2005 — Jan 6, Train Wreck and Hazardous Material Chlorine Release, Graniteville SC– 9
— 9 Dunning and Oswalt. “Train Wreck and Chlorine Spill in Graniteville, South Carolina.” 130
— 9 NTSB. Collision of Norfolk Southern Freight Train 192…Graniteville, SC, 11-29-2005.
Narrative Information
Dunning and Oswalt: “The 2005 railroad chlorine spill in Graniteville, South Carolina, killed ‘only’ nine people, but it illustrated the difficulties of achieving adequate capacity to handle no-notice evacuation for hazardous materials incidents. This research uses Graniteville as a case study to highlight needs for building capacity in evacuation capabilities and transportation recovery. Rail operational concepts emerged, such as the need for positive train control and automatic warning technology. The local community faced several challenges, including a lack of public understanding of how to react to a chlorine spill (even though chlorine traversed the town daily), public necessity for basic transportation to work after the evacuation, and a need for documentation of transportation infrastructure to facilitate recovery. Finally, evacuation issues arose, such as how to determine whether to shelter in place or evacuate, what routes would protect or harm people given different hazardous materials and how they behave in a spill, and the role of transportation professionals in working with emergency responders to manage evacuation. Experience and lessons learned from Graniteville can help define a national research agenda for the transportation requirements of no-notice and hazardous-materials evacuation.” P. 130.
NTSB: “About 2:39 a.m. eastern standard time on January 6, 2005, northbound Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS) freight train 192, while traveling about 47 mph through Graniteville, South Carolina, encountered an improperly lined switch that diverted the train from the main line onto an industry track, where it struck an unoccupied, parked train (NS train P22). The collision derailed both locomotives[1] and 16 of the 42 freight cars of train 192, as well as the locomotive and 1 of the 2 cars of train P22. Among the derailed cars from train 192 were three tank cars containing chlorine, one of which was breached,[2] releasing chlorine gas.” [3] (NTSB 11/29/2005, ii)
“The ninth car from the locomotive units, containing 90 tons of chlorine, was punctured during the derailment and released chlorine gas. Winds were light at the time of the accident, and the chlorine vapor cloud settled in the low-lying valley along the tracks.[4] Based on emergency responder observations and the locations of those receiving fatal injuries, the cloud extended at least 2,500 feet to the north; 1,000 feet to the east; 900 feet to the south; and 1,000 feet to the west. The sudden release and expansion of the escaping gas caused the product remaining in the tank to auto-refrigerate and remain in the liquid state, slowing the release of additional gas.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, 11)
“Nine persons, including the train 192 engineer, died from chlorine gas inhalation as a result of the accident. Of the eight civilians who received fatal injuries, six were employees of Avondale Mills facilities to the west and north of the accident site, one was a truck driver at one of the plant facilities to the west of the site, and one was in a residence south of the site.”[5] (NTSB 11/29/2005, 17)
“A review of the causes of death of the fatalities occurring in the field revealed that the mechanism of death for all the fatalities was asphyxia that occurred within minutes of exposure to the chlorine gas. This finding suggests that many, if not all, of the civilian fatalities in this accident occurred within the minutes that elapsed before emergency responders arrived on the scene or were able, because of the toxic fumes, to begin a safe search and rescue effort.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, 40)
“About 554 people complaining of respiratory difficulties were taken to local hospitals. Of these, 75 were admitted for treatment. Because of the chlorine release, about 5,400 people within a 1-mile radius of the derailment site were evacuated for several days. Total damages exceeded $6.9 million. The safety issues addressed in the report are railroad accidents attributable to improperly lined switches and the vulnerability, under current operating practices, of railroad tank cars carrying hazardous materials.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, ii)
“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the January 6, 2005, collision and derailment of Norfolk Southern train 192 in Graniteville, South Carolina, was the failure of the crew of Norfolk Southern train P22 to return a main line switch to the normal position after the crew completed work at an industry track. Contributing to the failure was the absence of any feature or mechanism that would have reminded crewmembers of the switch position and thus would have prompted them to complete this final critical task before departing the work site.
“Contributing to the severity of the accident was the puncture of the ninth car in the train, a tank car containing chlorine, which resulted in the release of poisonous chlorine gas. The safety issues identified in this investigation are as follows:
- Railroad accidents attributable to improperly lined switches;
- The vulnerability, under current operating practices, of railroad tank cars carrying hazardous materials.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, ii)
“After the accident, the FRA [Federal Railroad Administration] issued Safety Advisory 2005-01, which urged railroads to review their operating rules and take certain steps to ensure that crews using manually operated switches leave those switches in the proper position when their work is complete. The advisory referenced rules already implemented by the BNSF and UP railroads requiring that crews inform dispatchers of switch positions or inform them that switches had been properly relined before reporting clear of main line track. These rules were developed because of accidents similar to the one at Graniteville. The FRA also urged the use of a switch position reporting form to be filled out by the conductor before reporting clear of main line track.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, 44)
“While any operating rule change designed to enhance safety is welcomed, the Safety Board does not believe that rule changes or the use of forms is sufficient to prevent recurrences of accidents such as the one at Graniteville. The Safety Board notes that only 2 days after the Graniteville accident, a BNSF freight train was unexpectedly diverted into an industrial siding in California where it struck two loaded cars and derailed. This accident occurred less than 3 months after the BNSF implemented the rule referenced in the FRA advisory, a rule similar to those the FRA is urging other railroads to adopt and to the rules adopted by the NS after the accident. The Safety Board further notes that the UP had also adopted such a rule before the issuance of the advisory, but this did not prevent the September 15, 2005, collision of a southbound UP freight train with a standing local train in Shepherd, Texas, that resulted in a fatality and several injuries.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, 45)
“As previously noted, the 9th of 42 cars in the train was struck and punctured by the coupler of the 11th car transporting steel coils. The combined weight of the striking steel coil car and the rest of the trailing cars in the train was about 2,618 tons. The estimated impact speed was determined to be about 42 mph. This combination of mass and velocity subjected the punctured chlorine tank car to severe impact forces during the derailment, with the most concentrated forces being applied in the area struck by the coupler….the punctured car was among the strongest tank cars currently in service. The Safety Board therefore concludes that, as shown in the Graniteville accident, even the strongest tank cars in service can be punctured in accidents involving trains operating at moderate speeds.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, 50-51)
Sources
Dunning, A.E. and J. L. Oswalt. “Train Wreck and Chlorine Spill in Graniteville, South Carolina.” Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, No. 2009. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, 2007, pp. 130-135. Accessed 9-8-2015: http://www.transportation.gov/highlights/disaster-recovery/train-wreck-and-chlorine-spill-graniteville-south-carolina
National Transportation Safety Board. Railroad Accident Report. Collision of Norfolk Southern Freight Train 192 With Standing Norfolk Southern Local Train P22 with Subsequent Hazardous Materials Release at Graniteville, South Carolina January 6, 2005 (NTSB/RAR-05/04). Washington, DC: NTSB, Nov 29, 2005. At: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2005/RAR0504.pdf
[1] The P22 “was propelled about 217 feet northward (along the track) by the impact.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, 20)
[2] Punctured by the coupler of the 11th car. (NTSB, 11/29/2005, p. 49)
[3] “…chlorine is a poisonous gas, an oxidizer, and a marine pollutant….If inhaled, chlorine will react with moisture in the respiratory tract and lungs to form hydrochloric acid, resulting in inflammation of these tissues. Severe exposure can result in pulmonary edema, suffocation, and death.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, 28)
[4] The vaporization of liquefied chlorine at 32º F at atmospheric pressure can generate a gaseous cloud with a volume 450 times greater than the volume of the liquid released.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, 49) “Because gaseous chlorine is 2 1/2 times heavier than air, the toxic cloud tended to settle in low areas around the railroad tracks and remain more concentrated in these areas.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, 50)
[5] “The coroner’s investigation reports for the eight deceased civilians all listed the probable cause and mechanism of death as asphyxia, which occurred within .minutes of exposure, with secondary/contributing factors that included exposure to chlorine gas. The locomotive engineer survived the collision but died several hours later. The coroner’s
investigation report listed the probable cause and mechanism of death of the engineer as lactic acidosis with secondary/contributing factors that included exposure to chlorine gas.” (NTSB 11/29/2005, 18)