1957 — Sep 15, Northeast Air 285 ILS Airport Approach Crash, New Bedford, MA — 12

–12 Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). Massachusetts.
–12 AirDisaster.Com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 09151957.
–12 Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Northeast Airlines, DC-3, 15 Sep 1957.
–12 CAB. AIR. Northeast Airlines, Inc., Douglas DC-3…New Bedford, MA, Sep 15, 1957.
–12 Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJFMP, 3/1, Mar 1982, Table 1.

Narrative Information

Civil Aeronautics Board: “At approximately 2046, September 15, 1957, Northeast Airlines Flight 285 crashed during an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to runway 5 at the New Bedford, Massachusetts, Airport. Of three crew members, the two pilots were killed and the stewardess was seriously injured. Ten of 21 passengers were fatally injured and 11 were seriously injured. The aircraft, a DC-3, received severe and unrepairable damage…

“Northeast Airlines Flight 285 is a scheduled passenger operation originating at Boston, Massachusetts, and terminating at New York, New York, with intermediate stops serving Hyannis, Nantucket, Martha’s Vineyard, and New Bedford, Massachusetts.

“On September 15, 1957, the flight originated on schedule…Flight 285 was routine until it reached Martha’s Vineyard where it landed at 2007 following a missed approach in poor weather conditions. The flight departed Martha’s Vineyard for New Bedford at 2019, about 50 minutes behind schedule, the result of the missed approach, IFR delays, and accumulated minor delays….

“Flight 285…contacted the New Bedford tower operator…at 2038…stated it was starting an ILS [instrument landing system] approach. The controller gave the flight the latest weather…visibility one mile; fog; wind southeast 3… He also cleared the flight to land, ILS approach, straight in to runway 5, and requested that it call the tower when inbound at the outer marker.

“Following this clearance the captain of another Northeast flight, 275, which had shortly before, at 2031, taken off from runway 23, the reciprocal of 5, gave Flight 285 the following information. “It’ll be tight.”

“Flight 285 reported that it had completed the procedure turn and was inbound over the outer marker. The controller acknowledged this report which was the last communication with the flight. He logged the report at 2046, shortly after it was received.

“Investigation. The tower controller. who was alone on duty, watched for the flight to appear over the approach lights after It reported inbound over the outer marker. Northeast ground personnel who were waiting to meet the flight watched for it to land. None of these persons heard or saw the flight. After a reasonable time for the approach to have been completed the tower controller called the flight several times without response….

“The New Bedford controller notified the airport manager, who, suspecting the tragedy, immediately ordered key rescue personnel alerted and drove to the airport from his residence. Upon arrival he drove to the ILS middle marker shack located on the edge of a swamp which lies below the approach area. From this position he heard cries for help coming from the swamp area. The manager attempted to penetrate the swamp but could not because of a stream, the fog, dense undergrowth, and waist-deep mire. He returned to the airport for assistance.

“With a doctor and the doctor’s wife, the airport manager led other doctors, firemen, and rescue personnel to the middle marker shack. From there, in small groups of two or three, and with disregard for personal safety, the rescuers waded through the stream, undergrowth, and mire and located the accident scene. The airport manager’s group was first and began giving medical care about 2245. While this assistance was being given a floodlight truck was moved into position across the stream and fire ladders were fastened together and laid across the water and mire, enabling the emergency personnel to carry out the survivors.

“During the night it was learned that me passenger, Mr. Gerald Bland, had saved the stewardess by administering first aid and that he and a 14-year old girl, also deserving mention by name, Nancy Blair, had extinguished a small fire which threatened the entire fuel-soaked wreckage in which several survivors were then trapped.

“Investigation at the scene disclosed that initial damage to the aircraft resulted from the nearly simultaneous contact with two large trees, the first with the left wing tip, 49.2 feet above the swamp and the other with the right wing in the area of the landing light, 45.3 feet above ground level. These trees were located about 165 feet to the right of the centerline of the ILS localizer course, nearly 189 feet below the glide path centerline, and about 4,000 feet short of the runway threshold….

“Initial ground impact occurred when the stub right wing dug into the soft, spongy swamp floor. This caused the aircraft to start a cartwheel motion. during which the right powerplant was torn out and the cockpit area was crushed rearward, left, and upward into and over the upper fuselage shell. The cartwheel continued until the left propeller struck a large tree stump, causing the aircraft to pivot to its right. This whipped the fuselage with such severity it broke into two portions, except for control cables along a line approximately parallel to the fifth row of passenger seats. The pivoting action continued on the outer portion of the left wing until the aircraft was sliding backward along the heading of the wreck age path. The rear portion of the fuselage and the empennage, still facing forward, were thrown and dragged with the center section and forward cabin area. The wreckage slid to a stop 600 feet from the trees that were initially struck….

“During the investigation all major components of the aircraft, including its flight control surfaces, were recovered from the area between the trees initially struck and the final resting place of the main wreckage. Examination of these components disclosed no evidence of fatigue failure. Continuity of the flight control system was established and it was found there were no primary failures of the cables and no evidence to indicate malfunction of failure of the systems. Farther, it was determined that all exterior doors and access panels were properly secured at the time of impact…. Examination disclosed conclusively that the landing gear was extended at impact. From the examination of the airframe and its associated systems and components there was no indication that they caused or contributed to the cause of the accident…. The examination of both engines showed they were capable of normal operation prior to impact….

“The ILS is designed to guide pilots to a favorable position for visual landing through instrument weather conditions, which preclude outside visual references. In general, the electronic system consists of radio beans transmitted to provide the pilot with directional and vertical information through cockpit Instruments. The localizer course defines the runway centerline extended several miles into the approach zone. The glide path defines a gradually descending path normally intercepted over the outer marker and sloping to runway level just inside the runway threshold. The glide path centerline clears all ground obstructions according to an established obstruction criteria over this distance. At New Bedford the localizer course is marked by outer and middle markers, 3.9 miles and .6 mile, respectively, from the runway threshold. The glide path is normally intercepted at l,240 feet over the outer marker. The middle marker includes a low frequency compass locator…. N 34417 was equipped to utilize the above ILS and also had two ADF’s (Automatic Direction Finder) which would “home in” on the compass locator at the middle marker. The aircraft was equipped for operation in instrument weather according to Civil Air Regulations governing air carrier operations….

The ILS approach, as any other instrument approach, may not be continued beyond certain minimums without visual reference to the approach lights, runway lights, or the runway surface having been established. For Northeast Airlines at New Bedford these limits were: Ceiling 200 feet, visibility one-half mile. Specifically, if Flight 285 had not established visual contact at an altitude of 200 feet above the runway elevation the pilot was obliged to discontinue the approach. Following the glide path, this altitude would be reached 189 feet above the trees initially struck….

“[A]…ground witness, at home, a position about 2-3/4 miles from the runway along the localizer course, stated that at 2045 he heard the flight; and that it was so low it rattled his screen door. He added that he was well acquainted with engine sound. living where he did, and knew that this aircraft sounded much lower than usual. The witness tried to see the aircraft but could not, adding he took this action in alarm because of the apparent lowness of the aircraft. He described the weather as being very foggy.

“[A]…passenger, seated on the left side of the aircraft at the window seat of the second row, stated she looked oat very intently after the “fasten seat belt” sign came on. She stated that she saw tree tops sticking up out of the fog which obscured all but the upper branches. She said the aircraft passed over them very closely. Her observations caused her to remark to the passenger seated beside her, “It looks as though we’re in the Berkshires and only 10 feet above them.” She added that there was a period of time of at least one minute between her observations and the crash….

“The captain of Flight 274, which landed at 2012 and was the last flight to land before the accident, said that when he “broke out” weather conditions were substantially above minimums. He said conditions made the transition from instruments to visual positive but he felt the weather was deteriorating and this prompted him later to pass the information to Flight 285, “It’ll be tight.” The captain stated he noted no significant wind factor during his approach.

“Analysis….

“…it is the Board’s view that Captain Pitts not only did not follow the ILS approach path but also descended to an extremely low and unsafe altitude without adherence to the ILS glide path. It is reasoned that the captain was attempting to fly visually below the overcast to the runway, assisted by ADF and localizer indications for direction. The Board finds no valid reasons or justification for the conduct of the approach in this manner.

There is no clear evidence to explain the final descent into the trees. While the flap position found is not considered the amount normally used for landing, it was an amount indicating intention to land. Such intention would indicate that at least the glow of the approach lights had been sighted. From low altitude, in foggy visibility, Captain Pitts may have fixed his vision to the lights ahead and, without good reference to vertical position or margin for error, the aircraft descended unnoticed toward the trees. Without question, however, the descent was recognized in time to apply near maximum power but too late to avoid striking the trees….

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident ins that the pilot, attempted to make a visual approach by descending prematurely in the approach area without adherence to the prescribed ILS approach procedure which was dictated by existing weather conditions.” (CAB. AIR. Northeast Airlines, Inc., Douglas DC-3…New Bedford, MA, Sep 15, 1957.)

Sources

AirDisaster.Com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 09151957. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=09151957&reg=N33417&airline=Northeast+Airlines

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Northeast Airlines Flight 285, 15 Sep 1957. Accessed 2-22-2009 at: http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19570915-0

Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. Northeast Airlines, Inc., Douglas DC-3, N 34417 New Bedford, Massachusetts, September 15, 1957. CAB, March 19, 1958, 14 pp. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*P%3A%5CDOT%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C091557.pdf

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.