fire, Richmond, VA–77

lornajarrettblanchard November 8, 1961

–77 AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 09171961.
–77 Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description, Imperial Air Flight 201/8, 08 Nov 1961.
–77 Bugbee. “Fire Protection Developments in 1961.” Quarterly of NFPA, 55/2, Jan 1962, 229.
–77 CAB. AAR, Imperial Airlines…Byrd Field, Richmond, Virginia, November 8, 1961.
–77 Gero. Aviation Disasters…World’s Major Civil Airliner Crashes Since 1950 (2nd Ed.). 1996, 44-45.
–77 NFPA. “Large Loss Fires…The Large Transportation Vehicle Fires of 1961.” 55/4, Apr 1962, 444.
–77 NFPA. “Large Loss of Life Fires of 1961.” Quarterly of the NFPA, 55/3, Jan 1962, p. 344.
–77 Taylor (AP). “Pilot Tells of Recruit Plane Crash.” Titusville Herald, Nov 11, 1961, p. 1.
¬¬¬–76 Eckert “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJFM&P, 3/1, March 1982, Table 1.

Narrative Information

CAB: “On November 8, 1961, at 2124 e.s.t., an Imperial Airlines, Lockheed L-49[N2737A], crashed and burned during an attempted landing at Byrd Field, Richmond, Virginia. Seventy-four passengers and three flight crew members died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning. Two members of the flight crew escaped from the burning wreckage. The aircraft was totally destroyed.

“The flight was en route from Baltimore, Maryland, to Columbia, South Carolina, when in the vicinity of Richmond the crew as a result of fuel mismanagement allowed the Nos. 3 and 4 engines to run the No. 4 fuel tank dry. When they were unable to restart the two engines, they feathered the propellers and elected to land at Richmond. As the flight approached the airport for its intended landing on runway 33.

“Captain Greenlee, who was acting as copilot, without warning to the captain in command, turned the aircraft to attempt a landing on runway 02 and put the landing gear selector in the down position. When the landing gear did not extend due to crew mismanagement of the hydraulic system, a go-around was attempted with only the Nos. 1 and 2 engines operating. During the go-around, which was poorly executed, the No. 1 engine failed as a result of over-boosting. With only one engine remaining in operation it was impossible to maintain flight. The crew also misjudged the aircraft flightpath, overshot the extended centerline of runway 33 and crashed one-half mile to the left of the final approach path and one mile from the runway threshold.

“Imperial Airlines Flight 201/8 was scheduled as a common carriage flight to transport newly inducted members of the U. S. Army to Columbia, South Carolina, for training. The aircraft, a Lockheed L-049, N 2737A, was to depart Columbia, South Carolina, enplane passengers at Newark, New Jersey, Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania, and Baltimore, Maryland, and transport them to Columbia.

“In preparing for the flight several aircraft discrepancies required maintenance. The aircraft was serviced to 3,180 gallons of fuel and the necessary flight papers prepared. The crew consisted of Captain Ronald H. Conway, Captain James A. Greenlee, Flight Engineer William. F. Poythress, Student Flight Engineer Peter E. Clark, and Stewardess Linda Johns. Captain Conway testified at the public hearing that although Captain Greenlee was the senior captain, it was agreed between them that Conway could command this flight and Greenlee would act, as copilot….

“It is clear that both captains were issuing orders and both were attempting to command the flight. Greenlee, although senior with the company, had elected to act as copilot. Yet, during the emergency he issued orders to the other crew members as captain. From all of the testimony the Board concludes that confusion prevailed in the cockpit due to lack of crew coordination and the issuing of conflicting orders. Greenlee’s sudden turn to attempt a landing on runway 02 is a clear indication that a division of command and lack of coordination existed. His actuation of the landing gear selector handle was equally rash. Conway testified that when this turn had been made and the gear handle lowered he did not see any indication of the landing gear extending. He then “recycled the landing gear up.”….

“From the location of the wreckage it is apparent that the landing pattern was poorly executed. It is believed that when the airplane was on its base leg the bank angle was steepened in an attempt to avoid overshooting the extended centerline of the runway. This increased angle of bank and increased rate of turn bled off airspeed and the aircraft began to sink. To try to arrest the sink rate Greenlee called for … “all the power you got.” By this time the No. 1 engine was destroying itself as a result of the over boosting during the emergency. It failed completely. With only one engine delivering power it was impossible to maintain flight and the aircraft stalled into the trees.

“It is apparent that few, if any, traumatic injuries to the occupants were incurred by the impact….

“Certain portions of the cabin were evidently ruptured during impact with the trees permitting smoke and flame to fill the cabin immediately. The threshold of useful consciousness of occupants exposed to carbon monoxide is a function of the concentration of CO, the rate of consumption of available oxygen by the fire, the physical condition of the subjects, individual tolerance factors and the total exposure time.

“Estimates of the expected elapsed time from impact to loss of mobility of cabin occupants are from as little as 30 seconds to as long as two minutes, under such extreme conditions. It would be expected then, that with known available escape routes, time would have permitted at least a small number of occupants to escape. Possible limiting factors include dense smoke, rising ambient heat, radiation, shock, panic, no preparation for emergency evacuation, and the possibility of jammed or blocked exits.

“From a study of all the information available to the Board it is concluded that this flight crew was not capable of performing the function or assuming the responsibility for the job they presumed to do. The Board further concludes that the management personnel of Imperial Airlines should have been aware of the manner in which company operations were being accomplished. It is believed that the substandard maintenance practices of Imperial’s employees “were condoned by management. The manner in which maintenance and personnel records were kept by the company confirms this conclusion.

“The Federal Aviation Agency, which is charged with the responsibility of inspection for compliance with Civil Air Regulations and minimum safety standards by all air carriers, conducted extensive inspections of Imperial’s operations and maintenance practices and procedures over a period of almost a year prior to the accident. Numerous improper operational procedures, and maintenance practices were found. It is indicated that Imperial did take some corrective action when specific items were pointed out. However, it is also evident that Imperial’s management did not make satisfactory efforts on their own to improve the overall operations and maintenance standards of the company, but only corrected those Items which the Federal Aviation Agency pressed.

“The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the lack of command coordination and decision, lack of judgment, and lack of knowledge of the equipment resulting in loss of power in three engines creating an emergency situation which the crew could not handle.” (CAB. AAR, Imperial Airlines…Byrd Field, Richmond, Virginia, November 8, 1961.)

“Except for the seat structures, the fire which occurred after impact had completely destroyed the entire cabin area. All the seats except two of the more forward were found in the normal position and had not been dislodged by impact. Only one of the seat belt buckles found showed indication of being fastened daring the fire. The grouping of bodies in the passenger cabin indicated that many of the passengers had left their seats after impact and had attempted to evacuate the aircraft. The student engineer, Clerk, apparently had gone to the cabin immediately before the crash to assist as a cabin attendant. Both Clark and the stewardess were found in the cabin with the passengers. The largest group of bodies was found near the main cabin entrance door, which either had been jammed by the ground impact or by trees and debris which were piled up against the fuselage. There was no evidence to indicate that attempts had been made to use any of the emergency over-the-wing window exits. The charred remains of what appeared to be the emergency escape slide retaining bar were found lying across the bottom of the main cabin door opening. No positive evidence of impact injuries to the passengers was found. The cause of death in all cases was established as suffocation caused by carbon monoxide poisoning.” (CAB. AAR, Imperial Airlines…Byrd Field, Richmond, Virginia, November 8, 1961.)

Aviation Safety Network: “Imperial Airlines Flight 201/8 was scheduled to transport newly inducted members of the U.S. Army to Columbia, SC, for training. The Lockheed L-049 was to depart Columbia (CAE), enplane passengers at Newark, NJ (EWR), Wilkes Barre, PA, and Baltimore, MD (BWI), and transport them to Columbia….

Flight 201/8 departed Baltimore on November 8th with 79 passengers and 5 crew members – destination Columbia Metropolitan Airport, South Carolina. ‘The trainee flight engineer opened the Nos. 3 and 4 crossfeeds like he had done on previous occasions on the flight, in anticipation of a drop in fuel pressure. The Constellation departed at 20:30, climbing to 4500 feet.’

“En route, the no. 3 and 4 engines continued to run the no. 4 fuel tank dry. Suddenly, the airplane
yawed to the right and the fuel pressure warning lights for engines 3 and 4 came on. Engine no.3 stopped and engine no.4 surging between 1,500 and 2,000 rpm. They were unable to restart the engines, so the props were feathered and a diversion to Richmond was initiated.

“As the flight approached the airport for an intended landing on runway 33, the captain (who was acting as co-pilot), without warning to the pilot-in-command, turned the aircraft to attempt a runway 02 landing and selected the gear down. When the landing gear didn’t extend because of mismanagement of the hydraulic system under the existing conditions, a go-around was attempted with only the no. 1 and 2 engines operating. During the poorly executed go-around the no. 1 engine failed as a result of over-boosting. In an attempt to reach runway 33 the aircraft crashed and burned half a mile to the left of the extended runway centerline and one mile short of the runway threshold.” (Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description, Imperial Air Flight 201/8, 08 Nov 1961.)

Taylor: “Richmond, Va. (AP) – The impact of Wednesday night’s Imperial Airlines Constellation crash which killed 77 person s “didn’t seem like hardly anything,” the surviving pilot said Friday. Ronald H. Conway, 29, skipper of the plane, told newsmen his crippled craft was limping in for an emergency landing at Richmond’s Byrd Field with two of its four engines out, another losing power fast, and a balky nosewheel….

“[Co-pilot] Greenlee had been flying the ship and Conway grabbed his controls also. The two of them fought to keep the sinking airliner in flight to make the runway at Byrd Field, but it pancaked into a marshy woodland two miles short of the airfield. In the fiery crash — survived only by Conway and his flight engineer — most of the victims survived the impact to die in the smoke and flames, a state medical examiner said.

“Conway…said he saw the lights from the city of Richmond and called Byrd Field to say the plane was in trouble. “The airplane was under complete control on the two engines,” he said.

“On the turn for the final approach to the airport, Conway said, Poythress “reported that we were losing power on our No. 1 engine;” due to high engine temperatures caused by the surge of power at low speed. “At that time, Capt. Greenlee said, ‘Get on it with me, Ronnie.’” Conway said. “I saw the trees coming up….

“We prepared then to put the airplane in a nose high altitude and at the slowest possible air speed so that the impact wouldn’t be too great. When we hit the trees, the impact didn’t feel too severe to me.’” (Taylor (AP). “Pilot Tells of Recruit Plane Crash.” Titusville Herald, 11-11-1961, p. 1.)

Sources

AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 09171961. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=09171961&reg=N137US&airline=Northwest+Orient

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description, Imperial Air Flight 201/8, 08 Nov 1961. Accessed 10-23-2022 at: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19611108-0

Bugbee, Percy. “Fire Protection Developments in 1961.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 55, No. 2, January 1962, p. 229.

Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Imperial Airlines, Inc., Lockheed Constellation L-049, N 273A, Byrd Field, Richmond, Virginia, November 8, 1961 (File No. 1002). Washington, DC: CAB, February 6, 1962, 15 pages. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*P%3A%5CDOT%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C110861.pdf

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.

Gero, David. Aviation Disasters: The World’s Major Civil Airliner Crashes Since 1950 (Second Edition). London: Patrick Stephens Limited, 1996.

National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Fires…The Large Transportation Vehicle Fires of 1961.” Quarterly of the NFPA, Vol. 55, No. 4, April 1962, p. 444.

National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss of Life Fires of 1961.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 55, No. 3, Jan 1962, p. 344.

Taylor, George D. (AP). “Pilot Tells of Recruit Plane Crash.” Titusville Herald, 11-11-1961, p. 1. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=104703088