1957 — Feb 1, Northeast Airlines Flight 823 crashes on takeoff onto Rikers Island, NY– 20

— 21 AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 02011957.
— 21 Planecrashinfo.com. “1957…Accident Details…Northeast Air…NY, NY, Feb 1, 1957.”
— 20 Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). New York.
— 20 Aviation Safety Network. Northeast Airlines Flight 823, 01 Feb 1957.
— 20 CAB. AIR. Northeast Airlines, Inc., DC-6A, N 34954, Rikers Island, NY, Feb 1, 1957.
— 20 Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJFMP, 3/1, Mar 1982, Table 1.
— 20 NFPA. “Large Loss Aircraft Fires of 1957.” Quarterly of…[NFPA], 51/4, Apr 1958, p289.
— 20 Salisbury Times (MD). “Seven Air Crashes Kill at Least 43,” February 2, 1957.
— 20 Wikipedia. “Northeast Airlines Flight 823.”
— 20 Wikipedia. “Timeline of New York City Crimes and Disasters.”

Narrative Information

Civil Aeronautics Board: “Northeast Airlines Flight 823 Douglas DC-6.A, N 34954, crash landed on Rikers Island, New York, at 1802 on February 1, 1957. The accident occurred at night under IFR [instrument flight rules] conditions less than one minute after takeoff from runway 4, La Guardia Field, New York. There were 101 persons aboard the aircraft – 95 passengers (which included 11 children) and 6 crew members. Of these, 20 passengers received fatal injury, 25 passengers and 3 stewardesses serious injury, and 50 passengers minor injury. The pilot, copilot, and flight engineer were uninjured. The aircraft received major damage from ground impact and was destroyed by subsequent ground fire.

“Northeast Airlines Flight 8232 a DC-6A., N 34954, was scheduled to originate at La Guardia Field, a nonstop to Miami, Florida, with a departure time of 1445. This aircraft and the same crew. Operating as Flight 822, had arrived at La Guardia from Miami at 1250….

“Snow, which had started at La Guardia at 1202, began to accumulate on the aircraft’s horizontal surfaces after its arrival at the La Guardia ramp position. Snow removal by ground personnel, during preflighting, was ineffective because of the continuing snowfall. Accordingly, about 1600 the aircraft was taxied, with all occupants aboard, to a nose hangar on the west side of the airport for snow removal. This was accomplished and at 1745 the crew advised La Guardia ground control that they were ready to taxi from the nose hangar for the IFR, departure to Miami.

“Flight 823 was then cleared to runway 4 and was advised that the wind was northeast 10….

“Takeoff clearance was issued at 1800 and a tower controller saw the aircraft airborne at approximately 1801.2 The controller advised the flight to contact La Guardia radar departure control… This message was acknowledged but the radar controller did not receive a call from the flight; however, he did observe a target on the scope that indicated an aircraft over the runway. The next two sweeps on the scope disclosed the target beyond the end of the runway. A subsequent sweep indicated that the target was turning left. The target then disappeared from the scope. The La Guardia tower controllers observed a large flash at approximately 1802 in the vicinity of Rikers Island, the approximate center of which is about one mile north of the point where the aircraft left the runway. It was learned at 1819, by telephone, that Northeast Airlines Flight 823 had crashed on Rikers Island….

“Evacuation. Very soon after the aircraft came to a stop the captain and copilot got out through the left cockpit window; the flight engineer *** the right side crew door. These three testified that they were then unable to get on either wing to open emergency exits because of flames on both sides of the fuselage at the wing section. They assisted the egress of persons from other areas. A number of passengers seated in the forward part of the cabin were able to get out through a gaping hole torn in the left lower side of the cabin. Toward the rear of the cabin the stewardesses and many passengers were able to use window exits as well as a hole torn open on the right side of the cabin. Others opened emergency exits on the right side and got out on the right wing before the fire had developed to large proportions. The main cabin door had jammed because of fuselage deformation and could not be opened by the cabin attendants. Testimony indicated that those leaving the aircraft did so in less than two minutes after the aircraft came to a stop. Following the ground slide. The cabin filled with smoke; the lights went out as wiring separated, and very shortly fire entered the cabin. The safety belt sign had been on and the belts of the 89 passenger seats (19 double and 17 triple) were used and the seats remained in place. The cabin emergency exit impact lights did not go on because the first ground impact did not provide sufficient deceleration and the subsequent ground movement was comparatively smooth with stopping gradual. These impact lights derived their power from flashlight batteries and could not be operated manually.

“Fire equipment and assistance were supplied promptly by personnel from the nearby city penal institution on Rikers Island. Those who had been able to leave the aircraft were conducted to shelter and given medical aid…

“Scene of Crash. Rikers Island is irregularly oval with its greatest dimension, from east and west, approximately one mile. Its southern shore-line is some 600 yards north of the northeast corner shoreline of La Guardia Field. The northwestern area of the island is occupied by New York City penal buildings. The DC-6A came to a stop and was destroyed by fire a short distance south of these buildings.

“Flight 823 first struck small trees while on a heading of 285 degrees magnetic. The left wing tip struck the ground first; the right wing tip struck 150 feet beyond. The aircraft. After striking the ground nearly level longitudinally, skidded approximately 1,500 feet and came to a stop on a heading of 241 degrees. The ground elevation differential between the initial impact point and the stopping place is less than 10 feet. It was determined that the angle of descent at impact was seven degrees. Groundspeed at impact, computed from propeller slash marks and engine r. p. m., was approximately 138 knots. Impact occurred approximately 60 seconds after start of the takeoff and after a left turn of approximately 119 degrees from the heading of runway 4….

“Analysis…. Evacuation. It is believed that because of the sliding ground impact of not too great severity there were no fatalities or serious injuries caused directly by the impact or ground movement. The cabin floor remained fairly intact, before the fire, and the seats were not loosened from the floor. Unfortunately, the intense fire, fed by 3,000 gallons of fuel, caused the many fatalities and serious injuries. There was obviously some deformation of the fuselage during the l.,500-foot slide which jammed the main cabin door, and possibly other exits as well….The absence of lights in the cabin after the aircraft came to a stop undoubtedly hindered the evacuation of many occupants. The normal cabin lights, which were on, went off when electrical connections were separated during the ground slide and the deceleration was not sufficient to actuate the automatic impact lights with their independent source of energy. The Board is concerned by the difficulties experienced in evacuating passengers after the airplane came to rest. The jamming of the main door and the nonoperation of the automatic lighting system apparently hindered speedy evacuation, The Board is studying this problem from the standpoint of adequacy of the regulations and their application….

“Operations…. From the testimony, it is evident that the aircraft’s acceleration after takeoff was normal and that Captain Marsh followed the prescribed company procedures in ordering the landing gear to be retracted, the wing flaps raised, and power reduced to METO. Considering the short time involved in the execution of these commands, it is considered highly probable that, when the power was being reduced to METO, the wing flaps were still either in the process of retracting or were just completing the retraction. During this period, in which the configuration of the aircraft was progressively changing to en route climb, it would be imperative that the pilot devote his full attention to his flight instruments in order to control the aircraft effectively.

Captain Marsh testified that he observed the flight engineer in the process of reducing to MKTO power. Without reference to the proper flight instruments at this time, Captain Marsh would be unable to take the proper control action. Captain March stated that his prime concern was the airspeed, rate of climb, and direction. Further testimony indicated that he used his ADF indicator as a primary directional instrument, took little advantage of the C-2A Gyrosyn compass or azimuth card of the course indicator, and made little reference, if any, to the artificial horizon or turn-and-bank indicator. He did not use the magnetic compass.

“Captain Marsh testified that he knew at the time that the C-2A Gyrosyn compass had been somewhat unreliable. This fact, and the knowledge that the course indicator was a repeater, should have alerted the captain to cheek the C-2A Gyrosyn compass against the magnetic compass at the engine run up position. Following takeoff he also disregarded the altimeter and substituted the rate of climb indicator. Referring to the altimeter only on every third or fifth scan of the panel. Attaching little importance to this instrument. From this testimony it is evident that Captain Marsh did not take advantage of his full instrumentation nor did he rely upon primary instruments….

“It is customary for the first officer to monitor the flight instruments during an instrument climb-out. According to his testimony, First Officer Dixwell monitored the engine instruments and the flight instruments until the command was given for METO power. He then devoted his attention to monitoring the flight engineer’s actions without further reference to the flight instruments. This action, according to his testimony, consumed quite a few seconds and lasted until his attention was attracted to the outside immediately prior to striking the ground. Had First Officer Dixwell had opportunity to devote his attention to the flight instruments during this critical period in the flight he would undoubtedly have detected the deviation from course….

“…the Board can only conclude that Captain Marsh either did not properly observe his flight instruments or failed to refer to the proper instruments in his control of the flight.

“In conclusion, the Board has conducted an intensive study of the evidence accumulated in this investigation in an effort to arrive at a reasonable solution of the facts. It has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the aircraft and its accessories were functioning normally throughout the short flight. This being so, we must conclude with reasonable certainty that the events leading up to this accident point to the actions of the captain, who was at the controls and in complete command, in that he did not demonstrate the skill and care required of an airline pilot in the performance of his duties. The captain’s contention that he thought everything was normal until the first officer sighted the ground and quickly advised him, further substantiates the Board’s opinion that the captain did not have control of the aircraft.

“Findings…. The aircraft, immediately following takeoff, made a left turn of approximately 119 degrees and a descent. The pilot and flight crew did not observe or interpret any instrument indication of a left turn or descent….

“The Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the captain to (1) properly observe and interpret his flight instruments and (2) maintain control of his aircraft….

“Captain Marsh had been in command of two Northeast Airlines Convairs involved in accidents at La Guardia Field. One, in 1952, was found by the Board to be the result of pilot error culminating in a water landing during final approach. The other, in 1953, was determined by the Board to have been caused by propeller malfunctioning during the landing, Neither resulted in fatalities.” (CAB. AIR. Northeast Airlines, DC-6A, N 34954, Rikers Island, NY, Feb 1, 1957.)

Planecrashinfo.com:
“Date” February 01, 1957
“Time: 1802
….
“Aboard: 101 (passengers: 95 crew: 6)
“Fatalities 21 (passengers: 21 crew: 0)
“Ground 0

“….Shortly after lifting off from La Guardia Airport in a snowstorm, the plane rolled sharply to the left and crashed on Rikers Island. The failure of the captain to properly observe and interpret his flight instruments and maintain control of his aircraft. Several inmates from the Rikers Island Prison made some heroic rescues and were later pardoned.”

Sources

Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). New York. Accessed 3-9-2009 at: http://www.baaa-acro.com/Pays/Etats-Unis/New%20York.htm

AirDisaster.Com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 02011957. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=02011957&reg=—&airline=Northeast+Airlines

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation. Accident Description. Northeast Airlines Flight 823,Douglas DC-6A, 01 Feb 1957. Accessed 2-22-2009 at:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19570201-0

Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. Northeast Airlines, Inc., DC-6A, N 34954, Rikers Island, NY, Feb 1, 1957. Washington, DC: CAB, March 10, 1958, 28 pages. Accessed 3-3-2023 at: https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/33569

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.

National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Aircraft Fires of 1957.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 51, No. 4, April 1958. Boston, MA.

Planecrashinfo.com. “1957…Accident Details…Northeast Air…NY, NY, Feb 1, 1957.” Accessed 3-3-2023 at: http://www.planecrashinfo.com/1957/1957-6.htm

Salisbury Times, MD. “Seven Air Crashes Kill at Least 43.” 2-2-1957. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/freepdfviewer.aspx?img=5471686

Wikipedia. “Northwest Airlines Flight 823.” Accessed 3-3-2023 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northeast_Airlines_Flight_823

Wikipedia. “Timeline of New York City Crimes and Disasters.” Accessed 3-3-2023 at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_New_York_City#Events,_crimes,_and_disasters