designed to track and shoot down as many as 200 incoming missiles at once, had blown apart an innocent civilian airliner in its first time in combat. What’s more, NEWSWEEK has learned, the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters at the time of the shoot-down–in clear violation of international law. The top Pentagon brass understood from the beginning that if the whole truth about the Vincennes came out, it would mean months of humiliating headlines. So the U.S. Navy did what all navies do after terrible blunders at sea: it told lies and handed out medals.

“This is the story of a naval fiasco, of an overeager captain, panicked crewmen, and the cover-up that followed. A NEWSWEEK investigation, joined by ABC News’s “Nightline,” encountered months of stonewalling by senior naval officers. Some of the evasions were products of simple denial; a number of the seamen and officers aboard the Vincennes that morning in July 1988 are still in therapy today, wrestling with guilt. But the Pentagon’s official investigation into the incident, the Fogarty Report, is a pastiche of omissions, half-truths and outright deceptions. It was a cover-up approved at the top, by Adm. William Crowe, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“Captain Rogers insisted to “Nightline” last week that he had made the “proper decision.” He opened fire only to protect his ship and crew, he said. But drawing on declassified documents, video and audiotape from the ships involved in the incident, and well over 100 interviews, NEWSWEEK has pieced together an account that belies the skipper’s stoic defense. It is almost a parable for an era of “limited” warfare, with its blurry rules of engagement and its lethal technology in frightened young hands. It is as well an age-old story of hubris, of a warrior who wanted war too much.

“At 6:33 local time on the Vincennes, on the morning of July 3, the phone buzzed in Will Rogers’s cramped sleeping quarters….

“Some 50 miles to the northeast, the U.S. Navy frigate Montgomery was coming through the western entrance of the Strait of Hormuz. Every day, tankers bearing half the world’s imported oil wend their way through the strait, only 32 miles wide at its choke point. The Iran-Iraq War had turned the strait into a gantlet. Gunboats of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, based on the islands of Hengam and Abu Musa, had been attacking tankers and merchantmen bound to and from Kuwait, Iraq’s main ally in the war. Anxious to keep Kuwait’s oil flowing, the United States had agreed to provide escort to Kuwaiti tankers registered under the U.S. flag.

“On this July morning, the Montgomery spotted a half-dozen Revolutionary Guard launches venturing out from their island hideouts. On his own, Rogers decided to enter the fray. At 6:33, the Vincennes log records, he ordered “all ahead flank.” The cruiser’s four massive gas-turbine engines cranked up 80,000 horsepower and sent the warship smashing through the waves at 30 knots….

“At 7:22, the Vincennes’s SH-60B Seahawk helicopter lifted off and sped north; within 20 minutes it was circling over the Iranian gunboats. The pilot of Ocean Lord 25, Lt. Mark Collier, found the gunboats hovering around a German cargo vessel, the Dhaulagiri. They weren’t shooting. It was a common harassment tactic….

“The Vincennes had a dubious reputation inside the U.S. fleet in the gulf. Officers on other ships sarcastically referred to the ship as ‘Robocruiser.’ In deskbound war games in San Diego, just before the Vincennes left for the gulf, Rogers consistently pushed beyond the exercise’s rules of engagement, according to another participant. At a Subic Bay, Philippines, briefing on the rules of engagement in the Persian Gulf, the most senior officer attending from the Vincennes was a lieutenant. In early June, Rogers infuriated Capt. Robert Hattan, the commander of the frigate USS Sides, by ordering him to close in on an Iranian warship in a w he deemed provocative. Hattan refused–and fleet headquarters in Bahrain backed him up. By early July, Rogers was widely regarded as ‘trigger happy,’ according to several high-ranking officers.

“He was unquestionably eager to get at the gunboats trailing after the Montgomery. Onward the Vincennes charged, past the German merchantman (which nonchalantly flashed an “A-OK” signal) until it drew abreast of the Montgomery at 8:38. By now, Oman’s coast guard was on the radio, ordering the Revolutionary Guard boats to head home. The Omanis wanted the Vincennes to leave, too. ” U.S. Navy warship,” an Omani officer intoned over the radio, “maneuvers at speeds up to 30 knots are not in accordance with innocent passage. Please leave Omani waters. “By chance, a navy cameraman named Rudy Pahoyo was aboard the Vincennes that day, shooting videotape on the bridge. His video captures the officers’ response to the Omani request. They smirked at each other, and did not bother to reply.

“The Omanis weren’t the only ones who wanted the Vincennes out of the area. At 8:40, Captain McKenna in Bahrain returned to his command center and was startled to see that Vincennes was off the top of the Omani peninsula-about 40 miles north from where he believed he had ordered Rogers to remain. In some irritation, McKenna called Rogers and asked him what he was doing. Rogers replied that he was supporting his helo, and that he’d been having communications problems. Unimpressed, McKenna told him to head back toward Abu Musa. ‘You want me to do what?’ Rogers bristled. Over the circuit, McKenna could hear chortles of laughter from the Vincennes combat information center. Now angry, McKenna delivered a flat order: the Vincennes must come south — and the Montgomery, too. He was furious at the attitude of the captain and officers of the hotshot billion-dollar cruiser. ‘Aegis arrogance,’ he muttered to himself. Rogers grudgingly obeyed the order-but he left his helo behind to watch the Iranian boats. It was to be a fatal mistake.

“In the cockpit of Ocean Lord 25, pilot Mark Collier could not resist the temptation to follow the gunboats north, as they retreated toward their island lair. He later explained that he wanted to drop down and see how many men were aboard the launches, and how they were armed. He almost found out the hard way. As he banked around them, Collier saw what he later described as ‘eight to 10 bursts of light’ and ‘sparks … just a big spark’ in the sky 100 yards from his helo. He thought for a moment it was the sun glinting off a boat, but then he saw puffs of smoke. ‘Did you see that?’ Collier called out to Petty Officer Scott Zilge. ‘Yeah,” ‘Zilge replied. ‘Let’s get out of here. That was an airburst-antiaircraft fire.’ As Collier dropped the helo to the safety of 100 feet, the aircraft’s commander, Lt. Roger Huff, sitting in the copilot’s seat, radioed the Vincennes: ‘Trinity Sword. This is Ocean Lord 25. We’re taking fire. Executing evasion.’

“In the combat information center, this was all Rogers needed. At last the gunboats had committed a hostile act. Under the navy’s rules of engagement in the gulf, Rogers could order hot pursuit. ‘General Quarters,’ he snapped. ‘Full power.” Once again, the Vincennes forged north at 30 knots….

“At 9:39, still lacking a clear target, Rogers radioed fleet headquarters and announced his intention to open fire. In Bahrain, Admiral Less’s staff was uneasy. Captain Watkins quizzed Rogers on his position and the bearing of the gunboats. Finally, he asked, ‘Are the contacts clearing the area?’ The question could have been a show stopper. Judging from later testimony, few in the Vincennes CIC that day believed that the ship was under attack. In fact, the gunboats were just slowly milling about–evidently under the impression that they were safe in their own territorial waters. Through the haze, it is doubtful that the low-slung launches could have even seen the Vincennes. Rogers, however, continued to argue for permission to shoot. On the bridge, the lookouts reported that through their giant binoculars-called ‘Big Eyes’ — they could see the launches’ wakes more clearly now, turning randomly this way and that. A couple seemed to be heading in the direction of the Vincennes.

“For Rogers, that was enough. He reported to Bahrain that the gunboats were gathering speed and showing hostile intent. Again, he announced his intention to open fire. Aboard his command ship, Less finally concurred. The time was 9:41. On the bridge, the chief quartermaster had just called out that now crossed the 12-mile limit off the coast-into Iranian waters. The Vincennes was operating in violation of international law but Rogers was not paying attention to juridical niceties. Commander Guillory ordered the Vincennes’s guns to fire when ready. Two minutes later the ship’s forward five-inch gun opened up on its first target, a launch 8,000 yards away.

“Some 25 miles to the east, aboard the frigate USS Sides, Capt. David Carlson listened and watched Rogers’s maneuvering with mounting incredulity. “Why doesn’t he just push his rudder over and get his ass out of there?” muttered one of the frigate’s officers. When Carlson heard Less assent to Rogers’s request to open fire, Carlson turned to his number two, Lt. Cmdr. Gary Erickson, and gave two thumbs down. Carlson thought there was going to be a massacre. He had no idea.

“Some 55 miles to the northeast, at precisely 9:45:30, Iran Air Capt. Mohsen Rezaian announced to the tower at Bandar Abbas airport that his A300B2 Airbus was ready for takeoff. A minute later he throttled up his two General Electric CF6 engines and lifted the airliner into the haze. His course would take the plane and its human cargo southwest to Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates. Though Rezaian could not know it, his flight path would also go almost directly over the USS Vincennes.

“At that moment Captain Rogers was sitting in his own cockpit-the darkened, windowless combat information center of the Vincennes, directing a sea battle by remote control. To the uninitiated, the CIC of an Aegis cruiser looks like a luxury video arcade. Rows of operators hunch over radio consoles, each monitoring one element of the battle. All the information from their screens is then integrated by the mighty Aegis computer into, literally, the “big picture”–thrown up as symbols on maps displayed on four giant 42-inch-by-42-inch screens at the head of the room where the captain and his two “battle managers” sit. The $400 million Aegis system can track every aircraft within 300 miles. Its computers tag each contact with the symbol for ‘friendly,’ ‘hostile’ or ‘unidentified’… In war at sea, Aegis is expected to seek and identify all airborne threats to an entire carrier battle group, to display the speed and direction of each, and to rank them by the danger they present. Aegis is so powerful that it can not only track up to 200 incoming enemy aircraft or missiles, but also command missiles to shoot them down. In the full-scale war against the Soviet Union for which Aegis was designed, the captain and crew would have had little choice but to switch the system to automatic-and duck….

“Some of the Vincennes’s most senior officers were less than adept at computerized warfare. Under normal procedures, Captain Rogers rarely touched his console. He would have delegated the battle against the launches to Guillory, his tactical officer for surface warfare. But Rogers didn’t entirely trust Guillory, a former personnel officer who was uncomfortable with computers. (His fellow officers in personnel snickered because, one said, instead of plotting job changes by computer spreadsheet, he used his screen as a surface for ‘self-stick’ notes.) In essence, the skipper pushed Guillory aside and ran the battle himself. Rogers set the range on the ‘big picture’ display screen in front of him to 16 miles, to focus on the gunboats. He was oblivious to anything beyond.

“At 9:47, the Vincennes’s powerful Spy radar picked up a distant blip-a plane lifting off from the airport at Bandar Abbas. The blip was in fact Iran Air’s Flight 655 on its twice-a-week milk run to Dubai….

“…a few seconds after 9:50, someone called out that the incoming plane was a “possible Astro”-the code word for an F-14. No one was ever able to find out who. In Air Alley, the operators thought the word came from the technicians in the ship’s electronic-warfare suite. The technicians thought the warning came from Air Alley. Galvanized by this warning, Petty Officer Anderson again beamed out an IFF query. Ominously, the response he now got back was different. Up on his console flashed a Mode 2: military aircraft. Only much later did investigators figure out that Anderson had forgotten to reset the range on his IFF device. The Mode 2 did not come from the Airbus, climbing peacefully above the gulf, but from an Iranian plane, probably a military transport, still on the runway back in Bandar Abbas….

“Rogers was not absolutely sure that his ship did face an enemy warplane. The plane seemed too high–some 7,000 feet-for an attack approach. At his rear, another officer, Lt. William Mountford, warned ‘possible commair.’ Three more times, the warnings went out: ‘Iranian fighter … you are steering into danger and are subject to United States naval defensive measures.’

“Then something happened that psychologists call ‘scenario fulfillment’ — you see what you expect. Petty Officers Anderson and Leach both began singing out that the aircraft, now definitively tagged on the big screen as an F-14, was descending and picking up speed. The tapes of the CIC’s data later showed no such thing. Anderson’s screen showed that the plane was traveling 380 knots at 12,000 feet and climbing. Yet Anderson was shouting out that the speed was 455 knots, the altitude 7,800 feet and descending.

“Rogers had to make a decision. An F-14 could do little damage to the Vincennes. The version that Washington sold its ally the Shah of Iran in the early 1970s was purely a fighter plane, not configured to strike surface targets. Still, if Rogers meant to attack it with a missile, he had to fire before the aircraft closed much within 10 miles. At 9:54:05, with the plane 11 miles away, Rogers reached up and switched the firing key to “free” the ship’s SM-2 antiaircraft missiles. In Air Alley, Zocher had been given the green light to fire. The young lieutenant was so undone, that he pressed the wrong keys on his console 23 times. A veteran petty officer had to lean over and hit the right ones. With a whoosh, two SM-2s launched into the haze. In the CIC, the lights dimmed momentarily, like a prison’s during an electrocution….

“…a lookout came in from the wing of the bridge. The target couldn’t have been an F-14, he said. The wreckage falling from the sky, he murmured to the Vincennes’s executive officer, Cmdr. Richard Poster, is ‘bigger than that.’

“A few miles away, on the bridge of the Montgomery, crewmen gaped as a large wing of a commercial airliner, with an engine pod still attached, plummeted into the sea. Aboard the USS Sides, 19 miles away, Captain Carlson was told that his top radar man reckoned the plane had been a commercial airliner. Carlson almost vomited, he said later.

“On the Vincennes, there was an eerie silence….Rogers gave the order to head south, out of Iranian waters.

“In Washington almost ll hours later, at 1:30 p.m. EST, Adm. William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stepped to the podium in the Pentagon press room. Formal in his summer whites, the admiral told reporters there had been a terrible accident. Stressing that the information was incomplete, relying on what he had been told by Captain Rogers, Crowe said that the Iranian airliner was flying outside the commercial air corridor and had failed to respond to repeated warnings. The plane had been descending and picking up speed when it closed in on the Vincennes. Rogers had only been protecting his ship. A large map showed the position of the Vincennes at the time of the shoot-down. It was well within international waters….”

[We have ceased less than half-way through this long article. The official Navy report lays out much of the account of how the airliner was shot down. We suggest going to the Newsweek URL for the Barry and Charles article noted in “Sources.”]

Encyclopaedia Britannica: “….Immediately after the event, U.S. officials reported that the Iranian airliner had been rapidly descending and was headed toward the Vincennes. In addition, it was stated that Iran Air flight 655 was not within its normal route. However, a U.S. Navy report on July 28, 1988—released to the public in redacted form on August 19 — refuted these claims. It concluded that the Iranian aircraft was actually ascending “within the established air route,” and it was traveling at a much slower speed than reported by the Vincennes. Furthermore, the airliner’s failure to communicate with the Vincennes was dismissed; in contact with two air control towers, the Iranian pilot was likely not checking the international air-distress channel. In the end, U.S. officials concluded that it was “a tragic and regrettable accident.” In explaining how the state-of-the-art cruiser had misidentified Iran Air flight 655, authorities cited “stress…and unconscious distortion of data.” However, U.S. officials also claimed that Iranian aggression played a key role in the incident. In 1990 the U.S. Navy notably awarded Rogers the Legion of Merit for his ‘outstanding service’ during operations in the Persian Gulf.

“Some, however, accused the U.S. military of a cover-up. It was noted that investigators failed to interview others near the Vincennes—notably the commander of the USS Sides, some of whose personnel had identified the aircraft as a commercial plane—as well as the surface warfare commander who had ordered Rogers to change course several hours before the incident. In addition, the report’s statement that the Vincennes was in international waters was later acknowledged as incorrect; the cruiser was in Iranian waters….” (Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Iran Air flight 655. Aviation Disaster…Persian Gulf (1988).”)

Hammond: “….the Times revealed[31] that…[the US] attempt to blame the Iranians was also untruthful. As the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) determined in an investigation of the incident, seven of the eleven warnings issued by the Americans ‘were transmitted on a military channel that was inaccessible to the airliner crew.’ The other four were transmitted on the international civil aviation distress frequency. Of these, only one, transmitted by the USS Sides ‘39 seconds before the Vincennes fired, was of sufficient clarity that it might have been ‘instantly recognizable’ to the airliner as being directed at it.’….

“The US shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655 receives only rare mentions in the US mainstream media despite being a key incident in the history of the US’s relations with Iran that serves as critical context for understanding how Iranians today view the US government.

“When it is mentioned, the media’s tendency is to characterize the mass killing as an honest “mistake”, resulting from an action any other country’s navy would have taken if put in the same position. Although it has long been known that the US government’s account of the incident was a pack of lies, the US media to this day characterize it as though the resulting death of civilians was just an unfortunate consequence of war….

“The real story, in sum, is as follows:

“Twenty-nine years ago, on July 3, 1988, US warships entered Iranian waters and initiated hostilities with Iranian vessels.

“The consoles of the radar operators aboard the USS Vincennes at the time unambiguously showed an aircraft ascending within a commercial corridor in Iranian airspace, with the plane’s transponder signaling its identity as a commercial aircraft.

“Captain Rogers nevertheless ordered his gunner to open fire on the plane, shooting it out of the sky and killing the 290 civilians on board.

“Subsequently, rather than being held accountable for committing a war crime, Rogers and his entire crew received awards for their actions….” (Hammond. “The ‘Forgotten’ US Shootdown of Iranian…655.” Foreign Policy Journal, 7-3-2017.)

Kaplan: “….in 1996, President Bill Clinton’s administration expressed ‘deep regret’ and paid the Iranian government $131.8 million in compensation, of which $61.8 million would go to the victims’ families. In exchange, Tehran agreed to drop its case against the United States in the International Court of Justice….” (Kaplan, Fred. “America’s Flight 17. The time the United States blew up a passenger plane — and tried to cover it up.” Slate Magazine, 7-23-2014.)

Sources

Aspin, Les. “Witness to Iran Flight 655.” New York Times, 11-18-1988. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/18/opinion/witness-to-iran-flight-655.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm

Barry, John and Roger Charles. “Sea of Lies.” Newsweek, 7-12-1992. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://www.newsweek.com/sea-lies-200118

Burns, John F. “World Aviation Panel Faults U.S. Navy on Downing of Iran Air.” New York Times, 12-4-1988. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/04/world/world-aviation-panel-faults-us-navy-on-downing-of-iran-air.html

Crowe, William J. Jr. (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff). Memorandum to Secretary of Defense [8 pages] constituting Second Endorsement on Rear Admiral Fogarty’s letter of 28 July 1988, Subject: Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. Eight-page memo is in 77-page Investigation Report [Fogarty Report] (AD-A203 577). Accessed 9-2-2018 at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a203577.pdf

Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Iran Air flight 655. Aviation Disaster, Over the Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf (1988).” Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Air-flight-655

Evans, David (retired Marine Lt. Colonel). “Vincennes: A Case Study.” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. 119/8/1,086, Aug 1993. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1993-08/vincennes-case-study

Fisher, Max. “The forgotten story of Iran Air Flight 655.” Washington Post, 10-16-2013. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/10/16/the-forgotten-story-of-iran-air-flight-655/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0e9eec81a4f7

Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East. Knopf, 2005. Google preview accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=jp2mZr7BoGsC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=vincennes&f=false

Halloran, Richard. “26 Iranians Seized With Mine Vessel; More U.S. Shooting.” New York Times. 9-23-1987. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/23/world/26-iranians-seized-with-mine-vessel-more-us-shooting.html

Hammond, Jeremy R. “The ‘Forgotten’ US Shootdown of Iranian Airliner Flight 655.” Foreign Policy Journal, 7-3-2017. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2017/07/03/the-forgotten-us-shootdown-of-iranian-airliner-flight-655%C2%AD/

Kaplan, Fred. “America’s Flight 17. The time the United States blew up a passenger plane — and tried to cover it up.” Slate Magazine, 7-23-2014. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2014/07/the_vincennes_downing_of_iran_air_flight_655_the_united_states_tried_to.html

Navy News Service. “Navy Decommissions San Diego-based USS Sides.” 2-15-2004. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=5855

Navysite.de. “USS Elmer Montgomery (FF 1082).” Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://www.navysite.de/ff/ff1082.htm

Peniston, Bradley. “The Day Frigate Samuel B. Roberts Was Mined.” USNI News, The U.S. Naval Institute, 5-22-2015. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://news.usni.org/2015/05/22/the-day-frigate-samuel-b-roberts-was-mined

Sturkey, Marion F. Mayday. Accident Reports and Voice Transcripts from Airline Crash Investigations. Plum Branch, SC: Heritage Press International, 2005.

U.S. Navy. USS Halsey. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg97/Pages/default.aspx#.W4w_0LgnanI

Wikipedia. “Bridgeton incident.” 7-22-2018 edit. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bridgeton_incident

Wikipedia. “Frank Carlucci.” 8-6-2018 edit. Accessed 9-2-2018 at:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Carlucci

Wikipedia. “Iran Air Flight 655.” 9-2-2018 edit. Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_Air_Flight_655

Additional Material

Craig, Dan, Dan Morales, Mike Oliver. “USS Vincennes Incident” (Slide Presentation). Accessed 9-2-2018 at: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/aeronautics-and-astronautics/16-422-human-supervisory-control-of-automated-systems-spring-2004/projects/vincennes.pdf

[1] “While no passenger manifest nor list of deceased has been released by Iran, various sources have established that some 290 persons from six nations, were on board Iran Air Flight 655.”

[2] Sturkey adds: “The [Airbus] captain, age 38, had been trained in the United States. His daughter, age five, had been born there, and his sister-in-law still lived in Norman, Oklahoma.” (p. 260)

[3] Robert Fisk notes this was a daily flight. (The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East. 2005.)

[4] Some crewmembers may have believed this and reported so to the Captain, but later review of the stored Aegis computer system showed screenshots identifying the plane’s transponder reading as a civilian plane at high altitude (Sturkey notes 13,500 feet when struck) and ascending. See reporting below.

[5] Seven minutes, 29 seconds after takeoff. (p. 261)

[6] Sturkey: “The high explosive warheads sent 12,000 steel projectiles ripping out in all directions. The left wind and empennage of the Airbus tore away. The fuselage ripped open, and the wreckage tumbled fown in flames toward the sea. The fall took 82 seconds…” (pp. 263-264)

[7] “The Bridgeton incident was the mining of the supertanker SS Bridgeton near Farsi Island in the Persian Gulf on July 24, 1987. The ship was sailing in the first convoy of Operation Earnest Will, the U.S. response to Kuwaiti requests to protect its tankers from attack amid the Iran-Iraq War. The explosion of an Iranian mine in the Gulf’s shipping channel damaged Bridgeton’s outer hull but did not prevent it from completing its voyage.” (Wikipedia. “Bridgeton incident.” 7-22-2018 edit.)

[8] See our document accessed via the Spreadsheet, on May 17, 1987 event wherein the USS Stark was hit by Iraqi Air Force Mirage missiles in the Persian Gulf, killing 37 U.S. servicemen.

[9] On April 14, 1988, while in the Persian Gulf, the USS Samuel B. Roberts, a Perry-class guided missile frigate, struck an Iranian mine causing major damage. There were serious burn injuries but no loss of life. (Peniston, Bradley. “The Day Frigate Samuel B. Roberts Was Mined.” USNI News, The U.S. Naval Institute, 5-22-2015.)

[10] We assume this is a reference to the U.S. attack on and seizure of the Iran Ajr, an Iranian mine-laying ship, on 9-21-1987, killing three Iranian sailors and seizing 26 others, including four injured. (Halloran, Richard. “26 Iranians Seized With Mine Vessel; More U.S. Shooting.” New York Times. 9-23-1987.)

[11] Rules of Engagement.

[12] In the original there is a period here and then a line of separation before picking up with “and other types…”

[13] Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG 97). (U.S. Navy. USS Halsey. Accessed 9-2-2018.)

[14] A Knox-class frigate. “Decommissioned and stricken from the Navy list on June 30, 1993, the ELMER MONTGOMERY was transferred to Turkey on December 13, 1993.” (navysite.de “USS Elmer Montgomery (FF 1082).

[15] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

[16] Captain William C. Rogers III, captain of the USS Vincennes.

[17] Combat Information Center.

[18] Guided-missile frigate (FFG 14) Decommissioned 2-15-2003 at San Diego, CA. (Navy News Service. “Navy Decommissions San Diego-based USS Sides.” 2-15-2004.)

[19] Actually the flight was on-time. From Sturkey: “Within the CIC in ‘Air Alley’ a petty officer manually checked the list of airline flights over the gulf that morning: Flight 655 was on the list but the petty officer did not see it, most likely because of the four time zones in the gulf.” (p. 265)

[20] Sturkey: “The Aegis computer flashed an electronic query to the bogey’s transponder. The response came back immediately: Mode III, Code 6760 [unique to Flight 655]. This indicated the bogey was a commercial airliner, called ‘ComAir.’” (p. 265)

[21] “…a signal that identified it as a civilian aircraft…” (Wikipedia. “Iran Air Flight 655.” 9-2-2018 edit.)

[22] Used by Iranian military aircraft. (Wikipedia. “Iran Air Flight 655.” 9-2-2018 edit.)

[23] Sturkey: “Air Alley queried the bogey’s transponder again, and this time the response was different: Mode II, Code 1100. A warplane! The Air Alley operator had forgotten to reset the range for the query. Consequently, the query triggered the transponder on an Iranian military aircraft still at the airport.” (p. 265)

[24] This has been challenged. Robert Fisk has written: “Before the Airbus was 40 kilometres from his warship Rogers had sent a routinely worded warning — but addressed it to a fighter aircraft: ‘Iranian aircraft…fighter on course two-one-one, speed 360 knots, altitude 9,000 feet, this is USNWS {United States Navy warship} bearing two-zero-two from you, request you change course immediately to two-seven-zero, if you maintain current course you are standing into danger and subject to USN defensive measures…’” (The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East. Knopf, 2005.)

[25] It wasn’t. The Vincennes was equipped with a computerized Aegis defensive system, which provided an electronic recording of the engagement. When played back “Aegis provides records demonstrating that its electronics never said the airplane was descending toward the Vincennes or squawking a military signal.” (Aspin, Les. “Witness to Iran Flight 655.” New York Times, 11-18-1988.)

[26] Blanchard: On the other hand, given such uncertainties and the fact that one of the Air Alley officers shouted ‘Possible ComAir,’ one other possible course of action would have been to change course to withdraw from Iranian territorial waters back into international water and disengage in exchanging gunfire with Iranian gunboats, which the Vincennes had initiated.

[27] Blanchard: On the other hand one might write “Although it might not seem fair, commanding officers” must not attack a plane in a commercial flight zone, until sure that it is not a commercial passenger airliner.

[28] One of the factors not mentioned by Admiral Crowe was the Captain’s aggressiveness. According to Robert Fisk: For Captain David Carlson, commanding the Sides, the destruction of the airliner ‘marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers’ aggressiveness, first seen just four weeks earlier.’ On 2 June, two of Rogers’s colleagues had been disturbed by the way he sailed the Vincennes too close to an Iranian frigate that was carrying out a lawful though unprecedented search of a bulk carrier for war materiel bound for Iraq. On the day the Vincennes shot down the Airbus, Rogers had launched a helicopter that flew within 2 to 3 miles of an Iranian small craft — the rules stated that the chopper had to be no closer than 4 miles — and reportedly came under fire. Rogers began shooting at some small Iranian military boats, an act that disturbed Captain David Carlson on the Sides. ‘Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats?’ he later asked in an interview with an ex-naval officer. ‘It wasn’t a smart thing to do. He was storming off with no plan…’ Rogers subsequently opened fire on Iranian boats inside their territorial waters. The Vincennes had already been nicknamed ‘Robocruiser’ by the crew of the Sides….”

[29] Frank Charles Carlucci III served as Secretary of Defense from 1987 to 1989 in the Reagan Administration. (Wikipedia. “Frank Carlucci.” 8-6-2018 edit.)

[30] Large Screen Display.

[31] Burns, John F. “World Aviation Panel Faults U.S. Navy on Downing of Iran Air.” New York Times, 12-4-1988.

1988 — July 3, USS Vincennes missile cruiser shoots down Iran Air 655, Persian Gulf– 290