1959 — June 28, train derails at trestle over river, LPG-tank rupture/flash-fire, ~Meldrim, GA–23

–23 Bugbee, P. “Fire Protection Developments in 1959.” NFPA Quarterly, 53/3, Jan 1960, 177.
–23 ICC Investigation #3845. “Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company, Meldrim, GA…, ” 1959
–23 Khan and Abbasi. “Major Accidents in Process Industries…” LPPI Journal, V. 12, 1999.
–23 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Key Dates in Fire History. 1996.
–23 NFPA. “Large Loss of Life Fires of 1959.” Quarterly of the NFPA, V.53, July 1960, p. 35.
–23 National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.
–23 Wikipedia. “List of Rail Accidents (1950-1999).”
–22 Aldrich. Death Rode the Rails: American Railroad Accidents and Safety, 1828-1965. 2006, p. 301.

Narrative Information

Aldrich: “On June 28 that year [1959] a tank car of butane derailed on a trestle near Meldrim, Georgia and blew up [sic ], killing twenty-two swimmers and picnickers below [sic ]….The tragedy resulted from a buckled rail on a trestle, and seventy-five years after [Arthur] Wellington had inaugurated the campaign for guard rails, the Seaboard’s trestle lacked an inside guard, which the ICC concluded would have prevented the tragedy.” (Aldrich, Mark. Death Rode the Rails: American Railroad Accidents and Safety, 1828-1965. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006, p. 301.)

Bugbee: “…a freight train was derailed while passing over a trestle spanning the Ogeechee River near Meldrim, Ga., on June 28. Two LP-Gas tank cars plunged down an embankment into a picnic area. Due to the fact that a car coupler or draw bar pierced one of the LP-Gas tank cars, the flammable gas was released in a cloud and ignited, probably at a picnic fire. Twenty-three persons lost their lives.” (Bugbee, Percy. “Fire Protection Developments in 1959.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 53, No. 3, Jan 1960, pp. 177-180.)

ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission): “….an accident…occurred on the Seaboard Air Line Railroad near Meldrim, Ga., on June 28, 1959. The accident involved a derailment of a freight train moving over a bridge spanning the Ogeechee River and a flash fire resulting from the ignition of gas emitted from a ruptured tank of one of the derailed cars. This accident resulted in the death of 23 persons and the injury of 1 train-service employee and 6 other persons…

“This accident occurred on that part of the Carolina Division extending between Americus and Savannah, Ga., 196.3 miles, a single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable and train orders…. The maximum authorized speed for freight trains in the vicinity of the point of accident is 49 miles per hour.

“Description of Accident

“No. 82, an eastbound second-class freight train, consisted of diesel-electric units 1509, 1751, and 1502, coupled in multiple-unit control, 123 cars and a caboose. This train departed from Americus at 7:00 a.m., 4 hours 15 minutes late, stopped at Vidalia, 118.1 miles east of Americus, at 12:05 p.m., where diesel-electric unit 1706 was coupled to the rear end of the locomotive. The train departed from Vidalia at 1:30 p.m., 4 hours 55 minutes late, stopped at Collins, 19.1 miles east of Vidalia, and 42.5 miles west of the point of accident where the 21st car was set out of the train because of an overheated journal. It then proceeded eastward and while moving at an estimated speed of 45-49 miles per hour the 107th to the 122nd cars, inclusive, were derailed at a point approximately 117 feet west of the east end of the trestle spanning the Ogeechee River.

“Separations occurred at both ends of the 109th to the 121st cars, inclusive. The front portion of the train stopped with the rear end of the 108th car 2,772 feet east of the point of derailment. The 109th to the 119th cars, inclusive, fell from the trestle to the east bank of the river and into the river. The trestle was destroyed throughout a distance of 75 feet eastward from a point 111 feet west of the east end. The 120th car stopped with the front end in the river and the rear end on the trestle. The caboose and the rear two cars stopped on the trestle. The 113th and the 114th cars were tank cars loaded with Liquefied Petroleum Gas and as they fell to the ground the coupler of the 114th car penetrated the tank head of the 113th car. The Liquefied Petroleum Gas was emitted as a gas from the ruptured tank head of the 113th car and blanketed the surrounding area. The gas was ignited from an unknown source which produced a flash fire extending over the surrounding area for a distance of 500 feet east and about 525 feet west of the east end of the trestle and about 400 feet north of the track. A subsequent fire resulted from the flash fire, igniting the derailed equipment, destroying the trestle east of the collapsed portion and damaging 375 feet of the trestle immediately west of the collapsed portion. The tank and the contents of the 114th car were heated by the fire and the lading expanded increasing the pressure in the tank until it was released by the safety valve. The gas emitted from the safety valve was immediately ignited. Ten of the derailed cars were destroyed, 4 were heavily damaged, and 4 were somewhat damaged.

“Twenty three persons who were bathing or picnicking in an area adjacent to the trestle were killed or died from injuries received as a result of the fire. The flagman of No. 82 and 6 other persons were injured as a result of the fire….

“Discussion

“As No. 82 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was about 46-49 miles per hour as estimated by the engineer. The engineer and the front brakeman were in the control compartment of the first diesel-electric unit, two student brakeman were in the control compartment of the second diesel-electric unit and the fireman was in the control compartment of the fourth diesel-electric unit. The conductor and the flagman were in the cupola of the caboose. The brakes of this train had been tested and had functioned properly when used en route.

“The conductor and the engineer testified that prior to the accident they had made frequent observations of the train en route and with the exception of the car with an overheated journal which was set out of the train at Collins they saw no indication of any defective condition of the equipment. The engineer did not observe any defective track conditions prior to the derailment. The conductor said that as the rear end of the train approached the east end of the Ogeechee River trestle he saw cars ahead of the caboose derail and fall from the trestle.

“When the caboose stopped he said that he observed through the windows of the caboose that gas was being emitted from one of the derailed tank cars and was covering the surrounding area and he became concerned. He said that the flagman and he immediately proceeded to the rear platform of the caboose where they observed people in the river along the south side of the trestle. The flagman alighted from the caboose to the trestle and the conductor stood on the rear platform and they shouted warnings to the people in the river and the adjacent area. The conductor said that almost immediately afterward the escaping gas became ignited and the flash fire resulted. The flagman jumped into the river and the conductor returned inside the caboose, closed the windows and doors and remained there until the fire subsided. The members of the crew on the locomotive were unaware of anything being wrong until the brakes of the train became applied in emergency. The forward portion of the train stopped with the locomotive about 560 feet east of the station at Meldrim. The engineer said that he thought a broken air hose had caused the emergency application of the brakes until he observed the smoke resulting from the fire.

“Examination of the equipment after the accident disclosed no condition which could have caused or contributed to the cause of the accident. All journals of the derailed cars were inspected and no indications of overheating prior to the accident were found.

“An examination of the remaining portion of the track structure in the vicinity of the destroyed portion of the trestle after the accident occurred disclosed that the cross ties had been destroyed by fire. The south rail bore a mark on the gage side of the base of the rail beginning at a point 117 feet west of the east end of the trestle which extended eastward a distance of 40 feet. From this point eastward for a distance of about 2 feet the base of the rail on the gage side had been sheared from its normal width of 5 3/8 inches to a width of 3 7/8 inches. Immediately east of this point, which was 25 feet 6 inches east of the west end of the rail, the south rail was broken. The break was an angular break and indicated that pressure had been exerted against the gage side of the rail causing it to break. The top of the base on the gage side of this rail at the receiving end of the break bore a heavy mark. From the break in the rail eastward for a distance of 18 inches the bottom of the head on the gage side had been cut. At this point a cut mark about 1/2-inch in depth extended diagonally upward on the gage side of the head of the rail. Both the north and south rails bore marks on the gage side of their heads beginning at a point about 214 feet west of the east end of the trestle and extending eastward to the point where the south rail was broken.

“Examination of the track west of the point where the derailed equipment stopped on the bridge disclosed that there were no indications of dragging equipment or of any object having been on the track. An inspection of the track structure west of the destroyed portion of the trestle disclosed that flange marks appeared on intermittent ties along the north side of the south rail beginning at a point about 208 feet west of the east end of the trestle and extended eastward to the destroyed portion of the trestle. It is apparent that these marks were made by cars which became derailed after the initial derailment had occurred. The line, gage, and surface of the track, the ties, and the securement of the rails on the undamaged portion of the trestle were maintained in accordance with the carrier’s specifications. On the bridge and west of the bridge the north and south rails had moved longitudinally toward the east a maximum distance of about 17 inches. There were indications that the rails were under excessive compression prior to the accident. Rail anchors were removed from the bridge in 1952.

“After the accident occurred an examination of the track structure eastward from the east end of the trestle disclosed that flange marks appeared on the ties between the rails, wheel marks were found in the ballast at the south ends of the ties, and a flange mark appeared on intermittent ties on the north side of the north rail. These marks extended eastward from the east end of the trestle to the point where the 107th and the 108th cars stopped and indicated that several trucks were derailed to the south side of the track and that one pair of wheels was derailed to the north side of the track as the 107th and 108th cars passed the east end of the trestle.

“The 107th car of No. 82 was SAL 26994, an all-steel box car, built in May 1956. When this car stopped after the derailment occurred the leading wheels of the front truck were derailed to the north side of the track, the rear wheels of the front truck and the rear truck were derailed to the south side of the track. An examination of this car disclosed that the wheels on the south side of the rear truck bore marks on the outside faces of the rims which indicated that the wheels were bearing heavily against the gage side of the head of a rail. At one location the inside of the flange was cut diagonally for a distance of about 6 inches. The opposite wheel at the corresponding location to the cut had 2-1/2 inch skid marks on the tread. These marks indicated that this pair of wheels had been sliding at some point after the south wheel had derailed. An examination of the wheels of this car disclosed no condition that would allow one wheel of a pair of wheels to drop inside the gage side of a rail while the opposite wheel was in position on the rail….

“From the marks found on the rails and other parts of the track structure and on the wheels of the 107th car of this train it is apparent that as No. 82 was moving over the trestle the wheels on the south side of the rear truck of the 107th car dropped inside the south rail in the vicinity of a point approximately 117 feet west of the east end of the trestle and that the pressure of the wheels against the south rail forced the rail outward and it then broke at a point 75 feet west of the east end of the trestle. The wheels on one side of the truck dropping inside the gage side of the rail while the opposite wheels in that truck remained on the opposite rail indicates an out-of-gage condition of the wheel and axle assembly or track structure. As there were no defects on the equipment of No. 82 it is apparent therefore that the rails of the track in the vicinity of the point of the derailment were spread to the extent that wheels of a car dropped from the rail on the gage side while the opposite wheels remained on the rail. This condition apparently developed while No. 82 was moving over the trestle.

“On the day of the accident the temperature at Meldrim about 3:00 p.m. was 98 degrees. This temperature was higher then at any time during the previous 11 days. During the examination of the track structure on the trestle west of the point of the derailment it was disclosed that the rails had moved eastward a distance of about 17 inches. With the exception of this longitudinal movement, the inspection of the track structure and of the equipment did not disclose any other condition that would cause the rails of the track to spread. The rails of the track structure laid on the trestle were not provided with rail anchors to prevent longitudinal movement. The rails of the track structure at each end of the trestle were anchored for a considerable distance to prevent or minimize the movement of the rails. However it was noted that the anchors on the rails west of the bridge had moved.

“It appears, therefore, that the eastward longitudinal movement of the rails west of the bridge and on the bridge, and expansion of the rails as a result of the high temperature caused excessive compression which resulted in an outward deflection of the rails on the bridge as No. 82 moved over it sufficient to permit the south wheels of the rear truck of the 107th car to drop inside the south rail….

“An official of the carrier said that as a matter of policy guard rails are not provided on track structures laid over bridges on this railroad, although no reason was advanced for such policy. However, this practice does not conform with the recommendations of the Engineering Division of the Association of American Railroads, concerning the use of guard rails on track structures laid on bridges. If the track structure on the Ogeechee River trestle had been provided with guard rails, it is probable that the derailed equipment would not have fallen from the trestle.

We find that:

1. The derailment was caused by deflection of the rails on the trestle under the moving train as a result of excessive compression due to movement of the rails and expansion, this movement being restricted by the securely anchored rails at the east end of the trestle.

2. The flash fire resulted from the ignition of gas emitted from the ruptured tank of one of the derailed cars after the car had fallen from the bridge.

“If the track structure on the trestle had been provided with guard rails it is probable that the derailed cars would not have fallen from the trestle.

In view of these findings we recommend that the carrier review its existing policy concerning the use of guard rails on bridges and further explore the recommendations of the Engineering Division of the Association of American Railroads as to their use on such structures.” (Interstate Commerce Commission. Railroad Accident Investigation No. 3845. “Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company, Meldrim, GA, June 28, 1959.” Washington, DC: ICC, August 14, 1959.)

NFPA: “Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company Freight Train, Meldrim, Ga., June 28, 3:40 P.M. 23 Killed.

“About 3:40 P.M. on Sunday, June 28, 1959, 23 persons (ages 5 mos. To 46 years) lost their lives and a number of others were severely burned in an explosion and fire following a freight train wreck near Meldrim, Georgia. The disaster occurred as the 124-car train crossed a wooden trestle spanning the Ogeechee River. Sixteen cars (No. 107 to No. 122) in the train became derailed and eleven cars (No. 109 through No. 119, including two LP-Gas tank cars (No. 113 and No. 114), plunged part way down an embankment at one end of the trestle. A picnic area was at the foot of the trestle where more than 100 persons, including many children, were picnicking and bathing. Unfortunately, as the two LP-Gas tank cars rolled over the embankment, a car coupler or drawbar from the rear tank car was jammed through the head of the leading tank car. This large gash permitted LP-Gas to disperse over a very wide area until it was ignited, probably by a picnic cooking fire.

“After the initial blast the LP-Gas continued to burn at the hole in the damaged tank car until the next day. The intense fore exposed the second LP-Gas tank car, causing the safety relief valve on that car to discharge vapors which ignited. This car had received damage to the running gear and outer jacket, but the tank itself was intact despite a few dents and bruises to the outer shell where the insulation had been torn off.

“This remote recreational area, located about 18 miles northwest of Savannah, Georgia, was one of the favorite local picnic spots. Its inaccessibility was a severe handicap in the rescue operation following the accident since a winding narrow dirt road through the woods was the only means of access. Observers reported that most of the cars in the train had uneventfully passed over the trestle when suddenly, as the end of the train came into view, a peculiar bumping was noted by several picnickers. Moments later cars were strewn across the tracks, some piled up on the river bank with several remaining on the trestle, including the caboose.

“Several train crew members in the caboose, who realized the seriousness of the wreck, saw the released LP-Gas vapors spreading over the river and surrounding wooded grove and tried to warn all of possible danger. Almost at once a flash fire (explosion) occurred as the extending vapor cloud ignited. All persons within the area were horribly burned. Automobile, trees, and a 1-story wooden cabin were destroyed. Part of the wooden trestle was badly burned, including some piling. The LP-Gas vapors continued to burn at the damaged tank car until all of the gas was consumed.

“Rescue operations were initiated by the train crew conductor who radioed the train engineer. The engineer got in communication with the local train dispatcher who issued a call for help to assist in removal of the injured. Swift action was taken by local officials, the State Highway Patrol, and local fire departments. Traffic over the narrow dirt road was slow and difficult because of the congestion until roadblocks were set up to control traffic. Then, ambulances were shuttled in and out quickly. The U.S. Air Force sent helicopters to assist in evacuating the injured. Emergency calls at the disaster scene were relayed via police radio until a mobile telephone truck unit was rushed to the area to facilitate direct communication with Savannah and other nearby communities.

“On Thursday, July 9, 1959, the Interstate Commerce Commission conducted a hearing in Savannah in an effort to determine the cause of the disastrous wreck. This hearing was held jointly with officials of the Georgia Public Service Commission which was also probing into this accident since there had been quite a few derailments within Georgia in 1959. Testimony at the hearing showed that the track structure had been resurfaced on June 12, 1959 and that the da of the accident had been the warmest since (98⁰F). Examination of the wreck site indicated that the rails had expanded severely in the heat and were under heavy compression as the rails at the trestle ends were anchored. The rails thus spread outward allowing car No. 107 to derail. There did not appear to be any indication of any defect in the tank cars. Early press reports had erroneously indicated that the tank cars had exploded.

“LP-Gas tank cars are built and maintained in accordance with the Federal Code of Regulations Title 49 – Transportation, Parts 71-90 as promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission covering preparation and handling of explosives and other dangerous articles for shipment by common carrier. Through the years these regulations have proved adequate since a number of LP-Gas tank cars that have been involved in serious rail accidents have successfully withstood severe damage. Compliance with ICC Regulations does not protect against severe impact damage such as occurred at Meldrim, Georgia.” (National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss of Life Fires of 1959.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 53, July 1960, pp. 35-36.)

Wikipedia: “June 28, 1959 – Meldrim, Georgia, United States: Tank cars carrying butane derail atop a wooden trestle owned by the Seaboard Air Line Railroad. The resulting explosion and fire kills 23 persons.” (Wikipedia. “List of Rail Accidents (1950-1999).”)

Sources

Aldrich, Mark. Death Rode the Rails: American Railroad Accidents and Safety, 1828-1965. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006, 446 pages. Partially digitized by Google. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=W83OY7j-oaEC

Bugbee, Percy. “Fire Protection Developments in 1959.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 53, No. 3, Jan 1960, pp. 177-180.

Interstate Commerce Commission. Railroad Accident Investigation (Ex Parte No 218). Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company, Meldrim, Ga. June 28, 1959. Washington DC: ICC, decided 8-14-1959. Accessed 12-12-2022 at: file:///C:/Users/Wayne/Downloads/dot_46419_DS1.pdf

Khan, Faisal I. and S.A. Abbasi. “Major Accidents in Process Industries and an Analysis of Causes and Consequences.” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 12, 1999, pp. 361-378. At: http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:http://202.38.89.99/Loss_prevention/99503.pdf

National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. Accessed 2010 at: http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1

National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss of Life Fires of 1959.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 53, July 1960, pp. 7-38.

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.

Wikipedia. “List of Rail Accidents (1950-1999).” Accessed 7-18-2018 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_1950-1999_rail_accidents