1993 — March 16, Paxton Hotel (Single Room Occupancy) Fire, Chicago, IL — 20

—  21  Babwin/Birge. “Officials Add 2 More to Paxton Death Toll.” Chicago Tribune, 3-21-1993

—  20  Blanchard estimate.[1]

—  20  Chicago Tribune. “Arson fire kills seven in Chicago.” Herald-Journal, 3-21-1994, A4.

—  20  Emergency & Disaster Management, Inc. Chicago Disasters.

—  20  Kass, John. “City Seeks a New Fire Code for SRO Hotels.” Chicago Tribune, 3-15-1994.

—  20  NFPA. Summary Fire Investigation Report: Paxton Hotel Fire. 1993, p. 1.

—  20  O’Connell. “SRO [Single Room Occupancy] Fire Safety.” Chicago Tribune, 12-15-1994.

—  20  O’Connell, T.J. “SRO [Single Room Occupancy] Sprinklers,” Chicago Tribune, 7-2-1995.

—  20  Redsicker of O’Connor. Practical Fire and Arson Investigation, Second Ed. 1996, p. 192.

—  19  Chicago Tribune. “2 More Victims of Fire Identified.” 3-27-1993.

—>19  Chicago Tribune. “8^th Hotel Fire Victim Identified.” 3-23-1993.

—  19  Chicago Tribune. “Family of Paxton Fire Victim Sues.” 4-23-1993.

—  19  Davis. “Paxton Fire May Have Started Earlier, Chief Says.” Chicago Tribune, 4-3-1993.

—  19  O’Connell, T. “Fire’s deadly toll.” Daily Herald, Arlington Heights, IL, 11-21-1993, p.10.

—  19  Stein / Poppen. “Services Set for Several Paxton Victims.” Chicago Tribune, 3-20-1993.

—  19  Van Matre, Lynn. “Rising From The Ashes.” Chicago Tribune, 5-9-1993.

 

Narrative Information

 

EDM: “…many people were trapped by burglar bars on first-floor windows…”  (Emergency & Disaster Management, Inc.  Chicago Disasters.)

 

NFPA: “On March 16, 1993, an early morning fire of undetermined cause and origin occurred at the Paxton Hotel in Chicago, Illinois, a building housing mainly low-income and elderly people. The fire spread into several rooms and filled corridors with combustion products before most occupants could escape and before the fire department was notified. First arriving fire fighters found the building heavily involved in fire and found tens of people by windows and on the roof in need of immediate rescue.

 

“Twenty residents died in this fire and other people who would have been expected to be on the premises at the hotel were counted as “missing”. An estimated 28 other residents were injured, and the building was destroyed….

 

“The Paxton Hotel was a four-story, reverse E-shaped building constructed in approximately 1930. A variety of materials were used to construct this building. The exterior bearing walls were masonry, and a steel structural frame supported interior bearing walls that were constructed of terra cotta tiles with a plaster finish. Non-bearing interior walls separating rooms were constructed of wood studs and were covered with plaster-on-lath. Wood joists were installed between the interior and exterior bearing walls, and the joists were covered with wood sheathing material forming a sub- floor. The sub-floor was, in turn, covered with hardwood flooring in all areas. Ceilings in the building were wire mesh covered by painted plaster. The roof was constructed in a manner similar to the floor assemblies; i.e., it had wood structural members and wood sheathing materials.

 

“Each floor had a central corridor which connected smaller corridors for the three wings. The corridors served as access to three exit stairways; one stairway was located at the end of each wing. Like the corridors, stairways were enclosed by painted terra cotta tile walls, and the stairway enclosures were originally equipped with fire doors. Prior to the fire, however, doors on the top three floors had been removed during the installation of carpeting, and these doors had not been replaced at the completion of the project. The fire doors on the first floor reportedly were held open by chocks on the night of the fire. Combustible materials in the building’s stairway components included wood treads and risers and stringers. Combustible materials in the corridors included wood sub-floor assemblies, carpeting over hardwood floors, wood guest/resident room doors, and wood trim.

 

“The building had an estimated 140 single-occupant, guest/resident rooms, and all of these rooms opened directly onto the central corridor. Reportedly, all of the room doors were wood, and none of the doors were equipped with self-closing devices.

 

“The building’s population at the time of the fire has been estimated at 160 people because approximately 128 of the building’s 140 guest/resident rooms were occupied, and several occupants had guests in their rooms. The majority of the building occupants were middle-aged; however, a few were elderly. Most occupants had a low income. Many of the building occupants were apparently long-term, i.e., periods longer than 30 days, residents of the facility. Due to the apparent lengths of their stay, some of the residents filled their rooms with personal possessions and furnishings, the majority of which were combustible. Therefore, the fuel load in many guest/resident rooms was much higher than that in rooms housing a more transient or short-term population.

 

“The building was equipped with a local fire alarm system. Manual pull stations were installed throughout the building and the operation of any pull stations should have initiated alarm signaling devices also located throughout the building. Reportedly, the fire alarm system was not operational at the time of the fire. In addition to the fire alarm system, individual single station smoke detectors were reportedly installed in a few of the guest/resident rooms. Due to the extensive damage to the building, investigators were unable to locate any of these smoke detectors…

 

“At approximately 4:05 a.m., the Chicago Fire Department received a telephone call reporting a fire at the Paxton Hotel. That call was followed by a second, and last, telephone call reporting the fire. An alarm was initiated, which resulted in the dispatch of two engines, a tower ladder, an aerial tower, a squad and a battalion chief.

 

“Upon arrival, the first engine company saw fire visible above the building’s roof and it appeared that smoke was coming out of windows on the second and third floors of the four-story building. The company officer ordered a 2 1/2-inch hoseline be brought into the building and went around the building to perform an exterior size-up of the situation. Upon closer examination of the building, he found heavy smoke coming out of the top three stories and many people hanging out of windows on upper floors. He returned to the engine and, at 4:10 a.m., requested that a full box alarm be initiated. In response to this request, two additional engines, one ladder, and two battalion chiefs were dispatched.

 

“Fire fighters who advanced the first attack hoseline into the building found the first floor corridor to be clear of smoke. As they reached the southwest corner of the building, they found the fire involved the stairway and a large section of that stairway had already collapsed. In addition, the fire involved two first-floor guest/resident rooms adjacent to the stairway. The fire fighters were able to knock down the fires in the rooms, but they were not able to control the fire spreading up the stairway.

 

“In order to find a location for a more effective attack against the fire in the stairway, fire fighters eventually backed their attack hoseline away from their position near the southwest stairway. As they were moving through the building, this crew saw that the center stairway was now involved in the fire. In addition, plaster from the ceiling was dropping on their heads, indicating that the ceiling assembly was deteriorating. This deterioration was likely caused by fire spreading through the joist channels above the finished ceiling. These conditions forced the fire fighters to back all the way out of the building.

 

“As other fire companies arrived, they found external conditions that also indicated conditions within the building were rapidly deteriorating. For example, the amount of smoke coming out of windows on the upper floors continually increased, and more and more occupants began hanging out of windows pleading for rescue. Some occupants even began to jump.

 

“Early in the rescue operations, there were more occupants in need of immediate rescue than there were available fire fighters and ladders. Adjacent buildings, trees, and power lines limited the areas where aerial equipment could be used. Therefore, fire fighters used many ground ladders as quickly as they could. Fire fighters attempted to verbally assure the anxious occupants that they would be rescued soon. In addition to using visual cues to estimate the relative need for rescue, fire fighters sometimes gauged the need for rescue by the stress in the occupants’ voices.

 

“The difficulty of the rescues varied greatly. Sometimes fire fighters could hear, but not see, an occupant due to the heavy smoke that remained close to the ground engulfing the building; as a result, they placed ladders close to the voice as they attempted to locate the person. Some occupants attempted to jump on ladders while fire fighters were putting the ladders into position, and other occupants were too scared to climb down the ladders. A few victims did not want to leave, while others attempted to bring belongings and money down the ladder with them. Several occupants jumped before fire fighters could reach their location and attempt rescue.

 

“In addition to using ladders while rescuing occupants, fire fighters cut metal security bars in order to reach occupants trapped in first-floor guest/resident rooms. At least one of these trapped persons died in her room before fire fighters could remove the bars and reach her.

 

“Ultimately, five alarms were struck, bringing 30 fire apparatus, 5 battalion chiefs, 1 district chief, and 20 ambulances to the scene. In addition to being committed to the numerous and complex search and rescue operations, fire fighters were involved in the protection of exposures and the operation of at least eight hose-lines and master streams while extinguishing the fire. The fire was considered under control a couple of hours after the initial report; however, small hot spots continued to burn within the rubble for days while the damaged building was dismantled and the debris searched for victims.

 

“Analysis

 

“At the time this report was prepared, local fire investigators considered the cause of the fire to be “undetermined.” During their investigation, local authorities examined several possible ignition scenarios. One scenario placed the area of fire origin in a first-floor guest/resident room, and another scenario theorized that the fire may have started in a storage closet. The possibility of an incendiary ignition was not ruled out; however, no physical evidence was found to support that ignition scenario.

 

“Due to the lack of information regarding ignition, it was not possible to develop specific details about the initial fire growth, but the accounts of building occupants and of people who lived in buildings near the Paxton Hotel suggest that the fire may have been burning for an extended period of time before being reported to the fire department.  For example, two occupants of the building were awakened by ringing telephones connected to the hotel’s automatic “wake up call” system approximately 20 minutes before the Chicago Fire Department was notified of the fire. These people smelled smoke and found that their room doors were hot. Reportedly, both occupants attempted to call the fire department, but, were unable to do so for undetermined reasons. In addition, other witnesses reportedly observed smoke spreading across a street near the Paxton Hotel approximately 40 minutes before fire fighters arrived. One neighbor reported to investigators that smoke odors were noticeable approximately 45 minutes before fire fighters arrived at the hotel. Although the witness felt that the smoke odors were not coming from the building in which he was located, the witness could not confirm the smoke odors were coming from the Paxton Hotel.

 

“Investigators believe that most occupants of the Paxton Hotel did not become aware of the fire until it was well developed, blocking their means of egress. According to statements from the occupants who first discovered the fire, they attempted to evacuate the rooms closest to the two first-floor rooms involved in the fire. Their statements did not indicate that they attempted to notify occupants of other parts of the building. The building’s alarm system was reportedly inoperative at the time of the fire, and there were no reports of anyone hearing fire alarm signals early in this incident. These statements and details strongly suggest that many of the building’s occupants were unaware of the developing fire. Moreover, the fact that most occupants did not escape before fire department arrival, and the fact that arriving fire fighters found a well-developed fire, supports the theory that most building occupants were not aware of the fire during the period when they likely could have escaped.

 

“Arriving fire fighters, who had a response time of four minutes, found fire visible above the building’s roof and smoke coming out of rooms on at least two floors. They also confirmed that the fire involved at least two first-floor guest/resident rooms and a stairway when they made entry into the building.  All of these observations show that the fire was well developed at the time of their arrival and suggest that the fire was probably already well developed and growing at the time that the first reports of the fire were being communicated to the fire department dispatch center.

 

“Investigators theorize that several paths for fire spread were involved in this incident and allowed the fire to involve large areas of the building before the fire was discovered and reported. Evidence suggests that fire may have ignited combustible materials within the floor assemblies early in the fire scenario. The fire then spread horizontally in the joist channels until it reached the clay tile corridor walls. These walls had pockets allowing the floors joists to rest on the walls. The pockets were non­firestopped holes through the walls; therefore, fire in a joist channel on one side of the wall was able to spread to the joist channels on the other side of the wall, increasing the area subject to horizontal fire spread.  Investigators also believe that fire spreading above the first-floor ceiling probably caused plaster in that assembly to deteriorate and drop onto fire fighters operating below it. In addition to the horizontal fire spread, investigators theorize that early in the fire scenario the fire spread vertically through non-firestopped pipe chases. The fire spreading through pipe chases entered the building’s attic, a large, undivided, combustible concealed space. Once in this area, the fire spread over the building’s entire length.

 

“In addition to the fire spreading in concealed spaces, fire also spread vertically and horizontally in occupied areas. At some point in the incident, combustible materials in the southwest stairway and two first-floor rooms near this stairway were ignited. It was against this fire that fire fighters made their first attack. Even though suppression crews were able to extinguish the room fires, they were not able to suppress the fire that was spreading up the stairway. The fire in the stairway also entered corridors on floors above because enclosure doors had been removed. In turn, miscellaneous combustible materials in corridors, e.g., wood trim, wood flooring, and carpeting, were ignited contributing to the horizontal spread of fire through corridors. Because the corridors were not divided into at least two smoke compartments, smoke was able to quickly fill the corridor and fire was able to spread along the entire length of the corridor. Over time the fire burned through room doors, igniting the contents of those rooms. Thus, it appears that the fire was fueled by both combustible construction materials and combustible room contents.

 

“Based on the NFPA’s investigation and analysis, several factors apparently contributed to the loss of life and property at the Paxton Hotel. These factors include, but are not limited to, fire spread in combustible concealed spaces, stairways without doors, the lack of subdivisions in corridors, the lack of an operating building-wide fire alarm system, and a delay in fire department notification due in part to the absence of fire detection equipment. All of these factors are not new to the fire safety professionals and code writers and have been commonly cited as contributors to other large life loss fires….” (NFPA. Summary Fire Investigation Report: Paxton Hotel Fire. 1993, pp. 1-7.)

Newspapers

 

March 20, Stein and Poppen/Chicago Tribune: “Services have been scheduled for several of the seven people identified as victims of Tuesday’s fire at the Paxton Hotel. Twelve of the 19 known victims remain unidentified Friday; eight other people were missing. The Cook County medical examiner’s office has identified the seven as Veeta Wilson, 32; Idana Morrow, 49; Florencio Coronado, 91; Percy Alsup Jr., 42; Charles Harms, 56; Theodore Warren Guernsey, 60; and Pamela Robinson, 30….” (Stein and Poppen. “Services Set for Several Paxton Victims.” Chicago Tribune, 3-20-1993.)

 

March 21, Babwin and Birge/Chicago Tribune: “The digging through the rubble of what was the Paxton Hotel stopped abruptly at 5:25 p.m. Saturday when a firefighter broke away from the cluster of his co-workers and ran across the street. “Chief, we got another one,” he said when he reached a group of Fire Department officials standing across from 1432 N. LaSalle St. With that, the number of victims of Tuesday morning’s blaze climbed to 21, and the number of missing residents dropped to six. Later, Fire Department spokesman Mike Cosgrove confirmed that a partial body had been found. He said that a short time later other body parts were discovered nearby, but it was too early to say whether they were from the same victim. Cosgrove said the body was unrecognizable, but another Fire Department official said the remains appeared to be that of an elderly man. Earlier in the day, Cosgrove announced that the death toll had reached 20 because the Cook County medical examiner’s office had determined that portions of human remains did not belong to any of the other recovered victims….” (Babwin, Don and Elizabeth Birge. “Officials Add 2 More to Paxton Death Toll.” Chicago Tribune, 3-21-1993.)

 

March 23, Chicago Tribune: “Officials have identified an eighth person killed in last Tuesday’s fire at the Paxton Hotel in Chicago. William Kozak, whose age was unavailable, was identified Saturday morning, said Mike Boehmer, an assistant administrator for the Cook County Medical Examiner’s Office….At least 10 people died in the blaze.” (Chicago Tribune. “8^th Hotel Fire Victim Identified.” 3-23-1993.)

 

March 27, 1993, Chicago Tribune: “Chicago — The Cook County medical examiner’s office has identified two more victims of the Paxton Hotel fire. Both Charles Settles, 54, and Irene Heard, 44, lived in the hotel at 1432 N. LaSalle St., said Michael Boehmer, a spokesman. Settles and Heard became the ninth and 10th victims of the fire to be identified. Nineteen people died in the March 16 blaze.” (Chicago Tribune. “2 More Victims of Fire Identified.” 3-27-1993.)

 

April 3, 1993, Davis/Chicago Tribune: “Fire was spotted on the roof of the Paxton Hotel as early as an hour before it was officially reported in a March 16 blaze that killed 19 people, Chicago Fire Commissioner Raymond Orozco disclosed Friday. More than one witness from the Sandburg Village apartment complex across the street from the single room occupancy residential hotel at 1432 N. LaSalle St. told Fire Department investigators of seeing fire on the roof. These observations were made 20 minutes to a full hour before the blaze was officially reported at 4:05 a.m. that day. Although Orozco declined to speculate about how the contradiction in reporting times might relate to the undetermined cause of the blaze, he did say the reports indicate “there might have been a delay in the alarm.” He said investigators are trying to determine why the alarm system did not sound earlier if the fire actually started closer to 3 a.m. than to 4 a.m.” (Davis, Robert. “Paxton Fire May Have Started Earlier, Chief Says.” Chicago Tribune, 4-3-1993.)

 

April 23, 1993, Chicago Tribune: “The owners of the Paxton Hotel and the city were sued Thursday by the family of a man killed in the March 16 fire at the transient hotel. The suit charges James Edwards died as a result of unsafe conditions in the hotel, including the lack of smoke detectors in hallways and stairwells, and exit signs that weren’t lit. In addition to seeking more than $50 million in damages against the owners, the Merryman Hotel Corp., the lawsuit also asks for damages against the city for failing to force the owners to correct the problems and for failing to adequately inspect the hotel for code violations. Nineteen people died in the fire.” (Chicago Tribune. “Family of Paxton Fire Victim Sues.” 4-23-1993.)

 

May 9, 1993, Van Matre/Chicago Tribune: “The Paxton Hotel disaster has vanished from the headlines. There’s a vacant lot where the single-room-occupancy residential hotel once stood at 1432 N. LaSalle St. Services for the 19 residents killed in the March 16 fire are just a memory now….” (Van Matre, Lynn. “Rising From The Ashes.” Chicago Tribune, 5-9-1993.)

 

March 15, 1994, Kass/Chicago Tribune: “Nearly a year after a deadly fire killed 20 residents of the Paxton Hotel, Mayor Richard Daley on Monday unveiled a sweeping series of building code changes aimed at improving fire safety in such Single Room Occupancy hotels. As he unveiled his proposed fire code changes, the mayor said it was unlikely that authorities will ever determine the cause of the March 16 fire at the Paxton Hotel, 1432 N. LaSalle St. “The Fire Department’s report indicates that the official cause of the Paxton fire remains unknown,” said the mayor as he stood outside the Windale Hotel, at 6019 N. Winthrop Ave. “There are several likely theories, but because the damage was so extensive, it’s impossible to say. But we do know that the building had no functioning fire alarms and smoke detectors, which is why the fire had spread so much before we got there.” The mayor’s ordinance, scheduled to be introduced to the Chicago City Council next week, would order SRO owners to install electric fire alarm systems and heat and smoke detectors for all rooms. It also would mandate that each stairwell be equipped with a fire door and call for other code revisions.

 

“SRO operators, who manage about 15,000 rooms in Chicago for poor and transient residents, will not be required to install expensive sprinkling systems. Daley said the measure was designed to encourage the development of SRO housing. The city will give $2 million to select operators to help them meet the proposed fire code cost. Daley said the sprinkler requirement, once considered by his administration after the Paxton fire, was dropped because of the cost….” (Kass, John. “City Seeks a New Fire Code for SRO Hotels.” Chicago Tribune, 3-15-1994.)

 

April 27, 1994, Chicago Tribune: “It’s too late to help those who died in last year’s fire at the Paxton Hotel, but this week the Chicago City Council can begin to honor the memory of the victims by helping make sure such tragedies are not repeated. On Wednesday the council’s Committee on Buildings will consider a package of amendments aimed at strengthening city fire and building codes covering single-room occupancy hotels, or SROs….

 

“The task force set up by Mayor Richard Daley to investigate the fire and recommend corrective action could have called for a drastic retrofit of all older weekly-rate hotels to include, for instance, installation of automatic sprinkler systems.

 

“Fortunately the panel was mindful of a less spectacular, though no less tragic, situation regarding the availability here of housing for low-income single adults. Over the past two decades the city has been losing privately owned SRO units at the rate of 750 a year-the result of urban renewal, gentrification and the financial near impossibility of developing and maintaining apartments for the indigent or near-indigent. Illinois’ decision to all but eliminate general assistance welfare has made a bad situation worse. Housing experts see a direct correlation between the decline of SRO units, now down to 15,000 citywide, and the growing number of homeless men and women to be seen on Chicago streets.

 

“With that in mind, the mayor’s Paxton task force has called for a series of code revisions that will make SROs significantly safer without forcing scores of operators out of business. The city, moreover, would set up a $2 million loan program to help operators make needed changes, with loans forgiven if the SRO stays in business for at least five years. Under the proposed code revisions, all SROs above a certain minimum size would have to install: hard-wired electric fire alarm systems; independent heat and smoke alarms in all rooms, corridors and stairwells; self-closing fire doors separating stairwells and corridors, and exit diagrams in every room. Owners also would have to be licensed by the city and keep their front desks staffed 24 hours a day.

 

“It should be remembered, however, that the Paxton was supposed to have stairwell fire doors-yet for some reason they were missing or inoperative that terrible morning of March 16, 1993. Which is to say that the most stringent fire code is useless unless it is adequately enforced. Let that, too, be a legacy of the Paxton Hotel.” (Chicago Tribune, IL. “Lifesaving Legacy of the Paxton Hotel. 4-37-1994.)

 

July 2, 1995, O’Connell/Chicago Tribune: “Chicago – In 1993 a fire swept through the Paxton Hotel on the city’s North Side, killing 20 residents. The Paxton Hotel was a single-room occupancy hotel, or SRO, and had not installed automatic fire sprinklers, the only fire-protection system that could have stopped the carnage. There has never been a multiple loss of life from fire or smoke in a fully sprinklered building. Today, despite the lessons of the Paxton Hotel fire, less than 5 percent of Chicago’s 200 SROs have installed sprinklers. The primary reason is cost. Under Chicago’s present building code, SROs are required to install fire-sprinkler systems of the same caliber and expense as Gold Coast luxury hotels. Unchanged since 1973, the existing sprinkler installation code does not take into account the many cost-efficient technologies the sprinkler and plumbing industries have introduced over the last two decades that can make modern fire protection a reality for SROs.

 

“As the co-author of an updated version of the sprinkler-installation code, I am asking for the careful consideration of the City Council, Mayor Daley and the Chicago Fire Department in this matter.[2] The code needs to be changed. It is in the best interest of the city, the real estate community and the more than 17,000 people who reside in Chicago’s SROs.” (O’Connell, Thomas J. “SRO [Single Room Occupancy] Sprinklers,” Chicago Tribune, 7-2-1995.)

 

Identified Victims

1. Alsup, Percy Jr., 42.
2. Coronado, Florencio, 91.
3. Edwards, James.
4. Guernsey, Theodore Warren, 60.
5. Harms, Charles, 56.
6. Heard, Irene.
7. Kozak, William.
8. Morrow, Idana, 49.
9. Robinson, Pamela, 30.
10. Settles, Charles, 54.
11. Wilson, Veeta, 32.

 

Sources

 

Babwin, Don and Elizabeth Birge. “Officials Add 2 More to Paxton Death Toll.” Chicago Tribune, 3-21-1993. Accessed 3-25-2016 at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-03-21/news/9303310212_1_paxton-hotel-digging-elderly-man

 

Chicago Tribune. “2 More Victims of Fire Identified.” 3-27-1993. Accessed 3-25-2016 at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-03-27/news/9303270194_1_paxton-hotel-settles-victims

 

Chicago Tribune. “8^th Hotel Fire Victim Identified.” 3-23-1993. Accessed 3-25-2016 at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-03-23/news/9303230105_1_paxton-hotel-assistant-administrator-fire

 

Chicago Tribune. “Arson fire kills seven in Chicago.” Syracuse Herald-Journal, NY. 3-21-1994, A4. Accessed 3-25-2016: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=28750238&sterm=paxton+hotel

 

Chicago Tribune. “Family of Paxton Fire Victim Sues.” 4-23-1993. Accessed 3-25-2016 at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-04-23/news/9304230258_1_hotel-for-code-violations-paxton-hotel-transient-hotel

 

Chicago Tribune, IL. “Lifesaving Legacy of the Paxton Hotel. 4-37-1994. Accessed 3-25-2016: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-04-27/news/9404270023_1_sro-units-paxton-hotel-city-fire-and-building

 

Davis, Robert. “Paxton Fire May Have Started Earlier, Chief Says.” Chicago Tribune, 4-3-1993. Accessed 3-25-2016 at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-04-03/news/9304030191_1_paxton-hotel-space-heater-first-floor-apartment

 

Emergency & Disaster Management Inc. “Chicago Disasters.” Accessed 1-22-2008 at:  http://www.emergency-management.net/chicago_di.htm

 

Kass, John. “City Seeks a New Fire Code for SRO Hotels.” Chicago Tribune, 3-15-1994. Accessed 3-25-2016: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-03-15/news/9403150071_1_paxton-hotel-sro-hotels-single-room-occupancy-hotels

 

National Fire Protection Association. Summary Fire Investigation Report: Paxton Hotel Fire, Chicago, Illinois, March 16, 1993. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1993, 11 pages.

Van Matre, Lynn. “Rising From The Ashes.” Chicago Tribune, 5-9-1993. Accessed 3-25-2016 at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/keyword/paxton-hotel

 

O’Connell, Thomas. “Fire’s deadly toll.” Daily Herald, Arlington Heights, IL, 11-21-1993, p.10. Accessed 3-25-2016 at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=263797144&sterm=paxton+hotel

 

O’Connell, Thomas J. “SRO [Single Room Occupancy] Fire Safety.” Chicago Tribune, 12-15-1994. Accessed at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-12-15/news/9412150047_1_single-room-occupancy-paxton-hotel-building-codes

 

O’Connell, Thomas J. “SRO [Single Room Occupancy] Sprinklers,” Chicago Tribune, 7-2-1995. Accessed 3-25-2016 at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-07-02/news/9507020008_1_sprinkler-installation-paxton-hotel-single-room-occupancy-hotel

 

Redsicker, David R. and John J. O’Connor. Practical Fire and Arson Investigation (Second Edition). Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis Group, 1996. Google digital preview accessed 3-25-2016 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=mUbGAAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

Stein, Sharman and Julie Poppen. “Services Set for Several Paxton Victims.” Chicago Tribune, 3-20-1993. Accessed 3-25-2016 at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/keyword/paxton-hotel

 

 

 

 

[1] Though there was an early report of 21 fatalities based on the Medical Examiner’s efforts to determine from body parts, how many victims were involved, the reporting thereafter tended to report nineteen fatalities up through Nov 21, 1993. Then the same author of that article, a retired Chicago Fire Dept. official and then Executive Director of the Northern IL Fire Sprinkler Advisory Board, referenced twenty deaths in a Dec 15, 1994 article. That is the number we tend to see thereafter. We have only been able to locate the names of eleven identified fatalities.

[2] Executive Director, Northern Illinois Fire Sprinkler Advisory Board, Chicago Fire Department (Ret.).