1991 — Sep 3, Chicken Processing Plant Fire, Hamlet, NC — 25

lornajarrettblanchard October 3, 1991

— 25 National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996.

— 25 USFA. Chicken Processing Plant Fires, Hamlet, NC (Sep 3, 1991), N. Little Rock…, 1999.

Narrative Information

USFA: “The morning work shift of employees at the Imperial Foods Processing Plant in Hamlet, North Carolina, had just begun when a fire occurred, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on September 3, 1991. The rapid spread of heavy smoke throughout the structure ultimately resulted in 25 fatalities and 54 people being injured in varying degrees. Of the people who died, 18 were women and seven were men….

“The plant had a total employment of approximately 200 people, with a normal shift having around 90 employees….

“The…Processing Room is the room where the fire incident occurred. This area is centrally located within the building complex. Any incident occurring in this area could adversely affect much of the building operations and personnel. Poultry products that had already gone through the various marinating and mixing procedures were taken by conveyor to a cooking vat in the Processing Room, which contained soybean oil. The oil was maintained by a thermostat control at a constant temperature of 375°F plus or minus 15°F.

“A maintenance worker who survived the fire indicated that the hydraulic line that drove the conveyor had developed a leak. The hydraulic line was turned off and drained of fluid. Then the maintenance worker disconnected the leaking line and replaced it with a factory prepared line.

“The factory prepared line, however, was found to be too long and would have dragged on the floor, possibly causing people working in the area to trip. So the maintenance worker reportedly asked for and gained permission to cut the factory prepared hydraulic line to an appropriate length, replaced the end connector with their own connector, and put the line back in place. This line has been described as a 3/4-inch flex line rated to carry 3,000 psi. Information from plant personnel indicated normal pressure was kept at approximately 800 psi, but it would at times fluctuate as high as 1,200 to 1,500 psi.

“The hydraulic line was brought back to operating pressure. Shortly afterward it separated at the repaired connector point. The connector was some four to six feet above floor level with hydraulic fluid being expelled at a pressure of 800 to 1,500 psi. It obviously began to splatter off the concrete floor. Droplets were bouncing back onto the gas heating plumbs for the cooking vat, which turned them into vapor. The vapors then were going directly into the flame. The vapors had a much lower flashpoint than the liquid hydraulic fluid and therefore rapidly ignited.

“In sum, the pressurization of the hydraulic fluid combined with the heat was causing an atomizing of the fuel which in all probability caused an immediate fireball in and around the failed hydraulic line and the heating plumbs. The ignition of the fuel caused an immediate and very rapid spreading of heavy black smoke throughout the building. Seven workers were trapped between the area of origin and any escapable routes….

“In addition to the hydraulic fluid, the fire reached a natural gas regulator that in turn failed and caused an induction of natural gas to the fire increasing the intensity and buildup of toxic gases….

“Witness reports indicate much of the plant was enveloped in under two minutes. Workers throughout the plant found their visibility eliminated and oxygen quickly consumed. Hydrocarbon-charged smoke, particularly as heavy as this, is extremely debilitating to the human body and can disable a person with one or two breaths. This was confirmed as autopsies conducted on all of the fatalities found that virtually all died of smoke inhalation as opposed to direct flame injury.

“Survivors indicate there was no real organization in the plant’s evacuation, and this was confirmed by the locations of the bodies. Several employees in the central part of the structure moved to the trash compactor/loading dock area near the southeast comer of the building. It was here they found one of the personnel doors to the outside locked. A trailer was backed into the loading dock cutting off all exiting through this area. One woman became trapped between the compactor seal and the building wall while trying to squeeze through an opening. A number of remaining people in this area went into a large cooler adjacent to the loading dock, but failed to pull the sealed door shut thus allowing smoke infiltration into the cooler. The cooler had the largest single fatality count area with 12 deceased people being removed from this room along with five injured people.

“The second largest fatality area were the seven trapped in the processing room between the fire and any escape route. Three additional bodies were found in the trim room area, one of whom was a route salesman who had been filling food machines in the break room. The exterior personnel door in the break room was the other door locked from the outside….

“Upon discovery of the fire, the operations manager of the plant attempted to call the alarm to the Fire Department, but found that phone lines were already inoperable. (Imperial Foods was not equipped with pull-station alarms, nor does the town have 911.) He then ran to his vehicle parked outside and drove some three to five blocks to the fire station….

“Much discussion has taken place about the lack of inspections conducted by the North Carolina Department of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) at the Imperial Food operations. In fact, during the 11-year operation of this plant, N.C.O.S.H.A had never inspected the facility…. (USFA. Chicken Processing Plant Fires, Hamlet, NC…, 1999, pp. 1-9)

Lessons Learned

Life safety codes must be enforced….
Cooking: areas must be separately partitioned from other employee work areas….
Building exits in wet type operations should have double emergency lighting, one positioned above the door and one low to the floor….
High pressure equipment maintenance and repairs must be limited to factory trained personnel and specifications….
High pressure equipment in probable incident areas should have built-in catastrophic shut down valves….
Negative air flow systems in these facilities could enhance safety by being modified to also accomplish smoke evacuation….
State and federal inspectors from various departments should be cross-trained….
Establish a “worry free” line of communications for industry employees….
The number of OSHA safety inspectors must be increased….
Emergency exit drills must be incorporated into industry policies….”

(USFA. Chicken Processing Plant Fires, Hamlet, NC…, 1999, pp. 14-15.)[1]

Sources

National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. Accessed 2010 at: http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1

United States Fire Administration. Chicken Processing Plant Fires, Hamlet, North Carolina, and North Little Rock, Arkansas. Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Data Center, USFA, FEMA,1999, 56 pages. Accessed at: http://www.interfire.org/res_file/pdf/Tr-057.pdf

[1] The names, ages and towns of residence of the victims can be found on pages 6-7.