1989 — April 19, USS Iowa No. 2 Turret Explosion, near Puerto Rico — 47

— 47  US Dept. Navy. “Casualties: US Navy…Marine Corps Personnel Killed and Injured…”

— 47  US Navy, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. Investigation to Inquire… 8-31-1989, p.1.

 

Narrative Information

 

USN, Naval Historical Center: “USS Iowa (BB-61) ammunition explosion in the #2 16-inch gun turret while conducting firing practice northeast of Puerto Rico. 47 killed, 11 minor injuries. 19 Apr. 1989.” (US Dept. Navy. “Casualties: US Navy…Marine Corps Personnel Killed and Injured…”)

 

USN, Office of Chief of Naval Operations:

“1.  I have reviewed this investigation in detail and agree with the findings and recommendations of the investigating officer and prior endorsers as modified by this endorsement….

 

“2. On 19 April 1989 a rapid series of three explosions within turret II aboard USS Iowa (BB 61) resulted in the instantaneous deaths of 47 American sailors. A Judge Advocate General’s Manual investigation was convened immediately. Every conceivable source of ignition and every aspect of USS Iowa’s condition and shipboard routine that might have bearing on the incident were evaluated: procedures, training, safety, manning, and personal conduct. Since the primary explosion was determined to have occurred within the center gun room, the focus of the investigation was properly directed to that location. The tragic loss of personnel within turret II and adjacent ammunition handling spaces precluded a precise causal determination since the personnel most knowledgeable of actions and intentions were those who lost their lives.

 

“3. The initial explosion was caused by premature ignition of five bags of smokeless powder contained within the center gun with the breech open. The point of ignition was most probably between the first and second bags. Exhaustive technical tests have ruled out the following possibilities which constitute the most logical inadvertent causes: burning ember, premature primer firing, mechanical failure, friction, electromagnetic spark, propellant instability, and personnel procedural error. Although deficiencies in training documentation, weapons handling procedures, and adherence to safety procedures were found within the weapons department, the exhaustive tests and duplication of the type of blast that occurred have conclusively demonstrated that these shortcomings did not cause the explosion….

 

“4. At the time of the incident, the center gun room of turret II was fully manned with four individuals. Confronted with evidence that brought into question a possible wrongful act, the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) conducted an exhaustive investigation into the backgrounds and recent behavior of not only center gun room personnel but of all relevant USS Iowa crewmembers….

 

“5. The thought of an intentional, wrongful act is repugnant to all professional seagoing men and women; however, this consideration had to be pursued when information surfaced that introduced its possibility. Extensive laboratory tests using optical and electron microscopy revealed the existence of foreign elements not normally present in the 16” gun-charge. An attempt by separate FBI analysis to correlate these elements with material associated with an improvised explosive device proved inconclusive… Additional hard factual evidence such as the position of the projectile/powder rammer and the subsequent delay in retracting the rammer to allow closing of the breech provides credibility to the theory that an intentional human act caused the ignition of the powder charge. The critical controlling station within turret II to allow the aforementioned factors to occur was that of the center gun captain. These factors, when combined with circumstantial evidence associated with the individual manning that gun captain position at the time of the explosion, strongly suggest that an intentional human act most probably caused the premature ignition.

 

“6. The evidence amassed includes: (1) irrefutable facts on conditions in the center gun room at the instant of the explosion, such as the position of the rammer, (2) the fact GMG2 Clayton M. Hartwig was in the gun captain position, and (3) significant circumstantial evidence documenting the lifestyle and thought patterns of GMG2 Hartwig over a lengthy period of time. The combination of these factors leads me reluctantly to the conclusion that the most likely cause of the explosion was a detonation device, deliberately introduced between powder bags that were being rammed into the breech of the center gun. This caused premature detonation and the subsequent disastrous explosions aboard USS Iowa on 19 April 1989, resulting in the deaths of 47 sailors, including Hartwig. I further concur with the investigating officer and the subsequent endorsers that the preponderance of evidence supports the theory that the most likely person to have introduced the detonation device was GMG2 Hartwig…. [pp. 1-3 of 16]

 

From “Second Endorsement,” Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, VA, 8-11-1989 to Chief of Naval Operations: “….The conclusion that a sailor deliberately, and with careful preparation, caused his own death and those of forth six of his shipmates is initially repugnant almost to the point of disbelief. This reviewing officer has had great difficulty in accepting such an opinion and has therefore carefully reviewed the complete investigation to date in great detail. The technical and administrative investigators have been excruciatingly thorough. Large sums of money and thousands of man hours have been expended. The result is impressive but discomforting. No living human being will ever know with unassailable certainty what happened in Turret II to initiate the tragedy, but the sheer weight of evidence leads in only one direction. Exhaustive testing has reduced the probability of causation to a single source, i.e., direct and deliberate human intervention during the loading process. Strong forensic evidence exists that n ignition device was deliberately introduced among the powder bags being rammed into the breech of the center gun. Based on the evidence, one must consider who had the access, knowledge, and motivation to accomplish such an act. The weight of information contained in the investigation, including the Naval Investigative Service reports, leads this reviewing officer to agree with the opinion of the Investigating Officer and the First Endorser – the persons on board USS Iowa at the time of the explosion who most credibly meets this test was GMG2 Clayton M. Hartwig…. [p. 12 of 16]

 

From First Endorsement, Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet to Chief of Naval Operations, via Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 7-28-1989: ….

 

“2. The investigative effort to determine the cause of this tragedy has been monumental. With no survivors able to explain what happened, and with much of the physical evidence disturbed during firefighting, the investigating team of experienced line officers and scientists relied largely on scientific tests, forensic data and circumstantial evidence in reaching their ultimate opinion. The opinion that the disaster of Turret Two aboard USS Iowa on 19 April 1989 was caused by a human act committed with the intent of bringing about the explosion leaves the reader incredulous, yet the opinion is supported by facts and analysis from which it flows logically and inevitably.

 

“3. The opinion of the investigating officer is further supported by a Naval Investigative Service (NIS) inquiry of great depth and detail. When read together, the two investigations identify the probable source of ignition which caused the explosion, the probable manner in which the source of ignition was introduced into the gun barrel, and the identity of the person most likely to have perpetrated the act…. [p. 13 of 16]

 

“4. In attempting to determine what caused the explosion, a carefully conceived plan of investigation was followed. From the fact that the projectile was moved over three feet by the force of the explosion, it was clear that the explosion took place in the gun barrel and the measured force of the explosion allowed investigators to determine with accuracy the point at which ignition occurred in the powder bag train. Analysis of the turret and the character of the injuries to personnel located throughout the turret enabled scientific determination of the size and path of the fireball. Numerous tests established that the source of ignition had to be between the first and second powder bags closest to the projectile. Ignition at any other location would have resulted in an explosion with different characteristics.

 

“5. The investigating team then considered all of the logical possibilities for an explosion. The burning ember theory was analyzed and eliminated since it was a cold gun. Video of the firing from Turret One confirmed that it is extremely improbable that embers could have entered any of the three gun barrels of Turret Two. Furthermore, tests showed that burning embers are not generated by the powder used in Turret One and therefore could not ignite 16”/50 powder bags.

 

“6. Premature primer firing was considered but disproved as a probable ignition source. Testimony was received that the primer in gun two had never fired and had been thrown overboard after the explosion. Furthermore, with the breech open and the powder tray down, as was the situation with the explosion occurred, the primer, even it it had gone off, could not have ignited the powder. Multiple tests were conducted that demonstrated that the primer when fired with breech open cannot ignite the powder.

 

“7. Possible mechanical failure was carefully analyzed. The rammer was reconstructed, as was the link chain and the hydraulic pump which drove it. Tests confirm that all had been in proper working order. [end of p. 14 of 16]

 

“8. Friction as an ignition source was considered in great detail. The investigation documents numerous simple and sophisticated tests which created varying degrees of friction, yet no ignition occurred. Tests were conducted where a rammer was pushed over broken powder bags; where the powder was rammed at high speed; where it was over-rammed and compressed against the projectile, but no ignition occurred. The rammer in USS Iowa was determined to have been moving at slow speed during the ram stroke prior to the explosion. Friction was eliminated as a source of ignition.

 

“9. The investigators considered the possibility of a spark from electromagnetic sources. The electromagnetic environment on USS Iowa was duplicated and electrical potentials at the breech were measured. No spark could be produced and this was eliminated as an ignition source.

 

“10. Propellant instability due to improper storage of the powder was carefully considered. Chemical analysis of powder deterioration, ether levels and residual stabilizing agents proved unequivocally that unstable powder did not cause the explosion.

 

“11. Having ruled out the most obvious ignition sources, the investigating team next looked at personnel error as a cause. Considerable administrative and training deficiencies raised concern about the operation of gunnery systems in accordance with prescribed Navy directives. Lack of an effective personnel qualification program, poor adherence to explosive safety regulations and ordnance safety, and an improperly supervised watch assignment process were all found to exist. Nevertheless, for personnel error to be the cause, it had to relate to the source of ignition. Pressure tests on powder bags, together with the friction tests, ruled out improper operation of the rammer as a cause. Cigarette lighters had been found on some of the bodies, but personnel closest to the breech, the Gun Captain and Cradle Operator, were not smokers. Tests showed that a burning lighter held against a powder bag for a short period of time could not sustain ignition and cause the explosion. The flame would have had to be applied for a length of time in excess of that available prior to the explosion. There was no evidence of smoking in the turret during the firing exercise. [end of p. 15 of 16]

 

“12. The Center Gun had been loaded with five powder bags rather than a normal six bag load. All of the tests discussed were conducted with loads of six and five bags. Number of bags did not influence gun powder stability and was not a factor in the explosion. Having examined all conceivable sources of an accidental explosion, the investigating team turned to the possibility of an intentional act.

 

“13. The Gun Captain, GMG2 Hartwig’s sister wrote to the Navy complaining that GMG3… a survivor of the explosion, was the beneficiary of Hartwig’s $100,000 life insurance policy. She explained that Hartwig and…had had a falling out and argued that Hartwig’s parents should receive the money. This letter opened the question of possible deliberate initiation of the explosion, and NIS was directed to commence an investigation. The focus of this investigation centered on…and Hartwig as well as other people who had been killed in the Center Gun Room. A search of the personal effects of the deceased sailors disclosed nothing noteworthy, but in Hartwig’s effects was found a magazine which discussed munitions. Further investigation into Hartwig’s background disclosed that he had experimented with explosive devices and detonators in the past; that he had frequently talked about different ways of dying; that he had a fascination with ship disasters (as evidenced by an album in his parent’s house containing numerous newspaper clippings reporting ship disasters); that he had recently had a falling out with his extremely close friend…and that on the evening before the explosion, his attempts at entering into a close relationship with another sailor had been rejected. Furthermore, Hartwig had attempted suicide while in high school and had discussed suicide in the weeks before the explosion, noting that his preferred way to go was by explosion. Hartwig said he wanted to die in the line of duty and be buried in Arlington Cemetery. Numerous additional factors regarding Hartwig’s emotional state and the likelihood that he committed suicide are contained in the FBI Equivocal Death Analysis…

 

“14. NIS looked at the possibility that…had murdered Hartwig by causing the explosion. For…to have caused the explosion, he would have had to somehow plant a powder ignition source so that the explosion would occur when planned. The Gun Captain is supposed to place a flat silk packet containing a square of lead foil between the first and second powder bags as they are loaded into the barrel. The lead acts as a decoppering agent, essentially cleaning the barrel. Conceivably, a detonating device could have been planted in one of the lead foil packets stored in a canister near the Gun [end of page 16 of 16] Captain, but logic fails at this point. First, there was no way to be certain the modified packed would be the one placed in the powder train. Secondly…could not reasonably predict the magnitude of the explosion and therefore could not guarantee his own safety in the magazine. There was nothing uncovered to indicate he had suicidal tendencies or was willing to risk death. Accordingly, virtually no credence has been placed in the probability that he caused the explosion to collect the insurance money.

 

“15. The left the Gun Captain, Hartwig, as the principal suspect. He had the opportunity to place a detonating device in the barrel, and it is probable that he knew how to make detonating devices. It also appears by equivocal personality analysis that he was emotionally capable of committing suicide, probably with the intent of killing others also. As Gun Captain, it was his gun-loading responsibility to give directions to the Rammer Man. The rammer had been extended 21 inches beyond the position where it would normally have been had the powder bags been properly rammed. With the powder bags so far up the barrel, proper ignition by the primer was virtually impossible and would have resulted in a misfire. But if a pressure or timer-actuated detonator had been placed between the first and second bags (perhaps concealed in the silk bag of the lead foil packet), and the rammer slowly extended under the direction of Hartwig, he could have ensured that the necessary pressure was obtained to initiate such a device or that the ramming process was delayed long enough to enable the detonator to activate before the breech was closed.

 

“16. The most telling evidence is found in exhibit (266) of enclosure (285). When the investigating team began to consider the possibility of deliberate ignition, the scientists constructed and tested compact compression-actuated and timer-actuated devices which could be easily substituted for the lead in silk packets and inserted between the first and second powder bags. Thirteen feasibility tests demonstrated that both types of devices could cause the required ignition. Furthermore, a timing device purchased off the shelf from a nationally known electronics store was tested to determine if it could be used as a detonator in conjunction with batteries and the primers readily available to a gunners mate on USS Iowa. The tests proved the device could ignite the powder and cause the explosion…. [p. 1 of 71, Part 2]

 

“19…there is compelling evidence that the explosion in Turret Two on 19 April 1989 was caused by a detonating device placed in the powder train, probably between the first and second powder bags. The cumulative evidence from both the administrative investigation and that conducted by NIS…points to GMG2 Hartwig as the individual who had motive, knowledge and physical position (access) within the turret gun room to place a device in the powder train. Accordingly, I concur with the investigating officer’s opinion that the explosion was the result of a human act committed with the intent to cause the explosion, and that GMG2 Hartwig most probably committed the act….” [p. 2 of 72, Part 2] (US Navy. Investigation to Inquire into the Explosion in Number Two Turret on Board USS Iowa… 8-31-1989, {Part 2}, 71 pages.)

 

Sandia National Laboratories, Introduction (in GAO): “On April 19, 1989, an explosion occurred on the battleship USS Iowa in the open breech of a 16-in. gun, killing 47 crew members. In its investigation of the explosion, the US Navy (USN) concluded there was evidence of ‘foreign material’ in the cannelure of the rotating band that spins the projectile on firing. In this incident, the projectile was driven a short distance up the barrel by the open-breech explosion,, but remained in the gun.

 

“From subsequent open-breech tests the USN concluded that the ‘foreign material’ was replicated only when a chemical ignition device was present. The USN proposed that the explosion was initiated by a chemical ignition device consisting of calcium hypochlorite, brake fluid (or a similar material) and steel wool, and that it was placed by a crewman between the bags of propellant that were rammed into the gun. The USN report stated that, ‘the residue found in the Iowa rotating band cannot be duplicated by simple contamination of the gun chamber with steel wool and other chemicals normally present in a gun firing.’

 

“In late 1989, the General Accounting Office (GAO) asked Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to examine the adequacy of certain aspects of the USS Iowa investigation. On November 22, 1989…[the] President of SNL, agreed that Sandia would consult with the GAO and undertake a technical study…SNL first reported its findings at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on May 25, 1990, and released its initial report, Sandia National Laboratories’ Review of the USS IOWA Incident, June 1990.

 

“The initial Sandia National Laboratories’ report concluded: 1) the presence of a chemical ignition device could neither be proved nor disproved, although all the ‘foreign materials’ except the steel wool fibers were shown to be normal components of battleship turrets; 2) the stability of both the propellant and black [end of p. 1] powder was within acceptable limits and there was only a remote possibility the black powder could have been initiated by friction, electrostatic discharge or electromagnetic radiation; 3) the powder bags were over-rammed against the projectile and the extent of the over-ram was determined; and 4) that a potentially important factor in the explosion was a previously unrecognized sensitivity of the powder bag train to over-ram when there is a reduced number of pellets in the trim layer(s) of the powder bags. SNL experiments indicated that a reduced number of trim layer pellets lying next to the black powder pouch could result in an explosion if over-rammed, and that the probability of an explosion increased with the speed of the over-ram. SNL recommended that these experiments be extended to actual 16-in. gun conditions to establish the validity of this ignition mechanism…. (p. 2.)

 

“It has been demonstrated in a full-scale simulator that a high-speed over-ram can initiate powder bags and result in an open-breech explosion. This previously unrecognized safety problem with 16-in. guns occurs when hot particles from fractured propellant pellets ignite nearby lack powder. Wile impact initiation cannot be proven to have been the cause of the explosion, these results raise serious questions about the USN conclusion that ‘impact and compression of the bag charges were not contributing factors in the Iowa incident.’ Impact initiation could have been involved since a significant over-ram occurred….” [p. 12]

(US GAO. U.S.S. Iowa Explosion. Sandia National Laboratories’ Final Technical Report, p. 1.)

 

Veteran’s Association of the USS Iowa (BB-61): “The following is a list of the turret two explosion casualties.

 

Crewmember’s Name             Rate/Rank                                                                   Hometown

 

Tung Thanh Adams                Fire Controlman 3rd class (FC3)                         Alexandria, VA

Robert Wallace Backherms    Gunner’s Mate 3rd class (GM3)(FC3)                 Ravenna, OH

Dwayne Collier Battle                        Electrician’s Mate, Fireman Apprentice (EMFA) Rocky Mount, NC

Walter Scot Blakey                 Gunner’s Mate 3rd class (GM3)                           Eaton Rapids, MI

Pete Edward Bopp                  Gunner’s Mate 3rd class (GM3)                           Levittown, NY

Ramon Jarel Bradshaw           Seaman Recruit (SR)                                           Tampa, FL

Philip Edward Buch               Lieutenant, Junior Grade (LTjg)                          Las Cruces, NM

Eric Ellis Casey                      Seaman Apprentice (SA)                                     Mt. Airy, NC

John Peter Cramer                  Gunners Mate 2nd class (GM2)                           Uniontown, PA

Milton Francis Devaul Jr.       Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3)                           Solvay, NY

Leslie Allen Everhart Jr.         Seaman Apprentice (SA)                                     Cary, NC

Gary John Fisk                        Boatswains Mate 2nd class (BM2)                      Oneida, NY

Tyrone Dwayne Foley                        Seaman (SN)                                                        Bullard, TX

Robert James Gedeon III       Seaman Apprentice (SA)                                     Lakewood, OH

Brian Wayne Gendron            Seaman Apprentice (SA)                                     Madera, CA

John Leonard Goins                Seaman Recruit (SR)                                           Columbus, OH

David L. Hanson                     Electricians Mate 3rd class (EM3)                      Perkins, SD

Ernest Edward Hanyecz         Gunners Mate 1st class (GM1)                            Bordentown, NJ

Clayton Michael Hartwig       Gunners Mate 2nd class (GM2)                           Cleveland, OH

Michael William Helton         Legalman 1st class (LN1)                                    Louisville, KY

Scott Alan Holt                       Seaman Apprentice (SA)                                     Fort Meyers, FL

Reginald L. Johnson Jr.          Seaman Recruit (SR)                                Warrensville Heights, OH

Nathaniel Clifford Jones Jr.    Seaman Apprentice (SA)                                     Buffalo, NY

Brian Robert Jones                  Seaman (SN)                                                        Kennesaw, GA

Michael Shannon Justice        Seaman (SN)                                                        Matewan, WV

Edward J. Kimble                   Seaman (SN)                                                        Ft. Stockton, TX

Richard E. Lawrence              Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3)                           Springfield, OH

Richard John Lewis                Fire Controlman, Seaman Apprentice (FCSA)   Northville, MI

Jose Luis Martinez Jr.             Seaman Apprentice (SA)                                     Hidalgo, TX

Todd Christopher McMullen  Boatswains Mate 3rd class (BM3)                       Manheim, PA

Todd Edward Miller               Seaman Recruit (SR)                                           Ligonier, PA

Robert Kenneth Morrison       Legalman 1st class (LN1)                                    Jacksonville, FL

Otis Levance Moses                Seaman (SN)                                                        Bridgeport, CN

Darin Andrew Ogden             Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3)                           Shelbyville, IN

Ricky Ronald Peterson           Seaman (SN)                                                        Houston, MN

Mathew Ray Price                   Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3)                           Burnside, PA

Harold Earl Romine Jr.           Seaman Recruit (SR)                                           Bradenton, FL

Geoffrey Scott Schelin            Gunners Mate 3rd class (GMG3)                        Costa Mesa, CA

Heath Eugene Stillwagon       Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3)                           Connellsville, PA

Todd Thomas Tatham             Seaman Recruit (SR)                                           Wolcott, NY

Jack Ernest Thompson            Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3)                           Greeneville, TN

Stephen J. Welden                  Gunners Mate 2nd class (GM2)                           Yukon, OK

James Darrell White               Gunners Mate 3rd class (GM3)                           Norwalk, CA

Rodney Maurice White           Seaman Recruit (SR)                                           Louisville, KY

Michael Robert Williams        Boatswains Mate 2nd class (BM2)                      South Shore, KY

John Rodney Young               Seaman (SN)                                                        Rockhill, SC

Reginald Owen Ziegler           Senior Chief Gunners Mate (GMCS)                  Port Gibson, NY

 

Sources

 

United States Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center. “Frequently Asked Questions,  Casualties: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Personnel Killed and Wounded in Wars, Conflicts, Terrorist Acts, and Other Hostile Incidents.”  Washington DC:  Dept. of the Navy, Naval History and Heritage Command. Accessed at: http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq56-1.htm

 

United States Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Investigation to Inquire into the Explosion in Number Two Turret on Board USS Iowa (BB 61) Which Occurred in the Vicinity of the Puerto Rico Operating Area on or about 19 April 1989 [Memorandum of endorsement from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Judge Advocate General]. Washington, DC: USN, 8-31-1989, 16 pages [Part 1]. Accessed 6-22-2016 at: http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/IOWA%2019%20APR%2089%20PT%201.pdf

 

United States Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Investigation to Inquire into the Explosion in Number Two Turret on Board USS Iowa (BB 61) Which Occurred in the Vicinity of the Puerto Rico Operating Area on or about 19 April 1989 [Memorandum of endorsement from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Judge Advocate General]. Washington, DC: USN, 8-31-1989, 16 pages [Part 2]. Accessed 6-26-2016 at: http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/IOWA%2019%20APR%2089%20PT%202.pdf

 

United States General Accounting Office. U.S.S. Iowa Explosion. Sandia National Laboratories’ Final Technical Report (Supplement to a Report to Congressional Requesters). Washington, DC: GAO, August 1991, 100 pages. Accessed 6-26-2016 at: http://archive.gao.gov/d19t9/144706.pdf

 

Veteran’s Association of the USS Iowa (BB-61). In Memoriam. “Turret Two, April 19, 1989 – 0955.” Accessed 6-27-2016 at: http://www.ussiowa.org/turret2/turret2_memorial.htm