1990 — Jan 25, Avianca #52 runs out of fuel and crashes, Cove Neck, Long Island, NY– 73

— 73  FAA. Avianca Airline B707 Flight 52 at Long Island, NY. “Accident Overview.” No date.

— 73  NTSB, AAR, Avianca…Fuel Exhaustion, Cove Neck New York, January 25… 1991, p. v.

— 73  NationMaster.com, Encyclopedia, “Avianca Flight 52.”

— 73  NY Times (Lueck). “U.S. Joins Airline in Plan for Settlement in 1990 Crash.” 11-17-1992.

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB Executive Summary: “On July 19, 1989 [Jan 25, 1990][1] at approximately 2134 eastern standard time, Avianca Airlines flight 052, a Boeing 707-321B with Columbian registration HK 2016, crashed in a wooded residential area in Cove Neck, Long Island, New York. AVA052 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Bogota, Colombia, to John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, with an intermediate stop at Jose Maria Cordova Airport, near Medellin, Colombia. Of the 158 persons aboard, 73 were fatally injured.

 

“Because of poor weather conditions in the northeastern part of the United States, the flightcrew was placed in holding three times by air traffic control for a total of about 1 hour and 17 minutes. During the third period of holding, the flightcrew reported that the airplane could not hold longer than 5 minutes, that it was running out of fuel, and that it could not reach its alternate airport, Boston-Logan International. Subsequently, the flightcrew executed a missed approach to John F. Kennedy International Airport. While trying to return to the airport, the airplane experienced a loss of power to all four engines and crashed approximately 16 miles from the airport.

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to adequately manage the airplane’s fuel load, and their failure to communicate an emergency fuel situation to air traffic control before fuel exhaustion occurred.  Contributing to the accident was the flightcrew’s failure to use an airline operational control dispatch system to assist them during the international flight into a high-density airport in poor weather.  Also contributing to the accident was inadequate traffic flow management by the Federal Aviation Administration and the lack of standardized understandable terminology for pilots and controllers for minimum and emergency fuel states.

 

The Safety Board also determines that windshear, crew fatigue and stress were factors that led to the unsuccessful completion of the first approach and thus contributed to the accident.

 

“The safety issues raised in this report include:

 

1. Pilot responsibilities and dispatch responsibilities regarding planning, fuel requirements, and flight following during international flights.
2. Pilot to controller communications regarding the terminology to be used to convey fuel status and the need for special handling.
3. ATC flow control procedures and responsibilities to accommodate aircraft with low fuel state.
4. Flightcrew coordination and English language proficiency of foreign crews.” [p. v.]

 

[On page 13 it is noted that the fatalities consisted of 65 passengers (including one infant), three flight crew (all), and five cabin crew (out of six), for a total of 73. Also notes there ere 81 serious injuries.]

 

[On pages 78-79, after the NTSB statement of Probable Cause, is the following:]

 

“Jim Burnett, Member, filed the following dissenting statement:

 

Although I support the probable cause and recommendations as adopted, I have voted against the adoption of this report because it fails to adequately deal with the role of the air traffic control (ATC) services in this accident scenario.

 

Air traffic control services were inadequate in four respects.

 

1. The Washington ARTXX R50 controller failed to inform the flightcrew of AVA052 of additional holding in the Washington ARTCC area.
2. The JFK tower local controller failed to transmit the RVR[2] and the latest windshear report to the flightcrew of AVA 052.
3. The JFK tower local controller failed to forward to the N90 FV controller the remark by the flightcrew concerning their fuel situation.
4. The Controller-in-Charge in the JFK tower failed to ensure that the ATIS[3] contained the pilot reports of windshear as required.

 

While I can accept the argument that such unsatisfactory service was not causal to this accident, this pattern of substandard service reflects poorly on the ATC system and raises serious safety concerns.

 

Although the reasons for this pattern of substandard service have not been developed in the report, I suspect that it has little to do, in this case, with the experience level of the controllers and a great deal to do with controller workload under the weather conditions and with the fact that the Federal Aviation Administration flow control intentionally allowed a greater flow of traffic, bound for JFK, into the system than could be safely and efficiently accommodated by the system.

 

“Christopher Hart, Member, filed the following partial concurring/dissenting statement:

 

I concur in part with the probable cause as adopted, but I dissent in part because I do not agree that as contributing factor is ‘the lack of standardized understandable terminology for pilots and controllers for minimum and emergency fuel states.’ We do have standardized understandable terminology – ‘Mayday’ internationally, and ‘Emergency’ in English – that would have adequately communicated the existence of a dangerous situation, and the problem was that the pilots failed to use this terminology with the controllers.

 

(NTSB, AAR, Avianca…Boeing 707…Fuel Exhaustion, Cove Neck New York…, 1991.)

 

FAA: “….According to the lead flight attendant, seated in 2C, who survived with serious injuries, there was no warning to the cabin from the flightdeck regarding the low fuel status, loss of engines, or the impending emergency landing.  Therefore, passengers were not briefed on brace positions, other than during the preflight briefing, or on evacuation procedures. However, after the failure of all four engines and generators, the ability of the flightdeck to communicate with cabin of the PA system would have been lost….

 

“Seventy-two of the 74 passengers who survived sustained serious injuries.  These injuries consisted of multiple lower leg fractures and dislocations, head injuries, hip fractures, spinal fractures, and multiple lacerations and contusions.  The legs of passengers were believed to have impacted the lower seat back frames of seat units in front of them.  Simultaneously, passenger seats most likely collapsed and twisted downward and to the left, resulting in hip and spinal fractures.  As the impact sequence progressed, separation of the seats from their floor attachments pushed passengers forward into passengers, seats, and other wreckage debris, causing head injuries and lacerations….

 

“The captain, first officer, and flight engineer died from blunt force head and upper torso trauma.  The captain and first officer seats had no shoulder harnesses installed.  On March 6, 1980 the FAA required all flightdeck seats to be equipped with combined seatbelts and shoulder harnesses; however, ICAO standards do not address these restraint systems.

 

“Five of the six flight attendants were fatally injured as a result of blunt force injuries to the head, chest, abdomen, and limbs.  Three of the five flight attendants’ locations could be established based on the statement of the surviving flight attendant.  One was seated in the L-1 one attendant seat, the second was in passenger seat 2A, and the third was in passenger seat 3C. Sixty-four adult passengers and one 4 month old infant died as a result of blunt force injuries….” (FAA. Avianca Airline B707 Flight 52 at Long Island, NY. “Accident Overview.” No date.)

 

NationMaster.com: “.…Flight 52 had been in a holding pattern over New York for over one hour due to fog limiting arrivals and departures into John F. Kennedy International Airport. During this hold, the aircraft was exhausting its reserve fuel supply which would have allowed it to divert to Boston in case of an emergency or situation such as this one….

“Around 77 minutes after it had begun holding, New York Air Traffic Control asked the crew how long they could continue to hold, to which the first officer replied “…about five minutes.” The First Officer then stated that their alternate was Boston, but since they had been holding for so long they would not be able to make it anymore; the controller then cleared the aircraft into runway 22L.

“As Flight 52 flew the approach, they encountered wind shear at lower than 500 feet and the plane descended below the altitude needed to safely descend into the runway. Air traffic controllers had only informed the flight of wind shear at 1500 feet and not at lower altitude. This forced the crew to announce a missed approach, yet, at this point, the plane did not have enough fuel to make another approach….

“The crew alerted the controller that they were low on fuel and in a subsequent transmission stated “We’re running out of fuel, sir.” The controller asked the crew to climb to which the first officer replied “No, sir, we’re running out of fuel.”

“Moments later, the number four engine shut off, quickly followed by the other three. With the aircraft’s power supply now drained, the cabin’s lights shut off and the aircraft was plunged into darkness. Within seconds, the entire aircraft had lost all power, causing it to plunge into the small village of Cove Neck, New York in northern Long Island, 15 miles from the airport.

“The aircraft struck and slid down a hill in the town, splitting into two pieces as it reached the bottom. The impact flung the cockpit into a nearby building. Due to the lack of jet fuel, the aircraft did not burst into flames, probably saving the lives of the 85 survivors. By the end of the ordeal, 73 passengers and crew lay dead, and another 85 had been injured.

 

“The recovery efforts for Flight 52 proved to be difficult since the aircraft had crashed in an area that was hard for emergency crews to reach. The weather conditions and the darkness of night made the search crews’ task even more challenging. In addition, the cockpit had snapped off and was embedded in the side of an unoccupied house….” (NationMaster.com, Encyclopedia, “Avianca Flight 52.”)

 

NationMaster.com: “Avianca Airlines threatened to sue the FAA for the actions of the air controllers, who they felt were negligent in misunderstanding the pilots reports. The FAA countered stating that the crew never declared a fuel emergency until the final minutes before the crash, and had never reported the amount of fuel they had left when asking for priority landing, making it impossible for air traffic controllers to give them correct priority status. It was also determined that the crew never attempted to divert to the alternate destination of Boston despite being aware they would be in a holding pattern for up to forty-five minutes, though this may have been due to the fact the pilots misunderstood their priority confirmation. After some deliberations, a settlement was reached where the FAA paid for 40% of the settlements with the passengers and their families; the rest was paid by Avianca.”[4] (NationMaster.com, Encyclopedia, “Avianca Flight 52.”)

Sources

 

Federal Aviation Administration. Avianca Airline B707 Flight 52 at Long Island, NY. “Accident Overview.” No date. Washington, DC: FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation. Accessed 5-2-2016 at: http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=4&LLID=70&LLTypeID=2

 

NationMaster.com. Encyclopedia. “Avianca Flight 52.” Accessed 12-19-2008 at:  http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Avianca-Flight-52  [Note: URL found to be inoperable when checked 5-2-2016.]

 

National Transportation Safety  Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Avianca, The Airline of Columbia, Boeing 707-321 B, HK 2016, Fuel Exhaustion, Cove Neck New York, January 25, 1990 (NTSB/AAR-91/04). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted April 30, 1991, 295 p. Accessed 5-2-2016 at: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR9104.pdf

 

New York Times (Thomas J. Lueck). “U.S. Joins Airline in Plan for Settlement in 1990 Crash.” 11-17-1992. Accessed 5-2-2016 at: http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/17/nyregion/us-joins-airline-in-plan-for-settlement-in-1990-crash.html

 

 

 

[1] Elsewhere in the report the correct date of the crash is given.

[2] Runway Visual Range.

[3] Automatic Terminal Information Service.

[4] See: NY Times (Thomas J. Lueck). “U.S. Joins Airline in Plan for Settlement in 1990 Crash.” 11-17-1992.